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ABSTRACT 
The Challenges to Democratization in the Global South:The Political Economy of Regime 
Change, Class Struggles, and Class Alliances in Egypt (1952-2016) and Brazil (1930-2016) 
 
Lara Khattab, Phd  
 
Concordia University, 2019 
 
 
This research adopts a cross-regional comparative historical and a political economy approach to 
democratization processes in the Global South. It explains why in Egypt (1952-2016) and Brazil 
(1930-2016) where calls for democratization and regime change were preceded by class struggles 
and an impressive wave of working-class activism, the Brazilian working class broke free from 
corporatism and built a broad and strong alliance with other struggling social classes while the 
Egyptian working class was not able to fulfill this objective. While Brazil transitioned to a 
democracy until 2016, Egypt experienced the rise of the military to power since 2013. These 
different outcomes are explained by embedding the questions of working class organizing and the 
absence or presence of broad inter-class alliances in the will of the authoritarian leaders to leave 
power or to entrench authoritarian rule, as well as the will of the military in particular to tolerate 
or repress opposition. The dissertation assesses this question of military tolerance of opposition or 
lack thereof, by looking at the institutional, foreign policy and economic interests of the military. 
The analysis puts the focus on the way such interests evolved under authoritarianism and the way 
the military was constituted and shaped by capitalism and hence by its relationship with the 
owners of capital and labor. The research contributes to the comparative democratization literature 
by pursuing a multi-disciplinary approach that combines theoretical insights from comparative 
politics, political economy, critical history and geography as well as the regional Latin American 
and Middle Eastern literature. It also expands the geographical scope of the academic conversation 
by examining the challenges of democratization in post-colonial societies and by incorporating 
cases from the Arab world that had been hitherto unexamined by the democratization and regime 
change literature. The research combines historical, archival research with qualitative research 
methods including interviewing and fieldwork. Fieldwork in the two countries extended over a 
period of 8 months between December 2015 and December 2016.  Throughout this period of time, 
I have conducted 43 interviews with activists in the anti-corporatist labor movement, and social 




As I write the first words of this dissertation, a wave of mass mobilization had already 
hit my home country. Lebanon, which has been known for being divided along sectarian 
lines, has finally united over the struggles for social justice and human dignity. The crisis in 
Lebanon is not a crisis of a sectarian regime alone; it is a crisis of a rentier and neoliberal 
economy that had been sustained by a sectarian regime. The class struggle talk of a 
dispossessed majority facing an oligarchy of sectarian leaders who control political and 
economic life is what echoes the most in the streets today. While Lebanon’s future is still 
unknown, this dissertation reflects on these themes in Brazil and Egypt that had equally 
experienced class struggles under authoritarian regimes. While my research emphasizes that 
context matters, the lessons drawn from this dissertation will help us to reflect on the 
challenges that Lebanese and other citizens around the globe are facing today as they struggle 
for human dignity and democracy.  
 The completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without the help, 
and support of a large number of people. First, I would like to thank my advisor and my 
committee members. Professor Jean-François Mayer, my advisor, constantly provided 
encouragement, guidance and all forms of support. Professor Mayer patiently read and 
commented on several drafts of this dissertation while challenging the way I thought about 
my dissertation and helping me improve it. Professor Ceren Belge and Professor Tina Hilgers 
helped me hone my critical perspectives and provided continuous support, guidance and 
encouragement. Professor Hilgers generously granted me a bursary to pursue my fieldwork in 
Brazil and Professor Mayer granted me Taships while in Brazil and Egypt. Concordia’s 
Graduate Student Mobility award and the Political Science Department at Concorida 
generously supported my fieldwork in the two countries. Our program assistants: Julie 
Blumer, Tanya Volpe, Pat MacFarlane, Joanne Downs and Kathryn Rawlings, have all 
greeted me with a big smile and positive vibes and were always there to provide support when 
needed. I would also like to specially thank Stephen Cabilio from Concordia Univerity’s 
Psychology department who helped me set up a safe space on the Concordia university server 
to store my data.  
The Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University gave me the great opportunity to 
teach at the Institute while finishing my dissertation. Professors Michelle Hartmann, Khalid 
Medani, Malik Abi Saab and Rula Abi Saab have been generously supportive and 
encouraging and shared beautiful conversations on the challenges in the Middle East, Africa 
and Lebanon. 
In Montréal, my path crossed amazing friends. Oula Hajjar, Mostafa Henaway, Asma 
Al Nasser, Munir Katul, Samah Mansour, Ali al Dirani, Yasmeen Daher, Layal Shuman, 
Hassan Abu Jergi, Souha Bawab, Raja Hamady and Dania el Khechen have all made me feel 
at home, shared their love and many beautiful memories, and conversations over so many 
meals and drinks. I am very grateful for your love, your support, and your presence whether 
in Montreal or Toronto. Isabelle Fortier and Caroline Charbonneau have been the amazing 
roommates that anyone can ask for and have received me in their beautiful place with open 
hearts and minds. Jessica Stilwell did magic while copyediting each chapter of this 
dissertation as well as the entire dissertation.  
In Egypt, I met people that made Egypt a memorable experience despite the 
difficulties of conducting fieldwork there. Nancy Yacoub, Mohammed Rizkallah, Mostafa 
Seyam, Nada Sabet, Enrico de Angelis, and Farah Sabra made the experience of living in 
Egypt one of the most enjoyable experiences. Dina Al Samak, Hoda Kamel, Ghoussoun 
Tawfik and the staff at the Egyptian Center for Social and Economic Rights in Cairo and 
Alexandria provided me with all the support while conducting my fieldwork. Hoda Kamel 
was an amazing mentor in Egypt during the most difficult times of doing research there. In 
	 v	
Brazil, Alexandre Loureiro, Alvaro Pereira, Rodrigo Rodrigues de Silva, Sheila Ribeiro, and 
Maggie Shum were amazing friends and roommates, welcoming me and sharing great 
moments. Professor Salvador Sandoval generously hosted me in the PUC-SP and Leonardo 
Ostronoff, Sirlei De Oliveira, Pedro Neto, Rodrigo Linhares, and Eliana Martins Pereira from 
DIEESE gave me invaluable support for my research connecting me to the world and 
providing access to their data and ressources. Special thanks to every single person who 
accepted to participate in this study, who gave their time during the interviews and as I 
conducted my fieldwork. Without their willingness to share their experiences, this work 
would not have been possible.  
In Beirut, I would like to thank Fida Moukaled and Layla El Mahmoud Murad for 
their love and for giving me access to the AUB library and its ressources. Farah el Zarkout, 
Omar Gamal, Ali Kain and Myriam Mehanna who received me back home when I had to 
leave Cairo with their love and support, and Rabih Barakat provided generous support while 
putting me in contact with Assafir newspapers’ archives. Bassel Salloukh was a constant 
source of support, encouragement and inspiration for this project.  
This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of my parents, 
Hania El Mahmoud Khattab and Walid Khattab. Their love, constant psychological and all 
forms of support and their faith in me helped me keep going during the most difficult times. 
This dissertation would definitely not have been completed without their love and the 
constant feeling of empowerement that they fueled me with. I am thankful to have feminist 
and activist parents whose struggles have inspired me to stay strong, and committed to the 
struggles I believe in. I am forever grateful for all that they gave and continue to give to this 
day. Rania Khattab, my sister and my brother-in-law, Aidemir Cheroukh, have always been 
present, cheerleading for me and encouraging me, and trying to solve all of my problems. 
They received me with open arms as I first landed in Montreal in 2011. Their kindness, their 
love, their support, and their presence around the city were all very precious. Yenal Cheroukh, 
my nephew, has been the biggest joy in my life. Since December 2012, he filled my life with 
joy, crafts, stories and hot chocolates on weekends.   
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In April 2017, a general strike paralyzed Brazil. I was in the middle of processing 
Brazil’s lingering dilemma after spending five months there from August 2016 to December 
2016 researching labor unions before and after Brazil’s transition to democracy. My stay in 
Brazil coincided with the controversial impeachment of Brazil’s democratically elected 
president, Dilma Rousseff of the Workers’ Party. At the time, I met Maurício.1 At 35, 
Maurício had worked for years in an Italian industry in Brazil’s leading industrial hub, ABC 
(Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, São Caetano do Sul). ABC was and still is hailed as 
the birthplace of a working class that rose boldly against one of Latin America's most brutal 
military dictatorships. Under this military dictatorship, which ruled from 1964 to 1985, Brazil 
witnessed an unprecedented wave of labor militancy that paralyzed the country and forced 
concessions from both the military regime and capital. It also culminated in the creation of a 
new labor federation, the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), and of the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (The Workers’ Party [PT]). 
At the time, CUT and the PT adopted a classist democratic approach that challenged the 
military regime's pact with capital, pushed forward an alternative economic model, and 
suggested a new alliance and active participation of Brazil's formal working class, residents of 
the urban peripheries, landless rural workers, leftist activists, and intellectuals, as well as 
members of the progressive Church. The PT, in particular, by emphasizing the intersection of 
class, race, gender, and sexuality, constituted an alternative and counter-hegemonic party to a 
military bourgeois alliance dominated by elite men of western descent. In this respect, it was 
not a traditional workers' party: it also presented itself as the ultimate proponent of those who 
were marginalized based on class, race, gender, and sexuality. In the post-transition phase 
(1985-2002), the PT played a seminal oppositional role under the mandate of successive 
neoliberal presidents, holding civilian leaders accountable and, along with CUT, resisting the 
deepening of neoliberal reforms. When the PT finally managed to access political power 
between 2003 and 2016, democracy deepened with the erection of participatory and 
inclusionary mechanisms and policies that incorporated those who had previously been 
excluded from decision-making and by socioeconomic redistribution. 
																																																								
1 The real names of the participants have been changed to protect their identities.  
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Maurício hailed specifically from the working-class generation that benefited from the 
PT’s redistributive policies and social programs. While his forefathers had worked to restore a 
sense of dignity to a working class that was bearing the brunt of dehumanization by capital 
and a complicit military regime, Maurício developed a sense of pride in his working-class 
identity and the upward social class mobility that he enjoyed under PT rule. However, such 
gains did not last as in August 2016, Rousseff was impeached. Her vice-president and 
successor, Michel Temer, had no qualms about attacking Brazil's poor, the working class, or 
citizens in general. As soon as he assumed power, Temer launched an attack on Brazil's labor 
code and enacted a series of constitutional reforms that froze public spending on health and 
education, deeply affecting lower- and middle-income earners. In fact, by 2017, the 
unemployment rate reached one of its highest levels in Brazil's history, at 14.5%.2 It is against 
this background that the current far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro, a former captain and 
supporter of the military regime, was elected in October 2018 (Chagas-Bastos 2019, 93). 
Bolsonaro promised to put Brazil back on a neoliberal track; attacked women, the LGBT 
community, and the Native population; promised pension reforms that would burden the 
working class by increasing the retirement age; and cut public spending (Gonzalez and Leme 
2019).  
Neoliberalism under the generals is haunting not only the Brazilian working class, but the 
Egyptian working class as well, in the wake of its 2013 transition to military neoliberalism. In 
Egypt, the working class struggled to resist neoliberalism for decades under Hosni Mubarak, a 
fight that continues to this day. The horizontal spread of strikes delegitimized Mubarak’s 
regime and during the 2011 revolution, a general strike paralyzed Egypt and brought about his 
quick removal by the military. However, Egypt after Mubarak underwent one of its most 
troubled periods, culminating in the re-emergence of a brutal military dictatorship. El-Sisi 
deepened military neoliberalism, reinvigorated military intelligence, and initiated a prolonged 
siege on the Egyptian working class and the forces that had participated in the 2011 uprising, 
pursued the implementation of neoliberal reforms as recommended by the IMF and WB and 
deepened the expansion of the military economy. Under El-Sisi, strikes were banned, and 
workers faced military tribunals for merely demanding the betterment of wages and basic 
workplace safety. The few spaces that existed to support workers in their struggles were shut 
down entirely in the wake of draconian measures such as the "civil society law" that tightened 
																																																								
2 See for example the World Bank data on Unemployment: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=BR (accessed 
July 18th, 2019) 
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security’s grip over civil society organizations.3 Workers lost many of the voices that had 
expressed solidarity with them. Activists, lawyers, and journalists languished behind bars. 
Academics and researchers who expressed an interest in the working class did not escape 
military brutality.  
Amid news of forced disappearances, torture, and killings, the struggles of Egypt's 
working class faced a media blackout. While in Egypt between December 2015 and February 
2016, I met Sami, who worked for the food industry in Alexandria, Egypt’s second-largest 
city. Sami is a working-class activist who refused to be co-opted by either capital or the state. 
Along with a group of fellow unionists and like-minded independent activists, he created 
Alexandria's Permanent Council, a regional council, pushing for the democratization of state 
and labor relations and the legalization of independent unions in post-2011 Egypt. Sami and I 
exchanged messages, and we also developed a strong friendship that made me aware of the 
struggles of the working class in Egypt. In April 2016, he was chased by the security 
apparatus and was laid off from his job for being unwilling to relinquish his activism. His 
house was raided, and his older son was arrested. Struggling with uncertainty and under tight 
security surveillance, Sami resolved to work for a lower salary in a precarious job. He fixed 
yacht engines in an environment where even asking for workplace security and basic labor 
standards was a luxury. Nevertheless, he also did not give up his right to be reinstated. As of 
January 2018, he battled with his employer, demanding his reinstatement. In March 2018, I 
received a message from him. Sami and his friends had resolved to work in the tourism 
industry. They operated a small company organizing trips around Egypt's Hurghada. He never 
told me whether the business went well, but he assured me that he would continue to pursue 
his struggle to be reinstated. Sami was lucky in comparison to his colleagues. Egypt's militant 
working class faced an aggressive regime strategy that substituted their labor power with the 
free labor power of military conscripts. Forced unemployment urged many skilled workers to 
turn to garbage collection, to cleaning the windows of Egypt’s coffee shops, or, in the best 
cases, to immigrating to neighboring countries.  
In September 2019, El-Sisi’s regime came under attack by his former allies and 
supporters from the business community. Allegations of military corruption and of an 
expansive military economy that had sidetracked private investors and imposed strict 
measures such as prohibiting capital to travel abroad were conjoined to the growing 
																																																								
3 See for example : Amnesty International  “Egypt: NGO Law Threatens to Annihilate Human Rights Groups,” Amnesty International 2017. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/05/egypt-ngo-law-threatens-to-annihilate-human-rights-groups/; “Egypt Must Repeal Its 




dissatisfaction and marginalization of the majority of the Egyptian population. As El- Sisi 
promoted a discourse that stressed the necessity to pursue austerity measures to bring back 
economic growth to Egypt, he presided over the impoverishment of many with the national 
poverty levels reaching one of their highest in years. El-Sisi’s military neoliberalism opened 
avenues for self-enrichment for himself and for senior military officers (Al Ahram 2019; 
Middle East monitor 2019). Consequently, Egyptians have reclaimed their right to protest and 
took to the streets once again in September 2019 demanding his departure and raising the 
same unmet revolutionary slogans of bread, freedom and social justice. While it is too soon to 
tell whether the general will be toppled by mass mobilization, it is clear that El-Sisi’s 
delegative authoritarianism – a form of authoritarianism that emerged in light of the popular 
mobilization that had called on El Sisi to end the Muslim Brotherhood rule - (Chapter 4) that 
had been supported by millions of Egyptians is starting to run its course.   
While pursuing this research project, my primary objective was to give voice to Mauricío 
and Sami, their colleagues in the formal and informal sectors, and the dispossessed and 
marginalized by authoritarian capitalism. They, I argue, are the lead protagonists of social and 
political change in Brazil and Egypt. In order to give voice to these and other members of 
subordinate classes, this research project uses a comparative historical and political economy 
approach. It investigates the capitalist transformations in post-populist Egypt and Brazil and 
the effects of such economic transformations on both the dispossessed and marginalized 
social classes and the owners of capital. 
Comparing Egypt and Brazil, and The Central Puzzle  
This project is inspired by the political economy, cross-regional, and comparative 
historical approach to democratization and regime change articulated by Rueschemeyer 
Stevens and Stevens (Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens 1992) (hereafter RSS). It borrows 
from the RSS (1992) approach their central focus on how capitalist development shapes 
prospects for democratization and regime change but it also updates the model by examining 
the challenges of democratization under neoliberalism. The project also expands the 
geographical scope of the scholarly conversation on democratization and regime change by 
testing the propositions of the comparative democratization literature in the case of the Arab 
world that had been untouched by such theories (See Chapter 1). As Bunce (2003) argued, 
such a cross-regional approach invites 
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"stepping outside our familiar terrain [which] often alerts us to new factors and new 
relationships—more generally, new thinking, to borrow from Gorbachev. As already 
suggested, this is not just a matter of reaping intellectual benefits from the 
liberalization of trade among scholarly cultures. This is also a function of the new 
issues that additional cases often introduce" (Bunce 2003, 167). 
 
Egypt and Brazil were chosen because they exhibit variation on the independent 
(economic model) and dependent variables (democratization success until 2016 in Brazil and 
militarization in Egypt since 2013). Furthermore, the two countries are the largest in the Arab 
world and Latin America respectively, and in the two countries, the military played an 
instrumental role in overseeing the country's modernization and industrialization. Compared 
to other Arab countries, Egypt is one of the few places where the predominant religion is 
Sunni Islam and where society is not segmented along sectarian or tribal lines (unlike Yemen, 
Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Algeria, and Morocco), which reduces the possibility of other 
causal variables.4 Given also the thrust of the line of argumentation in this dissertation, which 
is inspired by conceptions of democratization as a struggle for class power pitting capital and 
labor against each other, the Brazilian case stands out as ideal for comparison with Egypt. 
Brazil is home to the largest union affiliations and the largest Workers’ Party in Latin 
America. In Brazil too, workers have made their way to power with the PT ruling the country 
between 2003 and 2016. The PT’s rise to power also paves the way for a better understanding 
on whether democracy deepens and socio-economic redistribution improves as workers made 
their way to power and whether the balance of class power shifted in favor of the poor and the 
working class. Finally, while not all transitions from authoritarianism have been preceded by 
class mobilization, Egypt and Brazil share this common history of class struggles under 
authoritarianism (Egypt 1981-2011; Brazil 1964-1985) that de-legitimized their respective 
authoritarian regimes which also makes an interesting comparative case to understand the 
diverging outcomes. 
The project, therefore, offers a political economy approach to understanding why, in the 
context of two countries that witnessed an upsurge of working-class militancy that inspired 
other social classes to organize and mobilize, the working class in Brazil was able to build a 
broad alliance bringing about an end to military rule and democratization of authoritarianism, 
																																																								
4 Despite the cultural differences, this dissertation is a response to and a critique of culturalist interpretations of democratization or lack 
thereof. It challenges the culturalist and orientalist generalizations that have attributed the absence of democracy in the Arab world to Arab 
and Islamic culture (Lewis (1990)) or the absence of the "political cultures of opposition" (Slater 2009). Instead, the dissertation attributes 
the difference in the outcomes to the ways in which these countries have been integrated into the capitalist economy and how this integration 
affected prospects for social class organization and mobilization. 
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while in Egypt the leadership of the independent labor movement was not able to forge a 
broad alliance of social classes and the entrenchment of military rule took shape in post-
Mubarak Egypt.  
I argue that the weakness of inter-class alliance formation and the cooptation of the 
leadership of the labor movement in Egypt by the Egyptian military derailed the country’s 
prospects for democratization. In Egypt, the weakness of inter-class alliances has to be 
understood in light of both the nature of the transition away from Mubarak’s rule and the 
absence of shared spaces of activism that could have enabled the rise of such inter-class 
alliances. In Egypt, Mubarak was not willing to leave power; rather, he entrenched his 
authoritarianism, a condition that left very little time and space for the dispossessed and 
disenfranchised classes to politicize their struggles in party, social movement, and union 
formation. In Egypt, the transition from Mubarak’s rule to the transitional government under 
SCAF was quick, and spontaneous extending over less than a month, whereas in Brazil the 
transition from military to civilian rule extended for over a decade (1974-1985). In Egypt, 
although independent unions and independent federations emerged, they were non-
representative of the entirety of the working class. Furthermore, no parties that could 
represent the entirety of the struggling social classes under Mubarak’s authoritarianism 
emerged.  
Also in Egypt, the organized religious groups that could have played a mediating role 
between social classes did not assume this role because they had accommodated neoliberalism 
and authoritarianism. As for the cooptation of the independent labor movement in Egypt, it 
must be understood from the perspective of the military's successful strategies tailored to 
preserve its long-term foreign policy, institutional, and economic interests, and the military’s 
ability to exploit the divisions between the oppositional forces that had mobilized in the 2011 
revolution. Such military interests did not express a drift away from Mubarak’s policy lines 
but rather sought to deepen the role of the military in the economy and in politics so that the 
generals could reap the benefits of neoliberal capitalism in post-Mubarak Egypt. For the 
military, it was thus unimaginable that they would tolerate working class organizing that 
could yield to a substantive democracy that would in turn challenge their interests.  
In Brazil, in contrast, inter-class alliances were strong and an independent labor 
movement shielded itself from cooptation by the military and the elites. At the time in which 
the anti-corporatist labor movement, the new unionists, emerged in Brazil, the military was in 
power. The military was willing to enable a transition to civilian rule to protect its long-term 
institutional interests and to preempt calls for public retribution. This military decision was 
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governed by the fact that the military had lost legitimacy as it presided over one of the worst 
economic crises the country had ever seen. The military decision to pursue political 
liberalization followed by a slow transition to civilian rule gave time and space for the labor 
movement to politicize its demands and to build a broad alliance with the informal working 
class, the peasants, and the students' movement. This broad alliance also benefited from the 
catalyst role played by the progressive Church under the influence of Liberation Theology, 
which had drawn some members of the Church more closely to the subordinate classes and 
aided them in pursuing constant mobilization and organization amid heightened repression. 
The breadth and the strength of the alliance and a labor movement refusing to bow to the 
military and the elites would delegitimize the military regime and expand the parameters of 
democratic citizenship in post-military Brazil. 
In order to illustrate these arguments, this dissertation adopts a comparative historical 
approach (CHA) to trace the shifts in the capitalist transformations in Egypt (1952-2011) and 
Brazil (1930-1985), the way this development shapes both structural arrangements, and the 
prospects for the success and failure of regime change in the two countries. I adopt a 
comparative case study approach, combined with interviews with union leaders and social 
movement activists in the two countries to show that both  (a) experienced late 
industrialization under populism, (b) witnessed an upsurge in workers' activism as a result of 
changing economic policies and a deepening of authoritarianism, and (c) experienced as a 
result wider avenues for further mobilization among other disenfranchised and disenchanted 
social classes, i.e. the urban poor, the peasants, and a downwardly mobile middle class, by 
calling for a betterment of their living conditions and regime change. Both also witnessed (d) 
the emergence of anti-corporatist labor organizing that promised regime change. Despite these 
similarities, the two cases exhibit important variation on the independent variables (economic 
development), variation on the intervening variable (class mobilization, class organization and 
inter-class alliances) and the dependent variable (regime change). 
My dissertation makes three contributions to the field of comparative democratization. 
Firstly, it brings into conversation several disciplines that have addressed the emancipatory 
power of class struggles but have not yet engaged in conversation with each other. I adopt a 
multi-disciplinary approach to democratization processes, borrowing from the work of 
sociologists, historians, geographers, and political theorists to understand the dynamics of late 
capitalism in the Global South and the ways in which these dynamics ushered in the class 
struggles that have become linked to regime change. While the existing comparative historical 
approach rightfully points to the role of subordinate classes in regime change, it remains 
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anchored in a traditional contradiction between capital and labor that ensues from the large 
concentration of workers in big industries.  As a result, it does not take into consideration the 
emancipatory potential of class struggles and class alliances under neoliberalism. My research 
does not displace this critical contradiction between capital and labor. However, I argue that 
under neoliberalism the conflict between capital and labor needs to be complemented by an 
analysis of how the informal sector and other social classes have resisted both the stealing 
away of their rights and their dispossession, as David Harvey (2003; 2007; 2014) suggested. 
Consequently, I update the argument in the RSS (1992) account, which emphasizes that it is 
when the workers forge a strong alliance with the middle class that democracy comes about. 
In this dissertation, I argue that the alliance needs to be broad to include the struggling and 
dispossessed social classes under austerity including the urban poor, the peasants and the 
downwardly mobile middle class.  
While Harvey, a leading critical geographer, contributed to an understanding of the 
contradictions of neoliberal capitalism, his approach does not explain how those affected by 
such processes could organize and rise defiantly against neoliberalism. Sociologists (Wright 
2009) have similarly focused their attention on questions of domination and exploitation of 
labor power, but they have not linked this process of exploitation to the question of working-
class agency. My approach combines these seminal contributions to account for the 
contradictions of structural adjustment measures, the forms of resistance led by the 
subordinate classes under austerity measures, and how such subordinate classes coalesce to 
challenge the systems that thrive from their marginalization, exploitation, and dispossession. 
Based on this multi-disciplinary approach, this dissertation raises some questions that help us 
to better account for the relationship between capitalist development and democratization 
processes.  
Secondly, in pursuing a comparative approach to regime change in Brazil and Egypt, I 
show how the scholarship on the Latin American case of regime change helps explain the 
phenomenon emerging in the Arab world, which has experienced a challenge to decades of 
authoritarianism since December 2010. Thirdly, in pursuing this cross-regional perspective, 
my project extends the geographical scope of the democracy and democratization literature by 
contributing a comparative study of regime change in the Global South and shedding light on 
conditions leading to the success and failure of such transitions. 
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Definition of Concepts 
 A democratic regime, according to Robert Dahl (1971), is a regime responsive to 
ordinary citizens and incorporates mechanisms that pave the way for citizens’ political 
participation that can also hold those at the helm of political power accountable. Hence, 
democratic citizenship signifies the ability of citizens to articulate their preferences to their 
fellows and their governments (Dahl 1971, 1) and the government's responsiveness to 
citizens, who are considered as political equals. Democratic countries are therefore the ones 
that offer for their citizens “freedom of expression, association, the right to vote, eligibility for 
public office, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections and institutions for 
making government policies dependent on votes” (Ibid). As a political regime,5 a democracy 
with all its variants is also characterized by the "rule of law" and a set of institutions that 
mitigate and resolve conflicts with minimal coercion (Linz and Stepan 1996).  
Although Dahl elaborates on the mechanisms of accountability and equality, his 
approach does not address how control over economic resources sets limits for the practice of 
political citizenship which in turn shapes the responsiveness of the state to its citizens (Jonas 
and Stein 1990; Karl 2000; Rueschemeyer 2004). In this dissertation, classes – the social 
relations that people form among each other in a capitalist economy – play an important role 
in determining the power and the privileges of individuals in society at large and in the 
practice of democratic citizenship. For example, the dominant classes acquire social and 
political power through their command over economic resources. The elites also control the 
production of knowledge and culture and shape the views of subordinate classes. Economic 
inequality also affects the practice of political rights such as electoral campaigns, voting 
patterns, the ability to participate in governments, and the ability to lobby for specific policies 
(Rueschemeyer 2004). Hence and by placing class at the heart of democratic citizenship, one 
can better understand how the struggles for socio-economic equality and rights trump the 
struggles for a democratic and inclusive citizenship.   
Transitions are  “the interval between one political regime and another […] They are 
delimited on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian 
regime and on the other by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some 
form of an authoritarian rule or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative" (O'Donnell et al. 
1986, 6). Transitions from authoritarian rule are crucial moments as they yield to the 
																																																								
5 “Regime […] refers to the rules (formal or not) that govern the interactions of the major actors in the political system. The notion of regime 
involves institutionalization, i.e., the idea that such rules are widely understood and accepted, and that actors pattern their behavior 
accordingly" (Mainwaring 1989, 4).  
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negotiation of new political structures and social pacts between contending factions (Ibid; 
Karl 1990).  
In this dissertation, the transitions from authoritarianism6 and the democratic struggles 
that underlie them are “struggles for class power” between the dominant and the subordinate 
classes over the right to rule (RSS 1992, 5 and 47). Also in the RSS (1992) account, 
democracy will bear fruit only when the subordinate working class’ organizational capacity 
rises to a level where it can challenge the hegemonic economic and ideological structures of 
the dominant classes (Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1993, 74). I borrow from the RSS 
(1992) approach but I expand on their definition of “class power.” In the RSS (1992) 
approach, “class power” refers to the density and the organizational capacity of social classes 
(RSS 1992). In this dissertation, an assessment of class power does not stop at the 
organizational capacity and the density of social classes but it also takes into consideration 
how the subordinate classes are positioned in the economic and political spheres of the post-
authoritarian regimes. To this end, I pursue a political economy of the post-authoritarian 
phase to better understand the way power relations are negotiated and whether the subordinate 
classes have been empowered in the post-authoritarian phase.   
Research Questions, Sub-Questions, and the Structure of the Argument  
This research connects a macro-economic, macro-historical approach to political 
economy, regime types, and state-society relations with a meso-level analysis of contestations 
and resistance to authoritarian capitalism at the industry/community/workplace levels. My 
first objective is to determine the social classes that play a protagonist role in democratization 
processes, the reason(s) why they challenge authoritarianism, and the inter-class alliances 
needed for its dismantling. My second objective is to understand why the military 
overwhelmed the democratic and the revolutionary forces in Egypt only two years after the 
2011 revolution, while anti-democratic forces were brought to a halt for nearly three decades 
in Brazil. To answer the aforementioned puzzles, I proceed in three consecutive steps that 
make up the entirety of the argument in the dissertation.  
																																																								
6 I adopt Linz’s definition of an authoritarian system characterized by “limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without an elaborate and 
guiding ideology… without intensive nor extensive political mobilization except at some points in the development, and in which a leader or 
occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones” (Linz 2000, 159).  
 
	 11	
Step One: Political and Economic Transformations in Populist and Post-populist Brazil 
(1930-1964) and Egypt  (1952-2011) 
In the first step, I proceed by answering several sub-questions: What forms of regimes 
emerged to support capitalist transformations in Egypt and Brazil? What class alliances did 
populist and post-populist leaders pursue to implement their preferred economic models? 
What state functions were erected and what forms of state-society relations emerged? What 
were the effects of economic restructuring on the material and organizational power of capital 
and labor? 
Answering these questions necessitates analyzing the political and economic 
transformations that shaped populist and post-populist Egypt (1952-2011) and Brazil (1930-
1985) to analyze their effects on class structures, class organizing, and the political and 
economic conditions for contending social classes, namely the dominant/business community 
and the formal/informal working class.  
I adopt a historical structural approach focusing on a discussion of the economic models 
adopted, and the way they shaped political outcomes leading to the emergence of specific 
forms of authoritarianism that in turn were cemented by authoritarian pacts, bringing winners 
from these economic models into an alliance with the authoritarian rulers. Furthermore, I 
trace how state functions emerged and were upgraded to respond to the needs of the social 
classes that made up these pacts and how social engineering (namely state corporatism) was 
adopted by populist and post-populist rulers to undermine the potential of independent class 
organizing or to tame resistance from those who were left at a clear disadvantage by these 
economic models.  
In this dissertation, the political and economic interact together. The central independent 
variable remains the economy as it determines political outcomes and shapes society. The 
state is constituted by the capitalist economy (O’Donnell 1978; 1979; Hanieh 2013) but the 
state and the regime also use the realm of economic policymaking to entrench authoritarian 
rule and to guarantee regime survival (Cammett et al. 2015; Brynen et al. 2012). In the Arab 
world, the economic transformations were born from a combination of the contradictions of 
the previous economic phase as well as from the quest of authoritarian rulers to upgrade their 
authoritarian rule and maintain their hold on power (Ibid). 
 As I highlight the effects of economic and political transformations on the material and 
living conditions of the poor, the working class, and capital, I analyze how the authoritarian 
regime engineered its relationship with capital and labor to serve the specific form of 
authoritarian capitalism. This allows me to reflect on how such relationships were 
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transformed and became vulnerable for transformation ultimately paving the way for the de-
legitimization of the authoritarian regime. 
I attend to the relationship between the state and labor organizing under authoritarianism, 
by disaggregating the varieties of state corporatism that emerged in the two cases from a 
political and legal perspective. The disaggregation of corporatism allows me to better 
understand the transition from a populist corporatism to Bureaucratic Authoritarian (BA) 
corporatism under military rule in Brazil, which became vulnerable for transformation from 
within. It also allows me in the case of Egypt to account for the transition from populist to 
neoliberal corporatism, which was weakened by neoliberal restructuring but was more 
difficult to conquer given that corporatism in Egypt, unlike Brazil, was tied to the ruling 
party. This strategy immediately criminalized all other political identities and forced them to 
work outside the official union structure. Compared to their Brazilian counterpart, the anti-
corporatist unionists were left with very few resources and organizational capacity that would 
in turn set limits for their capacity to renegotiate state and labor relations in post-Mubarak 
Egypt.    
On the relationship between the regime and the business community, I argue that the 
disintegration (or lack) of a pact that brings together the business community and the 
authoritarian regime and the state, weakens authoritarianism, to the advantage of the 
dispossessed and disenfranchised social classes, democratization’s lead protagonists. There 
are, however, several plausible scenarios discussed below (see the table, Business and 
Military Autonomy). 
In a context where the business community is dependent on the authoritarian regime, with 
the authoritarian regime rewarding them with privileges and boosting their investment 
interests, businesses will continue to side with the authoritarian structure. However, the 
capacity of the dependent business community to sustain the authoritarian structure is also 
related to the question of the military's autonomy or lack thereof from the regime. In a context 
where both the business community and the military depend on the regime in place, the 
prospects for regime change are grim (e.g. Syria in 2011/2012). If, however, the military is 
autonomous from the regime but has developed economic interests of its own that are at odds 
with the state-dependent business community, the calls for regime change can end up with the 
militarization of politics. This case is, for example, the one we see in Egypt, where the 
military was neither tied by blood nor ethnicity to the Mubarak regime; it did not play a direct 
role in repressing public dissent under Mubarak, but it also took advantage of his coup-
proofing strategy to expand its control over local governance and its economic ventures. In 
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this context of a state-dependent business community and an autonomous military, the 
military enabled the removal of Mubarak, but it did not then retreat to the barracks, as it 
continued to have an eye on expanding its economic ventures, reaping the benefits of 
neoliberalism in post-Mubarak Egypt. 
On the other hand, if the local business community does not benefit from the 
authoritarian structure or they see that their interests are compromised under authoritarianism, 
they will no longer have an interest in maintaining the authoritarian regime. The business 
community can, in this case, distance itself from the authoritarian coalition, bringing about its 
disintegration and paving the way for delegitimizing authoritarianism. This outcome again, 
depends on the roles that the military assumed under authoritarianism and the interests that it 
has developed over years of authoritarian rule. If the military has been in power and has been 
charged with overseeing capitalist transformations, as is the case for 1964-1985 Brazil, the 
military will then enable a transition to civilian rule to protect its long term institutional 
interests (budgets, appointments, military industries) and to shield itself from public 
retribution in a context where it has been directly involved in repressing dissent. The 
following matrix summarizes these findings.  
 
Table1 : Business and Military Autonomy From The Regime  
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Step two: Delegitimizing Authoritarianism: The Social and Political Mobilization 
This step constitutes the heart of the analysis of the struggles under authoritarianism. It 
seeks to account for and identify the social classes that played the most important role in 
democratization processes. It therefore extends the analysis to explain the effects of such 
political and economic transformations on subordinate class mobilization and organization 
under authoritarianism. More specifically, the second step links class mobilization, class 
organization, and inter-class alliances to the pressure for democracy. I therefore answer the 
following questions: What forms of class struggles emerged, and who were their leading 
protagonists? What roles did the dispossessed and disenfranchised classes play in the 
struggles for democracy? Did alternative forms of class organizing and inter-class alliances 
emerge and if so, what forms did they take? 
I trace the class struggles resulting from two critical contradictions of capitalism: 
accumulation in the production process and accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2007). 
The struggles led by the formal working class at the workplace level are born from the 
process of exploitation and domination at the workplace and remain a central focus for the 
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study of class struggles that usher in demands for regime change. My analysis moves away 
from the traditional leftist/Marxist perspective. This perspective has remained focused on the 
processes of industrialization and urbanization and on prospects for emancipatory working-
class politics. In this view, the enlargement of the working class, as a result of deepening 
industrialization, allowed for their empowerment as workers, strengthened their capacity to 
organize and disrupt the economy, and forced losses on the dominant classes (RSS 1992; 
Mitchell 2013). Such processes are salient and especially crucial in the context where the 
modes of production continue to be premised on a large concentration of workers in big 
industries. This premise was prevalent in both military Brazil and populist Egypt, but it came 
under attack in neoliberal Egypt and Brazil. Such transformations invite us to rethink the 
democratizing potential of the working class but also to reflect on the breadth of the inter-
class alliances that are necessary to bring a challenge to neoliberal authoritarianism as 
neoliberalism engenders new forms of precariousness and increases unemployment, 
informality and temporary work. 
By illustrating the contradictions in the production process, I pay attention to three 
processes that are born from formal working-class mobilization and that contribute to the 
delegitimization of the regime. Firstly, working-class strikes can trigger mass mobilization 
across different geographical regions and across different work categories. Secondly, 
working-class mobilization democratizes labor relations at the industry/workplace level, 
which is a direct response to the tightening of state corporatism under authoritarianism. 
Experiences of direct democracy at the workplace act as a model for grassroots participatory 
democracy and can inspire a horizontal cross-class alliance. Thirdly, these horizontal ties and 
experiences of participatory democracy at the factory level politicize the discourse around 
social and economic rights and ultimately pave the way for the possibilities of renegotiating 
citizenship away from a simple focus on liberal freedoms to incorporate social and economic 
demands that remain at the heart of democracy as a struggle for class power (Arslanalp and 
Pearlman 2017; Riethof 2018).  
By combining the analysis of the contradictions in the production process with the 
struggles born under the process of  "accumulation by dispossession," the stealing away of 
previously-acquired rights and privileges (Harvey 2007), I embed working-class resistance 
that takes place as a result of workplace exploitation in struggles over daily life. As David 
Harvey argued, the working class is not only exploited in the production process, but the 
realization process as well. Workers are not only alienated from themselves at the workplace; 
they are dispossessed of their rights for a decent living (Harvey 2013). This observation by 
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Harvey opens avenues for other forms of class struggles that do not necessarily take place at 
the workplace, expanding it to the community level and across different social classes that 
have borne the brunt of accumulation by dispossession. It is also in line with Karl Polanyi's 
observation that social resistance in a market economy does not necessarily take place only at 
the factory level but also at the level of the community (Polanyi 2001).  
While the working class breaks fear barriers under authoritarianism and delegitimizes 
authoritarian rule, it is when the dispossessed formal working class inspires other classes, 
such as the urban poor, the peasants, and the disenfranchised middle class, into sustained 
forms of class organizing that prospects for inter-class alliances emerge. The struggles led by 
residents of urban peripheries are crucial to mounting a project counter-hegemonic to the 
regime in power. Demands for salubrious housing, land reclamation, access to state services, 
and lowering the costs of living widen the circle of contention and bring to the fore issues that 
can affect ordinary citizens struggling with the process of accumulation by dispossession. 
Confrontation with the security apparatus that criminalizes their informal economic activity 
opens avenues for challenging the regime's capacity to deprive all citizens of their civil and 
political rights. 
Furthermore, with the adoption of austerity measures, a state-dependent middle class 
experiences downward social class mobility that ensues from downsizing the state, cutting 
wages and social spending. As a result of the downward social mobility, civil servants rise 
against the stealing away of their privileges. Their struggles under authoritarianism hit a 
critical nerve of the regime, i.e., the state bureaucracy, and threaten to dismantle the regime 
from within. Finally, as structural adjustment measures take place only when repression 
deepens, the struggles for human rights and freedoms are viewed in tandem with the struggles 
for the betterment of living standards.  
So far, the discussion has focused on the process through which the disenfranchised and 
the disenchanted social classes under capitalism delegitimize authoritarian rule, break fear 
barriers, and engage in a horizontal practice of citizenship. The discussion is not complete 
without taking into consideration whether these social classes succeed in politicizing their 
demands in alternative forms of organizing (parties, unions, and social movements). From the 
perspective of democracy as a struggle between contending social classes, it is essential to 
consider whether the working class and their allies have been able to coalesce in alternative 
institutions and to insert themselves as bargaining partners after decades of marginalization 
and exclusion under authoritarianism. The success of this next step is not only governed by 
the organizational and mobilization capacity of the working class but also by the will and the 
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capacity of the authoritarian regime to leave political power and the military’s tolerance of the 
opposition. 
The two cases present important differences. The authoritarian rulers in the Arab world 
were not pursuing any measures to transition to civilian rule and democracy. As will be 
shown in Chapter two, the Arab rulers were bent on upgrading authoritarianism. Family rule 
and political succession became the order of the day as aging Arab presidents groomed their 
sons for power, thereby emulating the neighboring Arab monarchies. In Latin America, the 
military in government was wary about staying in power as their institutional interests became 
threatened both by the expansion of military security, which became imbricated in the 
violation of human rights, and by their delegitimization in the face of a severe economic 
crisis. These different contexts shaped the opportunities for alternative forms of organizing in 
the two regions. A liberalizing military regime in Brazil gave time for the social classes to 
hone their political skills and to start perceiving themselves as important bargaining political 
actors, a condition that was absent in the Arab world. 
Beyond the aforementioned condition for the politicization of subordinate classes and 
their demands, one has also to question how these inter-class alliances materialize. How do 
they result in strong, alternative forms of organizing that increase the chances for the 
dispossessed and disenfranchised classes to reinsert themselves as key bargaining partners for 
the dominant classes and the ruling elites? In this dissertation, I argue that there are essential 
factors that enable the transition from the horizontal spread of militancy at the society level to 
inter-class alliance formation and hence to the creation of formal organizing that reflects these 
alliances. Urbanization and improved communication can yield inter-class alliance formation 
and solidarities, as RSS (1992) argued, but this condition does not necessarily hold across 
different contexts. For example, Caldeira's (2000) anthropological work on Brazil's Sao Paulo 
shines a light on how sharing an urban space can lead to inter-class fear and seclusion rather 
than alliance formation. 
From this perspective, other structures are needed to mediate the process away from class 
seclusion and pave the way for collaboration and coordination across social classes. For such 
inter-class alliances to be forged, I argue that in the contexts of Latin America and the Arab 
world, where religious institutions were among the only institutions that had been relatively 
shielded from authoritarian repression, these religious institutions could therefore play the 
role of mediator and catalyst for inter-class alliances. This dual role is made possible both 
because of that shielding itself, and because it can translate to protecting formal and informal 
workers, as well as other social classes, from demobilization whenever repression intensifies. 
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The mosque/church can also provide social, human, and financial resources to sustain the 
mobilization. It can act as an arena where citizens struggling under authoritarianism can share 
a common space of activism and start to view their struggles as historically and politically 
connected. It can play an instrumental role in politicizing every day struggles, especially for 
the residents of the urban peripheries and the peasants, who in Marxian terms are the most 
difficult to organize, and in enabling a sustainable form of inter-class solidarity through 
church- or mosque-based organizations. 
The roles that the religious institutions can play as mediators should not be taken for 
granted; the theoretical chapter problematizes the roles that they could assume in the struggles 
for democracy. Such roles depend in the first place upon the relationship between the 
religious groups and the authoritarian structure and then on the relationship between the 
religious groups and capital and labor. I argue that in the context where religious organizing is 
autonomous from the state and capital, it can further the cause of the subordinate classes. 
Alternatively, in a context where religious organizing has accommodated and supported 
authoritarianism, whether formally or informally, and where it sides with capital, it could 
impede the empowerment of the subordinate classes, the potential for inter-class alliances, 
and the transition to a substantive democracy.  
By the end of this second step, there is a need for workers and their allies to tie their 
activism to a sustainable form of organizing that can impose them as bargaining partners in 
the post-authoritarian phase. Such independent unions and federations, along with social 
movements that represent formal and informal workers, the peasants, the residents of the 
urban peripheries, and their allies, are necessary to showcasing that the working class and 
their allies have overcome the vertical ties imposed by the authoritarian regime, and that they 
have forged new ties free from elite control and domination. At this stage, independent 
working-class organizing needs to be representative of the most important sectors of the 
economy. It also needs to be tied to the militancy and activism that happens at the grassroots 
level. 
Being tied to their base, and held accountable to them, reduces the propensity of new 
union leaders to be coopted by anti-democratic forces, i.e. capital and the former regime. 
Moreover, active labor organizing needs to forge strong alliances with other dispossessed and 
disenfranchised social classes. The broader the alliance and the more representative it is of the 
classes struggling under authoritarianism, the higher the chances for these classes to impose 
themselves on the dominant classes and the elites and to negotiate the post-authoritarian 
phase.  
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Divisions among unionists who break away from corporatism might ensue from their 
different ideological perspectives, but also from diverging strategies for addressing the 
challenges of post-Mubarak and post-military Brazil. Given the inevitability of such divisions, 
I argue that they need to be negotiated, and a clear positioning needs to occur before the 
negotiation of a new constitution takes place. Otherwise, they risk undermining the capacity 
of the working class to coalesce and launch a counter-hegemony to the regime and the 
dominant classes. This fragmentation weakens prospects for workers to tip the balance of 
class power in their favor. 
Step Three: The Roles of the Dispossessed and Disenfranchised Classes in Negotiating 
Democratic Citizenship and in Deepening Democracy 
What roles do the subordinate classes assume in the post-transition phase in each case? 
What role did anti-democratic forces play in shaping the post-transition process in each case? 
Why did these anti-democratic forces succeed in overwhelming the democratic and the 
revolutionary forces in Egypt but were brought to a halt for three decades in Brazil? 
While the previous phase stopped at socio-political mobilization and the rise of anti-
corporatist unions, new parties and social movements, this last phase examines whether these 
alternative forms of organizing played a role in negotiating democratic citizenship. The 
analysis sheds light on whether workers and their allies were able to build on their capacity to 
continue mobilizing and organizing in post-2011 Egypt and post-1985 Brazil. A central focus 
is on how workers and their allies and the organizations that represent them were able (or 
unable) to participate in the process of constitution-making, whether this participation led to 
the expansion of democratic citizenship, and whether working-class (formal and informal, 
rural and urban) mobilization held those who managed the post-authoritarian phase 
accountable.  
Based on my approach to class power mentioned earlier, I examine how “business as 
usual” was maintained in post-Mubarak Egypt, except for displacing Mubarak's cronies and 
replacing them first with the MB's pious businessmen (2012-2013) and later with the generals 
(2013-present). Counter-revolutionary forces, the military in particular, in post-Mubarak 
Egypt handled the transition and aborted promises for a substantive democracy that might 
have eventually led to the implementation of the revolutionary demands of bread, freedom, 
and social justice. The military played an instrumental role in orchestrating a counter-
revolution to deepen "military neoliberalism." From this perspective, the transition failed 
because the Egyptian military, faced with a militant working class and a radicalized street, 
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considered it necessary to pursue a counter-revolution in order to preempt the implementation 
of revolutionary demands that threatened the military's economic, foreign policy, and 
institutional interests. The 2013 military coup, therefore, became a necessary precondition for 
the signing of the IMF loan agreements that continue to burden the poor and the working 
class. Furthermore, what facilitated the rise of the military to power was the fact that it 
continued to receive wide popular support as it was not charged with repression and torture 
under Mubarak and that its expansive, thriving economic empire was totally shielded from the 
public. In public perception, the military was still viewed as Nasserite, siding with the poor 
and a nationalist actor.  
In Brazil, the military enabled the transition to civilian rule despite being in power for 
two decades. It is worth noting that the military in Brazil did not expand its economic 
ventures, the way the Egyptian military did. Unlike the Egyptian military which was not 
charged directly with repression under Mubarak, the Brazilian military oversaw the torture 
and the repression of activists as well as a series of economic policies that would end up 
worsening Brazil's budget deficit and economic crisis. As it lost legitimacy, the military 
became aware of the necessity of enabling the transition to civilian rule and of thereby 
protecting its institutional interests (Stepan 1988). However, the transition to civilian rule did 
not immediately lead to the constraining of the influence of military power over political, 
social, and economic life (Hagopian 1990). As will be shown in Chapter 7, the first five years 
of civilian rule were marked by military tutelage (1985-1989), and it was only when the 
political and economic elites became aware of the necessity of limiting the military’s 
influence over politics that the military was constrained (1990-2016).  
While this move did enable a transition to civilian rule and expand the parameters of civil 
and political rights, I also argue that an investigation of the political economy of post-military 
Brazil before and after PT rule allows for a better assessment of whether the balance of class 
power shifted in favor of the poor and the working class. Here, the Brazilian case is complex. 
It could be argued that the phase between 1990 and 2002, under presidents who served 
neoliberal interests, was marked by the rise of a liberal form of democracy that allowed for 
the restoration of civil and political rights, but the poor and the working class continued to be 
excluded economically. Arguably, the neoliberal period is marked by the rising star of the 
fraction of capital that benefited from neoliberal market reforms but that had also brought 
about the continued socio-economic exclusion of lower-income earners through market 
reforms. Given that this dissertation is inspired by the RSS (1992) articulation of democracy 
as a struggle for class power, it is interesting to test the proposition in the Brazilian case 
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where the Workers’ Party ruled the country between 2003 and 2016. A political economy of 
the PT in power paves the way for a better assessment of the effects of the rise of the workers 
to power on the subordinate and dominant classes. A political economy approach, therefore, 
captures whether dominant classes were challenged in their material and ideological 
hegemony under PT rule. As will be shown in Chapter 8, a deepening of democracy 
compared to the previous phase (1985-2002) takes shape with the erection of participatory 
mechanisms and the impressive socio-economic redistribution under the PT; however, the 
balance of class power did not shift radically in favor of lower-income earners. This outcome 
is owed to the structural constraints that the PT inherited from its predecessors and to the 
nature of the neo-developmental economic model under PT rule, which continued to appease 
capital and to benefit from its investments.    
Methodology  
The comparative historical approach (CHA) inspires this project. CHA remains focused 
on historical sequencing and how processes unfold over time, which gives way to an in-depth 
and contextualized comparison of similar or contrasting cases (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 
2003, 11–14). This approach is well suited for research that asks big questions that concern 
people's lives, such as about democratization and regime change (Ibid). The approach 
proposed by Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003) is anchored in three features that help 
further the analysis of this dissertation. First of all, causal explanations are carefully selected 
and tested rather than introduced ad hoc as incidental parts of an overall narrative. Secondly, 
emphasis is placed on how historical sequences and processes unfold over time, and are not 
fixed in time and place. Finally, CHA allows for contextualized comparisons between similar 
or contrasting cases. The CHA, therefore, makes possible dialogues between theory and 
evidence of an intensity that is rare in quantitative social research.  
The two cases are similar in the class struggles under authoritarianism, yet they differ on 
the outcome of interest: democratization in Brazil until 2016 and a remilitarization of politics 
in Egypt since 2013. The two countries initially adopted similar policies of import 
substitution and industrialization under populist regimes but pursued different economic 
policies in the post-populist phase. While Egypt pursued liberalization and then neoliberalism 
under the auspices of the authoritarian presidential regime, Brazil's generals implemented a 
BA regime that oversaw the financialization and the internationalization of the economy. This 
variance in the economic models and the nature of the regimes that emerged in post-populist 
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Brazil and Egypt led to variance in the pact that sustained authoritarianism and the prospects 
for its disintegration (See Step one).   
The two cases also exhibit variation in the class struggles under authoritarianism, the 
strength of counter-hegemonic labor and social movement organizing and the strength and the 
breadth of inter-class alliances. In Brazil, a horizontal spread of strikes across various sectors 
of the economy would inspire the landless peasants and the downwardly mobile state-
dependent middle class to mobilize. Furthermore, CUT was representative of important 
sectors of the economy, tied to the base and inspired the landless peasants to pursue their 
mobilization and combativeness. The Worker's Party reflected a broad inter-class alliance 
forged between the formal and informal working-class, the peasants and leftist activists. In 
Egypt, the horizontal spread of labor militancy would inspire the urban peripheries, the 
peasants and the downwardly mobile middle class to mobilize. Although mobilization spread 
horizontally across different sectors of the economy, the peasants did not form a movement of 
their own. Furthermore, the independent/anti-corporatist unions under Mubarak represented 
the civil servants; the informal factory committees were more representative of militancy at 
the workplace. As for the independent federation (ETIUF) born during the 2011 revolution, it 
became rife with divisions and failed to garner support across various sectors of the economy. 
Inter-class alliances did not materialize into a constant form of organizing. In Egypt, unlike 
Brazil, workers and their allies are not represented in alternative parties or coalitions of 
parties that clearly articulate democratic alternatives and represent them, as is the case for the 
PT. Also, in Egypt the strong religious groups did not play a catalyzing role in supporting and 
empowering organization and mobilization along class lines. 
Organizing The Fieldwork and Accessing the Field  
The dissertation is based on evidence collected during fieldwork in Brazil and Egypt 
between December 2015 and December 2016. Interviews with labor unionists, journalists, 
lawyers, researchers, and academics were conducted in the two countries. Besides 
interviewing, I collected primary resources such as data on strikes and income inequality, and 
reports on the political economy of each country. The principal challenge in the two 
transitioning countries, which respectively experienced remilitarization and a coup staged 
against a democratically-elected president, was in accessing the field. The overall preparation 
for the fieldwork and the fieldwork itself took place over 13 months. Challenges were present 
from the very beginning.   
Egypt was never a comfortable place to research in the first place. Even before the 
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2011 revolution, Egypt was known as a place with a very robust and intrusive system of 
informants. The Maba’th Amn al Dawla (The Internal Security Forces) played an 
instrumental role in spying on, intimidating, and forcing activists into disappearance. In post-
2013 Egypt, military intelligence, which had been eclipsed under Sadat and Mubarak, made a 
comeback. Two distinct and often competing security apparatuses were now responsible for 
disciplining society to preempt another revolution amid worsening economic conditions.   
Under such circumstances, how could a researcher studying the political economy of 
Egypt, a critical issue for the military (see Chapter 4), access the field? To answer this 
question, I researched books written by researchers who pursued fieldwork in conflict zones 
and other dangerous areas. Two edited volumes, Danger in the Field (Lee-Treweek and 
Linkogle 2000) and Surviving Field Research (Sriram 2009), guided me on how to organize 
my fieldwork. Scholars emphasized the importance of initiating and gaining trust, protecting 
the identities of my interviewees and myself. The process of preparing for my fieldwork in 
Egypt started in Montreal when a security analyst in Concordia's psychology department 
helped me to think about ways to protect my data. In Egypt, where informants are also 
predominantly present in public spaces (metro stations and public transportation), it becomes 
almost impossible to carry interview data or documents. I was able to create a safe space on 
the Concordia server reserved for staff and students. This safe virtual space helped me erase 
all traces of the interviews that I conducted and all evidence of my research, in order to shield 
myself from being interrogated by the security apparatus. This step proved to be a crucial one. 
As a further measure, I set up contact with researchers who had previously worked on similar 
questions of labor and the political economy of Egypt.   
 I resolved from these conversations that I needed to go “incognito.” In the context of 
Egypt, a researcher can never declare that they are conducting research that would trigger the 
anxiety of the neoliberal military. This type of research, as will be shown, naturally branched 
out to include an investigation into the role of the military in post-Mubarak Egypt, which was 
and still is a red line. I applied for a tourist visa. The process for issuing the visa took more 
than two months (September 2015 to mid-November 2015). Under normal circumstances, a 
tourist visa should have taken two weeks. The process of issuing the visa was further 
complicated by the fact that since I was a holder of a Lebanese passport, I also had to go 
through a security check, performed by Cairo's security apparatus.  Since 2013, the military 
regime had scaled up security checks for Arab citizens. The assumption was that foreigners, 
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particularly Arab and European citizens, had plotted the 2011 revolution. To add to this 
problem, it was the Egyptian consulate that gave me the visa. In other words, the visa was 
neither issued nor approved by the internal security forces. For good or for ill, my journey in 
Egypt started in December 2015 and lasted until mid-February 2016. While I had foreseen 
spending six months in Egypt, my fieldwork was cut too short by the kidnapping, torture, and 
tragic murder of a fellow researcher from Cambridge, Giulio Regini, by the security 
apparatus.  
Between December 2015 and February 2016, I proceeded by first creating for myself a social 
stamp and getting approval from the people that I wanted to meet and interview. Before 
landing in Cairo, I researched the centers that worked primarily on labor issues. Among them 
were the Revolutionary Socialists, the Egyptian Center for Social and Economic Rights 
(ECSER), and the Centre of Trade Unions and Workers’ Rights (CTUWS). Getting access to 
the field through these centers was the most secure way, given the uncertainty that surrounded 
the independent labor federation (ETIUF) that had sided with the 2013 military coup (see 
Chapter 4). It also entailed that I stayed alert and listened very carefully to the advice of 
people with whom I developed a relationship of trust. Acquaintances introduced me to the 
staff of the Egyptian Center of Social and Economic Rights (ECESR), a leading civil society 
organization founded by a labor lawyer working closely with the organized working class 
before and after the revolution.  
While Cairo was the primary site for my research, because it had witnessed a popular 
mobilization calling for regime change in 2011 and hosted research centers and organizations 
working on labor issues, I allowed myself to explore other equally essential cities. Both Suez 
and Alexandria thus became targets of my research. Suez unionists advised me against 
traveling to Suez, given the security concerns, so we met in Cairo. I managed to travel to 
Alexandria, which is the second largest city in Egypt and is also known for its militant 
working class. There, I made use of the ECESR's branch and networks to conduct my 
interviews.  In Egypt overall, I was able to organize 21 formal interviews (see Annex A). For 
unionists in Egypt, my questions revolved around specific themes of their struggles before 
and after 2011, the participation of specific unions before 2011 in strike action, the roles that 
they played in the January 25, 2011 revolution and the 2013 military coup, their 
representation in the process of constitution-making (2012, 2014), their relationship with 
consecutive regimes in power (SCAF, Morsi, and El-Sisi), and their relationships with other 
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actors (namely the revolutionary youth, the April 6 movement, and the Tamarrod movement) 
and with their allies within and outside the labor movement. 
Most of my interviewees accepted to have their interviews recorded; some preferred 
that I take handwritten notes. The semi-structured interviews were aimed in particular at 
engaging the formal working-class and middle-class activists who expressed solidarity with 
workers. My informal discussions with the middle-class youth who participated in the January 
25 uprising also proved to be crucial for a general understanding of how they participated in 
and perceived workers' struggles. These conversations happened almost on a daily basis. In 
most cases, I recorded my observations in a notebook instead of pursuing semi-structured 
interviews. The constrained context of post-2013 Egypt drove this decision. As I prepared 
myself to talk to some representatives of the April 6 movement - an essential actor in setting 
up the 2011 revolution - their leadership was subject to surveillance, and most of them were 
thrown in jail. As for the residents of the urban peripheries and the informal sector, it was 
almost impossible to pursue interviewing them during this period in Egypt. One is reminded 
that Regeni was killed because he pursued research on the workers in the informal sector. I, 
therefore, relied on secondary resources and material to fill the gap in their participation 
before and after 2011. 
My fieldwork in Egypt included conducting semi-structured interviews; having informal 
discussions; recording field observations; attending events organized by independent 
unionists; and collecting publications and locally produced reports on labor and social 
mobilization, the political economy of Egypt, the social and economic rights in Egypt, and the 
role of multinationals in Egypt. I was able to access some of the resources at the American 
University of Cairo. As I had to cut my fieldwork short in February 2016, I flew to Beirut. 
There, I accessed the classified archives of the Assafir Newspaper for articles on Egypt from 
some local, regional, and international newspapers. The newspaper articles allowed me to 
triangulate. I used newspaper evidence to verify the data provided by my interviewees as well 
as secondary resources. At the same time, newspaper articles allowed me to understand better 
how the state framed labor mobilization and criminalized it to legitimize repression of the 
working class. I accessed articles about the political economy of Egypt, as well as social and 
political mobilization between 1952 and 2016. At the American University of Beirut, the 
leading university in the Middle East, I spent time in the library, collecting books and 
resources in Arabic on social class formation and the political economy in Egypt.  To 
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document the strike action before and after 2011, I relied on both primary and secondary 
sources. Before 2011, some of the data was produced and made public by the Egyptian 
research center, the Land Center for Human Rights. As for post-2011, I relied on the reports 
issued by the ECESR and the CTUWS. 
In Brazil, I started organizing my fieldwork in May 2016. While conducting fieldwork 
research in Brazil was safer than in Egypt, there were a few issues to take into consideration, 
primarily as the first-timer in Brazil. As was the case for Egypt, bureaucratic procedures 
delayed my fieldwork there. Only in August 2016 was I able to get a student visa and to set 
up for starting my work there, beginning in mid-August and ending at the end of December 
2016.  When I landed in Brazil, the country was facing a political crisis. The democratically-
elected president, Dilma Rousseff of the PT, had already faced a coup that had led to the rise 
of her neoliberal vice-president, Michel Temer, to power. As a result, while Brazil had 
already transitioned to a democracy, it was facing a process of deconsolidation. Weekly 
demonstrations took place, calling on Rousseff’s successor to step down. As I took part in 
these demonstrations, I allowed myself to observe who were the main organizers and to see 
whether labor federations, namely CUT, played any role in defending democracy in Brazil. 
While people were enthusiastic at the beginning of the protests that brought thousands of 
people to the streets, these protests eventually became regular events happening on Sunday 
afternoons and slowly died out.  
While in Brazil, I started to learn the language and attended courses given by a professor 
at the University of PUC-SP (Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo) in political 
psychology. I initiated contact with DIEESE (Departamento Intersindical De Estatica e 
Estudos SocioEconomicos). That proved to be an essential resource to get in touch with both 
the old generation and the new generation of unionists in Brazil. There, a professor teaching 
sociology of work invited me to give a presentation to his classroom. His students consisted 
of a new generation of unionists originating in different sectors of the economy and drawing 
from a wide variety of union centers. I interviewed them, and my research started to snowball 
from there. With this new generation of unionists, I engaged in a discussion about the 
relationship between unionism and the state in democratic Brazil, the effects of the PT 
policies on the poor and the working class, and the challenges that they faced in organizing in 
contemporary Brazil. The unionists had put me in contact with the older generation of 
unionists who had participated in the 1970s strikes. To pursue these interviews, I had to travel 
from Sao Paulo to ABC, an industrial area in Greater Sao Paulo where the strikes of the 
workers in the metal and car industries ushered in a wave of strikes in a wide variety of 
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Brazil's productive sectors.  In ABC, I spent time meeting and interviewing people in the 
Metallurgic Union, a lead protagonist for labor action under military rule. 
The Metallurgic union is home to the Centro de Documentacao e Memoria Sindical da 
CUT,7 which has documented the conditions surrounding labor activism in Brazil under 
military rule. I accessed books and materials that have been written on this matter in 
Portuguese and interviewed the older generation of labor unionists there. Moreover, as was 
the case in Egypt, I worked closely with the person heading the Centro de Documentacao e 
Memoria Sindical, who helped me organize interviews and also accompanied me to places 
where militancy had taken place. Furthermore, I had the chance to access DIEESE library 
resources about the questions of new unionism and the political economy of Brazil. 
Primary and Secondary Sources 
To trace the shifts in economic models and their impact on social classes, I relied on both 
primary and secondary sources. Secondary literature - the “published works and articles” by 
historians and scholars on the two cases (Mahoney and Villegas 2009, 83) -  allowed me to 
understand the major shifts in the countries' economies before and after the transition process. 
Primary resources, which included in this case interviews but also country-specific policy 
papers, laws such as labor laws, investment laws, trade union laws, 8 were gathered to assess 
the economic models. Some of it is available online in the language of origin (Arabic and 
Portuguese). This data was accompanied by an analysis of quantitative data from the World 
Bank, the IMF, and the Economic Intelligence Unit, on debt, economic growth, inflation, the 
size of the productive sectors (manufacturing, services and agriculture) in the economy, which 
allowed me to trace changes over time on these key economic indicators to understand how 
they might trigger also changes in the economic models and to trace the effects of such 
changes on the number of workers in each sector, unemployment, informality, poverty rates 
and income inequality  (see the Annex). The data on the minimum wage in Egypt before the 
transition was difficult to access. I wrote to the ILO, which openly answered that they would 
only give me data approved by their partner countries. In that case, I had to rely on secondary 
sources for data on wages. Data on informality was retrieved and only available through 
CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics) whereas data on 
unemployment was retrieved from the WB.9 In the case of Brazil, the historical data on the 
																																																								
7 See CEDOC: http://cedoc.cut.org.br/cronologia-das-lutas and DIEESE: http://www.dieese.org.br/materialinstitucional/quemSomos.html 
8  For the World Bank Privatization Database: 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/type/dataset?sort_by=changed&f[0]=field_wbddh_country%3A98 
9 For Egypt, I relied on reports from CAPMAS the government's Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). I was 
able to access their reports via the McGill Library University and online. As for Brazil, I was able to access the data via DIEESE, IBGE 
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minimum wage is available on the IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada). In 
short, the collected data allowed me to trace changes from one economic model to another 
and to assess the impact of shifting economic policies on the poor and working-class, and on 
capital, which remains at the heart of this analysis. 
To determine the question of class interests in the two cases, I relied extensively on 
reports issued by local research and survey centers. To determine the size of the informal 
sector in the two cases, I relied on surveys published by the Egyptian Central Agency for 
Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) and Brazil’s official research agency, the 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA). For the question of unemployment in the 
two cases, the data was provided by the World Bank and local research institutions 
(CAPMAS and IPEA). To distinguish between the working class in the public and private 
sectors, I based my categorization on the local research centers (CAPMAS and the ECESR in 
the case of Egypt, DIEESE in the case of Brazil). For the question of the middle class, I 
distinguished between the state-dependent middle class and the independent middle class 
based on interviews with political economists in Egypt and on the secondary literature 
(Camett et al. 2015).   
For data on working-class mobilization before and after the transition process, I mixed 
primary and secondary sources. I focused on labor mobilization under Mubarak, as this period 
was marked by class struggles leading to the de-legitimization of the regime and calls for 
regime change. Information about the informal sector and peasant mobilization was retrieved 
from secondary sources. For data on working-class mobilization before and after the 
transition process, I mixed primary and secondary resources. I focused on labor mobilization 
under Mubarak, as this period was marked by class struggles leading to the de-legitimization 
of the regime and calls for regime change. Information about the informal sector and peasants 
was retrieved from secondary resources especially for Mubarak’s Egypt. Given the emergence 
of a military regime in Egypt it was impossible to gather interviews from workers in the 
informal sector and peasants in the post-2011 Egypt. One is reminded that Regeni was killed 
as he researched the informal/street vendors in Egypt, and in this regard researching the 
informal sector puts the researcher’s life at risk, an issue that had been confirmed to me by 
Egyptian scholars through informal conversation. I acknowledge the gap in this dissertation as 
it relates to covering the mobilization and organization of the informal sectors and the 
peasants especially in post-2011 Egypt. Primary sources on the mobilization of the informal 
																																																																																																																																																																													




sector and the urban peripheries do not exist. Most of the secondary sources also come from 
an anthropological perspective and hence invited long periods of research in Egypt. 
Quantitative data for the formal working class is scattered. First of all, information on 
working-class mobilization between 1981 and 1998 is only available in secondary sources.10 
For data from 1998 to 2010, I relied on primary sources. Data on labor mobilization exists for 
this period (1998-2010) on the Land Center for Human Rights’ website.11 This data was 
substantiated with the information given to me by a labor lawyer and researcher during my 
stay in Egypt (Interview with Labor Lawyer and Founder of ECESR). Qualitative data such as 
the nature of working-class demands and how they emerged during this period was gathered 
from interviews with labor unionists. For post-2011 Egypt, quantitative data on working-class 
mobilization was documented by the Egyptian Center for Social and Economic Rights, The 
Center for Trade Union and Workers' Services, and Democracy Barometer.12 Information on 
working-class political participation, and on their relationships with the independent unions' 
base, the post-2011 regimes, the corporatist federation, their relationship with other social 
classes was retrieved from the interviews (Annex). 
For the Brazilian case, I mixed primary and secondary sources as well. For data between 
1964 and 1983, I relied on secondary sources such as the work by Alexandre (2003) and 
Alvez (1985). Primary data on labor strikes in Brazil between 1983 and 2013 was made 
available to me via DIEESE (Annex). DIEESE breaks down the data on strikes by sector 
(private and public, hours stopped and the nature of the strikes (defensive or otherwise)). As 
for the qualitative data, I relied on one-on-one interviews with the labor unionists who had led 
the struggles under the military (see Annex). I also combined this source with two books of 
interviews compiled by DIEESE. The interviews covered the leading figures of the union 
movement and the social movements, the landless peasants movement and activists in the 
national housing movement in particular. Data on the informal sector and peasant 
mobilization under the miltiary rule was retrieved from secondary resources. For post-military 
Brazil, I had relied on interviewing to be able to reflect on working-class political 
participation and their relationships with the post-transition regimes and with other social 
actors. 
Valenzuela argues that the organizational strength of the working class can be assessed 
by looking at the "the density of union affiliation in the total labor force, the density of union 
																																																								
10 Such as the seminal work by Joel Beinin (2016) the most prominent labor historian of the Egyptian working-class. 
11 For the Land Center of Human Rights archives:  http://www.lchr-eg.org/archive/77/77-17.htm (Last accessed October 23, 2018) 
12 For the Egyptian Democracy Barometer: https://demometer.blogspot.com/; For the Egyptian Center for Social and Economic Rights: 
https://www.escr-net.org/member/egyptian-center-economic-and-social-rights-ecesr; For the 
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affiliation in key areas of economic activity, historical characteristics of union organizing and 
their autonomy (or lack thereof) from the state, the degree to which unions can organize 
pressures collectively to win their demands" (Valenzuela 1988, 5-6). In the case of Egypt, the 
exact number of the post-2011 independent unions created is not documented. I relied on 
some interviews, press releases from the independent federations,13 and secondary sources 
(Alexandre and Bassiouny 2014; Beinin 2016). For the Brazilian case, information about anti-
corporatist labor organizing is documented by CUT. CUT reports document the number of 
independent labor unions in different sectors of the economy. Assessing whether the working 
class remains tied to its base was made possible through interviews and field observations. 
For example, I traced whether the new leadership of the new unions and federations was 
responsive to the base demands and whether they voiced their concerns, or whether they 
expressed an entirely different set of interests that were not strictly in line with the working-
class demands. 
Finally, in order to assess whether subordinate inter-class alliances were formed between 
the formal working class, the residents of the urban peripheries, and the middle class, I relied 
extensively on interviews, field observations, and an assessment of the platforms that 
emerged during and after the transitions took place. On inter-class alliances, I relied on an 
analysis of interviews and CUT and PT documents and secondary resources. For the case of 
Egypt, since such inter-class alliances did not materialize in an institutionalized and sustained 
form as they did in Brazil, I also relied on interviews and field observations to determine their 
absence. 
Analyzing the interviews  
To manage the collected data and find linkages between the research questions and the 
interviews conducted, I engaged in a process of data extrapolation. After transcribing the 50 
interviews, I read the transcripts literally and then retrieved from each interview the 
information that answered the aforementioned research questions. After making sure that all 
the issues were addressed, I moved on to analyzing the data. The process entailed identifying 
the main ideas, tagging them, and then identifying concepts. This process of data analysis 
allowed me to label concepts related to working-class mobilization, their relationship with 
other disenfranchised and dispossessed classes, and their relationship with the state as well as 
with the owners of capital.  
																																																								
13 For the EDLC creation see http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/326830.aspx  
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Map of the dissertation  
With this introduction, the first chapter provides the theoretical framework. It surveys 
the literature on comparative democratization and argues for the adoption of a comparative 
historical structural and a political economy approach to the study of democratization 
processes in the Global South. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provide an in-depth analysis of the 
Egyptian case. Chapter 2 focuses on Egypt's capitalist transformation from Nasser to Mubarak 
(1952-2011). The chapter adopts a structural, historical approach so as to provide a better 
understanding of how capitalist transformations and regime strategies shaped the question of 
class power under different regimes. Chapter 2 lays the foundation for a better understanding 
of how calls for regime change in 2011 emerged from the contradictions of Mubarak's 
neoliberalism and the policies of accumulation by dispossession pursued under his rule. 
Social class mobilization is addressed in Chapter 3 which traces the varieties of subordinate 
class mobilization before and during the 2011 revolution to make the argument that the 
subordinate classes, namely the poor and the working class, delegitimized the regime in 
power by spreading their struggles horizontally. Chapter four extends the analysis beyond 
2011. It offers a political-economic approach to post-Mubarak Egypt to account for how a 
military committed to deepening military neoliberalism derailed the transition to civilian rule, 
as it challenged its long-term foreign policy and economic interests. A political economy of 
post-Mubarak Egypt also allows for the dispelling of some of the assumptions that the 
military in Egypt remained tied to the developmental model under Nasser and hence offered 
economic redistribution to the poor and lower-income earners. The chapter shows that the 
generals in post-Mubarak Egypt favored the continuation of neoliberal economics, placing the 
military at the helm of political and economic power and thereby impeding prospects for the 
political and economic empowerment of subordinate classes.    
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 attend to the Brazilian case. Chapter 5 provides a historical 
structural approach to the political economy of Brazil under populism and in the post-populist 
phase under military rule. While Brazil did not witness a radical shift in its economic model, 
military rule (1964-1985) was marked by a series of locally-administered structural 
adjustment measures that dispossessed the poor and the working class and privileged private 
local and international capital accumulation. This process, I argue, is what led to the series of 
class struggles that preceded the transition from military to civilian rule in 1985. This specific 
theme is addressed in Chapter 6, which illustrates how subordinate classes delegitimized the 
military regime. Chapter 7 assesses the impact of the post-transition phase on the poor and the 
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working class and the roles that the latter played in expanding the parameters of democratic 
citizenship. Chapter 7 shows that the poor and working class played an instrumental role in 
negotiating democratic citizenship, holding civilian leaders accountable, and challenging the 
historical tradition of laying the burden of the economic crisis on their shoulder. From the 
perspective of the balance of class power, it is important to note that post-military Brazil 
(1985-2003) was marked by an expansion of civil and political rights, especially after the 
election of the first civilian president, Collor, but the balance of class power did not shift in 
favor of the poor and lower-income earners. Chapter 8 delves into the process of deepening 
democracy under the PT (2003-2016) through the expansion of socio-economic and political 
inclusion as well as the erection of the architecture of participatory democracy under the PT. 
The chapter embeds the deepening of democracy in a political economy of PT rule to assess 
whether the deepening of democracy was accompanied by shifting the balance of class power 
in favor of the poor and the working-class and assesses the roles that the formal and informal 
working class played under the 13 years of PT rule.  
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Chapter One: Theoretical Perspectives on Comparative Democratization  
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter surveys the debates that have shaped the study of democratization and 
regime change. Five theoretical approaches - modernization theory, the transitology/actor-
centric models, the path-dependent model, and the comparative historical model - explain 
democratization processes and discuss the role of their main protagonists. Modernization 
theory links capitalist development to complex and socially mobilized societies in which an 
educated middle class applies pressure for democratic opening. In Egypt and Brazil, 
modernization resulted in populism, rather than democracy, and the middle class balked at 
political and economic changes that would have genuinely included the lower income and the 
working classes. The actor-centric approach roots the analysis in the schisms within the 
monolithic authoritarian structure between the hard-liners and soft-liners (O’Donnell et al. 
1986, 19). Applied to the two cases, this approach obfuscates the crisis of capitalism and the 
class struggles that ushered in the calls for democratization and regime change. The 
comparative historical approach provides a corrective by putting the emphasis on the 
contradictions of the capitalist economy under authoritarianism and on how it leads to regime 
change. This dissertation is inspired by the (RSS) (1992) approach, which emphasizes the 
protagonist role of the working class. However, the RSS (1992) model remains anchored in a 
reading of developmental/industrial capitalism. In order to account for the contradictions 
under neoliberal authoritarianism, I combine their approach with David Harvey’s rendition of 
Marxian economics (Harvey 2007; 2014; 2003) and his concept of accumulation by 
dispossession. I also borrow from those who have worked in the political economy of 
neoliberalism in the Arab world from a class-based perspective to account for how the 
transition to neoliberalism shaped social classes and the state (Hanieh 2013).  
This hybrid approach (1) allows for a better understanding of how struggles for democracy 
are embedded in the broader class struggles under capitalism and how these struggles are born 
from the twin processes of accumulation by exploitation and accumulation by dispossession 
(Harvey 2003; 2007); (2) allows for a better understanding of the disintegration of the 
authoritarian coalition overseeing the implementation of capitalism under authoritarianism; 
(3) allows for the specification of the classes that play a protagonist role in democratization 
processes and the forms of inter-class alliances that are needed to dismantle authoritarianism; 
and (4) explains how these struggles guide democratization processes (Rueschemeyer, Huber, 
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and Stephens 1992, 147).  In short, this dissertation situates itself in the context of a 
comparative, cross-regional, and class-based approach to democratization and regime change. 
The chapter is divided into four sections.  The literature review starts by mapping the 
perspectives that have thus far analyzed the Arab spring. The second section surveys the 
theoretical approaches that shaped the study of regime change. In the fourth section, I delve 
into the pillars of the theoretical framework that will be adopted in this dissertation and the 
relationship between them. The final section is the conclusion.  
1.2 Literature Review  
The following review maps the approaches to democratization and regime change to 
argue that the RSS approach accounts for multiple levels of complexity combining the 
material and the ideational. While it roots the analysis in materialist demands, it embeds these 
demands in ideological struggles against authoritarian regimes and dominant classes. While 
RSS stressed that democratization processes are local processes, they did not downplay the 
critical role played by international factors. Finally, while rooting the analysis in the crisis of 
capitalism, they also take into consideration the alliances that bind authoritarian regimes to 
local and international capital. Only by understanding the nature of such alliances can one 
understand whether class struggle led by subordinate groups challenged the ideological and 
material hegemony of a given authoritarian regime and the authoritarian pact that sustained a 
specific form of capitalist development, excluding the majority of the population. However, 
the RSS approach does not take into consideration class struggle and class organizing under a 
neoliberal accumulation regime. This dissertation combines Harvey’s rendition of Marxian 
economics with the RSS (1992) approach to do just that.  
1.2.1 Explaining the 2011 Arab Uprisings  
In this section, I survey the scholarly work that examined Arab authoritarianism and the 
challenges to it in the wake of the Arab Spring. The purpose of the survey is to reflect on the 
limitations of the pre-2011 literature and to lay the foundations of the political economic 
approaches adopted in the wake of the 2011 uprisings. It is worth noting that prior to 2011 the 
predominant trend in scholarly work was a research agenda that focused mostly on the 
institutional determinants of authoritarian resilience, particularly on regime strategies adopted 
to entrench authoritarian rule. Such approaches mostly treated the economic realm as 
subordinate to the political realm. In this view, economic policies served to cement 
authoritarian leaders and their close business allies for the sake of entrenching 
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authoritarianism rather than deepening capitalism. In this section, I argue for the adoption of a 
political economy approach inspired by Hanieh’s work. It is best suited for this dissertation 
both because it does not treat the economic realm as subordinate to the political and because it 
moves beyond a discussion of economic policies based on macroeconomic indicators to 
reflect on the effects of neoliberal reforms on capital and labor. I also argue for the necessity 
of combining his political economic approach with the class-based approaches that have 
examined the effects of neoliberal restructuring on social class mobilization. The following 
section starts by discussing the pre-2011 literature, particularly the way it failed to account for 
the 2011 uprisings, and then moves to discuss the post-2011 literature.    
For decades preceding the Arab Spring, the focus of the scholarly community has been on 
studying authoritarian stability rather than political change. This research agenda was dictated 
by the fact that Arab societies were resistant to the third wave of democratization, which had 
challenged military and authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Brynen 
et al 2012). As of the early and mid-1990s, the Arab world witnessed political liberalization 
that accompanied the process of economic liberalization and neoliberal restructuring. 
However, this political liberalization soon came under attack, in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, when authoritarian leaders’ longevity in office was threatened by the rising star of the 
oppositional Islamist movements and parties.  
The scholarly community searched for answers pertaining to authoritarian resilience. The 
richest research agenda prior to the 2011 uprisings placed the analytical focus on institutional 
explanations of authoritarian resilience. This scholarly community had shifted the focus away 
from trying to look for explanations of the democracy deficit to propose a research agenda 
rooted in unpacking the dynamics and the workings of Arab authoritarianism (Schlumberger 
2007). Some of this literature proposed an explanation of resilient authoritarianism rooted in 
the “robustness of its repressive and security apparatus” (Bellin 2004). Still others focused on 
the ways Arab leaders manipulated electoral politics to reproduce authoritarian rule and 
regime survival (Heydemann 2007; Salloukh 2006). A profusion of literature focused on civil 
society organizations, and in particular the NGO community, which became embedded in a 
web of bureaucratic controls that turned them into sites for social control that reproduced 
regime hegemony, rather than leading to citizens’ empowerment (Wiktorowicz 2000; 
Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004; Jamal 2007; Kingston 2013; Abdelrahman 2004). Aside 
from the NGOization of activism in the Arab world, a research agenda explained the 
phenomena of Islamic activism (Wiktorowicz et al 2003) from a social movements 
perspective to reconcile Islamic activism with any other form of collective action. Another 
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focus had been on the questions of whether the participation of religious parties in politics led 
to their (ideological) moderation and whether this moderation necessarily entailed that they 
could be supportive of a democratic agenda (El Ghobashy 2005; Clark 2012; Masoud 2013). 
Scholars have observed an ideological moderation (in relation especially to the islamization of 
state), which was attributed to political participation in electoral politics, but this scholarship 
also argued that this participation moved Islamists closer to the authoritarain structure, hence 
conferring legitimacy and support on these leaders (Clark 2012).  
The literature that preceded the Arab Spring, with the exception of some scholarly 
work (El-Mahdi and Marfleet 2009) therefore failed to predict the wave of mass mobilization 
(Gause 2011), and leading scholars have since engaged in an auto-critique of their focus on 
the ruling elites and their strategies to explain authoritarian resilience. In fact, and with the 
exception of a limited scholarship the pre-2011 literature focused on the elites and did not 
take into account the invisible struggles of ordinary citizens. Sociological and anthropological 
perspectives prior to the 2011 uprisings had in fact provided a corrective to the 
aforementioned comparative and Middle East politics literature.  Important contributions had 
examined how ordinary citizens of the Arab world struggled on a daily basis (Bayat 2013; 
Ismail 2006). However illuminating these findings were, they remained confined to the 
invisible everyday forms of resistance of ordinary citizens but they did not tie this resistance 
to questions of broader social and political mobilization. 
Furthermore, the preoccupation of the aforementioned literature with explaining 
authoritarian resilience subordinated the economic realm to the political realm. The 
authoritarian leaders continued to use the realm of economic policymaking to entrench their 
rule. The post-2011 institutionalism continued to argue that “it will be some time before a 
more complete understanding of how socioeconomic factors figured into the 2011 uprisings” 
(Brynen et al 2012, 214). For example, the proponents of this approach investigated how Arab 
autocrats managed selective economic reforms for their own benefit. In the wake of the 2011 
Arab uprisings, some have applied such propositions to the case of oil-rich countries, arguing 
that this region has been immune to the wave of mass mobilization because the Arab 
monarchs have redistributed petrodollars in the form of “foodstuff, salaries, and jobs to coopt 
and absorb the resistance from below” (Yom and Gause III 2012, 83). 
Cammett et al (2015) agree with Brynen et al (2012) that economic policies in post-
ISI did not lead to freer politics but “saw instead the old regimes consolidating their shaky 
rule by forging new alliances with elements of the old elite capital and the state bourgeoisie” 
(Cammett et al 2015; Kindle location 1324). However, Cammett et al propose a view of the 
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2011 Arab Spring from the lens of “the interaction of political factors and real perceived 
economic developments” (Ibid, Kindle Location 624). Their focus is on how “crony 
capitalism” antagonized the population “by leading to economic underperformance of the 
region” and by fueling “perceptions of rising inequality and in particular of inequality of 
opportunities” (Ibid). Their analysis leads them to the following conclusion: crony capitalism 
“signaled a narrowing of the authoritarian coalitions that were squeezing out the middle 
classes a key constitution of the post-independence Arab regimes” (Ibid). According to the 
authors, it is the middle class that bore the brunt of neoliberal policies and as a result of their 
marginalization from the authoritarian ruling coalition, and their substitution by the 
crony/state-dependent capitalists, became the lead protagonists of revolutionary change (Ibid, 
Kindle Location 650). As much as this dissertation acknowledges the fact that economic 
policies served to entrench authoritarian rule, I also examine the flipside of the argument: that 
Arab authoritarianism served the implementation of neoliberal capitalism (Hanieh 2011; 
Hanieh 2013). While doing so, one moves beyond the assumptions that underlie Cammett et 
al’s (2015) approach, namely, that the real problem was that of crony capitalism and a corrupt 
implementation of neoliberalism, to allow an understanding of neoliberalism as a class-power 
project that serves the interests of local, regional, and international capital and dispossesses 
the majority of the population. From this perspective too, the protagonists of social and 
political change are not the middle classes, as (Cammett et al. 2015) argued, but the poor and 
the working class. 
Adam Hanieh’s work provided a corrective to Cammett et al’s arguments and inspired 
my reading of neoliberal transformations. Hanieh rightfully points to the crisis in the Arab 
world as a crisis of neoliberal capitalism rather than a crisis of authoritarianism per se. In his 
approach, the authoritarian regimes that emerged served specifically the purpose of 
implementing neoliberal capitalism, which was also tied to an American imperial project in 
the Arab world. His focus on and his reading of nearly two decades of neoliberal reforms in 
the Arab world moves beyond the discussion of crony capitalism and corruption to focus 
instead on neoliberalism as a class-power project (Hanieh 2013, 14). Hence, while the point 
of departure for Cammett et al (2015) and Brynen et al (2012) is politics, Hanieh’s Marxian 
approach (2013; 2011) departs from “capitalism” and “class” (Hanieh 2013, 2). While 
agreeing with Hanieh (2013, 2011), this dissertation traces the economic transformations in 
Egypt from ISI to the adoption of neoliberalism in the early 1990s and their deepening since 
then to  
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“convey some of the principal aspects of the intertwined development of class and 
state in the Middle East tracing where and how various classes in the region (both 
capital and labor originated) what their accumulation is based around and how this has 
shifted overtime and the ways in which this class formation links to the nature and 
changing attributes of the state” (Hanieh 2013, 9). 
Despite the important insights that Hanieh brings to the study of the political economy of the 
Arab world, by his own admission he does not delve into the social class mobilization that 
challenged neoliberal authoritarianism.  
A class-based analysis emerged from some of the scholarly work focusing primarily 
on formal working-class participation. Some of this scholarship argued that workers were lead 
protagonists of the revolution and “a critical element from the start, with the interwoven 
pattern of strikes and political protests weakening the grip of the regime in the years before 
2011” (A. Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 11). Others do not deny that workers have been the 
largest instigators of mobilization under authoritarianism, but they argue against the idea that 
the 2011 uprisings could be attributed to working-class mobilization (Beinin 2016, 7). Still 
others root the origins of the 2011 revolution in the rise of the proletarian subject in Egypt’s 
largest textile industry, Al Mahllat al Kubrat, which was described as the “vanguard of the 
working-class initiating important strikes and articulating the interests of the whole Egyptian 
working-class” (Smet 2015, 233). What this literature shares in common is an emphasis on 
the industrial working class and civil servants’ mobilization and organization and sometimes 
on the connections between the formal working class and the middle class (political parties, 
NGOs, and Youth movements), but the discussion of urban subalterns and the peasants was 
totally absent.  
The most compelling cross-class analysis is the one presented by Maha Abdelrahman 
(2015) who accounts, from a social movement perspective, for the struggles of the working 
class, the peasants, the urban subalterns and the middle-class youth activists. Abdelrahman’s 
study proposed to move beyond the dichotomization based on the nature of the struggles and 
the mobilization structures (workplace and community organizing) to pursue an analysis 
based on the “process of dispossession that provoked a burning sense of injustice” 
(Abdelrahman 2015, 5). While taking into consideration horizontal and cross-class 
mobilization, Abdelrahman’s analysis of the presence/absence of coalition formation is one 
premised on cross-ideological alliances (the left with the Nasserites on the one hand and the 
Muslim Brotherhood on the other hand) rather than on inter-class alliances. It also seems from 
her perspective that the absence or the weakness of organization across different classes 
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impeded prospects for regime change. In relation to the working class, she argued that 
workers “have not coalesced together into a movement that could play a leadership role in 
Egypt’s revolutionary process” (Ibid, 87).  
While I borrow from her perspective the necessity of examining the totality of social 
class struggles under neoliberal authoritarianism, I propose some alternatives. Firstly, my 
focus is on inter-class alliances rather than cross-ideological alliances between the seculars 
and the Islamist factions of the opposition. By focusing on inter-class alliances, one can 
reimagine a democratic order brought about by the varieties of social classes that are left 
dispossessed and disenfranchised by neoliberalism. Whereas as focus on cross-ideological 
alliances puts the emphasis on the ideological cooperation among middle-class activists and 
intellectuals rather among than the totality of social classes that bore the brunt of 
dispossession under neoliberalism. Secondly, in relation to the working class my research 
shows that the real problem was that workers were not given a space to politicize their 
demands and to imagine a democratic alternative. Hence and while they might have not 
coalesced into a movement, the way Abdelrahman argued, this outcome has to be embedded 
in the context in which the alternative forms of labor organizing emerged and operated.  This 
outcome, I argue, came about because Mubarak was ready to entrench his rule rather than 
leave political power and because the military, the main orchestrator of post-Mubarak Egypt 
had no intention in enabling a transition to democracy, an issue that will be dealt in greater 
details in Chapters 2 and 4. Thirdly, the analysis of organized religion in Abdelrahman is one 
shaped by the relationship between the MB and the authoritarian structure on the one hand 
and the MB and the liberals and the leftists on the other hand. However, the author does not 
take into consideration the political economy of the MB, the deepening of neoliberalism 
under their rule and their relationship with the business tycoons. 
This theme is also absent in most of the literature that has examined Islamism in the 
post-2011 Arab Spring, with the exception of the work by Katerina Dalcoura (2016) and 
Angela Joya (2018 a). In fact, the post-2011 scholarly community engaged once again with 
the question of whether Islamists would capture the state and Islamize it. The 2011 uprisings 
renewed interest in the questions of whether the inclusion of Islamists in the political process 
leads to their moderation or whether their moderation necessarily entails that they would push 
for the democratization of the regime (Masoud 2013; Clark 2012). While the inclusion-
moderation and moderation-democratization hypotheses were testing grounds for scholars 
working on the Brotherhood, other authors examined the rise of new Islamist actors to the 
scene, such as the Salafis (Cavatorta and Merone 2017). For this scholarly community, the 
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puzzle was in explaining the rise of these new actors in contexts where their appeal had been 
marginal or in contexts where it had been confined to the social rather than the political realm. 
 Still others proposed other strategies to move beyond the question of inclusion-
moderation, and its focus on pragmatism, to consider the process of “dialectical conversation 
between praxis and ideological innovations” (Cavatorta and Merone 2015, 30). This 
scholarship focused on “post-Islamism” rather than Islamism per se (Bayat et al 2013). Post-
Islamism is seen as a paradigm shift from Islamism, which “is neither anti-Islamic nor un-
Islamic or secular. Rather, it represents an endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and 
freedom, Islam and liberty” (Bayat 2013, 9). In general, this scholarship, whether focusing on 
Islamist political participation or on post-Islamism, continued to be premised on whether 
Islamists have adopted and adapted to a liberal democratic ideal.   
Very few have shifted the focus of the discussion to show that Islamists have 
accommodated neoliberalism. The works of Dalcoura (2016) and Joya (2018 a) fill this gap, 
tracing specifically how Islamists were tied to neoliberalism and promoted their own version 
of “pious neoliberalism,” inspired by the Turkish model that promoted the interests of “pious 
businessmen” and their regional allies (Turkey and Qatar in particular). In this respect, the 
Islamists’ rise to power in the wake of the 2011 uprisings not only challenged liberal ideals 
and freedoms, they also derailed the revolutionary demands for bread, freedom, and social 
justice and pursued the continuation of neoliberalism that weighed heavily on the poor and 
the working class. This research favors this approach and proposes to reflect on the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s relationship with authoritarianism, its class biases, and its relationship with 
capital and labor to provide a better understanding of why the largest religious organization in 
Egypt accommodated neoliberalism over the years and hence impeded prospects for the 
democratization of the regime. 
In sum, it is worth noting that the scholarly work on the Arab world did not apply 
democratization theories to this region, largely due to the fact that the Arab region until 2011 
was characterized by enduring authoritarianism. Furthermore, in the wake of the 2011 Arab 
uprisings, some of the interesting scholarship has dismissed a reading of the 2011 Arab spring 
inspired by democratization literature. For example, Hanieh’s political economy approach 
assumed that democratization is premised on a liberal ideal associated with free-market 
economics, and suggested that protesters in the Arab world were challenging neoliberalism in 
the first place. However, a review of the comparative democratization literature and in 
particular the political economy and class-based approaches, suggests that some of these 
approaches can offer a high level of complexity, embedding the struggles for democratization 
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in the contradictions of capitalism, as Hanieh suggested. 
1.2.2 Democratization in Theoretical Perspectives 
In this section, I map the literature that had addressed democratization processes and 
which had been mainly inspired by the wave of democratization that engulfed Latin America. 
In this regard, this review will map this literature and explain why the RSS (1992) approach is 
best suited for the purpose of this research. The second part will shine light on the some of the 
literature that examined Brazil.  
1.2.2.1 Modernization theory and democratization processes  
The influx of newly-decolonized states emerging in the context of the Cold War 
presented American policymakers with a serious puzzle: how to make these countries richer, 
more democratic, and more firmly aligned with the Anglo-Saxon model? (O’Donnell 1979; 
Close 2009) The answers to these questions were rooted in modernization theory. 
Modernization theory informed the quest of American policymakers to extend American 
hegemony while countering the communist threat. The underlying assumptions were 
premised on a positivist approach to the study of political change; modernization projected a 
panacea for the ills of the developing countries. Rooted in the American and Western 
European experiences of capitalist development, it projected liberal democracy onto the rest 
of the world (Close 2009, 196–97). In this respect, one of the central assumptions for 
modernization theorists is that democracy emerges as the result of a rapid and sustained 
economic development (Przeworski and Limongi 1997).  
Some Social Requisites of Democracy by Seymour Lipset (1959) is the seminal work 
that inspired modernization theorists. Lipset set the stage for a discussion revolving around 
socio-economic development and democracy (Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens 1992, 13). 
He started by setting two goals for his research:  identifying the socio-economic determinants 
leading to the emergence of democratic regime, and their endurance.  Lipset’s work focused 
on the conditions leading to democratic stability (Lipset 1959, 71). Wealthy economies, 
Lipset argued, make possible higher levels of literacy, education, urbanization, and mass-
media exposure. These developments are associated with a moderate middle class, which 
leads to an increased belief in democratic ideals (Ibid, 78).  
Such arguments found an echo among modernization theorists (Huntington 2006; 
Cutright and Wiley 1969). The latter based their model on the assumption that modernization 
increases social and political consciousness, stimulates and unleashes social forces, and 
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expands the politicized strata of the population in traditional societies (Ibid). In turn, the 
process described above fosters the population’s ability to challenge traditional forms of 
governance and to push for democracy (Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens 1992, 16). 
Traditional political systems facing a crisis of legitimacy must contend with the imperative of 
accommodating the unmet socio-economic demands of the disenfranchised masses (Ibid). 
Hence, “modernizing nations were set in motion to reach a standard equilibrium. This is 
because the new divisions of labor and the structural differences demanded more complex 
political systems if the system as a whole was to reach equilibrium” (RSS 1992, 16). 
Representative democracies were deemed the best systems for dealing with a modernizing 
heterogeneous social order (Cutright 1963; Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens 1992). 
There are several limitations associated with modernization theory. Firstly, it exhibits 
a Western bias. Constructed from an idealized view of liberal democracy and capitalism, the 
model did not fit particularly well in developing countries (Close 2009, 197). In Latin 
America and the Middle East, this economic development was wedded to populist 
(authoritarian) regimes, which did not conform to the modernization narrative (Ibid; 
O’Donnell 1979; Prezworski and Limongi 1997). Furthermore, the resilience of the 
economically developed non-democratic regimes opened new avenues for research among 
critics of the modernization approach. Some authors argued, “authoritarian regimes are more 
likely to endure once they reach a certain threshold” (Prezworski and Limongi 1997, 159). 
Barrington Moore (1973) dealt an early blow to modernization theory’s universalistic 
assumptions. Moore argued that there is not a unified path to modernity, and that fascism and 
communism were also the outcomes of modernization.  
1.2.2.2 Actor-centric Transitology and Path-Dependent Approaches 
The elite, actor-centric approach, labeled the “transition” paradigm, is best captured in 
O’Donnell, and Schmitter’s (1986) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule and Prezworski’s 
Democracy and the Market (1991). The origins of this strategic approach are rooted in Dahl’s 
Polyarchy (1971) and Rustow’s Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model 
(1970). Rustow’s work, in particular, sets the stage for the transition paradigm. He delineates 
the foundations of the actor-centric approach to democratization premised on the centrality of 
elite bargaining (Haggard and Kaufman 1997, 277). Rustow challenges the idea that there 
must be some existing preconditions that lead to democratization, to argue instead for an 
interaction between the political, economic, and the social that leads to democracy. The model 
suggests a “sequence from national unity as background, through struggle, compromise and 
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habituation to democracy” (Rustow 1970, 362).  These arguments deeply affected the 
policymaking and scholarly communities. Refuting the idea of democratic “preconditions” 
restored some optimism and liberated policy and democratization scholars from the fear “that 
democracy might be impossible in some areas due to cultural and social sets” (Carothers 
2002, 8). The main drive was to make democracy “travel across borders” (Ibid).  Another 
central theme highlighted by Rustow is the idea that transitions come in phases. This phasing 
of the transitions tends to be primarily defined as the opening/liberalization of the 
authoritarian regime, the breakdown of the regime, democratization, and democratic 
consolidation (Rustow 1970, 7).  
Another important influence for transitologists was Robert Dahl, particularly his work 
on Polyarchy (1971). Transitologists (For example Przeworski 1991; O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986) adopted the Dahlian thick version of procedural democracy and a rational 
choice approach to democratization. Dahl emphasized democratic citizenship – the ability of 
citizens to articulate their preferences to their fellows and their governments (1971, 1) – and 
the government’s responsiveness to these citizens, who are considered political equals. 
Democratic countries are therefore those that offer for their citizens “freedom of expression, 
association, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, alternative sources of information, 
free and fair elections and institutions for making government policies dependent on votes” 
(Ibid). Transitologists also borrowed the Dahlian calculus to give shape to their approach to 
democratization processes. According to Dahl, a “successful transition” depends on the 
balance between the costs of suppression and the costs of tolerance (Ibid, 15). A peaceful 
transition to democracy, in the Dahlian account, can only be reached when the costs of 
suppression outweigh the costs of tolerance (Ibid).  
The actor-centric approach is inspired by the cost-benefit analysis underlying the 
Dahlian calculus (Prezworski 1991; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). One of the most 
influential pieces of work in this tradition is O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead’s 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (1986). Transitions are processes delimited on the one 
hand by the dissolution of “an authoritarian regime and on the other hand by the installation 
of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule or the emergence of 
a revolutionary alternative” (Ibid, 3). Underlying this approach is an emphasis on a central 
idea advanced by Dahl, namely that transitions from non-democratic regimes are uncertain 
(Ibid). This uncertainty challenges the determinism underlying the comparative historical 
approach and the modernization theory. Transitions can lead to “democracy or the restoration 
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of a more severe authoritarian rule, or it might even develop into widespread violent 
confrontations” (Ibid, 7). On the particular question of the actors driving transitions, the 
authors advance an elite-based model that emphasizes the role of domestic actors. This work 
is based on a four-player model that lays the foundations for strategic bargaining and 
negotiations among local actors. Transitions are therefore not led by popular uprisings; 
instead, schisms within the monolithic authoritarian structure between hard-liners and soft-
liners are its main triggers (Ibid, 19). The real players are the opposition and authoritarian 
elites, who shape the course of the regime breakdown, the transition, and the post-transition 
phase (Ibid, 37). 
The transition paradigm adopts the idea that democracy in transitioning countries should 
be brought about by undemocratic means. The political pact is a central mechanism that 
brings about this limited democracy. These pacts, the agreements between the opposition and 
the authoritarian regime, set the rules of the game by providing mutual guarantees for the 
interests of those entering into the new regimes (Ibid). On the one hand, the moderate 
opposition hopes for greater liberalization of the regime, which would eventually lead to 
democratization. On the other hand, soft-liners, the moderate authoritarian elites, engage in 
this bargaining to amass popular legitimacy by broadening their social base (Ibid, 38). In this 
understanding, “coup-proofing” transitions lies primarily in the hands of the moderates from 
both sides. Their mission is, therefore, to keep their radical counterparts in check. The second 
pillar that enables democracies is “founding elections” where “parties of the right-center and 
right are helped to do well while the left and left-center should not win by an overwhelming 
majority” (Ibid, 62). While the "right should be prepared to give some concessions regarding 
its materialist interests, the left should postpone its goal for a radical advanced democratic 
transformation" (Ibid, 63).  
Przeworski’s Democracy and the Market is a continuation of this approach. Democracy, 
Przeworski argues, “is an equilibrium, not a social contract” (Przeworski 1991, 23). For him, 
“a theory of democracy based on the assumption of self-interested strategic compliance is 
plausible and sufficient” (Ibid, 24). Like his predecessors, Przeworski emphasizes the 
liberalization of authoritarian regimes. This liberalization provides “the prologue to 
transitions from authoritarianism” (Ibid, 53). While echoing O’Donnell, and Schmitter (1986), 
his answer as to why transitions happen is rooted in the divisions among authoritarian rulers 
between “Liberalizers and Hardliners” (Ibid, 57). Przeworski’s game-theoretic approach 
informs his argument that the actors’ comparative strength shapes their strategic choices. In 
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turn, these strategic choices affect the course of the transition (Ibid, 65).  
The actor-centric approach shaped the understanding of regime change especially in 
relation to the divisions within the authoritarian structure, which is an important factor 
contributing to democratization. However, applied to the cases under scrutiny, transitology 
does not provide an adequate explanation of the success and failure of the transition in the 
cases under scrutiny. To illustrate my argument, I will be shedding some light on the Egyptian 
case. A “transitology” approach to the Egyptian case would be based on the following line of 
argumentation: elite divisions between the army and the Mubarak regime led the military to 
strategically further the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to divide the opposition 
irreparably. As the Brotherhood made concessions to the military and centralized power (in 
response to the military’s maneuvers), they lost credibility from their secular counterparts. 
Hence, the army coopted the secular actors and initiated a coup against the Brotherhood. 
From the transitology perspective, the transition to democracy failed in Egypt because the 
military, the hardliners in this case, manipulated the divisions between the Brotherhood (one 
faction of the opposition) and their secular rivals (another faction of the opposition). Applied 
to Egypt, the transitology approach can indeed provide a plausible explanation for the 2013 
coup, but it does not explain the drive behind the military’s decision. My approach shows that 
the military coup can be better explained by examining the class interests of the military and 
by embedding these class interests in the military’s quest to derail the democratization process 
to preempt the rise of a substantive form of democracy that could tip the balance of class 
power in favor of the poor and subordinate classes. I also argue that a better explanation of the 
Egyptian failed transition to democracy should take into consideration how the working class 
broke free from the corporatist control that had long been imposed on them, yet was unable to 
build the necessary class alliances to preempt the military coup. Furthermore, the transitology 
approach remains focused on the “will of strategic actors,” placing too much emphasis on the 
role of elite bargaining, which dismisses the role of the actors who have the highest stakes in 
bringing about democracy, the ordinary citizens, a theme better addressed by Bunce (2003), 
Karl (1991) and Valenzuela (1989). 
 In Rethinking Recent Democratization Lessons from the Postcommunist experience, 
Bunce (2003) expands the geography of conversation of transition literature beyond the Latin 
American and Southern European contexts to apply it to postcommunist regimes. While doing 
so, she problematizes the propositions of the elite-centric transitology approach, arguing that 
in the context of postcommunist regimes, the most successful transitions to democracy have 
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been the ones preceded by mass mobilization (Bunce 2003, 172, 188). For example, she 
argues that the disintegration of authoritarianism happened because of mass mobilization 
rather than because of the elites’ will to enable a transition. Furthermore, she argues, given 
that transitions are governed by the necessity to create alternatives, mass mobilization did just 
that by conferring legitimacy upon a large opposition and pushing authoritarian leaders to 
bargain with them (Bunce 2003, 172). While the political context in postcommunist is 
theoretically more conducive to uncertainty, the transitions Bunce studied showed otherwise. 
Mass mobilization had empowered the opposition and forced the communists to “give up 
their defense of the old order” (Ibid, 172, 188). Mass mobilization thus shaped the interests of 
the communists and “made them aware of the division of power between them and the 
opposition” (Ibid, 189). As pertaining to the role of the military, mostly associated with 
derailing democratization, the scenario did not present itself in the postcommunist regimes, 
given the long tradition of civilian control over the military (Ibid, 175).  
Bunce’s contribution provides fresh insight and fills the gap in the transitology 
approach by showing that transitions from authoritarian regimes are shaped by the local 
contexts. Bunce shows that elite decision-making does not take place in a vacuum but that it 
is sometimes shaped by the mass mobilization. However important her general insights are, 
Bunce does not specify who constitutes the masses, who mobilizes, how they mobilize, or 
why they come to play such an important role in democratization processes. That the masses 
should be factored in is given primacy over who the protagonists are in such processes, which 
latter is a central theme in this dissertation.  
 
1.2.2.3 The Path-Dependent Approach  
 
The path-dependent approach offers remedies to the shortcomings mentioned above. 
Scholars working with this approach argue that short-term processes cannot always explain 
political outcomes. One of the seminal pieces of work in this tradition is Terry Lynn Karl’s 
Dilemmas of Democratic Transitions (1991). Karl moves beyond the ahistorical objective 
premises advanced by the previous transition literature regarding the personal rules that 
govern decision-making in the course of transitions. In Karl’s model, actors behave based on 
their interests, which are constrained by the historical evolution of socio-economic structures 
and political institutions. She moves beyond the pure rational choice perspective toward 
adopting a historical approach that immerses decision-making processes in their structural and 
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institutional determinants. Karl combines Moore's structuralism with the transition literature 
to propose a path-dependent approach (Ibid, 3-5) that overcomes the “determinism of the 
former and the voluntarism of the latter” (Ibid, 8). One of the central contributions made by 
Karl is her adoption of a “process-oriented analysis based on structured-contingency” (Ibid, 
5). Central to this notion of contingency is the idea that decision-making is conditioned by 
subjective rather than objective rules (Ibid).  Karl, therefore, acknowledges the important role 
of actors during uncertain transitions from authoritarian rule in striking deals, marginalizing 
some factions, and imposing their socio-economic and political preferences on the process. 
From this perspective, decision-making is conditioned by structural and institutional 
constraints that are themselves a product of history and years of authoritarian rule. “These 
(constraints) can be decisive as they may restrict or enhance the options available” for major 
actors (Ibid, 6). Karl’s model also moves away from a pure focus on the role of compromise 
in modes of transition to argue instead that some transitions are the outcome of the use of 
“overt force” (Ibid, 8). Most importantly, she restores the masses to their position as 
important actors in transition processes. By integrating these factors, she proposes a typology 
of four types of transitions: “reform, revolution, imposition and pact” (Ibid). 
While accounting for the role of the masses, Karl echoes some of the findings 
originally articulated by Mainwaring (1989). The latter suggests that both the elite and the 
masses should be brought back into the study of transitions. Mainwaring suggests that instead 
of favoring one actor at the expense of the other, one should consider the various linkages 
between the two. Karl (1990) goes further in her analysis, as she warns against the excessive 
mass mobilization in transition processes. She writes, “no stable democracy has resulted from 
regime transitions in which mass actors have gained control even momentarily over 
traditional ruling classes” (Ibid, 8). While Karl’s path-dependent approach takes into 
consideration how structural arrangements shape calls for regime change, it is ultimately 
inspired by the “crisis of authoritarianism” rather than the crisis of capitalism under an 
authoritarian regime.  It is not explicit about how specifically capitalism dispossesses the 
average citizen, creating avenues for their mobilization under authoritarianism and setting the 
stage for democratization. Consequently, it is not specific about the social groups or classes 
that can play a protagonist role in democratization processes, which is a central concern for 
this dissertation. 
While Karl, like Bunce (2003), refers to the “masses” in her work, Valenzuela is more 
explicit about focusing on the important role that organized labor has played in transition 
processes. He argues that the working class’ organizational capacity and its ability to disrupt 
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the economy makes it stand out compared to other forms of mass organizing in transitioning 
times. Valenzuela (1989) warms that there is a need for moderation when it comes to labor 
organizing. He argues that a radical working class can derail the democratization process and 
suggests that it is important for labor to devise strategies during times of transition. This 
observation leads him to the following conclusion: “the ideal mix for democratization is high 
labor mobilization at certain critical moments and a breakdown of authoritarian institutions 
followed by restrains when the political agendas shifts in favor of democratization” 
(Valenzuela 1989, 450). Applied to the Brazilian case, the argument suggests that in Brazil 
the successful transition to democracy occurred because the working class moderated its 
strategies and forfeited its combativeness in post-military Brazil. However, a closer 
examination of the patterns of labor organizing in post-military Brazil paints a much more 
complex picture. First of all, workers and peasants did not forfeit combativeness immediately. 
Rather, workers organized the largest wave of strikes in the first few years under civilian rule, 
which proved to be necessary in post-military Brazil to curb the military’s continued 
influence over politics (Annex). Between 1985 and 1988, the character of the strikes suggests 
that workers continued to embrace combativeness. The number of strikes demanding the 
betterment of working conditions outnumbered the defensive strikes (Annex). In fact, it was 
only with the deepening of neoliberal reforms as of the mid 1990s that the character of the 
strikes changed and that their numbers diminished significantly. At this stage, the changing 
patterns of working-class mobilization could not solely be explained by the strategic choice of 
the working class; at play were also the structural effects of neoliberalism that altered working 
class mobilization towards greater moderation. It is only as of the mid 1990s and later on 
when the PT rises to power in 2003, that one could speak of a working class strategically 
moderating its discourse and its attitudes. In sum, as important as Valenzuela’s insights are, 
the cases suggest that there needs to be more precision as to the specific moment when 
workers should strategically shift their attitudes toward greater moderation.    
1.2.2.4 Political Economic and Class Based Perspectives on Democratization  
Combining Political Economy and Actor-Centrism  
 Haggard and Kaufman (1997) argued that economic factors play an important role in 
transitions. Building on the strategic approach, they attend to the failure of transitology to 
account for the generation of preferences (Haggard and Kaufman 1997, 265). They suggest a 
political-economic approach that looks in particular at how economic conditions shape 
“preference generation, strategies and resources of key actors” (Ibid, 266). This approach 
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leads them to distinguish between transitions that happen during economic crises and those 
that happen when economic performance is strong (Ibid). The central factor identified as 
leading to democratization in transitology - the divisions within the authoritarian structure - 
can be observed in countries that witnessed an economic crisis. However, while their 
argument might hold its grounds for 1985 Brazil, it is challenged by the Egyptian case. At the 
moment when Mubarak was removed in February 2011, the Egyptian economy was not 
experiencing an economic “crisis” (Annex). Rather, the structural effects of neoliberalism 
weighed heavily on the poor and the working class, leading to their mobilization and the de-
legitimization of the Mubarak regime. Hence, although the authors “place the strategic 
interaction in its wider socio-economic context” (Ibid, 277), their analysis does not capture 
how structural arrangements shape regime change, a central theme in this project. 
Boix’s Democracy and Redistribution (Boix 2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson’s 
(AR hereafter) Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2006) combined a political 
economy approach with a game-theoretic strategic approach to explain democratic transitions 
(and in AR’s account the conditions that lead to democratic consolidation). The two works are 
similar in the sense that they draw their main inspiration from the Dahlian calculus pertaining 
to the costs of tolerance under authoritarian rule that eventually leads to democracy, and the 
costs of repression that could derail the democratization process. They combine this calculus 
with a game-theoretic approach that “models the attitudes of various individuals and groups 
toward different policies” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 15). At the heart of Boix’s and 
AR’s accounts are the conflicts over economic redistribution that precede and drive 
democratization processes. Such conflicts emerge between the wealthy and the poor in Boix 
and the elites and the citizens in AR. Boix argues that democracy takes shape under two 
conditions: low levels of inequality and high levels of capital mobility. The combination of 
the two factors leads to a situation wherein the owners of capital would tolerate 
democratization. This outcome is to be explained by the fact that in this context there is no 
pressure for economic redistribution and that capital does not fear expropriation or higher 
taxation. In other words, the costs of tolerance are highest in economies that are marked by 
low levels of income inequality. If income inequality is high and capital is immobile (e.g. 
landed capital), the outcome is authoritarian resilience. The tensions between the owners of 
capital and the poor are exacerbated given that the latter’s demands for economic 
redistribution, and hence higher taxation on immobile capital, triggers capital’s anxiety, which 
in turn expresses itself as resistance to higher levels of taxation. The costs of tolerance are 
thus made higher than the costs of repression, leading to authoritarian survival (Ibid, 3).  
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However compelling the arguments presented by Boix on the economic determinants 
of the costs of tolerance and repression, the argument is challenged by empirical facts. In the 
last years of military Brazil, capital was forced to remain immobile. This condition was 
governed by the Mexican debt crisis that reached Brazil and exacerbated the conditions for 
capital investments abroad. This was also conjoined to high levels of inequality that had 
placed pressure on the state to redistribute income more fairly to lower-income earners. One 
would then expect that under such conditions local capital would favor the entrenchment of 
military rule rather than support the transition to civilian rule. The converse happened; the 
bourgeoisie stood with the transition to civilian rule, where it saw its best interests being met. 
It is therefore not enough to assess capital’s stances on democratization, or lack thereof, based 
on the pressures for economic redistribution and capital mobility/immobility.  
Unlike Boix, AR argue that in the context of non-democratic regimes with low income 
inequality, the likelihood of a democratic transition is grim because citizens are already 
benefiting from the regime in place (AR 2006, 37). Some level of inequality is necessary for 
citizens to overcome the collective action problem and to become aware of their temporary 
and often short-lived de facto power, which would in turn trigger mass mobilization by 
citizens bringing forward challenges to authoritarian rule (Ibid, 25, 27). The elites with de 
jure power would tolerate a transition to democracy, feeling threatened by the revolutionary 
zeal and by threats that “the wealth of a society could be destroyed” (Ibid, 26).  The elites’ 
main concern is therefore to tolerate the transition to democracy in order to preempt a 
revolutionary alternative  (Ibid). They conclude that the likelihood of democracy is highest in 
the context of middle levels of inequality where citizens are not totally satisfied and the elites 
“are not so averse to democracy that they resort to repression to prevent it” (Ibid, 37). To this 
observation they add another contribution to the Boix proposition about capital mobility or 
lack thereof, arguing that “democratization is more likely in a more industrialized society 
where the elite own significant physical and human capital than a more agricultural society 
where the elites are mainly invested in land” (Ibid, 32). The arguments presented by AR are 
compelling indeed; however, they also lack historical specificity and are based on the 
inequality indicator under authoritarian regimes, which is often manipulated by authoritarian 
governments to conceal dispossession under their rule.  Furthermore, the authors do not 
present a convincing argument as to why the elites would tolerate democracy in the first 
place.  
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The Class-Based Comparative Historical Approach (CHA) 
This research adopts and updates the CHA outlined by Rueschemeyer, Huber, and 
Stephens (RSS) (1992). The following section discusses the main influences on the RSS 
(1992) approach, Moore’s work on the Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship (1966), 
as well as the basic tenets of the RSS (1992) approach. The section suggests that the RSS 
model needs to be updated by taking into consideration class struggles under neoliberal 
capitalism, which were not addressed by the authors.  
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (RSS) (1992), and Moore (1973), adopted a 
Marxist approach to classes and class struggles. Their works thus provide a historical and 
contextual analysis of their cases, and reflect on the impact of the countries' respective 
political economies in terms of social structures. The emphasis on class conflicts as an engine 
of social and political change suggests an affinity with Marxist historical materialism 
(Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens 1992, 47); it also illustrates the class struggles that 
inspire regime change. Despite agreeing with the Marxist tradition, they move away from 
Marx in a meaningful way, especially in their conceptualization of the state. Their discussion 
of the state is thus one inspired by a Weberian approach. A central theme emerges from this 
scholarship: the shifting relationship between authoritarian elites and existing social classes. 
In other words, structural arrangements shape the nature of the regime type that emerges. 
Moore’s Social Origins disputed the idea that there was a single outcome to 
modernization to show instead that different paths lead to different outcomes and that 
“industrialism was the main cause of twentieth-century totalitarian regimes” (Moore 1973, 
iix). His central objective was to explain the multitude of “political roles played by the landed 
upper classes and the peasants in the transformation from agrarian societies […] to modern 
ones” (Ibid). In particular, he ventures into a comparative historical approach to examine 
closely the historical context under which the upper classes and the peasantry shaped the 
transition to parliamentary democracy, fascism, or communism (Ibid). To answer his puzzle, 
Moore advanced a class-based perspective, but moved away from the Marxist tradition in 
important ways. Firstly, in Moore’s account it is the bourgeoisie rather than the working class 
that plays the protagonist role in social and political struggles, including the struggle for 
political democracy. Moore emphasized the role of the bourgeoisie in mounting significant 
challenges to feudalism and to the monarchies to replace them with democratic rule, putting 
the bourgeoisie at the peak of socio-economic and political power. His work became 
associated with the famous slogan “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” (Ibid, 418).  
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Secondly, Moore distinguished himself from Marxism by focusing on the historical 
circumstances that underlie the class conflict and class power that shaped different paths to 
modernization (Ibid, 423). He examined how the bourgeois impulse at the moment of the 
revolution (strong, weak, or medium), the modes of commercial agriculture (labor repressive 
or market oriented), and the peasant revolutionary potential (high or low) shaped prospects for 
democracy, fascism, and communism. According to Moore, for democracy to take root, the 
bourgeoisie and the landed elites should be independent from the crown, the transition to 
commercial agriculture should be complete, and prospects for peasant mobilization or 
revolution should be dealt with (Ibid, 40, 419). Such conditions lead to a transition to 
democracy because they could yield to an enabling environment for inter-class alliance 
formation between the bourgeoisie and the landed upper classes against the monarchy (Ibid, 
423-425). With the commercialization of agriculture, the landed upper classes become less 
vested in supporting the monarchy and develop interests that are congruent with those of the 
bourgeoisie (Ibid, 425). Consequently, since the bourgeoisie is perceived as the protagonist 
and the dominant actor in struggles for democracy, Moore suggested that whenever the 
bourgeoisie and the landed upper classes remained autonomous from the monarchy and 
controlled the political and economic powers, a capitalist bourgeois democracy emerged 
(Ibid, 40). This limited bourgeois democracy would help the bourgeoisie to further their own 
socio-economic interests. Moreover, the ways in which the landed upper classes and the 
peasantry positioned themselves from the commercialization of agriculture was decisive in 
determining political outcomes. Moore suggested that if any other class dominates, the 
outcome would be different: either fascism, if the landed upper classes dominate, or 
communism, if the peasantry dominates. 
Moore’s seminal work is not without its limitations. His conceptualization of 
democracy and conclusions about the role of specific classes, such as the landed upper classes 
and the bourgeoisie, did not generate much support among proponents of the class-based 
approach to democratization and regime change. RSS (1992) challenged the Moorean claim 
of “no bourgeoisie no democracy.” RSS (1992) agree that the bourgeoisie challenged 
feudalism and absolutism. However, they hold that the bourgeoisie is perceived as one of the 
classes that undermine democratization. In Egypt, for example, a state-dependent business 
community was invested in supporting Mubarak’s authoritarianism rather than in economic 
and political liberalization. In fact, the state-dependent business class became tied to the 
Mubarak regime, both ideologically and economically, and contributed to entrenching his 
rule. Furthermore, the business community played an instrumental role in supporting the 2013 
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mass mobilization that supported the military coup against the democratically elected 
president from the Muslim Brotherhood. In a similar vein, in Brazil the business community 
withdrew from the pact that sustained military rule for two decades, but they also sought to 
pursue repressing and oppressing the poor and the working class in post-military Brazil.  
The RSS (1992) model provides a corrective, arguing that it is the formal working 
class that has played the most important protagonist role in the struggles for democracy. RSS 
advance a “relative class power model” (1992, 59) to problematize the relationship between 
capitalist development and democracy. Democracy, they argue, is “a struggle for class power” 
(Ibid, 5, 47) between the subordinate and the dominant classes over the right to rule. It is the 
nature of these power struggles that shapes “the path to democratization and its ability to 
maintain itself in the face of adverse conditions” (Ibid). Social classes, according to this 
model, are organized along a spectrum: the dominant classes occupy one end and the 
subordinate classes the other (RSS 1993, 74). Landlords and the bourgeoisie - the capital 
owners - constitute the dominant classes (Ibid). Workers in the agrarian and the industrial 
sectors, as well as the middle classes, constitute the subordinate classes. The middle class 
gravitates around independent "small and medium farmers, craftsmen, merchants and the 
white-collar employees" (Ibid). 
RSS pay attention to a class-based analysis; they investigate the “structure of class 
coalitions and the relative power of different classes” (Ibid). This shapes prospects for regime 
change profoundly (Ibid, 6). In particular, they challenge the central premises of the argument 
presented by modernization theorists and by one of their main influences, Barrington Moore 
(1966). Although agreeing with Moore that it is the middle class that challenges feudalism, 
they disagree with him on its role in democratization processes. Drawing from their 
classification, they argue that “those who have to gain from democracy will be its most 
reliable promoters and defenders, those who have the most to lose will resist it and will be 
most tempted to roll it back when the occasion presents itself” (1992, 57). RSS’s central 
thesis is that democracy will bear fruit only when the subordinate working class’ 
organizational capacity rises to a level where it can challenge the hegemonic economic and 
ideological structures of dominant classes (RSS 1993,74). It is the working class, rather than 
the bourgeoisie and the middle class, that will push for an inclusive democratic system. The 
working class is the one invested in a democratic system that will extend universal suffrage, 
because such a democratic system allows for the incorporation of their demands and interests 
by the political leaders (Ibid, 57). The working class, unlike other subordinate classes, can 
organize itself and express its interests. Furthermore, it is expected that it would push for full 
	 54	
democracy, which holds the promise of "including the class in the polity where it could 
further pursue its interests" (Ibid, 7). The exception is when the “working class was initially 
mobilized by a charismatic but authoritarian leader or a hegemonic party linked to the state 
apparatus” (Ibid, 8). 
The authors do not take the empowerment of the working class for granted. They 
argue that the working class needs to forge its way into democracy. Echoing Marx, RSS argue 
that it is the unintended consequences of capitalism and the contradictions inherent in this 
system that lead to democratization (Ibid, 7). In the RSS approach, capitalist development is 
associated with the rise of democracy in two primary ways:  in enlarging the working and the 
middle classes and facilitating their self-organization, and in weakening large landowners. It 
is worth noting that the nature of landownership and land use changes under capitalism. Large 
landowners as a traditional political class were weakened but the large landowners who made 
the transition to modern capitalist agriculture were not. In the RSS (1992) approach, the 
“relative class power” which refers to the density of civil society advances the chances for 
democracy (Ibid, 59). Capitalism strengthens the organizational skills of an otherwise 
fragmented working class. It does so by facilitating the means of communication and 
transportation and paves the way for workers to organize themselves and pursue their interests 
(Ibid, 6).  
Consequently, the influence of the working class strengthens and the prospects for 
democratization deepen. However, the strengthening of civil society should not only be 
measured by its density; instead, its strength should be measured by its ability to mount 
challenges to the ideological hegemony of the dominant classes.  
 
“It is the growth of a counter-hegemony of subordinate classes and especially the 
working classes (developed and sustained by trade unions and parties) which is critical 
for democracy promotion” (RSS 1992, 50).  
 
It is when the working class is empowered enough to forge an alliance with the middle classes 
against the old guard of the regime that real democratization of the regime comes about. In 
this scenario, the position of the middle class is relatively ambiguous. It is supportive of full 
democracy when able to strike an alliance with a strong and not too radical working class. 
Otherwise, the middle class plays a vital role in enlisting the military's help and in 
reinvigorating authoritarian rule whenever its interests are at stake (Ibid).  
This dissertation will be inspired by the RSS (1992) putting of social classes at the 
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center of the analysis of democratic citizenship and democratization processes. It is also 
inspired by how RSS put the dispossessed and disenfranchised classes at the center of social 
and political change. However, this research also seeks to fill important gaps in the RSS 
account. In fact, the RSS approach is premised on the contradictions of the Fordist capitalist 
model, which is marked by the concentration of the workforce in large enterprises. What 
happens in contexts where this developmental model came under attack? Or was altered by 
the advent of neoliberalism? What happens in the context where the working class is 
fragmented and downsized by mechanization, automation, and other factors? If one was to 
follow the line of argumentation presented by RSS, one could easily conclude that in such 
contexts, prospects for subordinate and working-class organizing and mobilization are grim 
and even non-existent. However, this scenario did not take shape in Egypt where, under 
Mubarak’s neoliberal rule, the working class led the most significant wave of protests, 
bringing about 3 million workers to labor action between 2004 and 2011 (Beinin 2016; 
Abdelrahman 2015). Even under a neoliberal model, the working class continued to matter, 
but the question in theoretical terms brings us back to the necessity of accounting for both 
workers’ mobilization and organization and the nature of their inter-class alliances (Harvey 
2014).  
To this end, this dissertation attends to the contradictions of the varieties of capitalist 
development as well as their effects on class structures, organization, mobilization, and class 
struggle. Underlying the RSS account is the traditional leftist tension between capital and 
labor, emphasizing the contradictions in the production process. However, as David Harvey 
eloquently argued, the working class is not only exploited in the production process but in the 
realization process as well (2003; 2007; 2013). Moreover, in post-Fordism, there is a 
necessity to understand that the formal working class needs to be mobilized and organized to 
launch its counter-hegemonic action, but equally important is that other subordinate classes 
mobilize and organize as part of a broader coalition of subordinate classes that seek to 
challenge the ruling coalition. The breadth of this coalition ensues from the process of 
"accumulation by dispossession," which widens the margins of the informal economy and 
unemployment. To better understand these tensions and their effects on class structures in 
post-Fordism, I combine RSS’ approach with David Harvey’s rendition of Marxian 
economics and his conceptualization of the process of “accumulation by dispossession.”  
The working-class continues to constitute the heart of counter-hegemonic organizing, 
but they have to be understood and embedded in other struggles initiated by other subordinate 
classes equally resisting the process of accumulation by dispossession. The neighborhood 
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associations demanding better housing and living conditions or protesting state neglect, the 
struggles of the peasants demanding land distribution, and the struggles initiated by the 
middle class and demands for political amnesty are all equally important in delegitimizing the 
regime in power and its pact with capital. This dissertation therefore argues that the rise of the 
subordinate classes’ counter-hegemony is a phenomenon that happens at the level of society 
and spreads horizontally across different sectors of the economy, leading to the de-
legitimization of the regime in power. On this point this dissertation also moves away from 
the RSS (1992) account. Their conceptualization of inter-class alliances is one that takes into 
consideration only the alliances between the formal working-class and the middle-class; other 
classes, such as the urban poor and the peasants, are neglected. Thirdly, the authors assume 
that it is when workers forge their way to democracy through the creation of parties and 
unions that democratization takes place. However, the process by and the context in which 
non-corporatist union organizing and new parties are formed are not analyzed. As much as 
this dissertation is inspired by the struggles from below, it does not neglect what happens at 
the upper levels of decision-making. In particular, from a perspective rooted in capitalist 
development, an analysis of the disintegration or lack thereof of the pact between the 
dominant/business community, the authoritarian regime, and the military is in order to 
understand the context in which the transition took shape and how it shaped the chances for 
the dispossessed and the disenfranchised classes to organize. Finally, RSS suggest that 
democracy comes about when the balance of class power shifts in favor of the poor and the 
working class. However, they do not suggest avenues by which one can assess this question 
of the “balance of class power.” In this dissertation, I propose an assessment of the balance of 
class power from a political economy perspective, one that assesses whether capital was 
challenged in its material and immaterial power, and whether the poor and the working class 
were empowered. I also propose that shifting the balance of class power in favor of the poor 
and the working class is not in itself a measure of a democratic regime, but it is an important 
condition for maintaining democracy that favors the socio-political and economic interests of 
those who were previously marginalized from both.   
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Democratization and Labor in Brazil: The Scholalry Debate 
This research is inspired by the political economy approaches that have analysed the 
integration of Brazil in the world economy and the transition from an agro-export oriented 
economy to industrialization and later on to neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism 
(O’Donnell 1978; 1979; Filho and Morais 2018). From O’Donnell (1978; 1979) this 
dissertation borrows the idea that the economic models determined the regime types, the pacts 
of domination and the state functions erected in populist and post-populist Brazil. It also 
borrows from O’Donnell his definition and conceptualization of the Bureaucratic 
Authoritarian regime, which was erected in post-populist Brazil to deepen industrialization. 
From Filho and Morais (2018), I borrow their reading of contemporary Brazilian political 
economy and the transition to neoliberalism and then to neo-developmentalism under the PT 
administration. 
 
The case specific literature on Brazil has been divided over the role of actors in the transition 
process. Mainwaring (1986) argued that the process of democratization started with the 
military regime’s will to pursue liberalization. Arguing along the same lines, Alfred Stepan’s 
(1988) Military Brazil revisisted rooted the explanation of regime change in Brazil in the 
divisions between what he described as the military in government, the military as an 
institution and the military’s security apparatus. Stepan argues that the military as government 
and the military as an institution were skeptical of the threats posed by the expansion of the 
security apparatus on the longterm institutional interests of the military. Hagopian (1991) also 
builds on the idea of the military-initiated transition to argue that the post-military pact had 
preserved the priviledges of the military and had compromised the foundations of democracy. 
  
It is in Stepan’s edited contribution Democratizing Brazil, that the author brings a more 
nuanced contribution to the democratization process in Brazil moving beyond the focus on the 
elite and the military to account along with his co-authors for the roles that civil society actors 
played in democratizing authoritarianism. For the scholarly work that took into consideration 
the social mobilization that preceded the transition from military rule to civilian rule, the work 
by Alves (1985) on the opposition under military rule accounts for the plethora of 
mobilization and struggles under military rule but Alves suggests that it is the middle class 
which bore the brunt of the failed economic policies rather than the poor and the working 
class that had played a protagonist role. Keck’s work moves the focus to examine the 
working-class struggles, the emergence of new unionism and the Workers’ Party (Keck 
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1989). Keck (1992) later on examines how the PT came into existence and how it expanded 
its base of support beyond the blue-collar industrial working class to appeal to the broader 
middle class, the peasants and the urban subalterns. Keck’s (1992) work inspires this project 
but it also builds on the insights by Seidman (1994).  Seidman does not only take into 
consideration labor mobilization under military rule but acknowledges the struggles of the 
urban poor for better housing, access to public services, etc. Seidman’s work examines how 
unions and urban community organizing viewed their struggles as historically, socially and 
politically connected, an interconnectedness that challenged both the employers and the state. 
Finally Riethof (2018) looked at the formal working class to draw conclusions about how the 
labor movement, which emerged defiant to the military moderated its stances and moved 
towards pragmatic stances over the years and especially under the PT. She argues however 
that the process is not linear neither it could be assumed that the CUT had immediately 
followed the trajectory of the PT. Rather she argues that altough “CUT’s trajectory 
undoubtedly became closely intertwined with the PT government, to reduce the union 
movement’s position to one of co-optation and conservatism obscures the dilemmas this 
relationship generated” (Riethof 2018, 4).  
 
This dissertation borrows from this literature and in particular the political economy 
approaches (see Saad Filho and Morais 2018) to trace the process that had unfolded over time 
with Brazil’s integration in the global economy and the way this had affected structural 
arrangments and prospects for democratization and regime change. As the approach accounts 
for the class struggles and the ways in which they challenged authoritarian capitalism, it 
extends the analysis beyond military Brazil to argue that democratization and regime change 
had to take into account the process through which civil and political rights were granted and 
whether socio-economic redistribution had been incorporated as part and parcel of a 
democratic citizenship. This combination would lead us to the conclusion that while the 
military enabled the transition, they were not the ones to grant the expansion of democratic 
rights. Rather it was the poor and the working class who through their struggles and constant 
confrontation with capital and the state that had forced concessions from the elites in post-
military Brazil. The dissertation also proposes to look at PT Brazil, to shed light not only on 
the moderation of the union movement, but to embed the question of the deepening of 
democracy under PT in the neo-developmental model that it had adopted. Hence and while 
Riethof (2018) rightly points to the fact that CUT’s moderation has not been a linear process, 
she does not take into consideration the pact erected under the PT’s neo-developmental and 
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the alliance between capital, the formal working class and the low and middle-income to 
sustain this economic model, generate economic growth while pursuing income redistribution 
to the lower income. She also does not acknowledge how this pact disintegrated leading to the 
demise of the PT rule and the progressive social policies that had accompanied Lula’s and 
Dilma’s administrations. This dissertation pays attention to such themes in order to 
understand whether the balance of class power had shifted in favor of the poor and the 
working-class or not in post-military Brazil. 
1.3 Theoretical Framework  
The purpose of the following section is to revisit some of the literature and theoretical 
debates in relation to the important concepts and the relationship between them. I will start by 
reflecting on capitalism and its effects on social classes, the emancipatory potential of class 
struggles, and inter-class alliances that pave the way for tipping the balance of class power in 
favor of the dispossessed classes, the question of the state autonomy from capital or lack 
thereof, the determinants of the coercive apparatus’ attitudes toward democratization 
processes, and the issue of state-society relations. In this dissertation, I examine the effects of 
the capitalist transformations on both social classes and the state. It should be noted, however, 
that neither society nor the state are passive actors. States shape the economy and social 
classes shape the state. It is also worth noting that international structures and the regional 
context play an instrumental role in shaping the economy, the state, and social classes, but an 
in-depth analysis of the international and regional context is beyond the reach of this 
dissertation.  
1.3.1 Marx, Polanyi and David Harvey on Capitalism, the Market, and Emancipatory Class 
Struggles and Class Alliances  
In Marxian terms, a capitalist mode of production is a “production relation of bourgeois 
society” (Tucker, Marx, and Engels 1978, 207), whose wealth is defined by “an immense 
collection of commodities” (Ibid, 302). Therefore, in Marxian terms a capitalist mode of 
production is to be understood in the context of industrial societies where the owners of the 
means of production (the industrial capitalist in Marx) control the production and circulation 
of commodities to accumulate profits (Ibid, 334). The accumulation of wealth/profits in 
Marxian terms occurs by increasing production, where money is turned into capital through 
the purchase of commodified labor power (Ibid, 336-337) and of the means of production to 
produce commodities that can be sold for a profit through the extraction of surplus value (Ibid, 
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351). Underlying this process are social relations that mediate this process and that are 
premised on private property and the commodification of labor, which is sold in return for 
wages. It is also premised on the concept of an accumulation process that divorces the 
producer from the product and the wealth/commodities it is producing (Ibid, 350). The 
process is imbued with power relations that are not natural, but are the specific historical 
developments and outcomes of capitalism (Ibid, 338).   
In the Marxian account, classes are therefore social relations that emerge from the 
unevenness in the distribution of rights and powers that people have over productive 
resources and the appropriation of the results (profits) of this productive process (Wright 
2009). Marx therefore highlights the interdependence between the conditions and the 
activities of the capitalist classes and the working classes (Ibid). In addition to the capitalist 
exclusionary control over the means of production, the capitalists strive to accumulate wealth 
through the “commodification” of labor power and the alienation of workers: “the existence 
of a class, which possesses nothing but its capacity to labor is a necessary prerequisite of 
capital” (Tucker, Marx, and Engels 1978, 207). 
Marx linked patterns of exploitation (“inequalities in rights and powers over 
productive resources”) and domination (“the ability to control the activities of the other”) of 
labor power to social and political effects and prospects for change (Wright 2009, 106). The 
process of production creates avenues for cooperation at the level of industry, which in turn 
paves the way for resistance to capital, “as the number of cooperating laborers increases so 
too does the resistance to the domination of capital and with it the necessity for capital to 
overcome this resistance by counter-pressure” (Tucker, Marx, and Engels 1978, 385). In this 
analysis, the contradictions of a capitalist industrial economy become clear when the 
bourgeoisie force workers who live by selling their labor power into industry, and when the 
working class becomes aware of the necessity of developing resources and acting collectively. 
As workers develop their class-consciousness, they also develop the trade unions that give 
their consciousness a frame to rise against the domination and exploitation by the 
bourgeoisie.14 In Marxian terms, class struggle under a capitalist economy leads to an 
																																																								
14 Marx and Engels wrote in the Communist Manifesto “Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their 
battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of 
communication that are created by modern industry, and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just 
this contact that was needed to centralize the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. 
But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable 




emancipatory project whereby the proletariat emerges as the vanguard of the revolutionary 
transformation that could free them from their “chains.”  
Polanyi’s Great Transformation warns against the “satanic mill” of a self-regulating 
market, as well as its social consequences. Polanyi’s contribution is in conceptualizing the 
market as well as the emancipatory struggles in a market-economy, moving away from 
Marx’s focus on the factory and the formal working class to incorporate also community 
organizing. Polanyi argued that the transition from a pre-industrial phase, where the market 
was socially embedded, to an industrial phase, where the market became socially dis-
embedded and subordinated society to its exigencies, brought important socio-economic 
transformations. The process translated to a “fictious” commodification of the means of 
production (nature/land, human activity/labor, and money) that in turn maintained a market 
society perpetuating the idea of an expansionist and self-regulating market (Polanyi 2001, 
76). Moreover, as the market expanded, so did social resistance to the market’s encroachment 
on social and economic life and its disastrous effects (Ibid, 136).  Polanyi did not confine the 
anti-market struggles to working-class struggle. Rather, Polanyi moves beyond the perception 
of the working class as the only driver of social change, to propose a more diffused approach, 
which puts an emphasis on community struggles and resistance. In Polanyi’s perspective, it is 
not only the economic and material demands (wages) that were contested, but, more broadly, 
the social issues that arise from the dislocations created by a market economy and the 
commodification of labor and land. The struggles not only took place at the factory level, but 
also at the community level. This conceptualization of anti-market struggles is at the heart of 
inter-class alliance formation, which cuts across the concept of inter-class resistance and 
alliance formation to capitalism. 
Combining insights from both Polanyi and Marx, Harvey argues that there are other 
processes through which capital accumulates profits and that have dire implications for 
subordinate classes, including the working-class. Harvey points to the duality underlying 
capital accumulation, suggesting that “the two aspects of expanded reproduction and 
accumulation by dispossession are originally linked and dialectically intertwined” (Harvey 
2003, 176). "Accumulation by dispossession" entails "the extraction of income and wealth 
from vulnerable populations. The stealing back of privileges once acquired such as pension 
rights, as well as free education and the adequate services that underpin a satisfactory social 
wage" (Harvey 2014, 68).  
Harvey is inspired by the contradictory unity between production and realization that 
Marx pointed out in The Grundrisse. As Harvey argues, the working class is not only crucial 
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for the capitalist system to produce commodities; it is also a consumer of commodities 
(Harvey 2014, 80). However, “the realization of commodities in a capitalist system and thus 
of surplus value, is not restricted by the consumer needs of society in general but by the 
consumer needs of a society where the great majority are always poor and must always 
remain poor” (Ibid, 81). Workers’ struggles for better working conditions and higher wages 
might lead to some successes, but that is not the only concern from their standpoint. This is 
particularly the case because  
“they suddenly have to pay it (their wage success) back to the bourgeoisie in the form 
of rents, telephone bills, and so on. So, from the standpoint of the worker, there is a 
concern not simply with what happens at the point of production, but also with how 
much housing costs, and how much you pay for goods and services, commodities in 
the shops, hidden charges from paying interest on mortgages, and all the rest of it” 
(Harvey 2013). 
 
Without abandoning the capital-labor tension, Harvey proposes a more nuanced 
approach to the way class struggles are viewed and studied. Harvey accounts, for example, for 
the diversity within the capitalist class and the connections among the “industrial capitalists, 
financial capitalists, merchant capitalists, landed capitalists, and managers” (Resnick and 
Wolf 2004, 98). Such an approach also yields a broader spectrum of subordinate classes 
(urban poor, middle classes), thereby opening up fronts for new anti-capitalist struggles, 
where the struggles at the workplace are joined to the struggles over daily life, an idea that 
had been suggested earlier by Karl Polanyi. The forms of dispossession central for capital 
accumulation under neoliberalism constitute “an unprecedented opportunity for creating a 
broader alliance, one able to encompass the various social groups deprived and dispossessed 
by such processes, and the increasing ranks of the alienated and discontented” (Roccu 2013 b, 
423). Workers are one of the main classes that bear the brunt of such accumulation processes. 
In addition to workers, the urban poor and the middle class are also disadvantaged by 
economic restructuring and become part of the anti-capitalist struggles. 
As this dissertation combines insights from the aforementioned authors, it is important 
to highlight a few themes that go unattended by these classics. To start with, the effects of 
capitalism on class formation, and the class’ capacity to mobilize and organize, are not 
uniform and are shaped by the ways in which capitalism accumulates profits. Industrial 
capitalism exists with rent seeking and financial capital. While industrial capitalism exploits 
and dominates labor power and hence accumulates profits in the production process, other 
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forms of capitalism (rent seeking and financial capital) accumulate capital by imposing higher 
interest rates, assaulting and reselling public assets such as land and resource materials, 
commodifying social and economic rights (the right to housing, education, health-care), and 
so on.  
The implications of such processes of capital accumulation are dire for emancipatory 
class organizing. In the industrial sector, the formal industrial working class, especially if it 
constitutes a large proportion of the labor force, can force losses and concessions from 
industrial capital whenever it strikes. However, if capital is non-developmental, then forcing 
losses would not only result in the launching of industrial strikes; it invites bringing capital 
circulation to a halt. As a result, while the formal working class bears the brunt of 
commodification and financialization, it ought to bond and form alliances with other social 
classes equally struggling with commodification and with the stealing away of their rights. 
Those who are disenfranchised and dispossessed by such processes ought to organize, but also 
to form alliances with each other to challenge those who have the highest stake in 
dispossessing them. This observation is borrowed from David Harvey, but it is worth noting 
that Harvey talks only about urban struggles; the struggles of the peasants are almost entirely 
absent from his analysis.  
Furthermore, as Harvey argued, neoliberal restructuring shapes our conceptualization of 
the dispossessed social classes. While conditions for the formal and informal working class 
worsened under neoliberalism, we can also note downward social class mobility experienced 
by the middle class. For example, during the 2011 Arab uprisings, research and international 
organizations published reports highlighting that a large number of educated Arab youth were 
not being absorbed by the labor market, and hence joined the ranks of the unemployed. This 
youth bulge and the high levels of unemployment can be partially explained by the quest of 
Arab regimes to cut public spending and to downsize the public sector, the largest recruiter of 
fresh university graduates, all under the banner of dealing with questions of deficit and state 
inefficiency. While some immigrated to the rich neighboring Gulf Arab monarchies, or to 
Western countries, a large number remained sitting on the margin with no social protection or 
benefits. To add to this situation, civil servants had also experienced  significant downward 
social class mobility. As the imperative of dealing with the budget deficit presented itself, the 
first measure taken by the policymakers was to lay the burden of budget cuts on low- and 
middle-income civil servants. Hence, as some have already noted, public school teachers earn 
the lowest salaries (A. Alexander and Bassiouny 2014). Teachers had to fulfill several jobs to 
make ends meet, working as a schoolteacher in the day and a taxi driver at night, or giving 
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private lessons (Ibid). It is therefore impossible to discuss neoliberal capitalism without 
acknowledging that it has led to new conditions of precariousness and dispossession that were 
non-existent under state-led capitalism.  
In the case where the industrial sector continues to exist, the changes within the 
structures of production have changed how the working class can mobilize and organize. For 
example, the contemporary industrial era is governed by Toyotism, which has replaced the 
old Fordist model. While Fordism was governed by the large concentration of workers in big 
factories that in turn facilitated the development of a common agenda, the articulation of 
common demands, and their capacity to strike and thereby to force concessions on capital and 
paralyze the economy, Toyotism introduced new technologies that have reduced the labor 
force at the workplace. Consequently, the working class has to overcome workplace 
fragmentation and geographical dispersion to be able to bond and challenge capital. While in 
the traditional leftist and Marxian account, the labor density at the workplace was sufficient to 
force concessions on capital and bring about a regime that responds to working-class interests, 
the introduction of new technologies and the dispersion of industries across different 
geographical areas has brought important challenges. It is no longer enough that workers 
strike; they also need to spread their mobilization horizontally, and across different industries. 
It is also not enough to force concessions from capital; the workers ought to articulate a 
common national agenda that transcends workplace fragmentation and geographical divisions. 
Moreover, labor relations in the modern age have brought about flexible labor 
standards that pose important challenges for worker organization and mobilization. The 
introduction of temporary or contractual work has made it more difficult for workers to 
accumulate experiences in militancy at the same workplace, forge bonds with fellow workers, 
and sustain solidarity at the workplace level. Moreover, the introduction of temporary 
agencies that mediate the relationship between the employer and the employee has made the 
confrontation between capital and labor more difficult. The combined effects of such 
processes have dealt a blow to job stability and increased levels of unemployment. Workers 
are often on the defensive, struggling for their reinstatement rather than struggling for the 
betterment of their work conditions. Consequently, they are less defiant vis-à-vis capital. 
Furthermore, it is impossible to talk about social classes without taking into 
consideration that they intertwine with other social divisions such as race, gender, ethnicity, 
and so on (Hanieh 2013, 7). One cannot ignore the fact that women are primarily the ones to 
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perform unpaid and underpaid precarious jobs. They are the major labor force in the 
precarious informal and agricultural sectors in the Arab world and Latin America (Annex). 
Consequently, women have emerged at the frontline of resistance in the urban peripheries in 
Brazil and Egypt, mobilizing the residents there and protesting state neglect. Race also 
intersects with social class formation. In Brazil, the precarious industrial jobs in the 1960s and 
1970s mirrored the racial divisions in society at large. Manual industrial jobs were mostly 
performed by impoverished Afro-Brazilians from Brazil’s northeast, while the owners of the 
means of production were white men or men of European descent.  
The Brazilian case of the Workers’ Party provides fresh insight into how gender, race, 
and nationality can intersect to further or undermine democratization processes. For example, 
when the party was established by workers struggling under  military rule, they laid the 
foundations of a new identity that transcends the definition of the traditional working class to 
include white collar employees, the formal and informal working class, the landless peasants, 
and the urban working class, and for how this new branding of the social class intersects with 
broader questions of gender, race, and sexuality.   
1.3.2 The State Shaping Social Classes and Democratization Processes 
I have so far explored the relationship between capitalism and social classes; the 
relationship between capitalism and the state on the one hand, and the state and social classes 
on the other, has not been explored yet. On this particular issue, the approach adopted in this 
dissertation is one inspired by O’Donnell’s arguments underlying his seminal work on 
bureaucratic authoritarianism (BA) in Latin America. It is worth noting that Egypt did not 
experience a BA regime. However, O’Donnell shapes this dissertation through the sequencing 
that he suggests. In broad terms, O’Donnell suggests that political regimes and the pacts that 
sustain them are a function of capitalism. Furthermore, he suggests that pacts that bring 
together social classes and social groups and that cement the regime in place are maintained 
through state functions that satisfy the diverse and conflicting social classes. Furthermore, in 
O’Donnell’s approach, once a regime withstands the implementation of a specific form of 
capitalism, it is outlived by, transformed by, and adapted to the exigencies of the new 
capitalist model. As a result, a new social pact emerges and the state functions are updated 
and changed to meet the exigencies of this new social pact (See O’Donnell 1978; 1979).  
This dissertation is inspired by the sequence proposed by O’Donnell’s earlier work to 
understand how in particular capitalism shapes political regimes, the social pacts that underlie 
them, and the state functions that sustain them. However, there are important ways through 
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which this dissertation proposes to fill some gaps left by O’Donnell’s analysis. First of all, 
echoing the Marxist approach to the state, O’Donnell assumes that the political realm is 
totally subordinated to the economic realm. The following section will lead to conclusions 
that although the state serves capitalist interests, it is not always serving the interests of the 
capitalist class per se; the state develops capitalist interests that are sometimes in harmony and 
at other times at odds with the interests of the bourgeoisie. Secondly, in O’Donnell’s account 
the state is a unitary actor. The discussion in the two cases shows that there is a need to 
disaggregate the state to understand which fraction was vested in authoritarian stability, and 
which fraction supported the transition away from the authoritarian regime. Finally, 
O’Donnell categorizes state corporatism into two broad categories based on the regime in 
place (populist corporatism or BA corporatism). However, this approach to corporatism is too 
deterministic, and it assumes that there is just one type of populist corporatism or BA 
corporatism; the latter did not exist in Egypt in any form. By disaggregating corporatism, one 
can better understand how it becomes vulnerable to transformations.  
State Power and State Autonomy  
In the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx starts by 
laying the foundations of his views on the state. While challenging the Hegelian account, 
which depicted the state as the basis of “civil society,” Marx argues instead that the “civil or 
bourgeois society is the basis of the state” (Marx 1978, 16). In Marxian terms, the state/the 
superstructure is the appendage to the economic base/the capitalist economy and is therefore 
“devoid of its own space and reducible to the economy” (Poulantzas 2000, 15). Marx and 
Engels stated in the Communist Manifesto: “the executive of the modern state is but a 
committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx and Engels 
1969, 15). Neo-Marxists have argued that the state is not totally subservient to capital’s 
interests; the state is a contested arena of class struggles and it could enjoy a relative 
autonomy vis-à-vis capital, but would nevertheless keep capitalism as a mode of production 
working. Poulantzas best expressed this relative autonomy  
 
“Although the state is not created ex nihilo by the ruling classes, nor simply taken 
over by them: state power (that of the bourgeoisie, in case of the capitalist State) is 
written into this materiality. Thus, while all the State's actions are not reducible to 




Proponents of “statism” have questioned the neo-Marxist claims concerning the state’s 
total or partial subservience to private interests. In  “Bringing the State Back In” (Evans, 
Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985) have positioned themselves away from the society-centric 
approaches that have reduced the study of political outcomes by looking at societal norms and 
values and have therefore ignored the state (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; 
Steinmo et al 1992). Statists have also challenged the neo-Marxist perspectives that treated 
the state as an arena for class struggle and the accumulation of capital. These authors 
challenge the assumption of the state as the tool for dominant classes and argue that the state 
is an actor in its own right and has interests on its own that are independent from society. 
Guiding their research is a central question: What determines state autonomy and capacity? 
Their view of the relationship between state capacity and state autonomy is not a linear or a 
directly proportional one, but rather a dialectical one (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 
1985, 435). The authors combine Hintzian and Weberian perspectives of the state. From 
Weber, they borrow the idea that the state is the set of differentiated administrative 
institutions and personnel where power radiates from the center to territorially demarcated 
boundaries where the state controls coercive means and issues binding decisions. They 
borrow from Hintz the necessity of putting the state at the intersection of international and 
domestic politics. From this perspective, the authors raise two equally important points. First 
of all, they depart from the idea that the state is autonomous, in the sense that it is able to 
pursue its goals independently from societal actors and classes. Secondly, they link the issue 
of autonomy to the state’s administrative and military capacity. Another central issue that 
drives this scholarly debate is the idea that the state is not shaped by societal actors but itself 
shapes societies and the formation of social interests.  
Timothy Mitchell’s (1991) Foucauldian approach to the state challenged the 
abovementioned structural, Weberian view. Mitchell proposes to move away from a 
structuralist approach to the state to focus on its structural effects. He proposes to assess state 
power not only based on visible, material, and coercive power but also based on the state’s 
immaterial and invisible capacity to exert power by dividing subjectivities and transforming 
them into the carriers of power (Mitchell 1991). In this approach, the state creates compliance 
not only by force, but also through its structural effects, or what he described as “ghost-like” 
effects. As Mitchell argued, it is these structural effects of state power that play “a more 
inhibiting role undermining more daring forms of labor organizing” (Mitchell 1991,91). He 
writes that  
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"Disciplinary power works not from outside but from within, not at the level of an 
entire society but the level of detail, and not by contrasting individuals and their 
actions but by producing them. A negative exterior power gives way to internal, 
productive power. Disciplines work within local domains and institutions, entering 
into particular social processes, breaking them, down into separate functions, 
rearranging the parts, increasing their efficiency and precision and reassembling them 
into more productive and powerful combinations. These methods produce the 
organized power of armies, schools and factories and other distinctive institutions of 
modern nation states" (Mitchell 1991, 91).  
This approach allows for an understanding of how the state controls society through not only 
coercive means but also non-coercive means, through the production of knowledge and truth 
that could strengthen rulers’ hold on power. Hence, from Mitchell’ s Foucauldian perspective, 
the boundaries between the state and society are elusive (Ibid, 81). 
A neo-Weberian approach to the state proposed by Migdal (1988) and Migdal, Kohli 
and Shue (1994) combined insights from the Weberian and the Foucauldian approaches to the 
state. In response to statists, the neo-Weberian approach anchors itself in the perception that a 
state autonomous from society is a weak rather than a strong, capable, and efficient state. For 
these authors, strong and efficient states maintain close ties and collaborate with society rather 
than remaining distant and autonomous from them. They proposed a state-in-society approach 
(Migdal, Kohli and Shue 1994) inspired by a Weberian tradition of the state that challenged 
the idea that the state can be conceptualized as a single and coherent and autonomous unit. 
They propose instead to disaggregate the state to “shed light on its contentious fragments […] 
constituted of numerous societal variables influencing the processes of social change in the 
low-income countries” (Migdal, Kohli, and Shue 1994, 18).  
Interestingly, in Migdal et al (1994) and Migdal’s (1988) Strong Societies and Weak 
States, social actors are not reduced to social classes; they also incorporate tribes, sects, 
families, and patron-client networks.  In fact, while Migdal’s (1994) account sheds light on a 
cooperative relationship between state and society, it is in his earlier work that he highlighted 
the tensions and conflicting relationship between states and strong societal actors. In Strong 
Societies and Weak States, he argues that the state and social actors are competing over 
exerting social control and subordinating citizens to their own will. Like Mitchell, he argued 
that it is impossible for the state to control society by simply relying on its coercive means 
and moves to argue that both the state and social actors devise survival strategies that would 
create compliance and conformity and link the individual to the collectivity. Migdal argues 
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that strong social actors resist the state and attempt to control state resources to provide 
citizens with the means of survival. By providing these incentives and constraints, social 
actors provide a link between the individual and the collectivity. In Midgal’s (1988) approach, 
a strong state is not only militarily strong; a strong state can penetrate society, extract 
resources, and exert social control. 
 In this dissertation, I agree with Hanieh’s proposition that the state is not an 
autonomous actor, or “an independent separate feature of society severed from the class 
structure that generates its character” (Hanieh 2013, 8). I also agree with the Migdalian 
approach that the state needs to be disaggregated. Here, this disaggregation serves the specific 
purpose not only of understanding more broadly whether states cooperate with social groups 
to pursue efficient policymaking, but of avoiding treating the state as a unitary actor that 
serves the implementation of capitalist interests unequivocally. My contention is that by 
disaggregating the state, one can attend to a better understanding of which fractions of the 
state can serve capital’s interests and whether and if the state has developed capitalist interests 
of its own. State managers support capitalism because it helps them maintain political 
legitimacy (Block 1987, 58) but this reading is incomplete if it does not take into account that 
political power is also a tool for those within the state apparatus to control “the means of 
production” (Waterbury 1983, 15). The state bourgeoisie become a dominant class 
“exploiting labor power and depriving it from the control over means of production” (Ibid, 
18). Finally, I borrow from Mitchell’s approach the concept of the structural effects of the 
state. Workers were not only tamed by the force of arms, but also by what Mitchell described 
as the “ghost-like effects” of the state. Aside from state repression, corporatism, as will be 
argued, also extended the disciplinary power of the state over the working class by dividing 
them into subjectivities that contributed to reproducing state power under authoritarian 
capitalism. Before addressing corporatism, the following section delves into the important 
role of the military in relation to democratization processes.  
Coercive Means  
The discussion above delved from a conceptual and theoretical approach into the 
questions of state power and state autonomy. This discussion is incomplete if it does not take 
into consideration the important role that the repressive arm of the state and the military in 
particular play in enabling or undermining democratization processes. Skocpol’s seminal 
work on States and Social Revolutions (1979) did not deal with democratization per se but 
with revolutions. Her arguments were the launching pad for discussion revolving around the 
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coercive apparatus and its role in impeding or furthering social and political transformations. 
For Skocpol, the question of the cohesiveness and strength (measured in terms of the 
military’s coercive capacity) of the state determine political outcomes. When the 
coercive/military apparatus remains strong, combining both a will and a capacity to repress 
revolutionary tides, the prospects for revolutionary change are grim.  
Stepan (1988) took this argument further to apply it more specifically to the context of 
democratizing regimes. In his Rethinking Military Politics, the author argued that the 
“systematic examination of regime termination required both a general analysis of macro-
socioeconomic forces and a specific analysis of the factors that alter the will and the capacity 
of the coercive apparatus to maintain the regime” (Stepan 1988, 55). Stepan’s work inspired 
many scholars, and particularly those who worked on the institutional approach to 
understanding civil-military relations in the Arab world. This literature invited an analysis of 
the roles that the military fulfilled under authoritarianism and how they maintained 
authoritarian rule. Owen (2004), like Stepan, argued that “armies have their own institutional 
imperatives which means that their technological, educational or administrative resources are 
not simply available to the rest of society for whatever civilian purpose they may happen to 
be needed” (Owen 2004, 178).  
In explaining authoritarian resilience, Eva Bellin (2004) unpacks the question of will 
and capacity in the context of the Arab world and proposes that in the context where the 
coercive apparatus is “robust,” the prospects for democracy are almost totally absent. To 
assess the “robustness” of the repressive apparatus, she proposes four variables that relate to 
the questions of domestic and foreign policy determinants of the coercive apparatus’ attitudes 
to democracy and regime change. The four variables are: the fiscal health of the military 
apparatus (payment of salaries and benefits), the successful maintenance of international 
support, the degree of institutionalization (versus patrimonialism), and high levels of popular 
mobilization (Bellin 2004, 146). Bellin argued that rentier economies of the Arab world 
allowed the regimes to continue purchasing arms despite the fiscal and economic crisis that 
they faced (Ibid, 146). Authoritarian regimes have also maintained steady international 
support for their coercive apparatus to contain the “Islamist threat,” maintain a steady flow of 
cheap oil, and protect Israel’s security (Ibid, 148). Furthermore, in the context where the 
coercive apparatus is linked by blood and sectarian ties and where sectarianism permeates the 
military and security apparatus, tying them closely to the regime in power, the result is “the 
coercive apparatus' personal identification with the regime and the regime's longevity 
[…which] fosters resistance to political reform” (Ibid, 149). Finally, the high level of popular 
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mobilization might undermine the military’s will to use violence, as it might jeopardize the 
“institutional integrity of the security apparatus, international support, and domestic 
legitimacy” (Ibid).  
I combine insights from Stepan (1988) and Bellin (2004) to better understand the 
institutional drives that shape the military’s will and capacity to derail the democratization 
process. Institutional factors should be brought to the front of the analysis of the role of the 
coercive apparatus in such processes, but consideration of these factors should also be 
combined with an approach to a military as a class, which “moves beyond the view of the 
military as an institution of legitimized violence acting as guarantor of national security and 
instead examines its role in the economy, its changing relationships with other social classes 
and other fractions of the ruling class, and its political role in the state” (Joya 2018 b, 2). My 
discussion of the military thus combines an institutional perspective with an analysis of the 
“the military as a class fraction engaged in political, economic and social struggles” (Ibid). It 
is important to note that I do not view the military-as- institution and the military-as-class as 
diametrically opposed to each other. Rather, a combination of the two determines the 
military’s will to repress or not, and hence to enable or undermine regime change. More 
specifically, in this dissertation I investigate the relationship between the military and the 
authoritarian structure, the roles that the military played under authoritarian rule especially in 
relation to repressing dissent, the roles that the military played in the economy, its foreign 
policy and domestic interests, and the relationship that it entertained with the working class 
and the business community.  
1.3.3 State and Society Relations  
Approaches to State Corporatism  
Prospects for democratization are constrained by the strategies that authoritarian states 
pursue to shape state and society relations. Such strategies are aimed in particular at shaping 
class organizing and obviating prospects for the rise of independent voices that could 
challenge authoritarian capitalism. State corporatism served specifically this purpose and has 
been widely debated by scholars of comparative politics.  
 Schmitter (1974) was associated with launching the debate on state corporatism. He 
described corporatism as a mode of organizing state-society relations to shape interest 
organizing and representation, and to provide an alternative to pluralism. In his work, he 
distinguished between two types of corporatism. The first is social corporatism, which is 
common in advanced capitalist countries where organizing is autonomous from the state 
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(Ibid, 102-103). The second type, most common in the Global South, is state-corporatism, a 
top-down form of organizing in which the unions or groups formed remain “auxiliary and 
dependent organs of the state” (Ibid, 102-03). His lengthy definition of state corporatism is as 
follows: 
 
“a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a 
limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the 
state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective 
categories observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of 
demands and supports” (Schmitter 1974, 93-94).  
 
His work opened the debate on whether corporatism is uniform and homogenous 
across different countries or even within the same country. Scholars of Latin American 
politics distinguished between “populist” and “post-populist” (bureaucratic authoritarian) 
corporatism (O’Donnell 1979). The former included the working class in a multi-class 
alliance to serve the easy phase of Import Substitution and Industrialization. The latter 
marginalized and excluded workers while depoliticizing and bureaucratizing labor organizing 
to deepen industrialization (O’Donnell 1979). The transition from populism and corporate 
populism to bureaucratic authoritarian corporatism was therefore dictated by the exigencies of 
capitalist development.  
Collier and Collier (1979) disputed the idea that there is one single type of state 
corporatism, but moved away from O’Donnell’s deterministic account, which saw the 
inevitability of transitioning from one form of corporatism to another one to serve the 
exigencies of deepening industrialization under a bureaucratic authoritarian regime. Collier 
and Collier stressed the need to think of corporatism in terms of degrees (Ibid, 969) and 
proposed to disaggregate the concept (Ibid, 967, 969). State corporatism, they suggest, needs 
to be understood in terms of two key mechanisms that can coexist and interact together to 
facilitate state social control over the working class: “inducements” (to secure cooperation 
from society) and “constraints” (state direct control over the group) (Ibid). The way Collier 
and Collier operationalized inducements is based on high and low scoring in turn based on the 
“provisions regarding registration, right of combination, monopoly of representation, 
compulsory membership, and subsidy of unions” (Ibid, 971).  Another scoring applies 
constraints to include “provisions regulating collective bargaining and strikes, other controls 
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on demand-making, controls on leadership, and provisions for state monitoring and 
intervention in internal union affairs” (Ibid). The authors argue that this approach leads to 
“different combinations of inducements and constraints” that shape state-society relations and 
become governed by the state’s objectives to entrench control over labor organizing (high 
constraints, high inducements, and high constraints and low inducements) or to draw support 
from labor organizing (high inducements and lower constraints) (Ibid, 976-978). 
While adopting Collier and Collier’s principle of disaggregating corporatism, I move 
away from their quantitative approach to inducements and constraints and beyond thinking 
about the “degrees” of these inducements and constraints, as the authors proposed to show 
how inducements and constraints were implemented as part and parcel of a regime strategy to 
tame, discipline, and subsume labor to the authoritarian regime and to ensure capitalist 
development. If state corporatism sheds light on the power relations that mediate state and 
society relations, then quantifying such relations would obscure rather than elucidate how 
such power dynamics work to subdue labor. My concern is less with whether in the two cases 
it is corporatism of high constraints and low inducements; rather, I focus on the issues 
proposed by Collier and Collier  (representation, the manipulation and cooptation of 
leadership, the formal and informal rules that governed the intervention in union affairs, along 
with the controls exerted by the state over the issues of strike, collective bargaining, and 
funding) from a social, political, and legal perspective. By looking at these dynamics with a 
qualitative approach, one can better understand why despite the fact that the two contexts of 
this dissertation’s case studies exhibited high constraints and low inducements, the anti-
corporatist labor organizing led to important changes in one context (Brazil) and not the other 
(Egypt).  
Finally, while the aforementioned literature was focused on the relationship between 
the state and labor in particular, it overlooked the fact that social groups can be diverse, and 
that reality in turn invites various regime strategies to tame or coopt them. Robert Bianchi is 
one of those scholars who has taken issue with the corporatism debate, and in particular with 
the underlying assumption on the part of the aforementioned corporatist literature that 
pluralism and corporatism are “diametrically opposed to each other” (Bianchi 1989, 23). He 
suggests viewing them as “alternative patterns of representation that can emerge and develop 
simultaneously in the same political systems” (Ibid). Examining Egypt in particular, he argues 
that one can trace three patterns of organizing state and society (Ibid, 21). The first inhabits 
the middle-class professional syndicates and is labeled the “corporatist sectors,” predominated 
by corporatism as a mode of representation (Ibid). The other sub-type, which includes unions 
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and agricultural cooperatives, falls under the “corporatized sectors.” This sector is made of 
the social movements that enjoy some level of pluralism but have been increasingly 
incorporated, under the state, into corporatist organizing to exert control over them. Finally, 
the “hybrid sectors” (religious groups and business groups) exhibit a mix of pluralism and 
corporatism, leading to high levels of internal competitiveness.  
The Religious Factor in Democratization Processes 
In this dissertation, I do not delve into the emotive appeal of religious groups or into the 
structure of religious organizing. My approach is one that acknowledges that religious groups 
cannot simply be ignored even if one favors a class-based political economy approach. An 
approach inspired by a political economy of religious organizing can provide insight into how 
such actors can further or undermine democratization processes. Here, I agree with the 
scholarship that has moved away from debates revolving around secularism or lack thereof, 
the (in) compatibility of Islam (See Lewis 1990; Huntington 1993), or the presence or absence 
of the oppositional “political cultures” (Slater 2009, 206) to explain democratic mobilization 
or lack thereof. I argue, as some scholars of the Middle East and Latin America have, that 
religious groups could play an important role in regime change where the “normal political 
channels were closed […] and where the church becomes the only political outlet” (Levine 
and Mainwaring 2001, 211). My approach embeds class organizing and inter-class alliances 
into the mobilizational capacity of strong religious actors. As such, my argument delves more 
into the question of whether religious groups could make available their resources to the 
lower classes to organize and mobilize along class lines, rather than simply along religious 
lines, which in turn leads to their empowerment and furthers the inter-class alliances that are 
necessary to dismantle authoritarianism. What determines the roles of organized religious 
groups in democratization processes is dictated not only by their relationship to 
authoritarianism, but the extent to which they accommodate capitalism in its neoliberal form 
or otherwise. 
In understanding the role of religious movements in democratization processes, some of 
the scholarly work has eschewed the important role that social classes play in mobilizing 
people into contention, and argued instead that the lead protagonists are the “communal elites 
or a society’s primary possessors of nationalist and religious authority, as the pivotal players 
in democratic (non) mobilization” (Slater 2009, 206). Dan Slater, for example, argued that 
when analyzing democratic anti-authoritarian mobilization, what matters the most are not the 
material grievances that drive people into action but the “emotive appeals” to nationalist and 
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religious sentiments (Ibid, 203). The latter are seen as the main drivers for “sparking” and 
“sustaining” high-risk protests (Ibid). According to Slater (2009), religious elites can play a 
protagonist role in democratization if they retain their autonomy from the authoritarian 
structure (Ibid, 210).  For example, in the Philippines, where the Catholic Church remained 
autonomous from authoritarianism (Slater 2009, 230), it turned into the leading protagonist in 
inspiring people to protest. He confirms that it was not materialist or economic demands that 
motivated people into oppositional collective action, but the appeal of religious discourse 
(Ibid, 229). But how one assesses the question of autonomy, which is central to the analysis of 
the role of religious groups in democratization processes, is not stated or defined in Slater’s 
work.  
Moving beyond culturalist explanations, another research agenda has focused on the 
material and immaterial resources made available to religious/Church organizing under 
authoritarianism as a result of their protected status and the regime’s quest to ensure 
legitimacy (Figa and Johnston 1988, 35).  This scholarship argues that the Church is not “the 
central focus of opposition […] Rather the Church can be a catalyst in the process of 
mobilization. It often avoids direct participation but nevertheless protects the opposition by 
providing an organizational and institutional framework which is independent of all 
encompassing state control” (Ibid, 36). In other words, it is the unintended consequences of 
an authoritarian regime facing a crisis of legitimacy that authoritarian leaders are forced to be 
more tolerant toward the church, which in turn opens avenues for the church to support 
oppositional politics under authoritarianism. Figa and Johnston write that the “greater the 
regime’s crisis of legitimacy and need for the church, the more the church can take advantage 
of its unique freedoms to oppose the regime” (Ibid, 33). The church’s oppositional role is not 
to be taken for granted; rather, the “levels of institutional development, policies of the regime, 
geo-political considerations, and the structure of the national church shape it” (Ibid). Another 
interesting proposition by Figa and Johnston is related specifically to the roles that the church 
plays in forging inter-class alliances. They write that the church’s  
“‘bridging organizations provide opportunities for contact between different classes, 
ethnic groups and interest groups. The effect is to broaden the opposition by creating 
common understandings and shared symbolism, which often become the foundations 
for coalitions. They tend to function as training grounds for oppositional leaders 
because other youth organizations outside of regime control often do not exist. Their 
members are highly available for mobilization and typically apply a great deal of energy 
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to their activities” (Ibid, 38-39).  
Although their approach remains anchored in a social movement approach to resource 
mobilization, the authors acknowledge that “for participants who are faithful, the mobilization 
of resources for political opposition may be a result of the unintended consequences of their 
actions or at least a secondary motivation” (Ibid, 45), an argument reiterated by Mainwaring 
and Levine (2001). The approach provides fresh insight to how religious organizing plays a 
role in mobilization processes, but it does not delve into why they come to play such a role, 
nor does it specify why in particular the church, which receives a protected status under 
authoritarianism, would turn to support the opposition. The literature on the roles assumed by 
the Church under the influence of Liberation theology in Latin America and Brazil has drawn 
important lessons from this context, arguing that, aside from the Second Vatican Council 
emphasis on the necessity of bringing the Church closer to lower-income populations, the 
Church’s autonomy from the state in terms of financing and appointments of religious leaders 
played a significant role in enabling them to assume this catalyst role  (Gómez Bruera 2013; 
Houtzager 2001).  
Social movement theory has also captured the attention of scholars studying Islamic 
activism. However, the proponents of this approach have largely been preoccupied with 
countering the orientalist and culturalist claims of the exceptionalism of “Islamic culture” and 
with arguing instead that the “dynamics, process, organization of Islamic activism can be 
understood as important elements of contention that transcends the specificity of Islam as a 
system of meaning, identity and the basis of collective action… Even though Islamism is 
different at the level of ideology, it is not at the level of collective action” (Wiktorowicz et al 
2004, 3). The proponents of the social movement theory approach have thus not moved 
beyond the question of demystifying Islamic activism by approximating it with other social 
movements. The other main approach that has guided the study of Islamism has examined 
political participation to draw attention to the fact that, in the context of more politically open 
regimes, Islamists are more likely to moderate their views pertaining to the establishment of 
an Islamic state. However, this moderation does not necessarily imply that they would support 
democratization per se (El Ghobashy 2005; Clarke 2012; Masoud 2013). In fact, some of this 
literature had rightfully pointed to the fact that Islamists accommodate authoritarianism. 
This form of opposition under authoritarianism is viewed as an “ally rather than an opponent” 
to the authoritarian structure, bringing about authoritarian stability and longevity by 
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conferring some degree of legitimacy on the authoritarian regime through their acceptance of 
participation in the existing authoritarian regime  (Clark 2012).  
The most compelling arguments on Islamism are the ones that have overtly taken a 
political economy approach  
“to understand Islamic politics less on the basis of Islamic doctrine, or conflicts over 
its interpretation, than in connection with the changing social bases of politics, the 
context established by capitalist economic transformations, the evolution of the post-
colonial state from the Cold War and its aftermath, and of crises of political economy 
in the 1980s and 1990s” (Hadiz and Teik 2011, 463).  
Arguing along the same lines, and emphasizing the necessity of shifting the focus away from 
the discussion of “religion” to argue in favor of a focus that highlights political struggles and 
material interests, Angela Joya (2018 a) provided a compelling reading of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s actions in Egypt based on their integration into both the capitalist economy and 
the post-colonial state  (Joya 2018 a, Kindle Location 2603). She argues that the Brotherhood 
not only accommodated authoritarianism, but also neoliberal capitalism. The Brotherhood’s 
critique of the neoliberal model, which laid the burden on the poor and the working class, is 
premised on a moral stance that did not address neoliberalism’s structural effects on the 
subordinate classes (Ibid). In a similar vein, Katerina Dalcoura (2016) discussed how the 
Brotherhood adopted a form of “pious neoliberalism” that sought to displace Mubarak’s 
cronies and replace them with pious businessmen.  
 In this dissertation, I adopt this political economy approach to examine the 
relationship between authoritarianism and organized religious groups and to reflect on their 
relationships with the subordinate and dominant classes. I argue that in the context where 
religious organizing is autonomous from the state and capital, it can further the cause for the 
subordinate classes. In particular, it can provide an alternative space for political organizing, 
support mass mobilization, shield oppositional leaders from state repression, and provide 
spaces where inter-class alliances could be forged. Alternatively, in the context where the 
religious organizing is tied to authoritarian structure whether formally or informally, and 
where it sides with the upper classes and capital, it could impede the transition to a 
substantive form of democracy.   
 
1.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has mapped the theoretical approaches to the study of democratization processes. 
While this rich scholarship has advanced our understanding of transition processes and 
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regime change, the chapter argued that a political economy approach best explains the 
democratization process in Egypt and Brazil. The chapter therefore buids on the seminal 
contributions of RSS (1992) and Harvey (2007; 2014) to advance a political economy 
approach that will further a better understanding of the class struggles present in the two case 




Chapter Two: Egypt’s Capitalist Transformation (1952-2011) 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses Egypt’s integration into the global economy and the transition 
from state-led development to neoliberalism. It constitutes the first step of the analysis in the 
Egyptian case, allowing for a reflection on the effects of political economic restructuring on 
the material and organizational power of capital and labor. The chapter adopts a historical 
structural and political economy approach to argue that Mubarak’s three decades of 
authoritarian rule facilitated the implementation of neoliberal reforms that tipped the balance 
of class power in favor of local and regional capital. I argue that the authoritarian coalition 
that tied together the civilian and military bureaucracy, the business community, and the 
executive manifested rifts that facilitated the bloodless coup against Mubarak in February 
2011. Mubarak’s succession plan, crowning his neoliberal son to power, triggered the anxiety 
of his generals. Along with the delegitimization of the regime as a result of the class struggles 
initiated from below (Chapter 3), this condition contributed to bringing an end to Mubarak’s 
long rule. 
This chapter is inspired by the political economy approaches that returned to the study 
of Egyptian politics in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings (Hanieh 2011, 2013). Hanieh’s 
reading in particular is the one that inspires this chapter’s understanding of neoliberal 
transformations under Mubarak’s Egypt. The chapter moves away from Hanieh in arguing 
that as much as authoritarianism served the implementation of neoliberalism, the political 
leaders also used the realm of economic policymaking to tighten their grip and ensure regime 
survival. One is reminded that the widespread phenomena of Arab presidents for life (Owen 
2012) distinguished the politics of this region from other regions. Whereas Brazil’s 
authoritarian rule was entrusted to the military as an institution to avoid personalism and the 
entrenchment of political power in the hands of one strong leader, Egypt and the Arab world 
witnessed centralized political power in the hands of the presidencies and their close circles.  
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first one looks at Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) under Nasser’s populist regime. The second examines economic 
liberalization under Sadat as an outcome of the limits of state-led industrialization and the 
limits of Nasser’s populist regime. The third focuses on the neoliberal reforms under Mubarak 
	 80	
as they entered into effect in the wake of the first Gulf war. The discussion in each section 
focuses on the pillars of each model, the regime that accompanies each economic phase, the 
pacts of domination that were erected to ensure the implementation of the model and ensure 
regime survival, and the way state and society relations were fashioned to maintain a specific 
form of capitalism and authoritarian stability. The chapter provides the background for the 
following two chapters. Chapter 3 sheds light on the class struggles that emerged under 
Mubarak’s neoliberal authoritarianism. Chapter 4 reflects on the political economy of post-
Mubarak’s Egypt, to trace both continuity and change of the neoliberal model and to reflect 
on its effects on capital and labor. 
2.2 State Led-Industrialization under a Populist Regime (1952-1970) 
In this section, I argue that populism in Egypt was committed to confronting the 
landed elites, and thus emerged in a regime that was more biased toward low- and middle-
income Egyptians. This version of populism was upsetting for capital, which saw it as tipping 
the balance of class power in favor of the poor. In fact, the Free Officers undermined the 
power of big landowners and capital through land reforms and nationalization policies; at the 
same time, state-led industrialization amid capital’s retreat guaranteed economic 
redistribution to the popular classes marginalized by the monarchy economically and 
politically. By soliciting popular support, the FOs also built a strong base of support for their 
national and regional project.  Industrialization was projected as necessary to build the 
capacity of the Egyptian military and support Egypt’s struggle against imperialism. Pan-
Arabism and ISI were, therefore, the prerequisites for building a robust post-colonial state that 
was self-sufficient economically and militarily and that could stand against imperial threats 
and the encroachment on Egyptian lands.  
While populism maintained political and social stability under the easy ISI phase, it 
became an impediment to the more complex ISI phase. More complex capital-intensive 
industries necessitated appealing to foreign capital, and Egypt was not in the position to make 
such appeals, given that the populist regime had antagonized foreign capital through 
nationalization policies and an anti-imperial discourse. The state also could not embark on 
this phase alone, as it had exhausted its resources by overspending on costly regional wars. In 
particular, the state under Egypt’s populist regime could not pursue the stabilization policies 
(cutting wages, cutting social spending) necessary for the implementation of capital-intensive 
industries, as they challenged the interests of the regime’s base of support, the working class. 
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2.2.1 The Political Economy of the Free Officers and Nasser 
When Egypt branched out to ISI in the post-1952 Free Officers (FOs) coup against the 
British-backed monarchy, Egypt still relied on the export of cotton. In the wake of the Second 
World War, demand for cotton declined and the economy experienced one of its worst 
economic downturns. Worsening social and economic conditions alerted Egypt’s FOs to the 
necessity of overcoming the country’s twin predicaments of feudalism and imperialism, 
which were responsible for maintaining its subordinate and dependent position in the world 
economy (Smet 2015). Big landowners, chief among them members of the monarchy, 
benefiting from their privileged ties to Britain, their monopolies over the agro-exporting 
sector, and their joint ventures with European powers, expanded their wealth and extended 
Britain’s imperial interests, including the control over the Suez Canal in post-colonial Egypt 
(Smet 2015; Farah 2009).	 
When the FOs staged their coup, their central commitment was to end feudalism and 
its high levels of social and economic inequality in the countryside. It was after implementing 
the land reforms that the FOs expanded the industrial sector to overcome Egypt’s dependency 
on the export of cotton to the rest of the world, and thereby to reduce Egypt’s reliance on 
global markets for the import of local goods (Posusney 1997; Farah 2009). The national plan 
initially appealed to foreign and local capital in the industrial sector, but failed to entice 
private capital investments in the industrial sector. In turn, capital’s passivity to invest in local 
industrialization ushered in state-led industrialization, wherein the public sector played the 
most critical role (Ibid).  
Significant economic and political factors shaped capital's reluctance to invest in the 
country’s industrialization. Firstly, the Agrarian Land Reforms (ALR), the first policy 
pursued by the FOs, stipulated that land be expropriated from big landowners, capping 
landownership,	 redistributing land to the poor and landless peasants, and expanding state-
managed agriculture cooperatives (Waterbury 1983, 61; Bush 2007, 1061; Ikram 2005; Abdel 
Malek 1964; Farah 2009). At the time, a select few families controlled the underdeveloped 
industrial sector and the agricultural sector(Joya 2013; Farah 2009). Naturally, the ALR 
triggered the anxiety of this landed and industrial capital. Firstly, the landlords saw land 
reforms as an attack on their privileges, and the industrialists feared an attack on their private 
property. Secondly, the FOs’ subsequent policy move was to implement laws (Laws 317 and 
318 in 1953) that prohibited arbitrary dismissals and provided protection for workers in the 
event of dismissal for an unjust cause (Posusney 1997, 48). Thirdly, Nasser, pursued a policy 
of purging the political domain of the remnants of the monarchical past. He banned all 
	 82	
political parties and thereby closed the doors for bourgeois political representation and 
participation (Farah 2009).  
 The first and easy ISI phase started with the horizontal expansion of consumer non-
durables (food, textiles, etc.). This expansion benefited from the productive force and the 
consumption patterns of low- and middle-income wage earners (O’Donnell 1978; 1979). 
However, it was expected that an increase of local and regional demand for consumer non-
durables, textiles in particular, would increase the demand for “spinning and weaving 
machinery which in turn needed locally produced iron and steel” (De Smet 2015, 163). 
However, the transition was stalled with the saturation of the local market, the failure to 
appeal to regional markets, and regional wars that exacerbated the public deficit and brought 
ISI to a halt. Despite the failure to deepen ISI, the developmental model led to the expansion 
of the shares of the productive sectors in the economy, leading to one of the highest levels of 
growth in the country’s modern history (Annex). 
To oversee the aforementioned economic transformations, a populist dictatorship saw 
the light under Nasser. Between 1954 and 1970, Nasser ruled Egypt with an iron fist, 
becoming the embodiment of the national developmental project and the regional pan-Arab 
project, supported by the generals and backed by social classes incorporated in his populist 
pact (Hinnebusch 1981, 446). Under his populist authoritarian regime, the pact brought 
together the industrial working class, the middle class, and the peasants, who participated in 
economic transformations and who benefited from economic redistribution.  
The generals were the most important pillars of political power in populist Egypt. The 
FOs blamed imperialism and its local proxies, the feudal monarchy, for maintaining an 
understaffed and ill-equipped army (Kandil 2012, 7). A weak Egyptian army was seen as one 
of the main factors contributing to the defeat of the Arab armies in 1948 in Mandate Palestine. 
Furthermore, pre-1952 economic policies had left the industrial sector underdeveloped, which 
challenged the aspirations of the FOs of building a strong military-industrial complex that 
would assist them in their regional and anti-imperial wars. During this period, the military 
was the one overseeing both the industrialization and the modernization of Egypt (25/03/2020 
14:58Interview with Political Economist 2; Bou Nassif 2013, 512), using the statist model 
discussed in further detail below. Throughout this period, the military would provide 
technological expertise and control the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) while honing its skills 
in running businesses (Ibid; Joya 2018b, 9).  
 A strong and homogenous military with strong “bureaucratic organizational skills” 
was seen by Nasser and his fellow FOs as the only institution capable of running state affairs 
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(Harb 2003, 278). The representation of the generals in the cabinet reached a high of 64.4% of 
posts, leading to the rise of a “state within a state”: the first led by Nasser, and the second by 
his commander-in-chief, Abed Al Hakim Amer (Ibid; Stacher 2012, 44). This situation 
persisted until the 1967 defeat, when Arab armies lost the Six-Day War against Israel (Owen 
2012, 64). The 1967 defeat was the seminal moment in Egyptian history that began the de-
militarization of politics (Cook 2007; Owen 2012; Springborg 1987), a course that would 
only deepen under Nasser’s successor, Anwar Al Sadat.  
Nasser banned all political organizations and parties that challenged the 
implementation of the FOs’ project. Marxist peasant organizations and leftist trade unions had 
enjoyed wide popularity on the eve of the coup, but Nasser and the FOs viewed them with 
contempt because of the leftist promises to defy the generals’ attempt to appeal to investors, 
the capitalist developmental model, and the FOs’ dominance over politics and society (Abdel 
Malek 1964). Furthermore, Egypt’s communists challenged Nasser’s regional agenda for 
opening regional, specifically Syrian markets for Egyptian commodities, and his resultant 
quest for regional hegemony.  
While attacking the left, the FOs sought an initial rapprochement with the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB), the largest Sunni political organization in Egypt, which had been founded 
by Hassan el Banna in 1928 (Masoud 2013). Nasser’s strategy rested upon strengthening ties 
with the MB to weaken both left organizing and his senior FO competitor, Mohammad 
Naguib, who was a proponent of demilitarizing politics (Smet 2015). The MB was seen as a 
safe option for Nasser given that some FOs had previously been affiliated with it and given 
that the it did not seek radical economic policies (Posusney 1997). For example, the MB 
warned against a peasant uprising and their anti-leftist and anti-labor policies were clearly 
reflected in their discourse, which promoted purging the union movement of leftists (Ibid). 
However, the short-lived alliance between the military and the MB was brought to an end 
when the MB plotted to assassinate Nasser. Consequently, the Brotherhood, like the very 
leftist organizing against which it had united with the FOs, was banned (Smet n.d).  
After banning political parties and the MB, Nasser created the Arab Socialist Union 
(ASU), which became the institutional expression of the FOs’ populist pact with the urban 
and the rural working class and the state-dependent middle class (Ayubi 1991, 209). Though 
populism controlled the articulation of demands for the popular sectors, it did not close the 
door to their political participation. The workers and the peasants were entitled to 50% of 
seats in all ASU committees and the parliament (Abdel-Malek 1964, 42). ASU membership 
determined one’s access to the state bureaucracy, unions, and professional associations and, in 
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some cases it became a requirement to practice specific jobs (Stacher 2012, 52; Waterbury 
1983).  
Along with the aforementioned political restructuring, the state assumed 
developmental and redistributive functions. Between 1952 and 1956, the developmental 
functions of the state appealed to local and foreign investors by providing incentives for profit 
repatriation and directives for the private sector to entice private investments. The first phase 
of industrialization witnessed the rise of the Permanent Council for the Development of 
National Production, tasked with providing directives for investors and enabling a partnership 
between the state and the private sector (Farah 2009, 32). To appeal to international investors, 
the state repealed a 1947 law that required a 51% Egyptian ownership of industries, and, in 
1953, implemented Law 156, which allowed for-profit repatriation of 10% in the first five 
years and 20% in the following years, as well as a wide range of corporate tax exemptions 
(Smet 2015; Farah 2009; Ikram 2005). However, the attack on political pluralism and the 
1952 land reforms had triggered anxiety among local and foreign capital. The fear that the 
state would encroach on and nationalize their assets was the most significant factor pre-
empting capital investment (Interview with Political Economist 2; Farah 2009; Smet 2015).  
 The reluctance of capital to invest led to the expansion of the role of the state in the 
economy. Nationalization and sequestration of capital, agricultural surpluses, and 
geopolitically motivated foreign aid financed this transformation (Waterbury 1983, 76,86; 
Smet 2014). The expansion of the role of the state in the economy manifested itself first with 
investments in mega projects such as building the Aswan High Dam to provide the water 
supply for cultivable land areas and to generate electricity for industrialization (Farah 2009, 
33). The state also stepped in to stimulate the industrial sector by creating the Ministry of 
Industry to replace the failing private sector, and increased industrial investments from 2 
million EGP in 1957 to 69.3 million EGP in 1960 (Farah 2009, 34). As a result, beginning in 
1957 the industrial labor force grew at the rate of 8.5% annually (Ibid).  
The redistributive state appeased the classes that made up the populist pact. The 
peasants benefited from policies that “fixed the rent for agriculture land and rents at a low 
rate” and legislated that “rent contracts were inherited which reduced the role of property 
owners” (Farah 2009, 35).  The tenants thus became owners of the rents or lands, with 
regulations stipulating that the property owner had to seek out the tenant’s support for selling 
out the land (Ibid). Moreover, the state-created working class and middle class were 
dependent on the state’s welfare functions under Nasser, which ranged from public education 
to healthcare (Interview with Political Economist 2), and “were accompanied by policies that 
	 85	
capped the maximum wage, redistributed profits to workers (Law 111 of 1961), maintained a 
work week of 42 hours (Law 133 of 1962), gave guarantees for work stability, employment in 
the public sector for fresh graduates and a national minimum wage (law 262 of 1962)” 
(Waterbury 1983; Ikram 2005; Ramadan and Adly 2015; Posnusey 1997, 70). 
While dispensing welfare to the working-class, Nasser was also aware of the dual 
necessities of controlling the articulation of working-class agendas and of subordinating labor 
organizing to the exigencies of developmentalism. When the FOs staged their coup, they were 
met with a plural and radicalized leftist union movement that both played an essential role in 
anti-colonial struggles and challenged the FOs’ capacity to pursue capitalist development 
(Bianchi 1986; Posusney 1997; Smet 2015; A. Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 40). The first 
step for the FOs entailed outright repression against leftist unionists (Posusney 1997; Beinin 
1989; Smet 2014; Hanieh 2011). Following the purge, it took Nasser a few years to decide on 
the creation of a labor union confederation. His reluctance was due in part to the fact that the 
idea of a confederation had initially been popular among leftist unionists to put pressure on 
the government (Posusney 1997; Beinin 1989). Opening the door to labor organizing risked 
giving these leftists a voice and thereby radicalizing the working class. It was only when 
Nasser’s relationship with Yugoslavia deepened that he became aware that Egypt was still 
behind in the matter of labor organizing (Posusney 1997, 61), which encouraged him to create 
the first state corporatist structure. 
As Bianchi noted, the corporatist structure in Egypt resembled in a lot of ways the 
Brazilian CLT (Bianchi 1986). A three-layered pyramidal structure emerged, tightening the 
administrative controls of the General Egyptian Trade Union Federation (GEFTU) “over the 
federations, and the federations over local affiliates” (Bianchi 1989) The upper level of the 
union hierarchy was reserved for a 21-member executive committee and hence did not 
represent all the federations that made up the second level of the GEFTU (Posnusey 1997, 
86). This executive committee was made up mostly of regime loyalists affiliated with the 
ASU and co-opted by the regime through guarantees for various positions within and outside 
the union structure, significant material rewards (retirement packages, several salaries), and 
stability at work (Posnusey 1997, 89-90).  Decision-making was centralized in a limited 
number of federations, which were all incorporated under the single, hierarchical, centralized 
confederation structure as its second level (Bianchi 1989, 128). Federations possessed “vastly 
expanded finances and authority, and were officially guaranteed monopoly status” in 
determining the general directives for the local unions and in negotiating collective 
agreements (Ibid).  
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Subordinated to this small number of federations was the lowest level of the hierarchy, 
the unions. These unions were divided regionally and according to work categories (Interview 
with Cairo Unionist). Union unity was sanctioned by legalizing only one union at the factory 
level and at the regional level, which prevented unions from transcending occupational and 
regional divisions and appealing to the entirety of the working class. Moreover, by 
subordinating local unions to the federations, local leaders could not, for example, negotiate 
collective agreements that were not approved by federation leaders (Posnusey 1997, 87). The 
control over union dues was another area that entrenched the control of a few regime loyalists 
over the entirety of the union structure. The compulsory union tax, collected from workers’ 
salaries, was to be divided across several sectors of the union hierarchy, such that “10% were 
channeled to the confederation, 25% to the federation, an additional 25% was earmarked for 
the administrative expenses at the local and federation level and 5% were to be held in 
reserves” (Posnuey 1997, 87). This policy left the local unions with only 30% of union dues, 
over which the regime exerted tight control, so that union dues would not be used for political 
ends, by forcing unions to disburse these dues over social matters (Ibid).  
2.2.2 The Limits of State-led Industrialization under a Populist Regime   
Starting in 1965, a clear deceleration of growth was noted, reaching its worst levels in 
1968. More broadly, state-led industrialization revealed the limits of pursuing this 
developmental plan and the necessity for economic diversification. Egypt exhausted the early 
and easy ISI phase, and there was a need to open up and export Egyptian commodities abroad, 
a mission that proved to be untenable as tensions between Egypt and its regional ally, Syria, 
showed signs of the disintegrating Arab unity. At the same time, tensions with the Gulf 
monarchies also entailed that these countries were not in a position to import Egyptian 
produce.  
If Egypt had to deepen ISI, therefore, it was inevitable that the country branched out to 
develop capital-intensive industries, which was difficult to achieve. Capital-intensive industry 
development required appealing to foreign capital, given its access to credit and technological 
advancements. In the Egyptian case, this meant appealing to the former Soviet Union, as 
Nasser had antagonized most industrialized Western countries. Appealing to foreign investors 
proved to be extremely challenging amid Nasser’s anti-imperial discourse and worsening 
economic conditions. The budget deficit was exacerbated both by regional wars and the 
contradictions inherent to state-led capitalism.  The Yemen War (1963-67) and, most 
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importantly, the 1967 defeat by Israel, resulted in military overspending and hence diverted 
resources away from developmentalism (Interview with Political Economist 2).  
Moreover, deepening ISI by developing capital-intensive industries where the state 
continued to play the most significant role in the production process amid capital's retreat 
meant that the state would fulfill two contradictory goals (Smet n.d). On the one hand, it had 
to undergo a process of capital accumulation by extracting surpluses through cutting social 
benefits to finance the new phase (Wallerstein 1980). On the other hand, the populist regime 
could not achieve these objectives because it drew its legitimacy and support from the popular 
classes (Smet 2015; Interview with Political Economist 2). The populist regime thus became 
an impediment to pursuing a greater capitalist transformation; Nasser’s successors had to 
dismantle populism to overcome the roadblocks imposed by his populist and anti-imperial 
policies, which they deemed hostile to local and foreign capital because they relied on 
dispensing resources to finance the populist pact. 
2.3 Infitah (Opening) and Rentierism under Sadat (1971-1981) 
 The dismantling of populism under Sadat was synonymous with ending ISI and 
letting the market rule. This option entailed paving the way for reconciliation with capital. It 
also invited dismantling the redistributive and the interventionist state by letting the market 
determine economic priorities. Growth was no longer measured by increased production and 
consumption of consumer non-durables by lower- and the middle-income Egyptians. Under 
Sadat, growth was influenced by increasing local and foreign investment. Economic 
liberalization invited a dismantling of the trade protectionism erected under his predecessor 
and a concomitant opening up of the Egyptian market for both the import of luxury consumer 
goods and the expansion of the real estate sector (Mitchell 2002). Furthermore, the model 
relied on the improved consumption patterns of Egypt's upper classes. Consequently, an 
attack on workers' wages and income-concentration served the interests of the new allies of 
the regime, a handful of capital owners operating family businesses (Mitchell 2002). Along 
with the domestic changes, Sadat undertook a foreign policy realignment that would take 
Egypt outside of Russian influence to place it under American influence, which was also in 
line with his quest to place Egypt on a neoliberal track. The following section discusses the 
aforementioned political and economic transformations to show that Sadat tried to implement 
neoliberal policies that weighed heavily on the poor and the working class, but that he was 
forced to roll them back when the bread riots erupted in 1977. Hence, a full-fledged neo-
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liberalization of the economy did not see the light under his term; it had to wait until 
Mubarak’s rise to political power. It is also worth noting that although his term was 
synonymous with the reconciliation with capital, it did not witness a business community 
appropriating politics the way they would in Mubarak’s last years (2003-2010) to deepen 
neoliberal reforms.  
 
2.3.1 Political Restructuring, Local and Foreign Policy Realignments: Post-Populism and 
the Rise of the Presidential-Bourgeois-Bureaucratic Pact  
With Sadat’s rise to power, an authoritarian regime where the presidency emerged as 
the undisputed principal actor in Egyptian politics saw the light (Stacher 2012, 60; Droz-
Vincent 2010, 197). The 1971 constitution,15 as was the case for the 1956 constitution, 
awarded the president broad powers. The 1971 constitution was the first to allow for the 
president's indefinite re-election for more than one six-year term (Owen 2012, 67), elevating 
him to the status of the "president for life" (Ibid). Moreover, while Nasser had continued to be 
held accountable by his equals from among the Free Officers, Sadat was not accountable to 
anyone. In fact, the regime that emerged during his mandate has been described by some 
scholars as monarchical presidentialism  (Hinnebush 1981), wherein the president emerged as 
the center of political power and surrounded himself with a group of loyalists, his appointees 
hailing from among his family and his allies from the business community (Ibid). 
Monarchical presidentialism allowed him to pursue controversial and unpopular policies 
including a “visit to Jerusalem, the signing of the Camp David Peace Treaty with Israel, [and] 
the liberalization of the economy” (Owen 2012, 64).  
The post-populist presidential regime thus depoliticized and bureaucratized important 
decision-making. As Sadat pursued economic liberalization, he deactivated the popular 
sectors by excluding them politically and economically. This political and economic 
exclusion was achieved by blending repression, state corporatism, and cooptation. While the 
regime shared some of the attributes of a BA regime, there are important distinctions to be 
made between the two. Firstly, Egypt’s BA regime had revolved around the military as an 
institution, a strategy that sought to overcome the problems of personalism. The post-populist 
regime in Egypt depoliticized the military, the strongest bastion of Nasserism, and put the 
presidency at the helm of political power. Secondly, the BA regime had closed the door to 
																																																								




political participation, especially for the lower classes, but it also restricted the political 
participation of capital as well. The post-populist regime in Egypt paved the way for a façade 
of political liberalization, deemed necessary by the president to accompany the process of 
economic liberalization. This façade, paired with political pluralism, entrenched the 
presidential grip on the political realm. Reinvigorated parties were allowed to exist and 
participate as long as they were licensed by the state. Finally, the BA regime was projected to 
deepen industrialization, its primary function and the rationale for its existence. The post-
populist regime in Egypt oversaw dismantling developmentalism and foresaw transition to a 
neoliberal accumulation regime that facilitated all forms of capitalist investments, including 
the rent-seeking ones. 
The post-populist presidential regime rested on a political pact between the 
presidency, a depoliticized military, a de-nasserised bureaucracy, capital, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Sadat inherited an expanding state bureaucracy from Nasser, whose members 
started to act as state managers and to invite capital on their own terms (Farah 2009). Under 
Sadat, the bureaucracy gained access to transnational linkages, and through joint ventures 
brought the public sector and international capital together (Ayubi 1991, 340). Bureaucrats 
used their positions to accumulate capital, and their connections with local and international 
capital to create inroads for private ventures. The most famous form of public-private 
partnership was in the hotel industry, of which public capital retained the ownership while 
international capital managed it (Ibid).  
A new Infitah bourgeoisie emerged in the commercial and financial sectors (Ibid). 
Local commercial and financial capital entered into joint ventures with landed and foreign 
capital (Smet 2015, 24; Waterbury 1983, 171–88). Landed elites benefited from Sadat’s 
policies, particularly as he revoked the 1952 Land Reforms, returning vast amounts of land to 
large landowners. Landowners also made a comeback as exporters of raw material and as 
contractors. Along with the commercial elite, landowners engaged in financial speculation 
activities generating fast, and high profits (Mitchell 2002). In fact, only a handful of families 
controlled a few businesses and became “exclusive agents,” enjoying monopolies over the 
import and export of luxury commodities for Egypt’s nouveau riche (Mitchell 2002, 283). 
They carved their way first into the construction field, then distributed goods and services to 
the military, and finally took advantage of the relaxation of import restrictions under 
economic liberalization. With economic liberalization and the rise of international banks, 
capital infiltrated the growing private banking sector (Ibid). 
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 To implement economic liberalization, the president shielded himself from pressure 
by popular sectors and the proponents of Nasserism. Sadat rendered these institutions 
ineffective and depoliticized the institutions that had been the repository of populism, 
including the ASU, the civilian bureaucracy, the military, and the GEFTU (Stacher 2012).  
While populist corporatism controlled the working class by integrating them as a 
partner in the national developmental project, corporatism under the post-populist regimes of 
Sadat and later Mubarak aimed at obliterating working-class mobilization and organization, 
both deemed by the presidents and their business allies as the central impediment to the 
liberalization of the economy and as the most serious opposition to the pro-American foreign 
policy alignment pursued by Sadat and Mubarak. To that end, Sadat maintained the GEFTU’s 
structure intact and purged it of Nasserites and leftists who would oppose his liberalization 
and foreign policies. He also devised strategies to coopt the top union hierarchy (Posnusey 
1997, 110-111). Sadat convinced top union leaders to join his centrist ruling party, the 
National Democratic Party (NDP), discussed below, and to drop the idea of creating a labor 
party, which he considered tantamount to opening a Pandora’s box for a greater, and 
unthinkable from his perspective, democratization of state and labor relations and 
consequently of the regime as a whole. At the same time as he recruited the top union leaders 
into the ruling party, he incorporated this union leadership into his political project, which 
included the peace process with Israel, the main source of controversy at the time (Ibid, 111). 
In the wake of the 1977 bread riots, he pursued another brutal campaign that purged unionism 
of leftists and Nasserites wherein leftist unionists were arrested and given punitive transfers or 
fines (Ibid). He then ordered the creation of the Office of Socialist Prosecutor, which banned 
all of those who were deemed threatening to the “divine laws of the state” from running for 
elections, which in turn closed the door to all of those unionists who opposed his economic 
and foreign policies (Ibid).  
In a similar vein, the purge targeted the Nasserites in the state bureaucracy and the 
ASU. As Sadat came to power, he was met with a very hostile cabinet and strong Nasserite 
ministers who did not view his rise favorably.16 As was the case for the GEFTU, Sadat would 
pursue a purge at the level of the bureaucracy, known as the “1971 corrective revolution” that 
got rid of Nasserites and those within the ASU who proposed to make the presidency more 
accountable to a broader collective power elite (Hinnebusch 1985, 41). The purge ended with 
the arrest and jailing of “the majority of the ASU executive committee and several ministers 
																																																								
16 See Egypt’s Contemporary Pharohs (BBC 2016). 
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and ASU cadres” (Aoudé, Ibrahim 1994, 11). The president wanted to de-Nasserize the ASU 
before dismantling this strong bastion of populism. He was aware, however, that he could not 
undo the ASU immediately, given the broad popular support that Nasser enjoyed despite the 
1967 defeat.   
It was only after the corrective revolution that Sadat allowed the ASU's disintegration, 
combining this strategy with a policy of controlled political pluralism. The rationale behind 
the adoption of a multiparty system went as follows: with the erosion of the populist pact, and 
as economic liberalization promised to trigger political upheaval, the new regime would 
absorb the tensions by allowing some form of political representation, confined to state-
controlled political parties (Brynen et al. 2012, 149). Controlled political liberalization paved 
the way for political parties and political organizations to exist. However, these parties were 
rendered ineffective through cooptation and repression.  
 In the process of eliminating Nasserite voices within the ASU, the president allowed 
its disintegration into three parties (Stacher 2012; Waterbury 1983, 366-384).  The first, the 
National Progressive Party (Tagammu’), created from members with different tendencies 
including leftists, Nasserites (former ASU), and the Muslim Brotherhood, became a leftist, 
albeit state-created, party (Smet 2014). In subsequent years, the leaders of the Tagammu’ 
collaborated with the regime to spy on leftist activists and intimidate them (Interview with 
Journalist; Cairo Unionist). Another party that emerged from the disintegration of the ASU 
was the Liberal Party, the first state-created party in post-Nasser Egypt that represented and 
supported free-market economics. Finally, the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) 
claimed to stand somewhere between statism and a free-market economy, but ended up 
supporting Sadat’s choice to pursue Infitah (Roccu 2012, 106). The NDP, as Joshua Stacher 
argued, was "toothless" and was subordinated to the presidency (Stacher 2012, 54). 
Political liberalization paved the way for the re-emergence of the formerly banned 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and a plethora of Islamist movements.	 Between 1971 and 1975, 
Islamist prisoners were released and politicians and journalists in exile were given general 
clemency (Hinnebush 1985). Sadat, who alienated Nasser’s political base of support, needed 
to forge an alliance with new allies, and the choice fell on the Brotherhood. Sadat would first 
use the Brotherhood and the Islamist movements to tame the leftists and Nasserites of the 
student movement, who were skeptical of Sadat’s domestic and foreign policies from the very 
beginning. Neither Nasserites nor leftists supported the corrective revolution, seeing it as an 
attack on Nasser’s legacy. It is worth noting that the left was critical of Nasser’s policies, but 
they also recognized his anti-imperial stance and his support for the Palestinian cause.  
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As a result of this affinity, both the Nasserites and the leftists would press Sadat from 
the very beginning to launch an offensive against Israel to restore Arab dignity after the 1967 
defeat and to reclaim the lands that Israel occupied in 1967. Sadat was reluctant to pursue this 
option immediately, and he paved the way for Islamists to assault leftist and Nasserite 
students to tame and silence them. Islamists shared Sadat’s reluctance to go to war, as they 
argued that the only way out of the 1967 defeat would be through Islamization. In 1972, as 
Sadat declared that he would not pursue the war option at the moment, Islamists stormed a 
Nasserite and leftist meeting at Cairo University and assaulted those in attendance, accusing 
them of insulting the Islamists and their religious faith. As they did so, the internal security 
forces sat on the margin, which made it more explicit that the MB and the security apparatus 
collaborated perfectly (Smet 2015; Wickham 2013).17 The arrest of a large number of leftists 
and Nasserites by the security forces along with the expansion of Islamist activities and the 
blessings that they received from the president would mark the prospects for conflict and 
collaboration between organized religious groups, the Islamists in particular, and the left and 
Nasserites in the future. To this day, leftists and Nasserites would recall these incidents and 
highlight how the Islamists handed them to the security apparatus and opposed the “war 
option” under Sadat.18  
 Sadat would pursue more openly policies that would strengthen the Islamists at the 
expense of the left, which he deemed as the most important threat to his foreign and economic 
policies. In the wake of the 1972 clashes, Sadat would award Islamists an informal 
recognition, in the sense that he would allow them to establish their social institutions and 
operate them but at the same time he would withhold official political recognition, 
undermining their capacity to become an official political party (Wickham 2013). In return, 
the Islamists, with their largest and most representative group, the Brotherhood, would pursue 
a gradual and reformist option to Islamize society and the state and would commit to 
relinquishing the violent option initiated by the famous MB ideologue, Sayid Qutub. Hence, 
the Islamist student associations benefited from state tolerance and state subsidies to cater to 
the lower-income students, providing them with social services at reduced tariffs and 
absorbing the students' energy into their ranks, thereby contributing to the de-politicization of 
the student body through focusing on “indoctrination rather than politicization” (Wickham 
2013, 67). The permissiveness toward the MB was determined by another critical factor: the 
class base of the Brotherhood and its economic program, which melded well with Sadat's 
																																																								




neoliberal policies. Most of the MB leadership hailed from a middle class of professionals 
who had been forced into exile under Nasser and were given general clemency under Sadat. 
As they sought job opportunities in oil-rich countries, they returned with petrodollars, which 
boosted the revenues of the rentier state. The MB also used this money to expand their 
Islamic charities and hence their political clout (Clark 2011). Islamic welfare thus thrived and 
benefited from Sadat's attack on the public sector (Smet 2015, 186).  
The president pursued policies of de-nasserization within the military and devised 
coup-proofing strategies, including the de-politicization of the military, the demilitarization of 
politics, and the expansion of the military economy. While Nasser had ruled with the consent 
of the FOs and was held accountable by them,19 Sadat made sure that the military was 
transformed into an "auxiliary for the state rather than a repository of autonomous power" 
(Statcher 2012, 60). Sadat oversaw military appointments, and he occupied the highest 
position, the Supreme Commander of the Army. Through policies of divide and rule, and 
turnovers within the military ranks, the president made it impossible for any general to boost 
his popularity within the military and consequently pre-empted a potential coup. Military 
officers’ career stability was thus governed by their loyalty to the presidency (Ibid, 61). The 
adoption of Law 47/1978 reduced the number of military officers in the cabinet. For example, 
Sadat’s last cabinet had only two generals holding two portfolios: the ministry of defense and 
the ministry of foreign affairs (Springborg 1987, 5).  
The President’s resolute steps to pursue foreign policy realignment placed the armed 
forces of the largest Arab country under American and Israeli influence. Egypt, which had 
once pioneered pan-Arabism and anti-imperialism, was now the first Arab country to sign the 
first peace agreement with Israel, the Camp David Peace agreement. Consequently, the 
military became closer to Western capital, drawing from the latter financial support, training, 
and technological know-how for the expansion of their own and civilian industries (Joya 2018 
b, 10). Camp David became a sin qua non for a steady flow of American aid to Egypt. On an 
annual basis, the USA channeled 1.5 billion $, of which 1.3 billion $ were earmarked for 
Egypt’s generals, which cemented the military’s alliance with the USA (Hanieh 2011). A 
cable leaked by State Department overtly stated that “the tangible benefits to our military-
military relationship are clear: Egypt remains at peace with Israel, and the US military enjoys 
priority access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace” (Harding 2011). 
																																																								
19 This condition would remain true until 1967 when the defeat ushered in curbing the military’s influence over politics. 
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 Sadat tied the FP realignment to his economic liberalization policies. He viewed the 
continuous war situation with Israel as a serious impediment to political stability that 
discouraged foreign and local investors. A war situation with Israel had also deprived Egypt 
of Suez Canal and tourism revenues, while exacerbating the problem of military 
overspending. At the same time, he appealed to Egypt’s former Arab enemies, the Gulf 
monarchies. As he did so, he invited oil-rich Gulf capital to invest in Egypt and pursued 
opening the Gulf market to the absorption of the cheap Egyptian labor power. Hence, 
immigrant remittances and Gulf aid became vital revenues under Sadat (Stacher 2012, 66).  
 
Sadat also devised clever strategies to deal with a large and demobilized military in 
order to preempt a potential coup d’état. He involved the Egyptian military in economic 
liberalization and set the stage for the rise of the largest corporation in Egypt, led by the 
generals, the “Military Inc” as well described by leading scholar, Robert Springborg. The 
military economy would flourish later on under Mubarak (Springborg 1987, 5; Stacher 2012, 
63;  Joya 2018 b, 9; Bou Nassif 2013) but its architecture was erected under Sadat. In addition 
to the Ministry of Military Production, which runs a number of industries, the Arab 
Organization for Industrialization (AOI)20 was created in 1975 and the National Service 
Projects Organization (NSPO) in 1979. The AOI runs a number of industries (12 industries in 
2012) that have benefited from Western technical assistance and Gulf capital to initiate the 
production of weapons and oversee their export to the Global South (Annex). AOI would later 
branch out to several types of civilian production, including the purifying of water and 
production of cars, computers, ambulances, and many more products (AOI 2019). NSPO runs 
a number of industries (20 industries in 2019) and oversees civilian production of consumer 
non-durables for the purpose of creating a condition of self-sufficiency for the armed forces. 
It is also involved in a number of projects for land reclamation and agricultural production, 
the creation of gas stations, constructing highways and other construction projects, as well as 
the creation of military-run marble, cement, and chemical industries.21 By virtue of law 
32/1979, the military walled off its economic activity from civilian oversight. In fact, the 
industries that are managed by Military Inc. are not subject to external review from the 
parliament or any other civilian body, which deepened the financial and institutional 
autonomy of the military (Sayigh 2012, 17). The architecture of Military Inc. would set the 
stage for collaboration between the military and private capital and at the same time would 
																																																								
20 For the industries and activities of AOI see: https://www.aoi.org.eg/index.php?lang=ar 
21 See the NSPO website: http://www.nspo.com.eg/nspo/ar/about_nspo/index.html 
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also usher in a change to the military’s economic plan. While in the past it had been involved 
in the production of consumer non-durables geared toward lower-income purchasers, it now 
started to produce consumer durables aimed at the armed forces and the upper classes 
(Springborg 2018). 
 
2.3.2 Opening (Infitah) and Rentierism  
With this bureaucratic and political restructuring, Sadat pushed for the adoption of 
Infitah (opening). The policy opened Egypt to local and private investments (Hanieh 2011; 
Waterbury 1983; Farah 2009; Ikram 2005). From the beginning, Sadat provided a wide range 
of guarantees for capital encoded in the 1971 Constitution and Decree 65 of 1971. At the 
heart of these guarantees were safeguards given for capital against the nationalization of 
private assets and protections for private property rights (Mustafa 2007, 70). However, only 
50 projects were approved between 1971 and 1974 (Ibid), which made Sadat aware of the 
necessity of waiting for a riper moment to declare liberalization as an official national 
economic policy. By doing so, he hoped to boost capital's confidence in the Egyptian 
economy. Fearing popular resistance to the unpopular policies that he was planning to pursue, 
Sadat launched his offensive against Israel in 1973 and emerged as the "Hero of the Crossing" 
who restored dignity to Egyptians after the 1967 defeat. The 1973 war provided a protective 
shield for the implementation of his 1974 October Paper and for his resolute declaration that 
Egypt would step into "liberalizing its economy and opening it for foreign and Arab 
investments" (Ibid).  
The 1974 October Paper allowed for the adoption of Law 43 of 1974, a blueprint for 
Egypt’s economic liberalization. Sadat gave broad guarantees for capital, including the 
possibility of importing technologies, downsizing the public sector, and expanding the role of 
the private sector in the economy by considering any public-private venture a private one, 
enabling the creation of free zones with flexible labor standards, giving tax exemptions for 
private capital, and enabling the repatriation of profits and capital abroad. He also dismantled 
protectionist measures that had been awarded to the working class under Nasser. Sadat 
repealed “labor representation on management boards, the profit-sharing formula with 
workers (25%) and the (maximum) salary ceiling applied to the public sector” (Mustafa 2007; 
Waterbury 1983). When private investments did not pick up, Sadat adopted Law 32 of 1977. 
The new law allowed foreign investments in Egypt in all fields, exempting new investments 
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from tariffs and taxes for a minimum of 5 years and equalizing the treatment of Egyptian with 
foreign capital to appeal to Egyptian investors abroad (Mustafa 2007; El Tarouty 2015).  
 Despite the incentives provided to local and foreign capital, investments remained 
low. A decade after liberalization, the new investments only offered “74 946 jobs for a labor 
force of 11 million” (Mustafa 2007, 77). Most of the projects were in non-productive sectors 
such as tourism, construction, and the financial sector (Waterbury 1983, 144).22 Both local 
and foreign capital sought fast and high profits at the expense of development (Waterbury 
1983; Mitchell 2002). The Constitutional and legal guarantees were simply not enough to 
appeal to investors. As Mustafa noted, Sadat continued to “invite capital without institutional 
safeguards against expropriation” (Mustafa 2007, 73). Hence, a hostile and unreliable 
bureaucracy along with corruption and inefficiency led the president to intervene personally 
to authorize specific projects (Waterbury 1983, 144).  
 The economic transformations that opened up the Egyptian economy and rolled back 
state interventionism were accompanied by an overt attack on the state’s redistributive 
functions. From the beginning, Sadat was keen to cut public spending. The president 
inaugurated his term by proposing wage compression for public sector employees, but was 
quickly forced to roll back his decision amid a massive wave of strikes (Smet 2015, 182; 
Posusney 1997). In 1977, Sadat initiated talks with the IMF. Securing an IMF loan was 
conditional upon cutting public spending, to which Sadat responded by lifting subsidies on 30 
essential commodities,23 including sugar, rice, and gasoline, and canceling incentives on 
salaries for public sector employees Political Economist 2).  
These governmental decisions were met with the 1977 Bread Riots (Ibid). The main 
protagonists were workers in the public sector, students, and civil servants who engulfed 
Egypt's important cities, taking the president by surprise and forcing him to roll back his 
decisions. In two days, the military was asked to brutally end the public anger, killing 79 
civilians and wounding 800 (Mustafa 2007, 72). Instead of downsizing the public sector, 
Sadat was then forced to expand it. Public-sector employment reached a high of 32% in 1981 
compared to 9% under Nasser (Ikram, 2005, 37). Employment in the civil service went from 
28% in 1962 to 35% in 1979, and state subsidies rose from 7.7% in 1971 to 58.6% in 1980 
																																																								
22 A closer look at investments during this period shows that Egyptian investments accounted for 61% of all investments (24% by the public 
sector and 37% by the private sector) (Ibid). Most of the projects implemented were geared toward the banking and financial sectors (54%), 
and only 23% were in the industrial area (More 1986, 639). Arab investments reached 23%, and Western investments remained at a 
relatively low rate of 16% (Farah 2009, 31). Arab investments were geared toward free zones (72%) and the construction sector (40%). High 
and rapid profits were sought by both local and foreign capital at the expense of development (Ibid). 
23 These commodities included for instance: bread, cigarettes, gasoline, sugar, flour, corn, sesame oil, beans, meat, tea, rice, textiles, and 
clothing. 
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(Waterbury 1983, 242). Between 1978 and 1980, the monthly minimum wage increased from 
16 EGP to 25 EGP (Posusney 1997, 138). 
To finance the wage and subsidy bills, Sadat became entirely reliant on foreign loans and 
rents, setting the stage for Egypt’s chronic deficit and debt problem (De Smedt 2015; Farah 
2009; Interview with Political Economists 1 and 2). The diversification of foreign aid 
assistance and rents was governed by Egypt’s changing regional role. Oil-rich Gulf 
monarchies gained independence in the early 1970s, and the 1973 oil boom encouraged them 
to hire more migrant workers, including Egyptians. Sadat facilitated the export of Egyptian 
labor power to Gulf countries by enshrining the right to work abroad in the 1971 Constitution 
and removing all restrictions such as exit visa requirements (Hanieh 2011, 11). By 1979, 
Egyptian immigrant workers returned 2 billion $, equal to Suez Canal revenues (Ibid).  The 
reconciliation with Gulf monarchies also resulted in large amounts of Gulf aid, a “3.2$ billion 
loan which ended up exacerbating Egypt’s debt problem” (Mustafa 2007, 73). Besides Gulf 
money, rent revenues expanded in the wake of the 1979 peace accord with Israel to also 
include Suez Canal and tourism revenues as well oil and foreign aid (Smet n.d, 21). 
Rentierism therefore brought Egypt back, full circle, to the problems of dependent 
development. The Egyptian economy was subservient to immigrant remittances, regional and 
international stability, as well as to stable oil prices. The limits of rentierism, which financed 
political stability, were once again exposed under Sadat’s successor, pushing the latter to sign 
loan agreements that exacerbated public debt and a budget deficit and integrated Egypt in a 
vicious circle of loans and borrowing.   
2.4			Egypt’s	Neoliberal	Experience	under	Mubarak	(1981-2011)	
While Mubarak walked in Sadat’s footsteps, he was more “successful” in 
implementing neoliberal policies. This section argues that the deepening of neoliberal reforms 
during Mubarak's term weighed heavily on the popular sectors, and benefited the ruling 
family, the business community, and the generals. I also argue that Mubarak’s strategies in 
the last years of his rule antagonized his traditional base of support: the civilian and military 
bureaucracy. The distance between the Mubarak regime and the generals materialized when 
Mubarak attempted to turn against the bureaucracy in general by empowering his neoliberal 
son, Gamal. While Mubarak prepared for his son's succession, he conferred vast privileges on 
a small group of business tycoons who made fortunes through financial and real estate 
speculation and market monopolies (Mitchell 2002; Smet 2015). Mubarak also paved the way 
for the business community to start appropriating the political arena while marginalizing the 
old guards, particularly the military. The growing feelings of marginalization from politics 
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and the feelings that a potential encroachment on the military's economic and institutional 
interests would take place under Mubarak's neoliberal son facilitated the bloodless coup 
against Mubarak in 2011. Hence and along with the de-legitimization of the Mubarak regime 
by the class struggles (Chapter 3), the disintegration of the ruling alliance would bring about 
an end to Mubarak's long rule in 2011.  
2.4.1 The Presidency, the State-Dependent Business Community, and the Generals 
Neoliberal reforms were implemented over just two decades, the business elites 
wanted to speed up the process, deeming the "inefficient" public sector the major impediment 
to market reforms. I argue in this section that Mubarak's succession plan entered into conflict 
with his coup-proofing strategies. These contradictions manifested themselves at the level of 
the socio-political pact that had maintained Mubarak’s regime for thirty years, precipitating 
his removal by the 2011 revolution.  
Under Mubarak, the regime maintained the attributes of Sadat's presidentialism, but 
there were also important transformations that happened at the level of the state that allowed 
Mubarak to enforce the implementation of neoliberal policies. Mubarak emerged as the 
longest-standing dictator, ruling Egypt for three decades, with a project to transfer political 
power to his neoliberal son, Gamal. The centralization of power in the hands of the 
presidency was applauded by IFIs, who saw this centralization as key to circumvent the 
bureaucratic and popular resistance to unpopular neoliberal policies (Hanieh 2013, 64-65; 
Abdelrahman 2015, 11; Brynen et al 2012, 229). Consequently, these institutions, along with 
the unwavering American support for Egypt, the second largest recipient of US aid in the 
region, financed political stability and turned a blind eye to political reforms (Brynen et al 
2012). 
Important changes within the state apparatus have also taken shape to ensure the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms and to maintain Mubarak’s authoritarian coalition. 
Neoliberal authoritarianism had to cultivate a domestic, social, and political base of support 
(Hanieh 2013, 65). Hence, Mubarak’s authoritarian coalition tied the presidency to the 
civilian and military bureaucracy who were increasingly eclipsed from politics and replaced 
by a handful of state-dependent neoliberal businessmen and neoliberal ideologues trained at 
the World Bank and the IMF. Neoliberal policymaking became the realm of the president, his 
family, and the financial instruments (the central bank and the ministry of finance) as well as 
important think tanks (such as the Egyptian Center of Economic Studies (ECES)) that were 
created with the support of USAID and powerful businessmen (Ibid; Abdelrahman 2015, 9). 
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The details of the state-dependent business community’s appropriation and restructuring of 
politics (the ruling party, the parliament, the cabinet) will be discussed shortly, but it is worth 
noting here that state functions were upgraded to cement Mubarak’s pact with the proponents 
of neoliberalism. The state became the main instrument for transferring wealth from the poor, 
the working class, and the middle class to capital. For example, “in Egypt spending on 
subsidies dropped from 14% of government expenditures in 1980-1981 to 5.6% in 1996-
1997” (Hanieh 2013, 69) and at the same time more than three quarters of the energy 
subsidies were consumed by the business elites (Abdelrahman 2015, 11). Moreover, to deal 
with the popular resistance to neoliberal policies, the regime expanded its spending on the 
coercive apparatus. For example, expenditures in the interior and defense budgets exceeded 
the combined education and health spending between 2005 and 2010 (Hanieh 2013, 69). 
Compared to Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia, Egypt ranked second after Jordan “with 12.9% of 
government expenditures spent on both the internal security and military” (Ibid). 
The president was aware of the necessity of shielding his regime from opposition from 
within and in particular from the bureaucratic opposition to his neoliberal policies. Hence, he 
pursued altering this pact and tipping the balance of power in favor of the business class, 
given that his son was an investment banker who did not enjoy the favor of the senior military 
officers and the bureaucracy at large. Under Mubarak, the pact erected under Sadat continued 
to exist, but the rapprochement between the business community and the Mubarak regime 
became explicit in the few years of Nazif’s term, which widened the gap between Mubarak 
and the bureaucracy at large. This gap fomented the feelings among military officers that they 
were being relegated to the secondary order while they had previously occupied a center stage 
and especially in the economy (Joya 2018 b). 
To relate the discussion back to Chapter 1, the Egyptian case is a case wherein the 
military benefited from the Mubarak regime; the military grew autonomous over the years 
and developed economic interests of its own. It also coexisted for too long with the state-
dependent business community. However, while the state-dependent business community had 
high stakes in grooming Gamal to power, the succession project could not see the light given 
that the Egyptian military developed into the largest and strongest entrepreneur under 
Mubarak’s rule and had an eye on preserving a regime that would protect its privileges. The 
following section pays attention to this dilemma by examining the relationship between 
Mubarak and the state-dependent business community and the relationship between Mubarak 
and the military.  
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2.4.1.1 The Business community and the Mubarak regime  
In this section, I argue that the state-dependent business community reaped the 
benefits of the neoliberal reforms and attempted to tip the balance of class power in their 
favor in the last decade of Mubarak’s rule. It was not only that these businesses remained 
dependent on the Mubarak regime; the latter also relied extensively on their support to ensure 
the political succession project.  This combination of a state-dependent business community 
and a regime dependent on the politically connected business community undermined 
prospects for businesses to push further a democratization of the regime. 
The market reforms discussed in the following section ceded public assets and public 
land to the politically-connected businesses, and supplied them with cheap and unregulated 
labor power along with free access to natural resources and energy subsidies in return for their 
political quiescence (Mitchell 2002; Adly 2009; Abdelrahman 2015, 11). During Mubarak's 
term, the politically-connected businesses, a total of 32 individuals controlling 500 firms 
(Cammett and Diwan 2016, 86), exerted market monopolies over crucial sectors of the 
economy such as the iron, steel, telecommunications, food, and cement industries (Adly 2009; 
Abdelrahman 2015, 11). Even as they became responsible for the largest share of debt to the 
public banks, their debts were written off due to their political connections (Roll 2010, 357).  
By 2006, "0.19% of clients benefited from 51 % of credit extended to the private sector. 
Thirty large corporations accounted for about 40 % of total credit supply, and 28 from this 
group received in total 13 % of the overall credit" (Roccu 2013 a, 65). 
This politically-connected business community was aware of the necessity of 
appropriating politics to ensure the deepening of neoliberal reforms to a level where a handful 
of politically connected business tycoons could reap the benefits of market reforms. During 
Mubarak's term, the state-dependent businessmen shared the political and economic space 
with Egypt's "pyramids," the resilient and robust bureaucracy, chief among them the military. 
Furthermore, given that they had not yet fully appropriated politics, they held the bureaucracy 
responsible for slowing down the pace of neoliberal reforms (Interview with Political 
Economist 2), hence their resolute steps to control the presidency on the basis of the centrality 
of this institution to Egyptian politics. In pursuit of their agenda, the members of the business 
community were aware of the necessity of controlling the NDP and restructuring the party 
along neoliberal lines, thereby ultimately controlling parliament and the cabinet. 
Hence, they endorsed Gamal's succession and supported it ideologically, politically, 
and financially. On an ideological level, the neoliberal businessmen established their think 
tank: the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES). ECES published studies that 
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supported neoliberal reforms. Its members linked the ruling party, the think tank, and the 
cabinet (Roll 2010, 365; Abdelrahman 2015, 9). Businesspeople also mobilized privately-
owned media to promote the succession project, and financed Mubarak's electoral campaigns, 
ran on NDP lists during parliamentary elections, and supported the restructuring of the NDP 
along neoliberal lines (El Tarouty 2015). On the political level, the neoliberals staged a "soft 
coup" (Interview with Political Economist 2). This soft coup entailed restructuring the NDP, 
to eclipse the old guard of the regime, the representatives of the resilient bureaucracy from 
within the ruling party, and thereby to transform the NDP into a platform that enabled the 
articulation of neoliberal policies.24 The strategy materialized with the appointment of Gamal 
to the NDP’s Strategic Policies Secretariat. With a group of other neoliberal technocrats and 
businessmen, Gamal framed party politics along neoliberal lines and opened the doors for his 
friends from the business technocratic communities to join the ruling party (Roccu 2012, 
193).  
Accompanying the transformations within the political party were the transformations 
in the parliament and the cabinet that paved the way for the acceleration and the deepening of 
neoliberal reforms. Politically connected businesspeople ran for parliamentary elections, won 
seats in the People's Assembly, and controlled parliamentary committees. Between 1995 and 
2005, the number of seats controlled by businessmen increased from 8 to 150 out of 444 seats 
(Joya 2011, 370). Their control over politics took shape with the appointment of Ahmad 
Nazif as prime minister (2004-2011). Nazif centralized decision-making in a troika of 
businesspeople and technocrats trained at the World Bank and the IMF, who began one of the 
most aggressive waves of accumulation by dispossession. The troika worked closely with the 
business tycoons who were in charge of critical governmental portfolios such as tourism, 
trade and industry, transportation, housing, agriculture, and health. They divided the spoils 
between each other so that each businessman/cabinet member operated a family-owned 
business in his portfolio (Joya 2011; Adly 2017, 10; Abdelrahman 2015, 10). 
2.4.1.2 The Generals under Mubarak  
In this section, I argue that the military benefited from the privileges that it acquired 
under the Mubarak, but as an institution it was not tied via blood or ethnic ties to the Mubarak 
regime. Under Mubarak, the military was not a repressive apparatus protecting the interests of 
the neoliberal elites; rather, it unfolded into the largest corporation in Egypt, defending its 
own capitalist ventures whenever needed. Under Mubarak’s rule, military interests could be 
																																																								
24  For a discussion of the transformation at the level of discourse with the NDP see: 
http://ahramonline.azurewebsites.net/NewsContentP/1/2576/Egypt/Economy,-not-politics-in-NDP-conference-.aspx  
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summarized in the following manner: the military’s aspiration to control the defense budget 
and continue shielding it from civilian control; the protection of the military’s privileged 
position in the civilian bureaucracy and the SOEs, providing avenues for enrichment 
especially for senior and loyal military officers; the protection of the military's vast economic 
and business ventures; and maintaining a pro-American foreign policy that in turn maintained 
a steady flow of US military aid (Sayigh 2012). Although the Mubarak-dependent business 
community started to reap the benefits of neoliberalism from the late 1990s onwards, the 
military was not totally marginalized. In fact, the private sector needed the military’s approval 
(as it controlled large tracts of land); expertise in important areas including real estate, 
agriculture, and infrastructure; and technological know-how. Hence, the military and the 
private sector would cooperate together, although the military would have to accept the 
expansion of the neoliberal elites’ interests and spheres of influence in the economy (Joya 
2018 b, 8; Abdelrahman 2015, 21-22). Moreover, although the military industries and 
economy were geared toward satisfying local demand for the local markets (with the 
exception of the arms exports), they also become deeply embedded in networks of 
cooperation with regional and transnational capital. Hence, the military’s economic ventures 
thrived under Mubarak, but they had to co-exist and share the realm of economics with NDP 
businessmen. 
To start with, there was no “ideational link” between the EAF (Egyptian Armed 
Forces) and the presidency, in contrast to the strong ties forged between his predecessors and 
the army (Bou Nassif 2013, 515). As some have noted, Mubarak’s discourse focusing on 
“stability” did not appeal to the army (Ibid), hence the necessity of devising strategies that 
ensured the army’s loyalty to the presidency. Furthermore, unlike Sadat, he did not pursue 
divide and rule strategies within the army ranks nor frequent turnovers (Bou Nassif 2013, 
516); rather, he coopted the military officers, manipulating his power to appoint them and to 
reward them materially. As the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, he retained total 
control over the appointment of the post of Commander in Chief, the promotion above the 
rank of Brigadier, and dismissal of popular military leaders (Bellin 2004). 
Loyal officers were given key cabinet positions (the ministry of defense, military 
production, and civil aviation and local development), post-retirement jobs in the state 
bureaucracy,25 and managerial positions in state-owned enterprises.26 Retired generals were 
																																																								
25 For example the chairmen of the strategic Suez Canal, Alexandria, Port Said, Damietta and Red Sea ports were all generals, (see Bou Nasif 
2013, 523).  
26 For example all “transportation sectors, public utilities, the Cement industries in all provinces, tourism and food industries”  (See fSayigh 
2012, 16-17) 
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local governors controlling around 40% of all governor posts and permeated all aspects of 
civil service (Bou Nasif 2013, 517; Sayigh 2012, 16; Abdelrahman 2015, 23-24; Harb 2003; 
Joya 2018 b, 8). As the number of people living below the poverty line increased to nearly 
25% by the end of Mubarak’s term, the generals in “civilian jobs” earned astronomical 
salaries (Sayigh 2012, 17).  
The military was awarded large tracts of land, a legacy of Nasserism that was then 
justified by the necessity of defending national security. Mubarak’s law 143/1981 awarded 
the Ministry of Defense control over lands for ‘strategic use’ (Joya 2011, 372). This law gave 
the generals strong bargaining position vis-à-vis local and international capital, with the latter 
becoming dependent on the military’s approval to cede land for the private sector. As some 
have argued, the “most notable example in the 1990s and 2000s is the role that former 
officers-turned-governors played in collaborating with the Ministry of Housing to facilitate 
the transfer of public lands to private sector and accumulate wealth for themselves in the 
process” (Joya 2018 b, 8). Avenues for self-enrichment presented themselves as the generals-
turned-governors sold valuable land at less than the real value for private investors, incurring 
heavy losses for the public treasury (Bou Nasif 2013, 518).  
The expansion of their economic ventures into every aspect of civilian and military 
production was facilitated by the architecture of Military Inc. discussed above. The military 
benefited from access to land, raw materials and cheap labor power (the military conscripts), 
and its unique access to technological know-how from Western countries. All these factors 
led to a situation wherein, under the charismatic leadership of Marshall Abu Ghazala (1981-
1989),27 the military expanded its production of consumer non-durables (food, water, etc.), 
luxury consumer durables (computers, cars, jeeps, etc.), housing (for both low- and high-
income purchasers), military-run clubs and hotels, and public works contracts (Sayigh 2012, 
17; Springborg 2018; Joya 2018 b, 10).28 Furthermore, the Abu Ghazala years witnessed the 
expansion of the military industry and an astronomical rise in arms exports.29 The subsequent 
two decades would witness the rise of the neoliberals; the pressure on privatizing state assets 
presented itself and the military “was thrown on the defensive” while trying to protect its 
interests (Joya 2018 b, 13-14). However, despite the important changes, their share of the 
																																																								
27 See also a discussion of the expansion of the military economy under Ghazala in the CIA reports (1987, pages 3-4). 
28 For their economic activities see the AIO, MOD and NSPO websites. Bou Nasif (2013)  noted that 70% of the AIO production is civilian 
production while 40% of the MOD production falls in the relam of civilian production (Bou Nasif 2013, 526). 
29 For the arms exports , see Index Mundi : https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/egypt/arms-exports 
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economy was estimated to be somewhere between 25% and 40%.30  
As Egypt's largest and main entrepreneur, the military managed important partnerships 
with foreign and regional investors (Sayigh 2012, 17). By the end of Mubarak's rule, the 
military was the leading partner for Gulf investors. With the Kuwaiti group Kharafi and Sons 
the military controlled the International Pipe Industry Company, the "largest producer of oil 
and gas in the region" (Stacher and Marschall 2012). With Denmark, Hong Kong, and France, 
the military invested in maritime projects worth tens of billions of dollars (Ibid). The 
military's share of the energy sector was estimated to overwhelm the Ministry of Petroleum's 
share. The military owned shares in the state-owned oil company, Tharwa Petroleum, and 
collaborated with Chinese, Italian, and Canadian firms on energy-production projects (Ibid). 
Furthermore, the generals inserted themselves as middlemen in the lucrative arms deals 
businesses furthering the interests of specific arms corporations who have in turn disbursed 
vast sums of cash to the generals (Bou Nasif 2013, 528).  
However, whereas the military played a very intrusive role under Nasser, the 
military’s coercive role was rolled back in the wake of the 1967 defeat, a situation that would 
deepen under Sadat and Mubarak (Smet 2014; Droz-Vincent 2010). This role was conferred 
on a depoliticized police force staffed with regime loyalists and commissioned with 
maintaining “internal security” by smashing public dissent (Droz-Vincent 2010, 198). The 
General Intelligence Service (GIS) and the Interior Ministry’s State Security Investigative 
Service (SSIS) were the two main tools used by Mubarak to silence opposition, with the GIS 
being the “the more powerful of the two as it reached out to dissidents inside Egypt and 
abroad” (Brownlee 2011). Internal security forces reduced Mubarak’s dependence on the 
military’s “coercive and repressive capabilities, a bargaining chip for most militaries in the 
Arab world” (Droz-Vincent 2010, 198).  
While the military budget consistently exceeded the sums allocated to the security 
forces, the defense budget's growth was negligible compared to the ministry of interior's 
budget (Sayigh 2012). Furthermore, during Mubarak’s term the share of the military 
expenditure from the GDP was dramatically reduced (Annex). To add to the feelings of 
competition with the internal security apparatus, the military was alarmed by the fact that the 
security apparatus recruited 1.5 million people in 2010, which was also the equivalent of four 
times the size of the military (ICG 2012). 
																																																								
30 Of course actual data on the size of the military economy is not available given that its activities are walled off from civilian oversight. 
Joshua Stacher and Sana Marshall, “Egypt’s Generals and Transnational Capital”, Middle East Report On Line (MERIP), Spring 2012:  
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer262/egypts-generals-transnational-capital 
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Hence, while the Mubarak regime protected and extended the interests of a state-
dependent business class, the military, the repressive arm of the state, was not charged with 
protecting business interests. Instead, this mandate was conferred on the internal security 
forces, and the military defended its own businesses. While this was arguably a tacit strategy 
to deprive the military fof its bargaining chip, it actually shielded them from public calls for 
retribution for the human rights abuses under authoritarianism. It was the internal security 
forces, rather than the military, that became the center of such criticism on the eve of the 2011 
revolution. This condition enabled the military to play an overt role in deposing the dictator 
and in inserting itself as the key political actor in post-Mubarak Egypt. 
In sum, Mubarak’s multi-layered strategy aimed at coup-proofing his regime 
succeeded in keeping the military docile for nearly thirty years; however, it did not totally 
shield the dictator from the possibility of military defection. Ironically, this strategy at times 
antagonized military officers and at others gave them ample opportunities to draw their 
autonomy from the regime by expanding their economic ventures. As the military was 
committed to expanding its economic ventures, it sought to protect its privileged position as 
the largest corporation in Egypt rather than protect the interests of the neoliberal business 
community (Stacher and Marshall 2012). In fact, the generals’ main concern was that while 
Gamal was trying to project himself as a "reformist," his policies were geared toward 
privileging the businesses of his close allies. This situation urged the military to produce 
higher quality and cheaper commodities, and to “improve the quality of their work in the 
hotel industry and compete with private firms to attract critical foreign investment” (Joya 
2011, 137). Gamal also promised to downsize the public sector and replace the military 
managers of SOEs with his fellow businessmen, who would in turn put the career paths of the 
officers-turned-bureaucrats at stake (ICG 2012). Hence, while the military had previously 
benefited from Mubarak’s policies, it started to view the succession project with skepticism, 
which facilitated the military’s withdrawal from the pact that sustained Mubarak’s regime for 
three decades. 
2.4.2 Two Decades of Neoliberal Reforms  
This section focuses on the market reforms that transferred wealth and income from 
the poor and the working class to the upper classes and capital.  The reforms included an 
attack on the redistributive and interventionist state, i.e. labor market deregulation, subsidy 
policies, cuts on public spending such as health and education, taxation policies, land reforms, 
and freeing the prices of rents, as well as a shift from a developmental to a predatory state that 
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oversaw the liquidation of the public sector. I argue that, from the perspective of class power, 
the neoliberal decades were synonymous with the cannibalization of the public sector, driving 
the living and working conditions for the majority of Egyptians in a race to the bottom, while 
benefiting a handful of upper-class elites. The reforms are discussed in the chronological 
order of their implementation to make explicit how the Mubarak regime tried to circumvent 
resistance to the neoliberal agenda by starting with land reforms, privatization, and the 
changing of the laws of investments to accentuate and accelerate the process of accumulation 
by dispossession, under the last cabinet of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif. The deepening of 
accumulation by dispossession took shape with labor market deregulation, taxation laws, and 
the rolling back of state subsidies aimed at low-income and middle-income earners, along 
with an aggressive attack on the private sector, all of which increased the levels of income 
inequality and unemployment. The chronology is therefore essential to discussing how this 
race to the bottom, which reached its apogee under Nazif, ushered in the most significant 
wave of strikes, ultimately delegitimizing the regime in power and setting the stage for the 
2011 revolution that would in turn lead to the jettisoning of Mubarak (Chapter 3).  The 
intensity and chronology of the reforms is also essential to understanding how the rifts 
between neoliberal business elites and the bureaucracy started to take shape and deepened 
under Nazif's mandate. These rifts set the stage for divisions within the ruling coalition that 
would facilitate Mubarak's removal and the rise of neoliberal militarism in post-Mubarak 
Egypt. Before delving into free market reforms, the following section discusses the context of 
the signing of the 1991 ERSAP agreement. 
Hosni Mubarak initially declared that he would distinguish himself from his 
predecessor. His first statements revolved around reinvigorating the role of an interventionist 
state in planning, supporting the industrial sector, and opening court cases against the corrupt 
Infitah bourgeoisie (Sulaymān 2011). It shortly became clear, however, that Mubarak was 
walking in Sadat’s footsteps at both the domestic and the international levels. Under his 
mandate, the limits of rentierism were exposed with the advent of the 1985 oil bust (Roccu 
2013; Sulaymān 2011; Smet 2014; Farah 2009). Declining rents and growing government 
expenditures worsened the budget deficit and exacerbated Egypt’s debt problem (Sulaymān 
2011; Interview with Political Economist 1 and 2). In less than a decade, external debt 
doubled, reaching a high of $45.676 billion in 1989,31 while the budget deficit reached 20% 
of GDP (Farah 2009, 41; Joya 2013).  
																																																								
31 For Data on External Debt see the World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.DOD.DECT.CD?locations=EG. 
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Only a "miracle could have saved the economy" (Interview with Political Economist 
1; Sulaymān 2011); a miracle that happened when Iraq invaded Kuwait (Ibid). In exchange 
for Mubarak's support to the US-led coalition in the war, creditors forgave Egypt's debts. 
Between 1990 and 1994, half of Egypt's foreign debt was canceled and the other half was 
rescheduled (Adly 2014, 70). Debt relief was made conditional on Egypt's signing of the 1991 
ERSAP agreement with the IMF, which integrated Egypt into a vicious cycle of foreign debt 
and borrowing and at the same time the relationship between Mubarak, the USA, the Gulf 
monarchies, and Israel warmed up significantly.  
With the adoption of neoliberal reforms, Egypt became totally subservient to 
American imperialism. Besides the Egyptian collaboration with the U.S in the first Gulf war, 
the two countries collaborated in the wake of 9/11. The USA outsourced torturing terrorist 
suspects to Egypt. A BBC report featured “Egypt’s prime minister who acknowledged that 
since 2001, the USA transferred more than sixty detainees to Egypt as part of the ‘war on 
terror’” (Naguib 2011). Furthermore, “Egypt kept the Suez Canal open to US warships that 
were to devastate Iraq” during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq (Ibid). In Israel’s 2006 war on 
Lebanon, “the Egyptian regime was a staunch supporter of Israel’s plan to destroy Hezbollah, 
and it orchestrated an intensive media campaign demonizing Shiites and fuelling Sunni-Shiite 
sectarian tension” (Ibid).  
At the local level, the neoliberal reforms were implemented gradually to ward off their 
political costs. Mubarak's nightmare, like that of every ruler, was the 1977 Bread Riot 
(Interview with Political Economist 1). Against this background, the negotiation and 
implementation of neoliberal reforms took shape gradually under four prime ministers. 32 
One of the first pieces of reform was Law 96 of 1992, which dismantled Nasser's land 
reforms. Law 96 was passed by a parliament where seats allocated to peasants were controlled 
by big landowners connected to Mubarak (Roccu 2012). The landed bourgeoisie reclaimed 
lands, lifted the ceiling on land rents, and proposed the liberalization of rent, leading in some 
cases to prices as high as 400% of their original (Abedelrahman 2017; Hanieh 2011). The law 
also paved the way for evicting peasants from their lands, fomenting a crisis of landless 
peasants, rural unemployment, and poverty (Abedelrahman 2017; Joya 2013; Smet 2015, 
2014).  
																																																								
32 Atef Sedky (1986-1996) facilitated the negotiation of the ERSAP agreement and oversaw its early implementation. Kamal Al Ghanzoury 
(1996-1999) introduced changes to the laws governing investment, introduced early retirement schemes, and oversaw the privatization of a 
large number of SOEs (Joya 2013). Atef Ebeid (1999-2004), whose term was marked by the rise of political opposition to Mubarak's foreign 
and domestic policies, was forced to slow down the pace of reforms. Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) presided over the businessmen’s cabinet, 
which oversaw the most aggressive attack on the public sector and workers' rights. His term was synonymous with the most significant wave 
of privatization, as well as with rising unemployment, an amendment of the taxation laws, and rolling back of the state subsidies aimed at the 
poor and lower-income Egyptians. 
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Law 203/1991 exacerbated the question of unemployment and informality.33 The law 
provided the blueprint for privatizing the public sector and dealing with Nasser’s state-owned 
industries and enterprises in preparation for downsizing the public sector. The Egyptian 
government adopted IFIs’ views, depicting the public sector as “inefficient,” and “draining 
the resources and slowing economic growth” (Hanieh 2013, 50). To improve market 
efficiency, IFIs recommended privatizing 314 SOEs (Ibid), of which 174 were documented 
by the World Bank (Annex). Such recommendations were made at a time when the privatized 
SOEs were profitable34 and hiring more than a million workers (approximately 6% of the 
labor force) (Mitchell 1999, 458).  
In order to contain the inevitable working-class opposition, privatization was framed 
as a culmination of socialist principles encoded in Article 4 of the 1971 Constitution. Articles 
30 and 33 of the 1971 Constitution stipulated, “Public assets have their sanctity.” 
Policymakers justified privatization on the basis that it would “extend ownership to all 
Egyptians” and promote “widespread access to capital ownership through the democratization 
of capital” (Interview with ECES Researcher; Hanieh 2013, 51).	 An Employee Shareholder 
Association (ESA) was created to give 10% of the shares of privatized companies to workers 
in an attempt to co-opt and demobilize them (Weizz and Wurzel 1998, 118). In reality, 
however, most of these promised profits were never disbursed. By 2016, the workers in an 
Alexandria Cement industry privatized in 1994 were still protesting the disbursement of these 
profits (Group Interview with Cement Industry workers).  
As was the case for agricultural reforms, privatization invited non-developmental rent-
seeking foreign and local capital. This challenged IFIs’ assumptions that privatization could 
deal with the public sectors’ inefficiency.35 The manufacturing/industrial sector was struck by 
the privatization deals (Annex), leading to a clear policy of de-industrialization. Moreover, 
the Egyptian government sold SOEs beneath their actual value to generate fast revenues 
(Interview with Tanta Flax Unionist). Investors bought cheap and sold dear or closed the 
factory altogether and exported subsidized raw materials to another plant in another country 
(Interview with ECESR Researcher). Workers lamented the fact that their factories, which 
they had built with their fathers and in which they operated 10 to 12 lines of production, were 
sold for the value of one line of production. The Alexandria Portland Cement factory	and 
																																																								
33  Arabic Text of the Law on the Regulation of Public Sector Companies (Law 203 of 1991) available at 
http://www.egypt.gov.eg/arabic/laws/download/newlaws/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%20%D8%B1
%D9%82%D9%85%20203%20%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A9%201991.pdf  
34 The fact that they were profitable public enterprises was stated in a 2002 USAID report entitled “The Results and Impact of Egypt's 
Privatization Program”: http://www1.aucegypt.edu/src/wsite1/Pdfs/Results%20and%20Impacts%20of%20Privatization%20in%20Egypt.pdf 
35 For this line of argumentation, see USAID Report (2004): Privatization in Egypt: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdaca341.pdf 
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Tanta Flax and Oil Company are only two examples of many corrupt deals (Group Interview 
with Alexandria Cement Workers, Interview with Tanta Flax Unionist, Interview with 
ECESR Researcher).  
The combination of a non-developmental state and non-developmental capital 
expanded the services sector at the expense of the productive sectors (Annex). Furthermore, 
privatization did not lead to job creation; instead, unemployment reached its highest levels 
following the aggressive waves of privatization (11.3% in 1995; 11.2% in 2004; Hanieh 2013, 
53). The situation was exacerbated by the decision to adopt a program of early retirement 
schemes supported and applauded by USAID.	36 In 1996, early retirement schemes reduced 
working-class density at the factory level, reduced labor costs, and undermined the power of 
labor organizing to prepare industries for privatization, making them more appealing for 
investors.37  
Mubarak's commitment to downsizing the public sector and inviting the expansion of 
the private sector required amending the laws of investment. A first law (230/1989) appealed 
to investors by equalizing foreign with local investors, opening the door for investments in 
reclaiming land and cultivating desert lands, and providing a wide range of tax exemptions 
leading to the loss of much-needed state revenues (Sulaymān 2011, 123). The law was 
amended in 1997, allowing private capital to invest in the strategic oil, natural gas, and 
financial sectors. The law also stipulated that the state could pass public lands to investors 
“free of charge.” Far from increasing investments, the law paved the way for the ruling class 
to transfer natural resources and land to the regime’s regional allies. A case that caused public 
discontent was the transfer of 100,000 Feddans (1 Feddan = 0.42 hectares) by former PM 
Ghanzoury to one of Saudi Arabia’s wealthiest men, Al Walid Bin Talal. Hussein Salem, a 
former security officer, an Egyptian businessman, and a close friend of Mubarak, came under 
also public scrutiny before and after the revolution, for stepping into the gas sector and 
forging deals to sell cheap gas to Israel.38  
While opening strategic sectors for private capital and privatizing most sectors of the 
economy, the Mubarak regime embarked on its attack on labor standards to make Egypt more 
appealing for private businesses. This process took shape in several steps: first by introducing 
tercerization through placement agencies, and later by instituting labor market deregulation 
with the adoption of Law 12 of 2003.  
																																																								
36  See the USAID’s articulation of support for early retirement 
http://www1.aucegypt.edu/src/wsite1/Pdfs/Results%20and%20Impacts%20of%20Privatization%20in%20Egypt.pdf 
37 On early retirement, see the Land Center for Human Rights report (LCHR): http://www.lchr-eg.org/archive/77/77-17.htm. 
38 For the corrupt business deals under Mubarak, see the study by Amr Adly (2011) Mubarak A State of Corruption.  
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Mubarak’s Egypt witnessed the proliferation of placement agencies hiring temporary 
workers with no occupational or social protection (Interview with Cairo-based Unionist and 
Former EITUF member).39 Placement agencies were illegal as per the 1981 and 2003 labor 
laws, which prohibit a third party from mediating the relationship between workers and 
employees (Ibid). However, owners of these agencies served the regime's objective of making 
work contracts more flexible, and collaborated with the national security apparatus to shield 
their activities from public scrutiny (Ibid). Unregulated temporary work permits gave leverage 
for employers to abstain from complying with necessary safety measures. For example, Egypt 
was home to highly polluting industries such as the cement industry; a large number of 
European multinationals relocated to Egypt to avoid regulation back home (Interview with 
Suez Unionist). As one of my interviewees argued, "cement is very thin and toxic. They do 
not protect them from inhaling the thin cement powder. They will die from cancer” (Interview 
with Cairo unionist and Former EITUF member).  
Furthermore, for temporary workers, work remains temporary no matter how much 
time a worker spends at the workplace. Consequently, they are not entitled to a pension, 
social benefits, or bonuses (Interview with Cairo-based Unionist). Workers recruited 
temporarily argued that management gave them false promises of job permanence, which 
fueled working-class resistance, as will be shown in the next chapter (Group Interview with 
Cement Industry Unionists; Interview with Unionist in a Billing Company). Temporary work 
also created divisions in the same factory between temporary and permanent workers, a 
strategy adopted by management to obstruct solidarity at the factory level. “You end up with 
1000 permanent workers and 17,000 temporary workers. The two are doing the same job” 
(Interview with Cairo unionist).  
For a while, awaiting the adoption of Law 12 of 2003, early retirement schemes and 
temporary work contracts circumvented what the international financial institutions and the 
business community deemed "rigid" labor standards. Many unionists and activists described 
the 2003 law as the "businessmen law," since it formalized arbitrary dismissals and shielded 
employers from any punitive measures in cases of wrongdoings. The law legalized 
indefinitely renewable fixed-term contracts, putting workers in a limbo situation that left them 
always at the mercy of the employer to renew their contracts (Abdelrahman 2015). Workers 
were hired for a three-month probationary period during which the employer could declare 
the termination of work at any time. What is more, the 2003 law allowed punitive measures 
																																																								
39 See the following article on Temporary Agencies in Egypt: http://albedaiah.com/news/2016/08/15/118944 
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against activist workers. An employer could legally dismiss a worker caught up "collecting 
money, distributing publications, collecting signatures or organizing for meetings." The law 
also did not enforce any measures against an employer who violated occupational safety.40 It 
gave legal coverage to deindustrialization by enabling the employer to define investment 
priorities and close the factory if he deemed it necessary.41  
In return for driving workers' conditions in a brutal race to the bottom, the law 
recognized and regulated for the first time collective bargaining procedures and the right to 
strike. However, it placed all pertinent decisions on these fronts in the hands of the corporatist 
federation, with the latter being depicted by workers as a collaborator with the business 
community and the neoliberal ruling elites (Interview with Alexandria Unionist; Cairo 
Unionist).  The tightening of the corporatist grip over the working class was vital for the 
Mubarak regime to overcome the GEFTU opposition to the 2003 labor law. On the right to 
strike, the law imposed insurmountable conditionality to meet its requirements for a strike, 
including a 2/3 majority vote of the corporatist federation and a notification from the 
employer and administrative authority. In other words, it required approval from the same 
actors who have the highest stakes in breaking a strike: the employer and the corporatist 
federation. The law also prohibited strikes in "strategic establishments," politicizing the 
strikes and leaving the final decision for the prime minister. It, therefore, gave more leverage 
to employers to use this legal ambiguity to their advantage and dismiss workers under the 
pretense that strikes were held in "strategic establishments." Law 12 of 2003 fomented legal 
fragmentation among the working class to shield the Mubarak regime from pressure 
(Interview with Labor Journalist 2). The law regulated the private sector and the "public 
business sector" created in the wake of privatization, while public sector employees and civil 
servants were regulated by another set of laws (Law 2/1978 and Law 4/1978 respectively). 
This fragmentation was reflected in a critical demand for the working class: the 
national minimum wage. The minimum wage is one of the most complex issues in Egypt. 
First of all, the national minimum wage only applies to the public sector. The president set the 
minimum wage at 35 EGP (equivalent to 5 USD per month) before signing the 1991 ERSAP 
agreement (Omar and Abdelatif 2012). The actual minimum wage in the public sector has 
been frozen since then,	and supplemented by yearly bonuses (Posnuey 1997, 141). By 2009, 
“there were more than 40 different laws and 55 decrees regulating the public sector pay 
system,” creating disparities across different sectors of the economy (Abdelhamid and 
																																																								
40 See the Revolutionary Socialists:  http://revsoc.me/publications/34611/34644/ 
41 Article 196 paved the way for a businessman to close partially or entirely a workplace provided that “they include the reasons for the 
closure and the number of workers to be laid off.” 
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Baradei 2010, 5). With the neoliberal turn, the expression of the minimum wage as a 
percentage of per capita GDP was one of the lowest in the world, decreasing “from 60% in 
1984 to 19.4% in 1991/92 and further to 13% in 2007” (Hanieh 2011, 13).  
The attack on wages and work conditions was paired with tax policies that generated 
revenues from Egypt’s lower- and middle-income earners, while protecting the interests of the 
business community and the upper classes. The GST and personal income tax combined 
constitute the primary source of revenue for the state. While the Egyptian government 
projected GST as indiscriminate, it was the lower classes that bore the brunt of the sales tax 
(Sulaymān 2011, 110). In a similar vein, income tax constituted 48% of tax revenues for 
2007/2008. A 2005 reform reduced the “tax for the higher income bracket from 32% to 20%” 
(Hanieh 2011, 13). To further appeal to the upper classes, the Egyptian government generated 
only 1.5% of tax revenues from property tax. Likewise, under the logic of improving Egypt’s 
competitiveness in the international market, a flat corporate tax rate of 20% was introduced in 
2005 (Hanieh 2011, 13). The low price was defended on the basis that previous tax rates were 
too high (32% and 40%) and encouraged tax evasion, which incurred losses for the public 
treasury (Sulaymān 2011, 116).  
Another strategy aimed at extracting income from the poor, the middle class, and the 
working class to reallocate it to the rich and wealthy manifested itself in the subsidy policy. 
Under Nazif, bread subsidies were slashed from a high of 55.8% in 2003 to 11.4% in 
2005/2006 (Annex). While reducing bread subsidies, Mubarak increased fuel subsidies to the 
benefit of the industrial sector (Annex). In 2007, “45 factories received up to 65 % of the total 
energy subsidies allocated for the industrial sector, which constituted around 25 % of the total 
energy subsidy” (Adly 2014, 4). Rolling back subsidies was paired with freezing public 
spending on health, education, and public housing (Annex; Cammett et.al 2015, 69). At the 
same time, the quality of public services deteriorated, inviting an expansion of the private 
sector. With the erosion of wages, the majority of Egyptians but especially the poor and the 
working class were unable to access the quality education and healthcare provided by the 
private sector (Interview with Suez Unionist, Alexandria Unionist).	42  
 Two decades of neoliberal reform created social and economic disparities. An 
increasing number of Egypt’s “nouveau riche” and businessmen lived in gated communities 
while informal settlements expanded. By 2008, Egypt’s slum population reached 60% (Sabry 




the education and health sectors of funding drove Egyptians into poverty. A relentless race to 
the bottom exacerbated the situation of the rural and urban working class. With the state's 
strategy of downsizing the public sector and curbing public spending, those who were lucky 
enough to earn a permanent job turned it into private property (Obeid 2012). For the majority 
of Egyptians, work became ever more flexible and precarious. 
2.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I traced Egypt’s capitalist transformation. In Egypt, the populist regime that 
emerged under Nasser was a function of a state-led industrialization. When the model reached 
its limits, it became necessary for Nasser’s successor to dismantle populism and replace it 
with a post-populist presidency that centralized decision-making in the hands of the executive 
to oversee Egypt’s economic liberalization and neo-liberalization. However, Sadat inherited a 
wide range of challenges. First of all, while he dismantled Nasser’s foreign and economic 
policies, he could not easily deal with the resistance of public-sector employees and the state 
bureaucracy that had expanded under Nasser’s state-led industrialization. Secondly, the 
resistance from these sectors invited him to deepen the rentier aspect of the economy, which 
then also became governed by regional and international stability. Sadat brought Egypt back 
full circle to the dependency that had preceded the 1952 coup and expanded Egypt’s public 
debt. Mubarak inherited these dilemmas and pursued a slow-paced implementation of 
neoliberal reforms. Mubarak’s authoritarianism was deeply embedded in a neoliberal model. 
This chapter confirmed Hanieh’s (2011) thesis that Mubarak’s authoritarianism served to 
enforce a model that kept large sectors of the Egyptian population in poverty and deprivation 
while benefiting a small circle of neoliberal businessmen and senior military officers. As will 
be shown in the next chapter, these policies would create avenues for the delegitimization of 
his rule from below. I have also shown that in Egypt, the conditions pertaining to the schisms 
between the state-dependent business community and the military were present under 
Mubarak. However, these divisions were not conducive to enabling a transition to civilian 
rule for several reasons. The first relates to the state-dependent business community, which 
remained committed to defending Mubarak’s regime. The Egyptian business community was 
not antagonized by Mubarak’s policies in the way that the local business community was 
antagonized by the military in Brazil. The second factor related to the military, which had 
equally benefited from Mubarak’s policies but had an eye on preserving a regime that would 
extend its economic and foreign policy interests.  This entailed that the military remained 
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committed to keeping Egypt under the US’ influence and to maintaining neoliberalism while 
reaping its benefits. Hence, a transition to civilian rule that could promise to tip the balance of 
class power in favor of the subordinate classes was inconceivable for the military. 
Furthermore, these military interests that were clearly opposed to enabling a transition to 
civilian rule were shielded from citizens, and the military received support from the 
population. As a result, it was Mubarak and his cronies who were blamed for corruption and 
failed economic policies, while the military was totally shielded from public scrutiny.  
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Chapter 3: Resisting Mubarak’s Neoliberal Authoritarianism: Class Mobilization under 
Mubarak and the 2011 Revolution 
3.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 2, I traced the shift in Egyptian regime structure to a neoliberal police state 
that became subservient to American imperialism. This chapter argues that the January 25, 
2011 revolution did not happen in a vacuum. Rather, the chapter embeds the 2011 revolution 
in the class struggle that took shape during the three decades of Mubarak’s neoliberalism. 
Here, I illustrate the second step in this dissertation: linking mass mobilization, class 
organization, and inter-class alliances to the pressure for democracy. The existing literature on 
social class mobilization in Egypt under Mubarak’s term has mostly focused on working-class 
mobilization with some (Beinin 2016) making the argument that workers were not the ones 
responsible for bringing about a revolutionary crisis; others (Obeid 2012; Adly and Ramadan 
2015) have emphasized the protagonist role of the workers, arguing that they are the “social 
soul” of the revolution, with workers’ participation initiating the demands for “Bread, 
Freedom and Social Justice” (A. Alexander and Bassiouny 2014). Still others focused on the 
ways in which the working class shifted from defending populism toward forging a new 
identity born from their struggles under neoliberal authoritarianism, assuming greater hostility 
and combativeness toward capital and the state (El Mahdi 2011). Some have moved beyond 
the focus on the formal working class to account for the varieties of social and political 
mobilization under Mubarak’s rule (Abdelrahman 2015). While this literature points to the 
absence of movement formation, it does not provide an explanation as into why inter-class 
alliances failed to materialize; instead, it focuses on the divisions between the liberals and the 
Islamists and how such divisions impeded prospects for unity and democratization (Ibid).  
This chapter borrows from this rich literature, but it moves away from it in several 
ways. I argue that, in the Egyptian case, a horizontal, grassroots spread of labor action and 
mobilization from the bottom became defiant to the regime’s economic interests and 
ideological hegemony. The horizontal spread of workers’ mobilization and the contestation 
among peasants and urban subalterns challenged the hierarchical structures of the ruling 
party, the corporatist federation, and the regime’s pact with the business community. 
Workers’ strikes inspired strikes and mass mobilization among the state-dependent middle 
class (civil servants), the residents of the urban peripheries, and the peasants, who mobilized 
against their dispossession under neoliberalism and police brutality. As workers challenged 
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Mubarak’s neoliberalism, they tore down the corporatist structure that had kept them under 
tight control for decades. Furthermore, the emergence of workplace committees and in some 
cases of independent unions contributed to forging horizontal ties between workers and 
imposed the working class as a bargaining partner on the business community.  
In Egypt, inter-class alliances were not totally absent, but they were relatively weak 
and did not culminate with workers, peasants, and urban subalterns viewing their struggles 
against processes of dispossession as historically connected, a pre-requisite for them to be 
able to articulate an alternative agenda to authoritarian neoliberalism. My focus in this chapter 
is less on the divisions between the Islamists, the liberals, and secular voices, which has 
captured the interest of media circles and the scholarly community. My interest, instead, is in 
explaining why inter-class alliances did not reach the level of becoming defiant enough to the 
regime in place. I argue that there are two main factors that explain this gap. First of all, as I 
argued in Chapters 1 and 2, the regime in Egypt was not committed to democratization. 
Rather, Mubarak upgraded his authoritarian rule and prepared his son to inherit his position, 
which left no room for workers, peasants, or subaltern classes to hone their political skills and 
to pursue the politicization of their struggles. Secondly, I argued that in the context of 
authoritarian regimes, organized religious groups can play an important mediating role and 
can provide alternative avenues for mobilization and organization. In Egypt, the largest and 
most influential religious organization, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), did not play a role in 
mobilizing the subordinate classes along class lines and kept the poor and the working class 
tied to its Islamic agenda. Moreover, as I will show, the few civil society organizations, 
NGOs in particular, and the political parties that were allowed to exist under neoliberal 
authoritarianism could not fill the vacuum of alternative pro-poor and pro-labor organizing.  
This chapter contributes to the RSS (1992) arguments on capitalist development and 
democracy, pertaining specifically to the question of the contradictions under capitalism that 
usher in mass labor organizing and that in turn apply pressure for democracy. While still 
accounting for a central contradiction upon which the RSS (1992) literature on capital and 
labor is founded, it complements this contradiction with a reading of accumulation by 
dispossession under neoliberalism and the struggles born from this process (Harvey 2014; 
2003). While workers were struggling against the assault on wages, work stability and the 
privatization of their factories, the peasants and the urban subalterns paid with blood as they 
contested the processes of accumulation by dispossession. As neoliberal authoritarianism 
could not exist without the expansion and deepening of the police state, the struggles led by 
Egypt’s urban subalterns, the peasants, and the working class were also crucial for 
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challenging the assault on their civil and political rights and the fear instilled by the regime. 
One is reminded that the 2011 revolution took place on Police Day and raised the slogan of 
Karama (dignity), demanding a restoration of the dignity of citizens assaulted and humiliated 
by the security forces. I have argued in Chapter 2 that Egypt’s subservience to American 
imperialism was a necessary prerequisite for the implementation of neoliberal policies. As a 
result, the struggles of the independent middle class (students, intellectuals, political activists, 
etc.) who started to rise against Mubarak’s foreign and domestic policies also contributed to 
the wider struggles that delegitimized his authoritarian neoliberalism and paved the way for 
more audacious working-class confrontation in the last years of his rule. Only a reading 
rooted in the horizontal spread of these struggles can offer a full understanding of the 
protagonists of the 2011 revolution. The chapter illustrates these arguments by focusing on 
the transformation of corporatism under Mubarak. It then moves to the class struggles under 
Mubarak’s regime to finally address subordinate-class participation during the 18-Day Revolt 
that began on January 25, 2011. The last section is the conclusion. 
3.2 Corporatism under Mubarak: The Union Arm of Mubarak’s Neoliberalism  
I argue in this section that the Mubarak regime, like its predecessor, maintained the 
union hierarchy intact but coopted the union leaders and incorporated them into the neoliberal 
economy. The GETUF, which had been previously the strongest bastion of statism, had been 
gradually transformed into Mubarak’s union arm, giving the semblance that the only 
federation in Egypt, representing the entirety of the working class, supported his neoliberal 
policies. The regime strategies (manipulating union elections and coopting the top leadership, 
tying them to the NDP, and incorporating them in the neoliberal economy, all while 
criminalizing and silencing all non-NDP affiliates) were aimed at insulating the regime from 
working-class resistance to neoliberal reforms. The strategies also closed the door to those 
who wanted to transform the union structure from the bottom up, making it harder for those 
militant unionists who opposed Mubarak’s neoliberalism to promote an alternative identity 
from within the union structure. It was because of such regime strategies that anti-corporatist 
labor organizing that working-class resistance came about from outside of the corporatist 
structure. These forms of anti-corporatist organizing, as will be discussed in the following 
section, took the shape of factory committees that marginalized the coopted and ineffective 
corporatist unions and imposed workers as bargaining partners on the business community. 
Another form of alternative organizing was the independent unions; however, the latter were 
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not as pervasive, nor were they representative of the entirety of the working class. They 
remained much more confined to few work categories among civil servants. The following 
section pays attention to Mubarak’s strategies for unionism to transform the corporatist 
structure into the union arm of neoliberalism. The section also pays attention to the limits of 
these strategies and the way they became vulnerable to transformation.  
Mubarak, like Sadat, was aware of the necessity of securing a loyal union membership 
to support both his electoral campaigns and his neoliberal agenda. To this end, union elections 
were held, but were manipulated by the regime. Purging the federation of Nasserites and 
leftists in the previous years had not eliminated the regime’s fears that they would re-conquer 
the union hierarchy from below (Posusney 1997). In fact, the first few years of Mubarak’s 
rule were marked by a liberalization of the political realm, allowing for a freer atmosphere for 
union elections. This political liberalization strategy was in line with his policies of economic 
liberalization. However, the consequences of liberalization were dire. As soon as elections 
were held, the local levels witnessed an unprecedented turnover (almost 50% in 1987), with 
leftists fielding 400 contestants and almost half of them winning seats in the 1987 union 
elections (Ibid, 123). As the freer union elections coincided with the renewed working-class 
militancy and mobilization discussed below, the Mubarak regime became aware of the 
necessity of tightening the regime’s grip over the electoral process and of thereby making it 
almost impossible for any candidate who was not directly affiliated with the ruling party to 
run for union elections at the local level, closing the door to a reconquest of the union 
hierarchy from below. Furthermore, as per article 19 of the 1995 trade union law,43 anyone 
who had been convicted of a crime or arrested could not run for election, which automatically 
undermined the capacity of any activist, in particular leftist unionists and Nasserites, many of 
whom had been given prison sentences previously based on their political identity or 
activism. 
Even in the cases where the candidates were not stripped of their civil and political 
rights, the regime imposed insurmountable constraints on their capacity to run for union 
elections if they were not clearly affiliated with the ruling party. For any candidate to be able 
to run for union elections, he had to complete a year of union membership. Otherwise, he was 
immediately excluded. For those who had been members for at least a year, the process of 
getting their membership document from the federation’s central headquarters in Cairo posed 
																																																								
43 The trade union law that governed their operations was first Law 35 of 1976, promulgated under Sadat, but it was amended under Mubarak 
to become Law 1995. See the ILO: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=13925 (Accessed January 2018). For the 
Arabic text of Trade Union Law 1995 see: https://www.aljazeera.net/specialfiles/pages/536961d8-8f73-4687-9c7e-3de45711cd70 (Accessed 
January 2018)  
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a severe strain on their work. Workers outside Cairo were forced to seek permission to 
sacrifice a workday to obtain the document (Beinin et al. 2010). To silence opposition leaders, 
GETUF leadership, in alliance with the security forces, exerted pressure on the federations to 
withhold the abovementioned document for workers deemed “subversives” (Barakat and Ali 
2003). The highest echelon of the union hierarchy, which was also totally subservient to 
Mubarak, thus played a direct role in deterring people from running for union elections.  
Furthermore, the GETUF leadership silenced militant candidates whenever they 
challenged their control over the union structure. When a unionist in the Ministry of 
Manpower in Giza gathered the highest number of votes in the 2006 local elections and 
subsequently demanded an equalization of pay for all ministry employees in all provinces, the 
GETUF leadership froze her membership (Interview with Giza unionist; A. Alexander and 
Bassiouny 2014). The federation accused her of destabilizing the public order and of inciting 
workers to protest (Interview with Giza Unionist). A similar case transpired in the Suez 
Shipment facility. The leader at the facility level remained loyal and close to the rank-and-
file, which in turn triggered the anxiety of the GETUF. As was the case for other opposition 
leaders, the GETUF higher management intimidated him and made sure that he would never 
make it to the upper echelons of the GETUF hierarchy (Interview with Suez Unionist).  
With this heavy interference in union elections, the pro-Mubarak candidates ran on 
slates facing almost with no opposition; union elections were thus completely stripped of their 
competitive content, giving way to “elections by acclamation.” In other words, candidates 
loyal to the regime were declared victorious, since they were the only candidates running for 
their position as a result of the high levels of government meddling in union affairs. In 2006, 
“out of 1,805 local union committees, 805 were elected by acclamation […] the executive 
boards of 15 out of 23 general unions (federations) were chosen by acclamation. The 23 
members of the GETUF executive committee were elected by acclamation” (Beinin et al. 
2010, 30).  
As of the mid 2000s, the judiciary started to side with the working class to expose the 
corruption and violations at the level of union elections. Judicial activism was able to annul 
the 2006 GETUF union elections, since, by virtue of Article 31 of the 1995 trade union law, 
the judges were tasked with overseeing the electoral process. Labor lawyers from the pro-
labor civil society organizations ECESR (Egyptian Center for Social and Economic Rights) 
and the Hisham Mubarak foundation, supported by the judges, opened court cases to annul 
the results of the 2006 elections. Ultimately, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the 
2006 elections were rigged, given that the GETUF had prohibited more than 20,000 
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candidates from running for union elections for political reasons (Interview with Labor 
Journalist 2). Some observed that “it was only because he was an Islamist or because he was a 
leftist or even if he was from another right-wing party, basically that he was not an NDP 
member, he was automatically excluded” (Ibid). The court’s decision empowered the working 
class, who were being antagonized by their feelings of marginalization from social and 
political life. As one of my interviewees argued, “they made workers feel that elected elites, 
whether in the GETUF or the parliament, are not their representatives" (Interview with Labor 
Journalist 2).  
After closing the door to union opposition from within the GETUF structure, the 
GETUF itself was held hostage by regime loyalists, who made sure that the confederation 
acted as the regime’s union arm. Regime loyalists balked at the working-class agenda, spied 
on and reported militant workers to the security forces, and demobilized the working class 
whenever they challenged Mubarak’s neoliberal policies (Interviews with Suez unionist, 
Labor Lawyer, Journalist 2). Under Mubarak, the fusion between the ruling party and the 
GETUF board of directors was complete. One way in which the regime distanced the top 
leadership and in particular the administrative board of the confederation from the rank and 
file was by extending the political clout of high-ranking union leaders affiliated with the 
NDP. By 2004, 21 out of the 23 members of the confederation’s highest-ranking level were 
also NDP members (Marfleet 2009, 28). They ran for parliamentary elections on NDP lists, 
and controlled the workers' seats in the parliament as well as critical parliamentary 
committees (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014; Marfleet 2009). To further tighten their grip 
over the GETUF hierarchy, the 1995 trade union law prolonged the administrative 
committee’s term from four to five years (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 133).  
As this fusion between the ruling party and the top union leadership was made 
complete and as the regime devised strategies to further coopt union bureaucracy, regime 
loyalists would act as the conduit for Mubarak’s neoliberal project, supporting rather than 
opposing the neoliberal attack on the working class and their rights. For example, Mubarak 
mobilized the corporatist federation to silence any forms of resistance to Law 203/1991. 
GETUF members not affiliated with the NDP started to think of ways to mobilize against the 
law and called for a meeting on GETUF premises. The GETUF board responded by calling 
upon the security forces to pressure the invitees to leave and immediately declared the 
meeting illegal(Beinin 2016, 63). The then-president of the GEFTU was quick to claim, on 
behalf of the workers, that the entirety of Egypt’s working class was supportive of 
privatization schemes (Ibid, 43-44). The combination of these internal and external 
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constraints impeded prospects for spreading the strikes horizontally and delegitimizing the 
regime.   
Material rewards and the incorporation of the top union leaders in the neoliberal 
economy were other critical strategies adopted by Mubarak to ensure their total cooptation. 
Senior union leaders were turned into an elite class of a union bureaucracy that was 
handsomely rewarded by the Mubarak regime and that reaped the benefits of a neoliberal 
economy. For those who were "sitting on the company's boards, they could earn up to 30 000 
EGP a month, a salary beyond the dreams of any Egyptian” (Marfleet 2009, 28). Furthermore, 
as Law 12 of 1995 continued to transfer large amounts of union dues from the local unions to 
the federations and the executive committee,44 the Mubarak regime paved the way for the 
GETUF leadership to use the union dues to expand their businesses and economic ventures 
(Interview with Cairo unionist; Smet 2015; Posnusey 1997, 117). The GETUF managed 
social centers with 56 branches in 9 provinces and was sitting on the boards of several 
recreational and touristic projects. They also owned a bank, the Workers’ Bank, created in 
January 1983 with capital of 50 million EGP provided by union dues. Furthermore, the 
GETUF presided over large pension funds and owned cars and real estate (Barakat and Ali 
2003, 19-20). However, only the top leadership reaped the benefits of the economic 
expansion of the GETUF under neoliberalism (Interview with Cairo unionist). 
While electoral engineering reproduced regime loyalists who were deemed by many 
critics the representatives of the Mubarak regime, the 1995 trade union law and the 2003 labor 
law entrenched the GETUF’s grip on the working class. Article 14 of the 1995 trade union 
law and Article 153 of the 2003 labor law delegated to the second level of the hierarchy - the 
federations or the general unions - the capacity to negotiate on behalf of all workers, conclude 
all collective agreements,	and solve all disputes.45 The local unions, particularly the factory 
and workplace unions, remained the closest to the rank and file, but they were deprived of 
their capacity to politicize labor demands (Interview with Labor Lawyer; A. Alexander and 
Bassiouny 2014, 143). A local union could not negotiate any collective agreements without 
the approval of the federation. Dispensing union dues was only geared toward social and 
administrative affairs and was conditional on the approval of the federation. This situation left 
the local unions unable to support the politicization of working-class demands or strikes 
																																																								
44 I have discussed in Chapter 2 that 10% of the union dues collected by the local unions were transferred to the confederation and 25% to the 
federation. This provision remained intact as per the 1995 law.  
45 Article 8 of Trade Union Law 12 of 1995 reads: "The trade union organization may establish savings or fellowship funds or funds to 
finance cultural and social activities to compensate workers in cases where there is a financial burden under the Labor Law. It may establish 
sports clubs and resorts and participate in the formation of cooperative societies. To achieve its objectives, it may invest its funds in safe 
investment by the rules determined by the Financial Regulations of the trade union organizations." Article 180 of the labor law discusses the 
process of arbitration that was placed under the control of the confederation or the federation.  
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(Articles 12 and 14 of the 1995 trade union law). Hence, as some argued, their “role was 
limited to expressing their opinions on certain matters such as setting up disputes on an 
individual or collective level and generating reports to general unions” (Interview with Labor 
Lawyer).  
I argue that while Mubarak blended corporatism and repression to control the working 
class, his strategies were ultimately challenged by the same neoliberal policies that he had 
forcefully implemented. The effects of neoliberal restructuring on GETUF affiliations and 
membership were dire. GETUF lost its members to arbitrary dismissals, early retirement 
schemes, and a non-unionized private sector (A. Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 217). The 
confederation was and remains absent from the new industrial zones, which included more 
than 1200 industries in the 10th of Ramadan industrial city and another 900 industries in the 
6th of October industrial city (LCHR 2010). Moreover, the trade union law stipulated that 
workers were entitled to create unions only if the workforce exceeded 50 workers at the 
workplace. However, “98% of the workplaces are in the private sector which employs 15 
workers or less” (Obeid 2012, 207).  
Mubarak’s neoliberalism was synonymous with the expansion of the informal sector. 
Amid high levels of unemployment, this sector grew exponentially and the corporatist 
federation could no longer claim representation of the large majority of the Egyptian 
workforce. Consequently, this regime strategy freed workers from the corporatist grip 
(Abdelrahman 2015), paving the way for workers to break it, mobilize outside of the official 
union structure, and eventually weaken its representative and bargaining capacity. As a wave 
of wildcat strikes hit different sectors of the economy under the last cabinet of Ahmad Nazif, 
businessmen negotiated with the factory committees that had imposed themselves as the 
representatives of the workers at the shop floor level and were held accountable by the rank 
and file. The informal bargaining process challenged the GETUF monopoly over the 
bargaining process, ultimately weakening its bargaining position to the advantage of 
grassroots activists. Moreover, Mubarak’s strategy of coopting the corporatist confederation 
by tying the top members of the union hierarchy to the NDP opened the confederation to 
public scrutiny in the wake of the 2011 revolution. The high-ranking GETUF unionists were 
NDP members who came under attack, facing corruption charges like the pro-Mubarak 
neoliberal business elites, which contributed to further delegitimizing the GETUF and 
weakening its capacity to claim the representation of the working class and its agenda. 
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3.3 Social and Political Mobilization Delegitimize Mubarak’s Neoliberal 
Authoritarianism   
As argued in Chapter 2, the negotiation and implementation of neoliberal reforms took 
shape gradually under four prime ministers. Atef Sedky (1986-1996) facilitated the 
negotiation of the ERSAP agreement and oversaw its early implementation, with early 
attempts at cutting wages for public sector employees and rolling back some of the privileges 
conferred especially to this sector. At the level of mobilization, Sedky’s term was marked by 
public sector employees mobilizing to restore the Nasserite pact despite high levels of 
repression. Kamal Al Ghanzoury’s term (1996-1999) brought changes to investment laws, 
introduced early retirement schemes, and oversaw the privatization of a large number of SOEs 
(Joya 2013; Khalil 2011). As a result of such policies, the number of strikes that were 
defensive in nature started to rise and to include the more precarious private sector. The 
breadth of labor mobilization also reached rural areas with the 1997 peasant mobilization. 
However, both rural and urban workers were met with an iron fist, which impeded their 
capacity to continue their mobilization. Atef Ebeid (1999-2004), whose term was marked by 
the rise of political opposition to Mubarak's foreign and domestic policies in the wake of the 
2003 war on Iraq and the 2000 Palestinian Intifada, was forced to slow down the pace of 
neoliberal reforms. The businessmen in Ahmad Nazif’s (2004-2011) cabinet oversaw an 
aggressive attack on the public sector and workers' rights. His term was synonymous with the 
most significant wave of privatization, as well as with rising unemployment, labor market 
deregulation, the amending of taxation laws, and the rolling back of state subsidies aimed at 
the poor and lower-income workers. The Nazif years witnessed the deepening of neoliberal 
reforms and consequently the largest wave of workers’ strikes. The Nazif years were also 
synonymous with the relaxation of repression, with the business community rising to political 
power and introducing negotiation and bargaining rather than repression. The following 
section analyses the class struggles under Mubarak’s long rule, dividing them chronologically 
over the abovementioned four distinct periods. The chronological-historical approach 
facilitates the reference to the previous chapter and invites a better assessment of how 
economic policies shaped class organizing under each prime minister.  
I argue in this section that the confrontation between workers, peasants, and urban 
subalterns changed their perceptions of the regime. While in the first few years under 
Mubarak the working class was pleading with the state, it would move under the second 
prime minister to a more confrontational approach toward both the Mubarak regime and 
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capital. A similar scenario transpired in the countryside, where peasants paid with blood as 
they resisted their dispossession. Although peasants, workers, and urban subalterns bore the 
brunt of repression, they would continue to pursue their struggles. As they did so, they 
exposed regime brutality, which fueled the anger of the Egyptian streets in 2011. 
Furthermore, as workers mobilized at the workplace level, they started to challenge the 
symbols of the regime and its pact with the business community. They challenged the 
corporatist structure, which acted as the union arm of the Mubarak regime and exposed the 
regime’s pact with the business community, which excluded and marginalized the majority of 
the Egyptian population to deepen neoliberalism. I argue that the formal working class’ 
mobilization inspired the state-created middle class to start contesting Mubarak’s 
neoliberalism. As such, the formal working class contributed to widening the array of 
oppositional social classes against Mubarak’ authoritarianism and to delegitimizing his rule. I 
argue, here as in the introduction, that inter-class alliances were not forthcoming in the case of 
Egypt largely due to the weakness and unwillingness of the existing organizations to play a 
mediating role for such alliances to take place. 
3.3.1 Working-Class Mobilization in the Public Sector, and the Security Apparatus: 
Struggles under Atef Sedky (1984-1991)   
In this section, I trace the forms of working-class mobilization under the first Prime 
Minister, Atef Sedky. Workers rose defiantly and broke fear barriers despite the fact that 
Mubarak had put the country under emergency law. I argue that factors relating to the nature 
of working-class demands and their strike strategies, as well as external factors such as the 
willingness of the regime to use outright repression, impeded workers’ capacity to sustain 
their strikes and to challenge the regime. Firstly, the nature of the strikes is an important 
indicator of whether workers were contesting the hegemony of the regime or not. Defensive 
strikes in the public sector marked labor militancy during this early period of time. Workers 
sought to restore previous entitlements that had been conferred upon the working class under 
populism, rather than to conquer new rights such as the improvement of working conditions. 
At the symbolic level, the defensive strikes did not challenge the Mubarak regime. In most 
instances, with the exception of the Mahallat Strike, workers continued to plead with the state 
and continued to view themselves as partners to the state in the production process. Equally 
importantly, the regime had no qualms about repressing and coopting the working class, 
which undermined prospects for sustaining the strikes and for spreading mass mobilization 
across different work categories. The absence of this horizontal occurrence of strikes 
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undermined working-class capacity to delegitimize the regime. Thirdly, the state coopted the 
working class by providing material incentives for the strategic steel industry, and 
incorporated the working class into the privatization process to ward off challenges to its 
neoliberal agenda. In sum, the combination of internal factors specific to the working class 
proper and these external factors impeded prospects for the working class to contest 
Mubarak’s neoliberal authoritarianism at this early stage. 
During Sedky’s term, working-class mobilization against the Mubarak regime took 
root well before the signing of ERSAP. The reinvigoration of the 1981 emergency law did not 
prevent the working class from pursuing their struggles. While it is hard to determine the 
exact number of strikes given a media blackout at the time, Beinin (2016) estimated that there 
were 33 strikes per year between 1984 and 1994, which is significant given that workers had 
been previously demobilized for years by corporatism and repression (Beinin 2016, 43).  
 Between 1984 and the early 1990s, workers in the public and traditional sectors of the 
textile, railway transportation, and steel industries pioneered labor militancy. The private 
sector was both less organized and more precarious, which discouraged private-sector 
workers from initiating strikes. As a result, it was the workers in the public sector who 
emerged at the forefront of the struggle when they protested the 1984 law, which increased 
their contribution to pension funds (Posnusey 1997; Beinin 2016). The most significant forms 
of labor organizing were in the textile industry of Kafr al Dawwar. There, the protests took 
the form of a local uprising mobilizing workers and their local communities. Residents joined 
the workers’ protests; provided food assistance for striking workers, thereby helping to 
sustain their strike; confronted the police; and “blocked roads and cut telephone lines” (Beinin 
2009 a, 72; Posnusey 1997). Another wave of labor action followed the refusal by SOE-
management to implement Law 137/1981, which stipulated workers’ entitlement to a weekly 
paid holiday (Ibid). When inflation reached a high of 26% in 1986,46 consuming most of their 
wages, workers demanded an increase in incentives (a percentage increase of the salary 
determined by management) (Assafir 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, Beinin 2016, 45-46; Obeid 
2012).  
The turning point in this cycle of labor mobilization was the eruption of a wave of 
strikes in the strategic textile industry of Mahallat al Kubrat. The 1986 strike demanded a 30-
day monthly wage rather than the current 26-day wage. 95 workers were jailed for 




bonus at the beginning of the school year, thereby igniting another wave of strikes in Mahallat 
that lasted for three days. Mahallat workers were the first to come up with the slogan “Down 
with Hosni Mubarak,” and walked out carrying a coffin wrapped in a black flag and topped 
by Mubarak’s picture (Al Jazeera English 2012). To preempt a radicalization of streets, the 
regime responded with a media blackout and the jailing of some strike leaders and the transfer 
of others to other industries (Ibid). 
A year after Mahallat, another strike shook the strategic EISCO steel company . The 
company occupied a crucial symbolic position for consecutive presidents, including Mubarak, 
who “vetoed its privatization and restructured parts of it” (Obeid 2012, 16). Initially, workers 
demanded a meal allowance and the betterment of incentives, but the list of demands 
expanded to include dissolving the local union, which refused to side with the workers and 
endorse their demands.47 Workers retaliated by closing the factory when they were met with 
the government’s refusal to implement their demands. On the morning of the same day as the 
closure, the police raided the factory and fired rubber bullets and gas bombs. They killed one 
worker, wounded 100 others, and arrested 200 (Obeid 2012, Beinin 2011).  
The timing of the strike, along with the location of EISCO in the middle of the 
strategic Helwan industrial region, risked radicalizing the working class and undermining the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms. Besides repression, Mubarak coopted EISCO workers 
by increasing their “salaries by tenfold between 1989 and 2009 […] By 2009 workers were 
earning fourteen months’ worth of fixed-base wages in bonus pay” (Obeid 2012, 26). The old 
generation of EISCO workers enjoyed tenured jobs that they passed to their children. This led 
to the bureaucratization of some of Egypt’s most militant industrial workers (Ibid; Interview 
with Political Economist 2). As Obeid has eloquently argued, “under neo-liberalism, 
permanent work contracts […] acted as a potential property right that transformed a group of 
militant workers into a privileged group and set their interests against the rest of the working 
class outside the plant” (Obeid 2012, 3). 
Mubarak also pushed EISCO’s militant leaders away from the plant and into the arms 
of the NGO community. Kamal Abbas, one of the leading figures in the EISCO strike, was 
pursued, jailed, and tortured by the security apparatus. He abandoned labor activism at the 
industry level to establish, with a leftist labor lawyer, the Center for Trade Union and 
Workers’ Rights (CTUWS) (Beinin 2016, 47). 48 The CTUWS sought to overcome the 
corporatist siege imposed by the GEFTU, but over the years, as will be shown in the next 
																																																								
 
48 On the Center for Trade Union and Workers’ Rights see their official website : http://www.ctuws.com/en/content/about-ctuws 
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chapter, Abbas was transformed from a “proponent of revolutionary politics to a supporter of 
democratic trade unionism” (Ibid).  
The question in theoretical terms remains why the workers’ strikes at this stage failed 
to challenge Mubarak’s neoliberal authoritarian rule. To start with, the workplace strikes were 
not linked to broader mass strikes that could have impeded the early implementation of 
neoliberal reforms. The repressive apparatus, along with the corporatist structure, impeded 
prospects for resisting the neoliberal reforms, as will be argued. Furthermore, the workplace 
strikes led by public sector employees were not resisting the neoliberal reforms; rather, they 
sought to restore the Nasserite pact (Interview with Political Economist 2). At the heart of this 
populist pact was that workers would eschew class conflict and preserve the working-class 
position as partners to the state in the production process. In turn, the state would reward the 
working class with equal treatment, and guarantees for a decent living wage and control over 
prices (Posnusey 1997, 128). This populist discourse, which projected workers as partners in 
the production process (Interview with Political Economist 2; Posnusey 1997, Smet 2015), 
was best internalized and reflected by workers in the cement industry, a member of which told 
me that  
The state did not pay a single penny to expand the lines of production in this factory. 
The workers did. We are requesting our reinstatement. With our fathers, we 
transformed this factory from one line of production to 5 lines of production. It is the 
workers and resources that lead to production. I am a partner in this (Interview with 
Alexandria Cement Workers). 
However, as has been shown, the age of state-led industrialization under the auspices of a 
populist regime, which rested on this partnership between the state and the working class, was 
reversed by decades of liberalization under Mubarak and Sadat. Workers' demands, therefore, 
did not match the pace of economic reforms.  
That workers under Sedky were still calling for a restoration of the populist pact is 
best captured by both the nature of their demands and the strike strategies they pursued. As 
illustrated above, most of the “demands revolved around regaining earnings that had been 
taken away from them, which contrasts with new or aggressive demands such as increments 
to the real minimum wage, improvement in work conditions that do not grow out of the 
comparison with the past” (Posnusey 1997, 128). Moreover, the internalization and the 
salience of the populist pact affected the way workers led their strikes. As workers depicted 
themselves as partners of the state in the production process, they did not pursue a work 
stoppage that would incur losses for the company; rather, they resorted to a “work-in,” 
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pursuing production but refusing to cash in their salaries  (El Mahdi 2011; Smet 2015). In 
other words, workers did not contest the hegemony of the neoliberal state, and instead of 
treating the state as the enemy they continued with the tradition of appealing to the state to 
achieve immediate gains. 
 Challenging the regime proved to be costly for workers under Sedky. The Mubarak 
regime had no qualms about mobilizing corporatism, the state-owned media, and the security 
apparatus to criminalize and repress working-class opposition. For example, when the 1991 
ERSAP agreement entered with vigor, Law 203/1991, which promised to privatize SOEs, was 
met with a near-absence of working-class mobilization. One explanation for this lack stems 
from the high levels of repression that workers had been experiencing since Mubarak’s rise to 
power. As has been shown, workers paid with blood for demanding basic rights. Strikers were 
depicted by the regime and the state-owned media as the “domestic enemy,” the “other,” or 
“fanatics” destabilizing the country, which in turn legitimized the use of violence against 
them (Assafir 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989).49 Strikes making simple demands such as meal and 
school allowances were met with tanks, tear gas, and police violence that killed, injured, and 
jailed workers. High levels of repression also undermined workers’ capacity to maintain their 
strikes at the factory level and to solicit solidarity from their local community. For example, 
the aforementioned brutality in Kafr al Dawwar, Mahallat al Kubra, and EISCO sent the 
message to the working class that Mubarak would not tolerate labor resistance (Beinin 2016).  
That high levels of repression impeded prospects for working-class mobilization 
against Law 203/1991 only partially accounts for regime strategies against working-class 
mobilization, however. Sedky’s cabinet also devised clever strategies to co-opt the working 
class by incorporating them as shareholders in privatization schemes (See Chapter 2). For a 
while, this strategy guaranteed the quietism of the working class. As previously argued, 
Mubarak also mobilized the corporatist federation to silence any forms of resistance to Law 
203/1991. The combination of cooptation and repression, along with the workers’ strategy to 
plead with the state, undermined their capacity to resist neoliberal authoritarianism in the first 
few years under Sedky. 
3.3.2 Private Sector, Peasants’ and Citizens’ Mobilizations against Accumulation by 
Dispossession: The Ghanzoury Years (1996-1999) 
It is against this background that Prime Minister Ghanzoury assumed power, to 
preside over one of the most significant waves of privatization. Ghanzoury, who was formerly 
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a proponent of state-led development, facilitated the privatization of 115 SOEs, compared to 
only 37 privatized under Sedky. During his mandate, he oversaw the implementation of the 
law pertaining to land reforms, discussed more fully in Chapter 2, and supervised early 
retirement schemes, reducing the working-class density at the workplace to make SOEs more 
attractive for investors and to pave the way for their privatization. I argue that Ghanzoury’s 
mandate was marked by changes both in terms of introducing new actors to the wave of 
working-class militancy and in terms of pushing the prospects for a horizontal spread of class 
alliances. The commonality of dismissals, transfers, and unfulfilled promises, notably early 
retirement schemes, once again put workers on the defensive. However, this period was also 
marked by the rise of the more precarious private sector, which in turn started to change the 
face and the nature of labor strikes. Workers started to move away from the public sector’s 
strategy of pleading with the state toward a more combative approach toward both the state 
and the business community.  
However, while they were starting to organize, private-sector employees did not yet 
fully employ their capacity to defy the corporatist federation. A plausible explanation for the 
absence of more defiant forms of organizing lies in Timothy Mitchell’s (1991) observation 
pertaining to the "ghost-like" effects of the state. As Mitchell argued, it is the disciplinary 
effects of state power that play “a more inhibiting role undermining more daring forms of 
labor organizing” (Mitchell 1991, 91).50 Another factor that inhibited more daring forms of 
organizing is the fact that urban workers were not able to liaise with their fellow dispossessed 
peasants, who were left struggling on their own in the countryside. That a horizontal spread of 
urban strikes and peasant mobilization was met with the absence of inter-class alliance 
formation is the result of the absence of formal and informal organizing that could help in 
bridging the geographical gap. In fact, none of the existing parties or civil society 
organizations played any role in enabling the urban working class to create avenues for inter-
class alliance formation or for the peasants and the workers to view their struggles as 
historically and politically constituted by the processes of accumulation by dispossession. The 
following section pays attention to such processes. 
Aggressive privatization, insecurity at the workplace, unemployment, early retirement 
schemes, and arbitrary dismissals fueled working-class resistance under Ghanzoury (Beinin 
																																																								
50 Mitchell writes that "disciplinary power works not from outside but from within, not at the level of an entire society but the level of detail, 
and not by contrasting individuals and their actions but by producing them. A negative exterior power gives way to internal, productive 
power. Disciplines work within local domains and institutions, entering into particular social processes, breaking them, down into separate 
functions, rearranging the parts, increasing their efficiency and precision and reassembling them into more productive and powerful 
combinations. These methods produce the organized power of armies, schools and factors and other distinctive institutions of modern nation 
states.” (Mitchell 1991,91)  
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2009 a). Workers organized 115 and 164 strikes in 1998 and 1999 respectively, an increase by 
almost three-fold and five-fold compared to Sedky’s term (LCHR 1998; 1999). With 
Ghanzoury, workers in the private and public business sectors, sectors that the state had 
created in preparation for the privatization of SOEs, pioneered working-class militancy, rather 
than workers in the public sector. A report published by the Land Center of Human Rights 
(LCHR) showed that wages and incentives topped the list of demands, a direct response to 
Mubarak’s strategy, which rested upon fiercely attacking workers’ wages to make Egypt more 
appealing for local and foreign investors, cutting financial losses by laying the financial 
burden on the working class. With the implementation of early retirement schemes, 
Ghanzoury’s cabinet was slow processing the disbursement of retirement compensation, 
which in turn triggered working-class mobilization.51  
Workers were thrown on the defensive, resisting their arbitrary dismissals, the 
punitive transfer of workers to other factories, and the liquidation of factories. Throughout, 
they became more aware of the confederation’s complicity with the regime and were 
increasingly disenchanted with the performance of their factory/workplace unions as they 
became aware of the impotence of the latter at a time when neoliberal reforms were 
deepening. As a result, instead of demanding the resignation of local union committees, the 
workers started to demand autonomous union organizing. The rise of the more precarious but 
less organized private sector also ushered in a move away from labor strikes, which had 
previously been a domain reserved for the slightly more privileged public sector, and 
consequently a more serious confrontation with capital. Workers no longer viewed 
themselves as partners in the production process, but rather as being exploited by the business 
community. During this period, repression did not subside and the regime did not exhibit any 
tolerance to working-class strikes. For example, in 1998, security forces arrested several 
microbus drivers and stopped a strike that they had tried to organize (LCHR 1998).52 The 
combination of deepening neoliberal reforms and repression put the working class further on 
the defensive. While the working class changed its strategies, seeing the state and capital as 
enemies rather than allies to the workers, the working class was still agitating to defend its 
basic rights amid the state’s commitment to driving workers’ conditions in a race to the 
bottom.  
Aside from the formal working-class mobilization, Ghanzoury’s term witnessed the 
emergence of peasants’ protests. In 1997, the Tenancy Law discussed in Chapter 2 entered 
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52 LCHR: http://www.lchr-eg.org/archive/77/77-17.htm 
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into effect, to which peasants responded by sending petitions to the government and 
protesting its implementation. Peasants were also protesting to access land and water (Bush 
and Ayeb 2014; Abdelrahman 2015, 66-67). They faced prison sentences when they were 
unable to pay interest on agricultural loans.53 As was the case for the urban working class, 
they were met with brutal repression, including “detentions and torture in police stations, 
forced evictions and mass punishments of whole villages and families of protestors” 
(Abdelrahman 2015, 66-67). In that same year, 119 peasants were killed, and 846 were 
injured (Bush 2007, 1606).  
In the following year, citizens in the countryside started to mobilize against the 
repressive security apparatus (Ismail 2006). Popular upheavals exploded where people 
protested state neglect and the absence of services, basic utilities, and infrastructure, as well 
as the abuse of citizens in police stations.54 The recurrent, widespread, and confrontational 
nature of citizens’ resistance posed a challenge to the regime and its capacity to instill fear 
among them. However, as Salwa Ismail (2006) has noted, citizens’ protests remained short-
lived and spontaneous, and dissolved when the government’s negotiations with them bore 
fruit in the form of certain promises.  
Furthermore, neither the “citizens’ protests” nor the peasants’ struggles resulted in 
movement formation or fell back on a sustained form of organization that could have helped 
them politicize their demands, sustain their mobilization in the face of adverse conditions, and 
build alliances with those struggling in the urban centers, namely the urban working class. 
While the Ghanzoury years witnessed a horizontal spread of class mobilization reaching to 
the neglected and “invisible” countryside, prospects for inter-class alliances between the 
urban and rural workers were thus non-existent. In the vacuum of any forms of organizing 
that could have mediated and facilitated inter-class alliance formation, those who were most 
affected by neoliberal reforms continued to break fear barriers and challenge the repressive 
arm of the state to contest the stealing away of their rights.  
This organizational vacuum is owed to the fact that Mubarak did not express any 
commitment to preparing the country for democratic rule. Instead, the liberalization strategy 
adopted since the 1990s allowed for parties to exist and for civil society organizations to 
proliferate, but it was a strategy aimed in particular at containing the political fallouts of 
economic liberalization rather than at pushing forward a political liberalization that could 
																																																								
53 For the peasants’ struggles revolving around this law see the following report by the Land Center: http://www.lchr-eg.org/archive/66/66-
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54 The Egyptian Human Rights association criticizes violence against ordinary citizens; see: http://www.albayan.ae/one-world/1998-09-15-
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eventually lead to the democratization of the regime (Heydemann 2007; Brynen et al 2012). 
This controlled liberalization strategy had dire implications for the roles that civil 
society organizations and political parties could play in helping to organize the working class 
and the peasants. For example, the proliferation of civil society organizations created a space 
whereby some sort of middle-class solidarity pertaining to labor and socio-economic rights 
emerged. Aside from the abovementioned CTUWS, the Hisham Mubarak Foundation and the 
Land Center for Human Rights (LCHR) were two other NGOS created in the mid- and late 
1990s that had expressed solidarity with workers and peasants and had opened the debate 
around socio-economic rights. These NGOs created an alternative space for workers to meet 
and to overcome the corporatist siege imposed by the GEFTU and the ruling NDP party. They 
provided resources, legal assistance, and an open space for workers and peasants. For 
example, the aforementioned peasants’ uprising drew the attention of human rights activists 
and intellectuals, leading to the creation of a “Peasant Solidarity Committee linking small 
farmers, mostly in the Delta, to urban intellectuals and human rights activists” (Bush and 
Ayeb 2014, 7). The Hisham Mubarak Foundation, which would later unfold into the Egyptian 
Center for Social and Economic Rights (ECESR), would play an instrumental role in 
supporting the legal struggles of the peasants and workers against their dispossession. For 
example, in 2005, the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, along with other centers, “defended 
small farmers who had resisted with violence their dispossession by the Nawwar family of 
landowners in Sarandu, near the Delta town of Damanhour” (Ibid).  
However, the NGO community had to face the hurdles of authoritarian encroachment 
along with limited human and financial resources. These factors impeded their capacity to 
reach out to the entirety of the working class and to the peasants. This NGO solidarity 
remained weak and limited in its capacity to reach out to various work categories across 
different geographical regions (Interview with Labor Journalist). Furthermore, NGOs were 
licensed and recognized by the state. Despite their critical stances on the Mubarak regime and 
its policies, these NGOs were entangled in a web of bureaucratic and legal networks that kept 
them tied to the Mubarak regime. At the end of the day, these associations, although in 
opposition to the regime, owed their existence to state licensing and recognition. Hence, the 
associations internalized the limits imposed by regime and avoided triggering the regime’s 
anxiety, given that their actual existence was at risk. Within this constrained political context, 
these associations could therefore mitigate the impact of neoliberal reforms on the working 
class and the peasants, but they could never rise to a level at which they could actually 
empower them, given that the empowerment of peasants and workers would have constituted 
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a direct challenge to the Mubarak regime (Abdelrahman 2004; Heydemann 2007; 
Wiktorowicz 2000). 
Furthermore, despite the fact that Mubarak paved the way for the existence of loyal 
opposition parties, none of these parties expressed a true commitment to workers or peasants. 
I argued in the previous chapter that the main party, the ruling NDP, was gradually 
transformed from a platform privileging the old guard into a party of the business community. 
Tagammu’ (Collective), the only “legal leftist” party that existed at the time, became part of 
the regime by joining Mubarak’s anti-Brotherhood coalition, and became an extension of the 
security apparatus. Tagammu’s leadership cooperated with the Mubarak regime, and spied on 
their own membership and reported back to the security apparatus in an attempt to intimidate 
those who would dare oppose the regime (Interview with Labor Journalist; Smet 2015). 
Furthermore, Tagammu’ dismissed the role that workers could play in social and political 
struggles (Smet 2015).  
Several parties emerged as a reaction to Tagammu’s cooptation by Mubarak. One such 
organization was the Trotskyist Revolutionary Socialists (RS), created in 1995. Unlike 
Tagammu’, RS emphasized the centrality of the working class in social and political 
transformations. However, the RS was not a worker’s party; it remained limited in its 
membership and scope. Its main constituency was Cairo-based leftist intellectuals and 
students of the prestigious American University of Cairo (Interview with Labor Journalist 2). 
The Arab Democratic Nasserite Party (ADNP) also emerged from Tagammu’, but, as the 
name suggests, it drew on Nasser’s populist legacy (Smet 2015, 217). A 1996 division within 
the ADNP occurred, leading to the creation of the Karama party (Ibid). Karama did not play 
any role in mobilizing workers; instead, its leadership played an important role in the political 
opposition that will be discussed in the next section.  In sum, the centrist and the leftist parties 
that existed under Mubarak did not represent working class interests; they also did not play 
any role in mobilizing resources, or in helping to sustain working class strikes or peasant 
mobilization. They also played no significant role in politicizing the struggles of the peasants 
and the working class. 
I have argued in the Introduction and in Chapter 1 that organized religious groups can 
play an important role in the context of authoritarian regimes where almost all institutional 
channels are blocked or subject to heavy-handed repression. In the context where the 
organized religious groups are independent from the authoritarian structure in terms of 
financing, recognition, and appointment, and in the context where such organized religious 
groups openly side with the lower classes rather than with capital, they can play an 
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instrumental role in furthering the chances for democratization. 
In Egypt, the organized religious groups suffocated the class-based agenda and class 
organizing to promote Islamism as the solution to social, economic, and political ills. The 
largest, or practically largest, religious organization, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), did not 
depend on Mubarak’s regime for financing or for appointments. It had access to independent 
sources of financing from the MB business community, Gulf/regional monies, and Islamic 
religious charities, zakat. Although the MB did not depend on the authoritarian structure 
financially, given the long history of prosecution of MB leaders under Nasser, it needed the 
authoritarian structure’s recognition and guarantees that it would not crack down on its 
members.  
In post-Nasser Egypt, a bargain would tie the MB to Sadat’s and Mubarak’s 
authoritarianism. The heart of it was that the MB, which is a movement with various 
tendencies including those who would pursue moderate means to Islamize society and others 
who would advocate for more radical and armed means, would relinquish the 
violent/revolutionary option and accept to operate within the realm of the nation-state rather 
than pursuing the establishment of an Islamic Nation. The MB would also assist Sadat and 
Mubarak in taming and weakening the left by infiltrating the student movement and absorbing 
their militancy and activism, turning away from a leftist agenda toward religious 
indoctrination (Wickham 2013). In return, the authoritarian structure would recognize their 
capacity to operate by creating their social institutions, but would still withhold their 
recognition as a formal political party (Ibid). The bargain would be implemented under Sadat 
and Mubarak, albeit with various degrees of tolerance, or lack thereof, under each. For 
example, Mubarak would mobilize the emergency law (1980, 1990s, and 2000s) against the 
Brotherhood (Joya 2018 a), and would pursue a series of crackdowns against their leaders, 
especially when they ran for elections and scored some victories in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (Wickham 2013). This nevertheless did not prevent the Brotherhood from expanding 
their social networks nor running informally with other parties for parliamentary elections or 
professional syndicates. The long-term effects of this bargain were that the MB 
accommodated neoliberal authoritarianism, accepted to operate within its parameters (Clark 
2011; 2012), and reproduced it through its political and social participation.  
On the one hand, the MB contributed to authoritarian resilience by conferring some 
degree of legitimacy on Mubarak’s authoritarianism through their acceptance of taking part in 
electoral politics (Clark 2012). As will be shown, this participation had dire effects for their 
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willingness to take part in the January 25 revolution, in which they initially expressed 
reluctance toward joining the protesters. On the other hand, as pertains to neoliberalism, the 
MB would benefit from the state’s recognition of its social activism to deepen their social 
networks under a neoliberal state in retreat (Joya 2018 a, Kindle Location 2726). The MB 
would therefore seek to expand its Islamic charity associations to absorb the middle-class 
labor force of MB-affiliated professionals (doctors, teachers, and managerial and 
administrative positions) to cater to both the middle class and the lower classes (Clark 2011). 
The Islamic charities provided employment opportunities especially for the middle-class base 
of the MB in neoliberal Egypt, where the formal job market in the public and private sectors 
could no longer absorb the influx of new graduates. Islamic charities also provided high-
quality social services to the middle-class constituency of the Brotherhood. The combination 
of higher levels of employment and increased services for this social class expanded the 
parameters of MB membership and affiliation. The other social class that would benefit from 
the Islamic charities and welfare social services was lower-income earners. The MB stepped 
in to provide services to the rural impoverished communities and the residents of the urban 
peripheries (Joya 2018 a). The quality and quantity of social services targeting lower-income 
earners differed, however, from those aimed at the middle-class MB constituency (Clark 
2011, 157). In addition to the social services provided to the poor and lower-income earners, 
the MB was, for example, the most efficient organization providing relief services in the wake 
of the 1992 earthquake, especially in the urban peripheries (Ibid).  
However, as Clark noted, these Islamic institutions do not  
“forge strong ties between the two (the middle class and the lower class) […] There are 
more benefits for the middle class and the poor are not integrated into the middle class 
social networks that are the backbone of the Islamic Charities and ultimately of the 
Islamic movements. The poor are neglected or more accurately, alienated from the 
Islamist social and political vision… the poor are not participants in (and are largely not 
privy to) the trust and solidarity building among the middle class that works and 
benefits from ISIs” (Clark 2011, 157).  
 
Hence, the Islamic networks did not politicize the struggles of the poor and their approach to 
Islamic activism geared toward the lower classes was far removed from a class-based 
perspective or the empowerment of lower-income service recipients. Rather, the MB strategy 
favored expanding the social services geared toward the middle class, driven by the 
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assumption that the poor and lower-income earners were embedded in the clientelistic 
networks of the authoritarian regime and hence would end up casting their ballots for the 
ruling party rather than for the MB (Masoud 2013). Furthermore, the way the MB promoted 
its social activism and welfare services was from the standpoint of Islamic charity, which also 
rested upon the idea that the only solution to the poor’s problems would have to materialize 
through their support of the MB’s Islamism rather than through the politicization of their 
struggles from a class-based perspective. For example, “Islam is the solution,” a slogan used 
by Islamists on Election Day, promoted the idea that Islamism can cure all the social and 
political ills in society and that zakat or Islamic Charity would end up achieving social justice 
(Joya 2018 a, Kindle Location 2811). Not only is this approach problematic in the sense that it 
suffocates class identities, but as the MB reached political power, it failed to provide tangible 
solutions for a country wherein more than 25% of the population lived below the poverty line 
(Joya 2018 a).  
 As for the MB’s relationship to the business community, it is worth noting that the 
MB did not advocate a radical overhaul of neoliberal capitalism. Rather, it simply sought to 
promote replacing the Western financial banking system with an Islamic banking system, 
which was not necessarily immune to the ideas of “competition and profit maximization” 
(Ibid, Kindle Location 2666). Furthermore, the MB constituency also incorporated important 
businessmen, who mostly dominated the small and medium enterprises that had been left at a 
clear disadvantage compared to the large NDP business tycoons and the military, which 
enjoyed “protected markets” (Ibid, Kindle Location 2726). The MB was not critical of the 
neoliberal agenda that had dispossessed and marginalized the majority of Egyptians; rather, it 
criticized its corrupt implementation, which could, according to the MB, be curbed by Islamic 
morality (Joya 2018 a, Kindle Location 2666). Hence, as will be shown in Chapter 4, the MB 
promoted an economic agenda of “pious neoliberalism” that sought to displace the large NDP 
businesses operating in the construction, agribusiness, petroleum, and energy sectors with 
MB-affiliated pious businessmen operating in textiles, furniture, and food processing (Ibid). 
As such, the MB did not empower the lower-income social classes, as such a practice would 
have contradicted both the desires of the MB’s social base of the middle class and 
businessmen and the MB’s neoliberal agenda. It is therefore no surprise that the MB did not 
support a single strike under Mubarak (Beinin 2016) and that workers never viewed the MB 
as a representative of the working class (Abdelrahman 2015, 62-63). 
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3.3.3 Atef Ebeid (1999-2004): The Rise and Decline of Middle-Class Opposition  
The labor militancy of the late 1990s pushed Ghanzoury’s successor, Atef Ebeid 
(1999-2003), to slow down the pace of neoliberal reforms in the hope of containing the 
streets. It can hardly be argued that his strategy undermined labor mobilization. Between 1999 
and 2003, workers organized 286 labor actions (Annex). However, it was the Cairo-based 
middle class that captured media attention under Ebeid. As the distinguishing feature that set 
it apart from the state-created middle class under Nasser, this new middle class benefited from 
a liberalization of the economy but remained autonomous from the regime and state patronage 
(Interview with Political Economist 2). This new middle class included, for example, 
students, entrepreneurs, professionals, and intellectuals (Ibid).  
The middle-class opposition to the Mubarak regime and resistance to the succession 
project were tied to a group of Cairo-based intellectuals and youth activists. This middle-class 
opposition failed to represent the wide array of people who were antagonized by Mubarak’s 
neoliberal policies. While I argued in Chapter 2 that Mubarak’s foreign policies and the 
succession project served to deepen neoliberalism, the middle class did not make any efforts 
to draw these links. In this respect, the middle-class movement did not appeal to the poor and 
the working class and it therefore remained tied to the same social classes that had benefited 
from Mubarak’s economic liberalization (Interview with Political Economist 1). Despite its 
class biases, the middle-class opposition delegitimized the regime’s strategy, which had 
pushed class struggles to a secondary order compared to nationalist and anti-imperial causes. 
This regime strategy, although not totally internalized by the working class, had played an 
instrumental role in keeping large sectors of the working class under the impression that their 
struggles are insignificant compared to the broader anti-imperial struggles. However, as the 
middle class exposed the regime’s real foreign policy alignment with the imperial powers, the 
moral economy was disrupted, leading the working class to pursue even more combativeness 
under Sedky’s successor. The following section illustrates this argument. 
An overview of the middle-class movement illustrates how it did not make any socio-
economic demands; instead, it was alienated by Mubarak’s subservience to American and 
Israeli interests in the region. The middle class took to the streets to express solidarity with 
their Palestinian and Iraqi neighbors in the wake of the 2000 Al-Aqsa Intifada55 and the 2003 
American invasion of Iraq. In September 2000, the wave of protests in solidarity with the 
Palestinian struggle “shook the regime to its core, expanded the margin of contentious action, 
																																																								
55  The popular Palestinian uprising of 2000 whose participants expressed their anger and frustration with the halted peace process, 
humiliation, and the Palestinian National Authority’s corruption. Sharon, the then-prime minister of Israel, visited the Temple Mount and 
declared support for the annexation of Jerusalem, triggering a wave of anger among Palestinians.  
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mobilized new groups and offered a training ground for young activists” (Abdelrahman 2015, 
31).56 In subsequent years, this movement became the nucleus of an antagonized movement 
opposing the Mubarak regime. During the 2003 war on Iraq, Egyptians organized a massive 
anti-war demonstration, with more than 20,000 Egyptians occupying Tahrir Square (Smet 
2015, 219). What had started as a solidarity movement with Iraq and Palestine unfolded into 
opposition to Mubarak and his succession project. In 2005, Kefaya (Enough!) was founded to 
challenge Mubarak’s plan to renew his term and groom Gamal Mubarak for power 
(Abdelrahman 2015, 36).	 When the movement became too threatening, Mubarak moved to 
demobilize it (Smet 2015, 228). He then amended the 1971 constitution so “that the president 
becomes elected directly thus making their demand illegitimate” (Ibid).  
The Kefaya movement was also rife with ideological divisions, bringing strange 
bedfellows together including Nasserites (Karama), Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood), and 
leftists (Revolutionary Socialists) (Ibid, 229). Its members hailed mainly from an urban 
Cairo-based middle class of intellectuals. Kefaya did not reach out to the rural and urban 
working class (Joya 2011, 228). Their demands and discourse were not inclusive of wider 
factions that confronted and bore the brunt of Mubarak’s neoliberalism. In fact, these 
“political factions always told workers, your demands are apolitical” (Interview with Giza 
Unionist) and treated workers with vanguardism (Interview with Labor Journalist 2). Despite 
the fact that some elements of the democratic movement supported workers’ struggles, the 
middle class and the working class were clearly set apart, which served Mubarak’s interests 
(Interview with Political Economist 2). Activists’ support for the Egyptian working class was 
always from the standpoint of pushing for political demands, which was detrimental to 
working-class interests. Most importantly, youth activists, excepting the RS, did not take the 
time to sit down with workers to listen to their demands (Interviews with Labor Journalist 2 
and 3; Interviews with Giza Unionist, Interview with Alexandria Unionist).  
Despite the weaknesses and the elitism of the movement, one of its achievements was 
that it delegitimized the regime’s strategy, which had relegated class struggles to a secondary 
order compared to nationalist and anti-imperial causes. Beside the regime’s stances on the 
aforementioned regional conflicts, “in 2004 and 2006, the Mubarak regime signed two trade 
treaties (Qualifying Industrial Zones and export of Egyptian natural gas) with Israel, Egypt’s 
historic ‘enemy’” (El Mahdi 2011, 397). Workers’ issues could no longer be pushed aside. 
The longstanding saying that there is “no voice higher than the voice of the rifles” was 
																																																								
56 See also http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4709011.stm 
	 139	
shattered, and the regime’s total subservience to imperial powers was exposed. In 2009, 
following Israel’s attack on Gaza, workers in Suez were no longer willing to pursue 
production and serve the “national interest.” In a cement factory owned by two business 
tycoons from the Sawiras family, workers declared a strike when they realized that their 
products would be exported to Israel.57  
 
3.3.4 Deepening Neoliberalism and Relaxing Repression under the Businessmen’s Cabinet 
of Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011): The Workers’ Strikes, Urban Subalterns and Peasants’ 
Mobilization  
Under Nazif, the working class faced a fierce attack on its most basic rights to work 
and occupational safety, starting with the implementation of Law 12/2003 (Chapter 2). Labor 
market deregulation was normalized. Occupational safety was violated, with dire 
consequences for workers’ health. Arbitrary and punitive dismissals and withholding salaries 
and incentives became common occurrences that fueled workers’ anger and resistance. In 
February 2004 alone, 40,000 workers lost their jobs with the closure of some factories in the 
new industrial cities of 6th of October (Sita October), 10th of Ramadan (Asher min Ramadan), 
and Borg el Arab.58 In addition to the deterioration of work conditions and job security, 
workers faced accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2014, 68). The process reached new 
heights under the businessmen’s cabinet. Frozen wages, high inflation, declining public health 
and education services, as well as rising the prices of utilities, the lifting of support for 
essential consumer subsidies, and higher taxation laid the burden on subordinate classes 
(Interview with Labor Lawyer, Interview with Suez Unionist). The deepening of neoliberal 
reforms under Nazif would lead more than 2 million workers to participate in 2,800 labor 
actions (Annex). All such strikes were wildcat strikes organized by informal strike 
committees, themselves organized by the rank and file and reporting directly to them. The 
process of mobilizing and organizing for the strikes was the first experiment in direct and 
participatory democracy in Egypt, premised on the practice of grassroots participatory 
democracy at the workplace and on the horizontal ties that workers formed with each other, 
transcending the vertical ties imposed by the regime.  
																																																								







58See for example the Revolutionary Socialists: http://revsoc.me/workers-farmers/qr-wly-fy-lhtjjt-lmly-lrhn/ 
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There were other transformations within the political structure that enabled the 
astronomical rise of working-class mobilization. As I argued in Chapter 2, the last decade of 
Mubarak’s rule witnessed the rise of the business tycoons to political decision-making 
positions. Politically connected businessmen eclipsed the security apparatus in politics, and as 
they did so they used less outright repression and violence and replaced it with negotiation 
and bargaining with the working class (Abdelrahman 2015; El Mahdi 2011; 396). Hence, 
while in the past the strikes demanding basic rights had been met with heavy-handed 
repression, Nazif’s cabinet exhibited some tolerance toward labor strikes. This tolerance was 
owed to several factors. On the one hand, the businessmen’s industries were hit hard by the 
strikes that ended up incurring losses in terms of work stoppage. Consequently, the 
businessmen were forced to make concessions to the strike committees who imposed 
themselves as bargaining partners. On the other hand, the business community, which was 
also preparing for the grooming of Gamal Mubarak, was also aware that its political project 
could not be implemented under heavy-handed repression. In other words, if repression 
deepened, the business community risked losing legitimacy by alienating wide sectors of the 
population.  
The state strategy under Nazif gave more confidence to workers as they entered the 
negotiation process, and it also gave them more leeway in updating strike strategies (Ibid). 
They were now able to take their struggles outside the factory. Workers made use of public 
spaces and camped in front of the cabinet and the parliament (Interview with Cairo Unionist), 
drawing more attention to their struggles, aided by the rise of the social media run by the 
same factions that had been antagonized by the regime’s foreign and domestic policies. 
Bloggers and internet-savvy journalists replaced the state-controlled media discourse that had 
criminalized labor action, allowing for a freer access to information and a positive depiction 
of working-class struggles (El Mahdi 2011, 394).   
With the relaxation of state repression, the working class, who in the past had 
protested for a day or two at a time, prolonged its strikes for days, weeks, months, and even a 
year. The longer the strikes, the larger the losses incurred by businesses and the larger the 
concessions that workers demanded from the business community (Abdelrahman 2015; El 
Mahdi 2011; A. Alexander and Bassiouny 2014). Workers became more combative and more 
confrontational with both management and the state. While in the past they had pleaded with 
the state, they were now more emboldened to expose the tactics of their company 
management, whether in the public or private sector. On several occasions, they protested 
management’s tactics of enforcing losses for the working class or withholding the 
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redistribution of the profits with the excuse that their companies were not profitable 
(Interview with Alexandria Unionist). The higher levels of working class combativeness thus 
not only enforced material concessions from capital, but they also exposed the regime’s and 
businessmen’s strategy.  
 Under Nazif, it was the temporary workers in the new industrial cities who 
inaugurated the wave of strikes. The creation of new industrial cities59 had started under Sadat 
in the 1970s, but became the focus of new industries under Mubarak. A key strategy pursued 
by capital and the state was to disperse industries to cities far away from Cairo to preempt 
solidarity around labor mobilization (Abdelrahman 2015; A. Alexander and Bassiouny 2014). 
But the dispersion of the working class into smaller units and their divisions along geographic 
lines did not undermine their capacity to mobilize; it instead spread the wave of protests 
across different geographical regions. Well before the Mahallat strike, which will be 
discussed shortly, the temporary and precarious workers in 10th of Ramadan and 6th of 
October industrial cities were mobilizing against the stealing away of their rights to 
permanent work and occupational safety (Abdelrahman 2015, 58). The apogee of labor strikes 
in 10th of Ramadan was when temporary workers diagnosed with lung cancer from inhaling 
the toxic and internationally banned asbestos in the Egyptian-Spanish Asbestos Company 
(Ora) led an 8-month strike. The resilience of Ora workers and the solidarity that ensued both 
locally from the CTUWS and internationally from French trade unions forced the Nazif 
cabinet to order the closure of the Ora factory and award workers with compensations (Beinin 
2009 a, 77). Ora workers inspired more than 1,400 factories in the new industrial cities into 
labor action. Most of the labor force at these factories was temporary and non-unionized 
(Abdelrahman 2015).60 
Strikes also reached one of the most important industrial regions in Egypt, which 
would play a protagonist role in the 2011 revolution: Suez. Suez was home to a wide range of 
highly polluting industries (Interview with Suez Unionist). The 600,000 residents and workers 
faced deteriorating living and work conditions. In August 2006, more than 4,000 non-
unionized workers in the Ceramica Cleopatra factory went on strike. Workers there mobilized 
and challenged “one of the pillars of the Mubarak regime” (Interview with Suez Unionist), 
Mahmoud Abu El Einen, who had financed Mubarak’s 2005 presidential campaign (El 
Tarouty 2015). The strike committee organized workers at the grassroots level. Their 
																																																								
59 This includes the cities of 10th of Ramadan and 6th of October created following economic liberalization. The official website of 10th of 
Ramadan City: http://newcities.gov.eg/know_cities/Tenth_Ramadan/default.aspx  
60 For the Ora strikes and demands: http://www.ibasecretariat.org/lka_vict_egypt_asb_wrks.php. See also for the wave of strikes in the new 
industrial cities: http://weloegy.blogspot.ca/2014/05/blog-post.html 
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demands included a betterment of wages, work safety, and the right to form their own unions 
(Ibid). Under pressure from the workers’ insistence, Abu El-Einen conceded to the first two 
demands but balked at the last (Ibid).61 In Suez, the security apparatus imposed a siege on the 
industrial center to isolate striking workers from the external world, with the intention of 
preempting the rise of solidarity networks from within the local community and undermining 
a spillover of the strike to other sectors (Interview with Suez Unionist). This strategy failed 
when labor action spilled over to other industries in Suez, including textile, oil, and paper 
production (Ibid). Comparing Suez to Mahallat al Kubra, which captured extensive media 
attention, a Suez unionist opined that the main reason why Ceramica did not capture much 
attention was that “the technological revolution did not reach the region, and we were not 
using mobile phones” (Ibid).  
While Suez and the new industrial cities did not capture as much media attention, it 
was the December 2006 strike in the Mahallat al Kubra textile factory that captured local and 
international media attention. Mahallat was and still is considered the heart of Egypt both 
because of the long history of the factory and because of its status as a source of employment 
for more than 27,000 workers (Al Jazeera English 2012).  In Egypt, the textile sector is 
characterized “by a perpetual crisis and declining wages” (Interview with Giza Unionist). 
Real wages in this sector declined over the years, reaching their lowest level in 2006 
compared to 1988.62 The regime’s strategy was to starve the textile sector of capital and 
investments, leading gradually to its decay and the closure of factories. According to my 
interviewees, the issue of declining wages was a leading factor that triggered labor action in 
2006 (Ibid). “Workers became aware that strikes were their only weapon” (Several interviews 
with Unionists and a Labor Lawyer). They demanded meal allowances, the betterment of 
annual bonuses, and the betterment of working conditions (Smet 2015, 235). Nazif decided to 
raise yearly bonuses to an amount equivalent to two months of wages, which ignited the wave 
of strikes in Mahallat (Al Jazeera English 2012). When the factory’s management failed to 
implement the prime minister's decision, 3,000 women called for a strike and inspired 24,000 
out of 27,000 workers in Mahallat along with them. Workers stopped their work and called 
																																																								











for a vote of no confidence against their factory union, which they described as complicit with 
the corrupt management (Ibid). The most significant challenge to the federation emerged 
when more than 13,000 workers resigned from their local unions (Smet 2015, 236). To divert 
workers’ anger, the GETUF proposed a compromise solution: the creation of a temporary 
committee to manage workers’ affairs (Interview with Labor Journalist 2; A. Alexander and 
Bassiouny 2014).  
The strategy did not last for too long; workers, who had already gained confidence, 
declared another strike in 2007. This time, their demands transcended the factory level to call 
for a national minimum wage of 1200 EGP (Smet 2015; Interviews with Labor Lawyer and 
Labor Journalist 2). This demand was not met. Instead, the government diffused working-
class anger again by giving them “two months of bonuses along with extra bonuses for 
January and June 2008” (Smet 2015, 237). Workers viewed the concession as a victory, but 
pursued their struggles. On April 6, 2008, workers exposed the company’s tactics to withhold 
the disbursement of profits from workers despite the fact that the company was profitable (Al 
Jazeera 2012; Smet 2015). Workers rose again to call for a strike. This time, they drew the 
attention of middle-class activists, including bloggers and intellectuals, who seized the 
opportunity to declare the birth of a solidarity movement that they called “April 6,” calling for 
a general strike on the same day (Interview with Journalist 2; Labor Lawyer). 
Despite their open support of workers’ strikes, it is quite telling that, for example, 
April 6, which also emerged as one of the key players in organizing protests before and 
during the 2011 revolution, did not include any demands in relation to social justice, 
economic rights, or workers' struggles.63 According to many of my informants, the April 6 
movement hijacked the strike and harmed workers’ demands. By stating that this “is 
something bigger than a strike” (Interview with Labor Journalist 2 and 3), they politicized the 
strike action without coordinating with the workers (Smet 2015, 238). According to one of 
my interviewees, April 6 harmed the strike because “you do not start by saying down with 
Mubarak. This is despite the fact that the Mahallat al Kubra was the first to ask him to leave” 
(Interview with Labor Journalist 3). In fact, the politicization of the general strike raised a red 
flag for security forces. The latter prevented workers from arriving at the factory and thereby 
aborted the strike, blending intimidation and repression. Strike leaders were detained; others 
bore the brunt of punitive dismissals (Interview with Labor Journalist 2 and 3). In the regions, 
																																																								
63  For more information, see the website of April 6 movement: https://6april.org/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86-
%D8%9F/  (Accessed October 2017) 
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a wave of arrests targeted activists, spreading terror and fear and undermining prospects for a 
general strike (Interview with Labor Lawyer). 
When the strike at the workplace was brutally repressed by the security forces, the 
rising bread prices led to a popular upheaval in the city of Mahallat (Interview with Labor 
Journalist 3). In retaliation, the regime used force to tame the uprising and subvert prospects 
for another bread riot. Interviewees described the state violence as on par with Israel’s 
brutality against Palestinians (Interview with Labor Journalist 2). The entire city of Mahallat 
was set on fire by the security forces. However, the indiscriminate and broad repression 
mobilized more people against Mubarak, turning some of his supporters against him. “This 
(violence) was what encouraged more people to protest” (Ibid). Repression alone could not 
end the popular anger; amid risks of greater de-legitimization, the regime was once again 
forced to roll back, lifting bread subsidies, which consequently demobilized the protesters 
(Ibid).  
  The centrality of Mahallat and the symbolism of the factory as the heart of Egypt, 
triggered a wave of strikes in the textile sectors of Kafr al Dawwar and Shibin el Kom, but 
also in cement and among railway workers (Abdelrahman 2015; El Mahdi 2011; Smet 2015; 
Naguib 2011). Strikes then began moving through all sectors and different locations, 
spreading mobilization in Egypt.  
 The strike wave was also a direct response to Nazif’s policies of aggressive 
privatization, including the selling of 178 SOEs. Important strikes start to focus not only on 
wages and work conditions, but also on the protection of the right to work by redeeming the 
privatized industries. As privatization picked up, the unemployment level increased as a result 
of a deliberate strategy by the new management to get rid of the large labor force.  
The most prominent case was that of Tanta Flax industrial center, where workers 
initiated the longest strike in the history of Egypt. Tanta Flax was established in 1954 as the 
most important factory for linen production in the Middle East, covering an area of 311 
thousand square meters, including ten factories that accounted for more than half of the 
world’s flax production. In 2005, Tanta Flax was sold to a Saudi investor. While the Egyptian 
government estimated its cost to be 211 million EGP, the government ended up selling it for 
only 83 million EGP. The new investor, who committed to maintaining jobs for all employees 
and to developing the company’s production lines, did not keep his promises, shutting down 
lines of production and dismissing large numbers of workers. As one of the Tanta Flax 
unionists argued, “before privatization, there were 2300 workers. When he bought it, he only 
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kept 1200 workers, and by the end, we were left with 150 workers” (Interview with Tanta 
Flax Unionist). In response, workers entered a 13-month strike (Ibid).  
The Tanta Flax strike was the first strike to be legally recognized by the GETUF.  
However, the corporatist federation soon withdrew its support and sided with the investor, 
dismissing workers’ demands. After monopolizing the negotiation process, the GETUF 
concluded that workers should bring an end to the strike, as management had agreed to 
“increase meal allowances and pay an annual wage increase of 10%” (Ibid, 44). Striking 
workers did not bow to GETUF pressure, seeing that their main demands, the return of their 
dismissed colleagues and disbursement of bonuses and profits, as well as raising the meal 
allowance to 90 pounds, were never met (Ibid).64 In 2010, striking workers in Tanta Flax, 
supported by the famous labor lawyer Khaled Ali from the ECESR, succeeded in obtaining a 
first court injunction against the Saudi businessman: the Tanta Misdemeanor Court ordered 
him to be jailed for preventing workers from practicing their right to work (Ibid). The court 
decision set a precedent, since Article 375 of the criminal law had always been used to charge 
workers with work stoppage whenever they engaged in a strike.  
Civil servants also bore the brunt of accumulation by dispossession and witnessed the 
erosion of wages that fueled their resistance to the regime. For example, public school 
teachers were among those who earned the lowest pay under Mubarak (A. Alexander and 
Bassiouny 2014). To make ends meet, school teachers had to give private lessons after work 
hours and in some instances, school teachers would be teachers by day and taxi drivers by 
night (Interview with Independent Unionist, Alexandria).  
Consequently, the regime was delegitimized even further by drawing the civil servants 
to join the opposition and emulate the working-class strikes. In 2007, Kamal Abu Eita, a tax 
collector and a member of the Nasserite Karama party, led thousands of tax collectors in 
strikes and sit-ins outside of the cabinet. Abu Eita was inspired by Mahallat’s experience. The 
transfer of this experience included the creation of a national strike committee, direct 
democratization, and gaining of public support among tax collectors. Tax collectors 
demanded “wage parity with tax workers employed by the Ministry of Finance, whose 
salaries were higher” (Beinin 2012).65 Sustaining the strike was again a key element in 
winning concessions from the then-minister of finance. For eleven days, tax collectors and 
their families camped in front of the cabinet, finally forcing the minister of finance to increase 
their salaries by 325%. Despite the fact that they obtained a wage increase, tax collectors 
																																																								
64 See for example the article on Tanta Flax on the RS website: http://revsoc.me/workers-farmers/tnt-llktn-thmr-ldrb-ndjt-wan-wn-qtfh/  
65 See, for example, Beinin on The Rise of Egypt's Workers: http://carnegie-mec.org/2012/06/28/rise-of-egypt-s-workers-pub-48689  
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maintained their stance on transforming their strike committee into an independent union. In 
December 2008, the Ministry of Manpower approved their independent union, representing 
30,000 out of a total of 50,000 tax collectors. The tax collectors also inspired the formation of 
two anti-corporatist unions among public school teachers and health technicians (Ibid).  
Despite this important achievement of white-collar workers breaking away from 
corporatism to form independent unions, which is praised by the scholarly community as on 
par with Brazil’s new unionism and thus as a victory for the entirety of the working class, I 
argue that this instance should be understood with caution. It is clear that, for example, the 
white-collar unions were not representative of the struggles that pitted the industrial working 
class against the neoliberal model and hence against the aggressive and deliberate attacks by 
the Mubarak regime that deregulated the labor market, attacked job security and basic safety, 
and liquidated the private sector, leading to a large reserve of unemployed workers. They 
therefore cannot be considered representative of the entirety of the working-class agenda and 
demands. Though apparently they were the first anti-establishment institution, measuring 
anti-hegemonic struggles by looking only at the independent unions does not take into 
consideration the fact that a significant amount of labor militancy was happening at the level 
of informal factory committees. These factory committees, though informal, were actually 
challenging the regime’s hegemony on several different levels: through their direct 
confrontation with the security apparatus, and through their confrontation with the NDP and 
the new business-oriented ruling class.  
  
The Invisible Struggles: Urban Subalterns and Peasants In the Face of Violence  
 Workers' struggles were essential to exposing the processes of accumulation by 
dispossession under neoliberalism. As discussed in the case of Mahallat, the strikes were not 
confined to the walls of the industrial center; they ignited resistance from the local 
community over issues of accumulation by dispossession. Mahallat was just one example of 
how the working class inspired a horizontal spread of class mobilization within the local 
community and among the residents of the urban peripheries. The resistance initiated by 
Alexandrian unionists in the food industry and in their local community is another example. 
Inspired by the jubilant rise of workers at the Mahallat al Kubra factory, Alexandrian workers 
formed and got involved in a committee for the protection of the village of Toson (Interview 
with Alexandria Unionist). “In May 2008, the Governor of Alexandria, in cooperation with 
the Agricultural Reform Commission, the Agriculture Directorate and the Endowments 
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Authority in Alexandria, demolished houses inhabited by people for more than ten years.”66 
This incident prompted workers, along with residents of Toson, to form a popular committee 
for land reclamation. This inter-class alliance helped the workers who were involved in the 
land reclamation campaign to realize that the Mubarak regime was bent on dispossessing 
them of their right to land, but also of decent work conditions (Interview with Alexandria 
Unionist). As one of the unionist-activists on this campaign recalled it,  
“This campaign opened my eyes that this is not a matter of land only. That the 
government is taking away from me a piece of land but also more broadly, it is involved 
in stealing away my rights at the industry level” (Interview with Alexandria Unionist) 
 The residents of the urban peripheries who made a living from the informal 
economy were also inspired by the rise of the working class. The residents of the urban 
peripheries’ daily encounters with the police under a neoliberal state in retreat was the main 
cause fueling their resistance. Mobilization there was facilitated by the “growth in informal 
employment, and the increased privatization of social services” that awarded the residents of 
the urban peripheries a high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the state facilitating their 
mobilization (Ismail 2013, 871). For example, deteriorating health services encouraged 
patients with Hepatitis C to organize in front of public hospitals, protesting the failure of the 
government to deliver treatment (Abdelrahman 2015, 65). Women, the main labor force in the 
informal sector, also led people to protest in the urban peripheries (Annex). Women 
mobilized the residents in populous neighborhoods where poor families were being evicted to 
prepare for the destruction of their homes, paving the way for a project of Cairo purged of the 
lower-income classes (Ibid; Interview with ECESR researcher). Moreover, the residents of the 
popular quarters resisted the coercive and disciplinary practices of the police force in 
attacking their informal activities, including by seizing goods sold by street vendors (Ismail 
2013, 871).  
Another inspiring form of organizing that emerged from the urban peripheries under 
Mubarak and that played an important role in the mobilization during the 2011 revolution was 
on the part of the marginalized, often unemployed or underemployed, youth living in the 
populous quarters. In 2007, these marginalized youth formed the Ultras, a football fans club, 
which in turn reflected their identity as marginalized youth drawing from the populous 
quarters and confronting police tactics of crowd control that aimed to preempt the 
radicalization of Egyptian streets (Ismail 2013).67 As neoliberal authoritarianism could not 
																																																								
66Fort the Toson Village case see: http://revsoc.me/workers-farmers/hly-twswn-blskndry-ystrdwn-rd-mnzlhm/ 
67 For a documentary on the Ultras see : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TZcifsWdNpE 
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exist without the expansion and deepening of the police state, the struggles led by residents of 
the populous quarters were crucial to challenging the neoliberal state, and to breaking the 
barriers of fear instilled by the regime and its repressive arm. The 2011 revolution took place 
on January 25, Police Day, and used the slogan of restoring the dignity of citizens assaulted 
and humiliated by the security apparatus.  
The Nazif cabinet also witnessed renewed peasant mobilization in the countryside. A 
2009 report by the Land Center for Human Rights (LCHR) shone a light on the deteriorating 
conditions in Egypt’s countryside under Nazif’s cabinet. By 2009, 40 million peasants earned 
less than a dollar per day, and unemployment reached almost 60% in the countryside on that 
same year (LCHR 2009). There, the struggles revolved around the questions of land 
ownership, irrigation and access to water, and the refusal of the state to settle the landless 
peasants who have been forced out by landowners (LCHR 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). As had 
been the case in previous years, the peasants were met with brutal repression. In 2006 alone, 
92 peasants were killed and 257 were injured, while 465 were jailed (LCHR 2006). In most 
cases, the jail sentences were given to poor peasants who were unable to pay interests on 
agricultural loans. Despite the heavy-handed repression and brutality, the peasants continued 
to pay with blood as they struggled for access to land and water. In the last two years of 
Mubarak’s rule (2009-2010), the peasants organized more than “180 sit-ins, 132 
demonstrations and six strikes in rural areas » (Bush and Ayeb 2014, 7). The regime 
responded by killing 400 peasants, and arresting nearly 3000 in 2009, and arresting 2000 and 
killing 220 in 2010 (Ibid).  
The main challenge, as discussed in the previous section and suggested by Maha 
Abdel Rahman, was that the urban subalterns and peasants were not linked to a strong 
organizational core that could sustain their mobilization (Abdelrahman 2015, 66) and that 
could have, I would add, led to the greater politicization of their demands. As these struggles 
spread across different classes and work categories, they nevertheless did not coalesce 
together under a broader alliance of formal and informal workers, the employed and the 
unemployed, the workers in the urban areas and the countryside. Consequently, the 
contending social classes continued to challenge dispossession each on its own and to face the 
security sector’s brutality. These social struggles were not tied to a unified agenda that 
revolved around their daily struggles including the right to healthcare, the right to housing, 




illustrates how such connections between land reclamation and rights at work could have been 
made, but this case was not a generalized occurrence under Mubarak’s regime.  
3.3 Social Class Mobilization and the 2011 Revolution  
In this section, I argue that the working class played an important role in the 2011 
revolution. Although workers of the formal and informal sectors did not call the 2011 mass 
mobilization, the working class participated in the revolutionary process, presented 
themselves as martyrs, and was the first to challenge the symbols of the regime by storming 
the NDP headquarters and refusing to bow to the anti-revolutionary tactics of the corporatist 
federation. Arguably, the character of the revolution changed when the working class and the 
residents of the urban peripheries joined the mass mobilization. Furthermore, the mass 
mobilization during the 18 days that preceded Mubarak’s removal had built upon the workers’ 
capacity to organize and mobilize in the previous decades. Moreover, the working-class 
strikes paralyzed the country, facilitating the removal of Mubarak by the generals. Workers, 
unlike the Revolutionary Youth, did not bow to the military’s manipulative depiction of itself 
as being on the side of the protesters. Rather, workers continued to strike and the wave of 
strikes reached out to the military-owned industries. Workers had no qualms about exposing 
military corruption and challenged the military’s economic and foreign policy interests. It was 
the working-class participation that forced the military to remove the dictator. As argued in 
Chapter 2, the military grew wary of the Mubarak regime, but without the working class it 
had not yet reached the point of sacrificing the same regime that had helped it to expand its 
economic ventures. Finally, it was the working class that jumped to declare the first anti-
establishment institution. The following section pays attention to these arguments.  
When the April 6 movement called for protests through social media and took to the 
streets against Mubarak on January 25, 2011, workers did not refrain from joining the 
revolution, with many leaving their jobs and taking to the streets. The Egyptian Journalist 
Union and the Society of Heroes and Victims of the Revolution reported that 70% of the 
injured were “workers with no educational qualifications” (A.Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 
198). In the first days of the revolution, Mubarak closed workplaces, which “allowed a 
massive number of workers to come out on the streets of their cities and towns” 
(Abdelrahman 2015, 64). Until then, workers had been participating as citizens and 
individuals rather than as workers per se (CTUWS 2015; Beinin 2012).  
	 150	
Beyond the demonstrations and mobilization in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, led by a 
middle-class youth movement, working-class regions and Cairo’s populous quarters rose 
against Egypt’s dictator, thus widening the circle of contention against the dictator (A. 
Alexander and Bassiouny 2014). Suez, a strategic region and a working-class region par 
excellence, was known for the militancy of its residents, who prided themselves on being the 
first to storm the ruling party's headquarters there and to present the revolution’s first martyr 
(Al Jazeera English 2012). Furthermore, on January 28, the Friday of Rage, the revolution 
took another turn. The residents of Cairo’s slums joined protesters and set police stations on 
fire (Ismail 2013, 872). The problem for urban subalterns was the police brutality that they 
endured and the criminalization of poverty (Interview with Political Economist 1; Ibid). For 
them, “the police stations were sites of violent government through torture, verbal abuse, and 
humiliation, and police officers have long served as agents of everyday government in the 
popular quarters” (Ismail 2013, 872). 
Furthermore, the formal and informal workers were not only the ones to open fire on 
the symbols of the regime, i.e. the NDP and the security apparatus; they were also the first to 
create an anti-establishment institution (Beinin 2012). On January 30, 2011, the pre-
revolution independent unions and leaders from the industrial cities of Mahallat, Helwan, 
Sadat City, and 10th of Ramadan City met and agreed on the creation of the Egyptian 
Independent Trade Union Federation (EITUF) (CTUWS 2015). At the time, the EITUF was 
supported by the CTUWS, but splits became rife few months later, as will be shown in the 
next chapter. Furthermore, few months later, the peasants would also establish their own 
independent Farmers’ Union to break away from the state-created federation. The 
independent federation spread throughout various regions across the country (Bush and Ayeb 
2014).  
The working class also refused to join a counter-revolution orchestrated by the 
bastions of the regime, including the GETUF. On February 2, 2011, the corporatist federation, 
along with Mubarak’s supporters, launched one of the bloodiest attacks against peaceful 
protesters in Tahrir, the Battle of Camels(A. Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 198). The 
former GETUF president was one of the main orchestrators of this battle (Interview with 
Labor Journalist 2), leaving armed thugs riding on camels to run over peaceful protesters, 
killing and injuring several (Lutterbeck 2012).  
As soon as workers returned to their jobs on February 6, 2011, they declared a general 
strike (A. Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 198; Beinin 2012; CTUWS 2015). It was the 
workers’ strikes that “sealed the fate of the dictator” (A. Alexander and Bassiouny 2014). 
	 151	
Between February 8 and 11, 60 strikes spread through strategic sectors and military industries 
(Beinin 2012). They erupted among railway and bus workers, state electricity staff and 
service technicians at the Suez Canal, in the manufacturing, textile, and steel industries, and in 
hospitals (The Guardian 2011; Beinin 2012; Shenker 2011).68 Workers occupied factories, cut 
roads, demanded a betterment of wages, and kidnapped their managers (Interview with 
Labour Journalists 1 and 2, Alexander and Bassiouny 2014). On the eve of Mubarak’s 
departure, labor strikes spread horizontally, threatening a radicalization of the streets 
(Interview with Giza Labor Unionist).  
One of the areas that captured less media coverage was the strikes in military-owned 
factories. Workers there expressed their dismay with the retired generals’ corrupt 
management and were sent to military courts. They “made political demands such as 
impeaching minister Sameh Fahmi known for his close ties with Israel. Fahmi is known to 
have overseen agreements with Israel. They were accusing him of having sold Egypt’s gas at 
a subsidized rate to Israel thus causing huge losses for the Egyptian economy.”69  
But the military did not want to overthrow Mubarak; it was only when protests 
overwhelmed the Mubarak regime that a military coup nudged the dictator. Military officers 
were quoted saying “we gave the presidential institution the full opportunity to manage 
events.”70 The generals moved swiftly to change their position when the masses overwhelmed 
Mubarak’s forces “his (Mubarak’s) forces were incapable of responding to the events […] On 
February 10, there were demonstrations that amounted to millions of people all over the 
country.”71 The military decision was not made in a vacuum. In fact, it was blessed by the 
USA. While withdrawing its support from its longtime ally and client, the USA pushed for a 
military-orchestrated transition that nudged the dictator and contained the Egyptian streets.72 
Hence, on February 11, 2011, Mubarak did not leave; the military succumbed to popular 
pressure and staged a coup against him.  
3.4 Conclusion  
The Egyptian case invites us to rethink the central argument in RSS (1992), which 
stipulates that labor mobilization is sufficient to apply pressure for democracy.  First of all, on 
																																																								
68See The Guardian on the 18-day rebellion: https://www.theguardian.com/news/blog/2011/feb/09/egypt-protests-live-updates-9-february, 
also Shenker: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/11/egypt-economy-suffers-strikes-intensify 
69 Ibid. 
70  The Washington Post, Egyptian Generals Speak Out about Revolution and Elections, May 18, 2011: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/egyptian-generals-speak-about-revolution-elections/2011/05/16/AF7AiU6G_print.html 
71 Ibid.  
72 The Guardian, Julian Borger, and Chris McGeal: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/06/egypt-protests-hosni-mubarak-sulieman  
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the question of the unintended consequences of capitalist development, and the ensuing social 
and political mobilization led by the working-class, RSS (1992) based their argument on the 
Fordist model where a large concentration of workers in big units advance the chances for 
democracy. However, neoliberal Egypt was not characterized by a uniform working class 
organized in a few large-scale enterprises. Rather, the working class was fragmented 
geographically into smaller units. Organizationally, the fragmented working class faced more 
significant challenges to confronting the pacts of domination that cemented authoritarian rule 
and that facilitated the implementation of neoliberal policies. Mahallat al Kubrat is a 
representation of the large industries on which RSS (1992) based their model, but, as I have 
shown, labor action under Mubarak cannot be reduced to Mahallat, nor can the working class 
be reduced to the formal public sector employees of Egypt’s largest textile industrial center. If 
anything, the Egyptian case adds complexity to the contradictions of a neoliberal economy 
and the way these economies are tied to political transformations. The research shows that the 
labor-democracy argument of RSS has to be rethought to take into account the implications of 
this fragmentation. 
 I have argued in the theoretical chapter and in Chapter 2 that neoliberal capitalism 
transformed modes of production. Under neoliberalism, workers are scattered in smaller units, 
their numbers reduced at the factory level due to mechanization, tercerization, labor market 
deregulation, and arbitrary dismissals. However, this fragmentation in Egypt did not prevent 
the working class from mobilizing. Instead, these conditions that underpin neoliberal 
transformations actually brought about a horizontal spread of mobilization across different 
sectors (i.e. the private and the public sector), among the privileged unionized sectors and the 
less privileged non-unionized sectors, and across different industrial cities (the old and the 
new cities). It was the contradictions of neoliberal capitalism that actually ushered in labor 
militancy, which in turn delegitimized Mubarak’s authoritarianism and preempted the military 
from using outright repression in 2011 to immediately impose its own agenda. As will be 
shown in the next chapter, it took the military almost two years before it could appropriate 
politics to implement its own version of neoliberal militarism. 
 More broadly, the Egyptian working class under neoliberalism was not merely 
mobilizing for wage increases, which is what drives the capital-labor tension under the RSS 
model. Under neoliberalism, the struggles of daily life were coupled with struggles at the 
workplace. The demands for the betterment of the national minimum wage were accompanied 
by demands for social protection and land reclamation, and by struggles over accumulation by 
dispossession, which challenged the rent-seeking behavior of neoliberal business class. Such 
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forms of mobilization challenged capital’s interests under Mubarak, which profited not only 
from reduced labor costs but also from their access to public and free land, bank credits, and 
subsidized raw materials. Workers responded by exposing management corruption and 
demanding a renationalization of privatized industries, all of which challenged the rent-
seeking capacity of capital.  
In Egypt, the working class was not tied to a centralized structure that triggered labor 
mobilization. Egypt’s independent unions under Mubarak could not claim that they were 
representatives of the entirety of the working class nor their demands. As I have argued, 
experiences in creating independent unions came at a later stage and were in fact only 
successful among civil servants. However, the absence of formal organizing did not 
undermine the capacity of workers to pursue their struggles, culminating in their impressive 
participation in the 18-day revolt that ousted Mubarak.  
What emerged in the Egyptian case was a horizontal, non-centralized movement with 
no definite structure.  This form of organization challenged not only the material interests of 
the dominant classes but their symbolic and ideological hegemony. While the dominant 
classes were organized in a tightly knit and highly centralized structure that claimed 
domination over every aspect of social and political life, workers’ mobilization spread 
horizontally, was decentralized, and reached out to different regions across the country. They 
were not politically tied to any form of political organizing, which contrasts with the 
affiliation of dominant classes with the NDP. It was not their political affiliations but the 
grievances that they had developed against Mubarak’s neoliberalism that fueled their 
mobilization. Furthermore, the sheer number of militant workers in factories owned by 
Mubarak’s cronies, the Muslim Brotherhood businessmen, and local and foreign capital 
dismantled the regime’s capacity to label them as part of a single group and legitimize its 
assault against them. It was a horizontal, non-hierarchical form of organizing that 
delegitimized the regime.  
 The frequent occurrence of wildcat strikes that emerged among workers defied the 
regime both materially and symbolically. Where state-controlled factory unions existed, they 
were weakened by the decisions of the working class to resign en masse or to establish an 
autonomous union, independent of the corporatist federation. The two cases of Mahallat al 
Kubra and the Tax Collectors’ Union illustrate the argument (Abdelrahman 2015, 61). Even 
in factories where no official unions existed, workers elected a strike committee that 
represented them and forced concessions from the managers. Unlike the GEFTU, the strike 
committees were horizontal, based on participatory democracy; their elected leaders were 
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accountable to their colleagues and “reported back to them in one of the most democratic 
practices under Mubarak” (Abdelrahman 2015; 61). The factory committees were contrasted 
with the image of a centralized and hierarchical power within the GEFTU and an aging 
leadership that made its power through fraudulent elections and sided with the ruling party 
and businessmen to dissipate workers’ rights.  
Furthermore, workers pursued a new strategy that reflected their combativeness 
toward the state and capital. It rested upon work stoppage, incurring losses for businessmen 
and the state (El Mahdi 2011, 397). The demand for a minimum wage, which surpassed the 
industry- and workplace-specific requests for salary increases, or for the recognition of 
factory committees, transcended the factory. The demand for a national minimum wage 
challenged Mubarak’s pact with the businessmen but also with the military-owned industries, 
as will be shown in the next chapter (Abdelrahman 2015). Workers further challenged the 
business community by occupying and self-managing some industrial centers that had been 
abandoned by businessmen when they went bankrupt (Ibid). As El Mahdi (2011) argued, the 
new wave of workers’ mobilization challenged the moral economy argument, which was 
premised on the central idea that workers only seek to reinvigorate the populist pact, which 
entrenched rather than challenged the status quo (Interview with Political Economist 2). As 
will be shown in the next chapter, Nasserism continued to appeal to some workers in the 
public sector, but its appeal could not be generalized to the entirety of the working class under 
Mubarak, as some critics have argued (Interview with Political Economist 2). The generation 
of new, young, precarious, and temporary workers was not exposed to Nasserism. Moreover, 
the mobilization described above and several other examples attest to the fact that workers 
were breaking ties with the moral economy.  
In this chapter, I also argued that as a result of the process of accumulation by 
dispossession it was not only the working class that rose in contention against the neoliberal 
authoritarianism of Mubarak. It is true that workers inspired other contending social classes, 
but the struggles of the urban working class captured more local and international media 
attention compared to the struggles of the urban peripheries and the peasants. I have shown in 
this chapter that mass mobilization spread out horizontally to reach out to those who were 
previously considered the backbone of the regime, the civil servants. As they rose in 
contention, they narrowed the margin of support to the Mubarak regime. Moreover, I argued 
that while the Egyptian population had been kept under the tight control of an intrusive 
security apparatus, it was the poor, the working class, and the peasants who confronted the 
repressive apparatus the most. It was their struggles that were born both from the twin 
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processes of accumulation by dispossession and policing neoliberalism that widened the 
margin of oppositional social classes to the regime. On a symbolic level, it was the militancy 
and the confrontation of these social classes with the security apparatus and the state that 
brought the slogans of “dignity” and “bread, freedom and social justice” to the streets in the 
2011 revolution. 
While one cannot ignore the importance of these forms of mobilization and their 
impact on delegitimizing authoritarian neoliberalism, the Egyptian case, as I have argued, 
exhibited weak forms of inter-class alliance. Inter-class alliances took shape whether in the 
course of the strikes (for example, the local communities rising with the working class), or in 
the course of land reclamation campaigns or in the form of legal activism (the NGOs 
solidarity with the working class and the peasants), or even during the mass mobilization of 
the January 25 revolution. However, these inter-class alliances were not sustained and did not 
lead to a situation wherein various contending social classes viewed their struggles as 
connected all the time.  
This chapter rooted the explanation of a weak inter-class alliance in the absence of 
enabling factors that could lead to its emergence. First of all, the Egyptian paradox was such 
that the horizontal decentralized and very militant spread of working-class mobilization and 
informal organization at the workplace/factories was not tied to a strong alternative institution 
that reflected working-class militancy at the grassroots level. Although workers remained 
militant and organized in the informal factory committees, these committees were 
representative of the formal working class’ interests and in some instances they were 
dissolved as soon as they achieved workers’ demands. Furthermore, the EITUF, as will be 
shown in Chapter 4, became rife with divisions, its leadership was coopted by the military, 
and for a lot of unionists it did not reflect the militancy of the base. “The base is more militant 
than the leadership,” was one of the main themes highlighted by some of my militant unionist 
informants (Interview with Suez Unionist). Moreover, the formal and urban working class did 
not incorporate demands that could have improved conditions for the informal sector, the 
urban subalterns, or the peasants. My contention is that a strong alternative form of 
organizing, which could take the shape of an anti-corporatist federation, a party that 
represented the various social classes, or a social movement, was necessary to mediate such 
inter-class alliances and impose the working class, the informal sector, the peasants, and the 
civil servants as bargaining partners on the political and economic elites in post-Mubarak 
Egypt. 
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As argued in this chapter and the previous, this vacuum of strong organizing is owed 
to the fact that Mubarak did not want to leave power and hence left no room for the 
dispossessed and marginalized classes to politicize and liaise their struggles. It was also due 
to the weakness of existing political parties and the reluctance of the existing opposition 
movements and organized religious groups to politicize the class dimension of such struggles. 
In other words, there was no formal or informal space where such solidarities could translate 
into an understanding of urban reforms, land reforms, labor reforms, and political reforms as 




Chapter 4: Military Neoliberalism and the Working-class (2011-2016) 
The workings of neoliberal capitalism are everywhere in the world and the 
space here is becoming more tight when it comes to working-class issues. We 
are standing on the very small space left which keeps on shrinking. We are 
trying to enlarge it and it is not working (Interview with Founder of the 
Alexandria Permanent Council and Independent Unionist). 
4.1 Introduction  
In chapter 3, I argued that a horizontal spread of class struggles inspired the calls for 
regime change. While the previous chapter, stopped at the social and political mobilization 
before and during the 18 days revolution, this chapter offers a reading of Egypt’s failed 
transition to democracy. I argue that the militarization of politics in Egypt owes to internal 
and external factors that impeded effective counter-hegemonic labor organizing and its 
democratizing potential in post-2011 Egypt. Internal factors include the weakness of the post-
Mubarak independent unions, the cooptation of its leadership by the military and its failure to 
establish strong ties with the militant working-class base. The preoccupation of the anti-
corporatist union leaders with the religious/secular divides, signaled a disconnect between the 
leadership and the base, aborted prospects for the democratization of state and labor relations 
with dire implications for the capacity of workers to impose themselves as key bargaining 
partners with the military and the elites. Furthermore, the sustainable alliances between the 
working-class and other subordinate classes - the peasants, the residents of the urban 
peripheries and the middle-class – did not see the light.  
The analysis of the failed transition to a substantive democracy in Egypt does not stop 
at the internal/organizational level or the absence of subordinate classes’ alliances. At the 
heart of the argument presented in this chapter is that the Egyptian military played an 
instrumental role in orchestrating a counter-revolution in order to deepen “military 
neoliberalism.” From this perspective, the transition failed not because the Egyptian working-
class did not challenge the dominant classes. Rather, the transition failed because the 
Egyptian military faced with a militant working-class and a radicalized street resolved to the 
necessity to pursue a counter-revolution and preempt the implementation of the revolutionary 
demands for “bread, freedom and social justice.” In this regard, the 2013 military coup 
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against the MB elected president became a necessary precondition to enforce the signing of 
IMF loan agreements that burdened the poor and the working-class. While neoliberalism 
persisted under the transitional SCAF and MB rule, neither one of them could fully pursue the 
internationalization of the economy as they faced a real crisis of legitimacy. Furthermore, the 
military imposed itself as the key player in post-Mubarak Egypt because it had not lost 
popular support; in public perception it remained the pride of Egypt. 
As it had been illustrated in the previous chapters, the military in post-Mubarak Egypt 
embraced neoliberalism and was bent on inserting itself in capitalist ventures with the major 
regional (Gulf capital) and foreign investors in Egypt. It is important to note that this agenda 
is also in perfect harmony with its regional and international alliances with the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) and the USA but this topic, which is an important one remains 
far beyond the scope of this chapter.  As the military assumes political power in post-
Mubarak Egypt, the military did not roll back neoliberal policies pursued by Mubarak. It did 
not nationalize the privatized sectors or return the dismissed workers to their jobs, it did not 
restore social security or economic redistribution to the lower income, and it maintained the 
same laws (labor and investment) that led to labor market deregulation under Mubarak. Since 
general El-Sisi assumed political power in 2014, the military economic policies weighed 
heavily on Egypt’s poor and working class with the number of people living below the 
national poverty line climbing to 32.5% in 2019 compared to 27.5% in 2015 (Ahram Online 
2019).The military had also proven to be a good student of the IMF and WB, it had not only 
signed the loan agreements but it had implemented their policy recommendations and 
continued to receive praise (IMF 2019) for the high levels of growth achieved under military 
rule, fiscal responsibility and the military’s capacity to attract investors. The military rule 
therefore attests that it had drifted from the statism it embraced under Nasserism and that the 
senior generals transformed into high-powered investors who reemerged at the center stage of 
economic and political power after being eclipsed by Mubarak’s cronies under Mubarak’s 
Egypt. 
This chapter advances a political economy approach (PE) to post-2011 Egypt. As it 
had been discussed in the Introduction of this dissertation, I propose to fill a theoretical gap 
by assessing the balance of class power not only based on the organizational capacity of the 
working class (See RSS (1992)) but also from a political economy approach. I argue that 
examining labor organizing and their inter-class alliances to assess prospects for democracy 
does not capture how the political economy of post-Mubarak Egypt and how the military 
undermined the counter-hegemonic potential of working-class organizing. The PE approach 
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embeds the question of the subordinate and dominant class power in post-Mubarak regimes’ 
strategies and policies. Such policies shape the capacity and opportunities of contending 
classes in exerting their power and determine their inclusion/exclusion in post-2011 Egypt. It 
is important to note that given that I was not able to gather interviews from the informal 
sector and the peasants, as stated in the Introduction, I was also unable to fill this gap with 
secondary literature on peasants and the informal sector as scholars who have been working 
on this topic have also put it aside given the constrained political context in Egypt.73 This 
chapter acknowledges this gap and that their views are not reflected here. 
The chapter illustrates these arguments by analyzing the political economy of Egypt, 
and its effects on dominant and subordinate classes. It is divided into three sections to 
illustrate how the first post-Mubarak regimes though adamant on pursuing neoliberal 
economics were faced with a revolutionary zeal that invited a deepening of militarism. The 
chapter explains this dilemma by proceeding with an analysis of three periods of time: 
SCAF’s transitional rule (February 2011- June 2012), the Muslim Brotherhood rule (June 
2012- June 2013) and El-Sisi’s Military regime (2013-Present). The last section is the 
conclusion.  
4.2 SCAF’s Transitional Rule  
4.2.1 The Political Economy of SCAF (February 2011-June 2012) 
After Mubarak’s fall, SCAF orchestrated and engineered a transition from Mubarak’s 
regime guaranteeing for the senior and high-ranking generals control over political and 
economic affairs. SCAF proceeded with caution to implement a series of policies that 
preserved the neoliberal model, which thrived under the army’s clear continuous foreign 
policy alignment with the USA, Israel, and the Gulf monarchies. The first statements 
articulated by SCAF provided reassurances for the US and Israeli administrations that the 
military will continue to honor the Camp David agreement ignoring popular demands to 
terminate it (EIU reports January 2011-July 2012). SCAF also turned revolutionary demands 
for bread, freedom and social justice on their head by reassuring the IMF and the USA that 
Egypt will never return to its populist past and will pursue structural adjustment measures 
(Ibid). SCAF approached the IMF and the WB twice to secure a 3$ and 4.8 $ billion loans 
respectively (EIU reports January 2011-July 2012). The negotiations were brought to a halt 
when media commentators argued that SCAF’s transitional government lacked “proper 
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popular mandate to burden Egypt with additional foreign debt” (EIU July 2011, 16). Against 
this background, SCAF turned to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and secured aid 
assistance to pursue locally administered structural adjustment measures (EIU July 2011, 16; 
Joya 2017).  
As soon as SCAF assumed power, the generals continued to face the challenge of a 
militant and highly mobilized working-class. One month after Mubarak’s departure there 
were already 123 labor protests in various sectors of the economy74 (civil servants, textile 
industries, public transportation, petroleum, health services). By the end of 2011, 1400 strikes 
rocked Egypt (Annex) (A. Alexander and Bassiouny 2014). The apogee of strike action was 
in September 2011. More than 500 000 teachers and their supporters demanded the sacking of 
the Mubarak-era education minister, a minimum wage of 1200 EGP, and permanent work 
contracts for temporary teachers (Interview with Head of the Independent Teachers’ Union; 
(A. Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 213). The teachers’ demands were not parochial; rather 
they reflected their dismay with a neoliberal model that openly pursued flexible labor market 
standards. More generally, and under SCAF’s transitional rule, workers raised the same 
unmet demands of the pre-revolutionary phase. However, their militancy became much 
clearer with a series of strategies that they pursued in the course of their strikes challenging 
businesses’ and the old guards’ interests. Workers occupied factories, dismissed their 
managers and managed their industries. On a more symbolic level, workers raised the demand 
of tathir, the purging of their workplace from corrupt managers associated with Mubarak’s 
ruling party (Ibid). Between March and September 2011, tathir figured in 111 protests out of 
a total of 633 protests and involved 493 600 workers (Ibid). Tathir epitomized and echoed 
their dissatisfaction with the simple departure of the Mubarak regime, which translated with a 
transition to SCAF rule. The working-class deemed SCAF’s transitional rule as “simply 
changing the face of the regime” (Beinin 2016, 109). Moreover, the purging practice 
challenged the remnants of the regime and triggered the anxiety of senior generals who were 
managers of privatized industries and who were accused by workers of corruption and 
mismanagement (Chapter 3). Workers also called for their right to organize freely and 
attacked the GEFTU’s premises demanding its total dissolution75 (Interview with labor 
																																																								
74 For the documentation on strikes during this period, see the Revolutionary Socialists: https://revsoc.me/workers-farmers/brkn-lgdb-lmly-
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75 See for example https://revsoc.me/workers-farmers/myt-lml-ytlbwn-bhl-lthd-lrsmy/  
	 161	
journalists 1 and 2). Equally importantly, the working-class expressed dissatisfaction with a 
system that does not lead to substantive democracy and social justice (Beinin 2016, 110).76 
In this regard, a mobilized and combative working-class and a pro-labor agenda 
triggered the anxiety of the generals and challenged their commitment to deepen 
neoliberalism. The demands for a national minimum wage applied to all sectors including the 
military industry, the tathir practice, the demand for a just labor law, the renationalization of 
industries, ending the peace accord with Israel as well as union freedoms shook the military’s 
economic, institutional and foreign policy interests. A national minimum wage along with a 
fair labor law deprived the military of its comparative advantage: the surplus of cheap 
underpaid and unregulated military conscripts (see Chapter 2). The demands for the 
renationalization of industries and tathir bared senior military generals from their prestigious 
lifetime careers as managers in privatized SOEs. More so, such court cases risked opening a 
Pandora's box concerning the military’s illicit access to public land and resources that were all 
key to deepen Military Inc. 
SCAF responded by adopting carrots and sticks. They inaugurated their rule by 
mobilizing a state-owned media depicting workers’ demands as parochial (fia’waya) and 
undermining economic development (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 234).  Such statements 
were wedded to an anti-strike Law (34/2011) which imposed huge fines on an impoverished 
working-class as a punitive and deterrent measure (Beinin 2016, 111; Joya 2017; Adly 2017, 
12; Abdelrahman 2015, 89). 77 As it will be discussed in the next section, SCAF blocked the 
passage of a new trade union law that guarantees union freedoms and equally importantly, the 
generals pursued policies to reinvigorate a defunct GETUF and hence tighten rather than 
dismantle the corporatist siege. SCAF also ordered military conscripts to substitute striking 
workers in the public transportation sector which proved to be one of the most militant sectors 
both during and after the revolution to deprive them of their capacity to paralyze the country 
(Hartshorn 2015). 
Furthermore, the generals rushed to silence the working-class by increasing the 
national minimum wage to 700 EGP (116$) in the public sector from 35 EGP under Mubarak. 
While doing so, the generals deliberately turned their back to the historical working-class 
demand for a 1200 EGP national minimum wage, which fueled working-class resistance 
under Mubarak (Beinin 2016, 114). At a more symbolic level, SCAF’s wage policies sent out 
																																																								
76 Workers' resistance to SCAF rule started very early on. On February 15, 2011, they were still protesting for the renationalization of 
industries, operating the closed industries and wage increases: https://revsoc.me/workers-farmers/brkn-lgdb-lmly-ywsl-thdyh-lqrrt-lhkm-
lskry/   
77 See also the HRW report on the Ban on Strikes under SCAF rule: https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/25/egypt-revoke-ban-strikes-
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a clear message that the generals would implement fully any of the working-class demands as 
it would risk opening a Pandora’s box about the necessity of pursuing the above-mentioned 
pro-labor agenda that they deemed too threatening to the neoliberal order and their interests.  
SCAF cabinets also moved quickly to appeal the Supreme Administrative Court’s 
(SAC) decisions that ordered the renationalization of privatized industries. A renationalization 
of privatized industries, they argued, would exacerbate the problem of capital flights. By the 
government’s estimates, “there was a massive exodus of capital of around $12.8 billion from 
Egypt’s treasury bill market, the stock market, and the banking system in 2011 and 2012” 
(Adly 2017, 12). Moreover, the foreign businessmen who were involved in the corruption 
scandals surrounding privatization deals raised court cases against the Egyptian government 
incurring huge losses on an ailing economy. Against this background, SCAF moved to pardon 
“foreign investors caught up in illegal deals ‘in return for a moderate fine’” (EIU June 2011, 
14). It is important to note that SCAF was only successful in blocking the renationalization 
process, but they could not pursue the privatization of new SOEs. As is the case for the 
negotiation of loan agreements SCAF did not enjoy any popular legitimacy to pursue such a 
controversial step selling public assets brought to a halt under Mubarak’s regime amid 
popular and working-class resistance. In this regard, SCAF could not pursue a deepening of 
neoliberalism the way it saw best fit to its interests.  
As in relation to the local business community, the generals adopted several strategies 
that were in line with the persistence of neoliberalism. On the one hand, the military 
marginalized Mubarak’s business tycoons from politics by dissolving the ruling party. On the 
other hand, they made sure to protect their interests given SCAF’s long-term economic plan. 
After all, an attack on big local businesses exacerbated deteriorating economic conditions 
(Annex) and triggered the anxiety of foreign investors and creditors (EIU July 2011). The best 
illustration of this strategy is reflected in SCAF’s stance on court cases raised against 
Mubarak’s NDP and his business tycoons. In April 2011, SAC charged some ruling party 
members and business tycoons with long-term prison sentences including Mubarak and his 
two sons (Adly 2017, 11). A few months later, the military cabinet stepped in to reverse the 
court’s decisions by issuing a decree that pardoned businessmen in return for compensation 
paid to the state (Ibid; EIPR 2012). In short, SCAF was gradually and surely working to 
reinvigorate a post-Mubarak Egypt of “business as usual” that confirmed the fears of the 
Egyptian working-class warning from the very beginning that Mubarak’s departure was akin 
to changing the face of the regime (Beinin 2016, 109).  
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4.2.2 The Absence of Inter-class alliances and SCAF’s strategies of Divide and Rule 
I argued in my introduction and theoretical chapter that inter-class alliances are 
necessary to tip the balance of class power in favor of the poor and the working class. In 
Egypt, the inter-class alliances occurred occasionally on specific events or strikes but they did 
not materialize into a sustained form of organizing that can impose the poor and the working 
class as key bargaining partners in the post-transition phase. The transition in Egypt happened 
rapidly and spontaneously despite the will of the Mubarak regime. Mubarak was preparing to 
cement family rule rather than cede power to civilian rule, which withstood the capacity of the 
struggling classes to coalesce together. Moreover, the independent unions took shape before 
and after the revolution yet remained rife with divisions (see below), and party formation 
around such class struggles did not materialize. This owes to a number of factors. Firstly, the 
forces behind the 2011 revolution were neither prepared nor willing to compete for elections. 
For example, there was no unanimity among my interviewees from the independent union 
federations that workers ought to lead the post-Mubarak phase. Some have underscored that 
workers today are waiting for another revolution to build their capacity anew after having 
suffered from a severe setback under El Sisi’s military regime (see below) (Interview with 
Former EITUF board member and Giza unionist). While others were adamant on emphasizing 
that the working-class should lead post-Mubarak Egypt (Founder of the Alexandria 
Permanent Council and Alexandria Independent Unionist 2016). Moreover and as I have 
argued in Chapter 3, the working-class, the revolutionary youth and the urban subalterns 
viewed that a horizontal spread of their struggles was much more defiant to the hierarchical 
institutionalized form of politics that they associated with Mubarak’s authoritarianism 
(Abdelrahman 2015).  
Secondly, SCAF pursued strategies to keep all such classes separated. The first step in 
the military strategy entailed co-opting the Brotherhood and distancing them from Egyptian 
streets. The high-ranking MB leaders hail from the upper and middle-class, 78 but the MB also 
catered to the lower classes through a wide array of social services. Given that the MB is the 
most organized political actor in post-Mubarak Egypt, SCAF was adamant on keeping the 
MB separated from other revolutionary forces. The generals were convinced that only the MB 
could “push through the protection of the army’s prerogatives and economic and foreign 
policy interests” (Stacher 2012 b). Such convictions were reinforced by the Brotherhood’s 
behavior and participation before and during 2011. Under authoritarianism, the MB pursued a 
																																																								
78 See the Washington Institute Report “ The MB Who is Who?” : https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/WhosWhoInMB.pdf 
(accessed March 1st 2018)  
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non-confrontational approach towards Mubarak’s authoritarianism (Al Anani 2015; Masoud 
2013; Clark 2011; 2012). The reformist MB strategy under authoritarianism shaped its 
participation in 2011. While protesters filled the streets demanding Mubarak to leave, the MB 
proceeded with caution and joined them at a later stage. Equally importantly, the MB’s logic 
of reform rather than revolution entailed that they accepted, and supported the neoliberal 
model (See next section; Dalacoura 2016). This stance reassured the military that the MB will 
not pursue radical economics and would not tip the balance of class power to support the poor 
and the working-class. The MB was therefore viewed as a safe ally for SCAF whose primary 
objective rested on weakening prospects for the rise of a grassroots bottom-up revolutionary 
alternative. A labor unionist perfectly illustrates this dilemma "SCAF do not want to create 
any other form of organization except for the MB and SCAF. The two agreed very well and 
coexisted together for a long period. When their interests diverged, one of them came up and 
nudged the other" (Interview with the Founder of the Alexandria Permanent Council and 
Alexandria Independent Unionist).  
To guarantee its primacy over post-Mubarak Egypt, SCAF passed the political parties’ 
law that facilitated the recognition of the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and its more 
conservative and previously quietist counterpart, the Salafi79 Al Nur Party. At the same time, 
it constrained smaller political organizations from creating their own, and most importantly it 
challenged the capacity of a labor party to see the light. Under military rule, political parties 
could only be formed if they solicited support from 5000 members across ten governorates 
and 300 members in each governorate respectively (EIU April 2011, 14). The new party law 
privileged large political organizations such as the 80-year-old and well-organized 
Brotherhood and its Salafi Call counterpart (Al Anani 2015 b). I have previously argued 
(Chapters 2 and 3) that the MB does not draw from the ranks of the working-class and that its 
platform is not a working-class platform (See also the next section). Similarly, the Salafi 
Call’s relationship with the workers and the poor is one aimed at keeping them tied to their 
patronage networks, namely the social services that they provide amid state retreat. However, 
the Salafi call much like the MB drew from a large number of middle-class professionals and 
in this respect cannot be deemed as a representative of the poor and the working-class.  The 
Salafi call and its party arm, Al Nur party, have used their networks among the lower classes 
to solicit support for their Dawa’ (preaching) agenda rather than express the workers’ and 
																																																								
79 Salafism refers to an ideology and a trend in Sunni Islamism which advocates the coming to a pristine form of Islam best represented by 
the rule of the Prophet Mohammed and his three successors (Abu Baker, Omar and Uthman). They rely extensively on a strict reading of the 
Quran as well as Sunna and Hadith (the life and spoken words of the Prophet). While Salafism can be divided into several categories, it 
shares a strategy of pursuing Dawa - preaching – to Islamize state and society (See Wagemakers 2015). 
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poor people’s interests. Besides the Brotherhood and Al Nur party that have sidetracked class 
struggles, the more progressive parties before and after 2011, played no role in supporting the 
working-class except by "paying them lip service" (Abdelrahman 2015, 90). In this regard, 
the prospects for a mass party that would translate revolutionary demands and represent 
subordinate classes could not see the light under SCAF’s transitional rule.   
More importantly and in exchange for SCAF’s recognition and legalization of the 
MB’s work and political participation, the Brotherhood reassured SCAF that it would neither 
pursue nor support an implementation of radical economics. On Friday sermons following 
Mubarak’s departure, the most influential MB religious leaders insisted on the necessity to 
support SCAF’s ban on strikes (Chafi 2011). Furthermore, the successful cooptation of the 
Brotherhood by SCAF ensured that the MB refused joining forces protesting military brutality 
and calling for an immediate transfer of political power to civilian rule (EIU June 2011).  
A second step in the military strategy involved keeping the middle-class (The 
Revolutionary Youth), the residents of the urban peripheries and the formal working-class 
separated. As one of my interviewees stated “the solution in Egypt would only come about 
when the two (socio-economic and political) come together as is the case for the 18-day 
revolt. This explains why all rulers are adamant about keeping them separated. The day this is 
going to be solved you will see things changing” (Interview with Former EITUF Board 
Member and Independent Giza Unionist 2016). This specific task was not a very difficult one 
for the generals.  Residents of urban peripheries continued to rise in contention, but they did 
not link their struggles to the working-class. Their mobilization remained horizontal and did 
not fit within a strict hierarchy that linked their demands to a sustained form of organization 
such as neighborhood associations(Abdelrahman 2015).  
The middle-class coalesced around the Revolutionary Youth Coalition (RYC) and 
formed a unified front of disparate factions that came together in Tahrir square. As it had been 
the case for Kefaya (see Chapter 3), the RYC was made up of an ideologically heterogeneous 
group of liberals, leftists and some members of the MB youth (Shukrallah 2011; El Gundy 
2012). RYC initially undertook steps to negotiate with SCAF but as some noted their main 
weakness was their failure to articulate a clear plan of action to implement revolutionary 
demands (Abdelrahman 2015, 84).The RYC chose to disintegrate itself in 2012 when 
parliamentary elections took place under the pretext that Egypt was preparing to transition to 
civilian rule (El Gundy 2012).  
After Mubarak's departure, the "revolutionary youth," except for a few, internalized 
and reiterated the military discourse. The mix of middle-class activists with little or no 
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experience in politics drew from the ranks of small entrepreneurs, businesspeople and 
managers who benefited from and thrived under Mubarak’s neoliberalism or his authoritarian 
rule (Interview with Political Economist 1; Abdelrahman 2015). More so, their opposition to 
Mubarak’s regime had less to do with neoliberal economics and more with a corrupt 
implementation of neoliberalism (Interview with Political Economist 1). Therefore their main 
demands were liberal such as calling for constitutional reforms and political freedoms rather 
than pursuing social justice (Interview with Labor Journalist 1; Suez unionist; Political 
Economist 1) 
Let me tell you that the youth movement would put one or two demands from the 
labor movement’s list of demands, but their struggles are not the struggles of the 
workers; the youth movement’s struggles are always political (Interview with Suez 
unionist).   
This led to a general feeling among unionists that youth activists are politically opportunistic 
and have used the working-class to delegitimize the regime and achieve narrow political 
demands (Interview with Giza unionist). Such feelings deepened when youth activists 
“dismissed the important role played by workers during the revolution” (Interview with Labor 
Lawyer; Land Center for Human Rights and ECESR Report February 2011). In one of his 
first interviews, the co-founder of April 6 Youth Movement, had openly declared “The 
workers played no role in the revolution. They were far from it” (Maher quoted in Beinin 
2016, 135). According to independent unionists and founders of the EITUF, the youth 
endorsed SCAF’s immediate call to end the strikes and depicted workers’ demands as 
apolitical and parochial (Interview with Giza unionist). More so, only a few activists adopted 
the workers’ agenda, but even in this case workers described them “as sympathizers rather 
than true allies” (Ibid).80 Still, other unionists take their sympathy with caution, as they tend 
to exert a monopoly over the working-class. “Few organizations play an important role, only 
very few of them, but they also seek to control the labor movement. These organizations 
should not be speaking in the workers’ name” (Interview with Suez Unionist). More so, and 
while middle-class activists described themselves as “revolutionary,” they viewed the 
subaltern classes including the working-class with contempt. The revolutionary youth 
represented themselves as the “educated” and “peaceful” protesters contrasting their identity 
with that of the popular sectors depicted as “vandals” and “infiltrators” (Ismail 2013). After 
all, the middle-class was equally wary of a structural transformation that would tip the 
																																																								
80 These included the Revolutionary Socialists, the ECESR (Egyptian Center for Social and Economic Rights), and the CTUWS (Interview 
with Labor Lawyer). 
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balance of class power in favor of the poor and the working-class which also challenged their 
cultural capital but also their upper-class interests (Mandour 2017).  
 
4.2.3 Challenges to the New Labor Organizing: Independent Unions under SCAF Rule 
This next section delves into the divisions that rocked the post-2011 unionism and the 
strategies pursued by the military to neutralize the power of counter-hegemonic labor 
organizing. After all, new unions could spread horizontally across all sectors of the economy 
promising a more radical pro-poor and pro-labor agenda, which challenged the military 
neoliberalism. As on one of my interviewees argued “these (independent unions) are small 
seeds. If they grow, they will swallow everyone around them. We are talking about 26 million 
workers” (Interview with Alexandria Unionist). It is worth reminding the reader that founders 
of Egypt’s independent federation described the outburst of independent unions in post-2011 
as “a legacy of the revolution, not a legal thing” (Interview with Cairo unionist). The workers 
declared the establishment of independent unions, which operated de facto without ever being 
recognized by SCAF. As it will be shown, the juntas delayed the legal recognition of 
independent unions, which paved the way for aborting this project under El-Sisi’s counter-
revolution. The following sections examine the divisions that rocked Egypt’s independent 
unionism at a very early stage of the transition as well as military strategies devised to 
weaken independent labor organizing. 
 
Personalism Divides Egypt’s Independent Unions 
 Following Mubarak’s removal, the working-class was emboldened by the critical role 
that it played in unseating Egypt’s dictator. Taking their revolutionary fervor further, workers 
declared their independent unions and some of them rushed to join the independent 
federation. As some argued workers “were pursuing a process of revolutionary development 
rooted in the ongoing struggles which are intended to culminate in a qualitatively new 
network of proletarian institutions” (Abdelrahman 2015, 87). This revolutionary development 
was in line with the nature of labor protests and demands that emerged under SCAF rule 
which on the one hand reflected workers’ dissatisfaction with changing the face of the regime 
and on the other hand sought to bring the revolution to the workplace by purging the shop-
floor from ruling party affiliates and creating alternative avenues of workers’ representation 
(see the previous section). It is worth noting that while independent unions flourished in post-
Mubarak Egypt and became one of the symbols of working-class militancy, a good number of 
	 168	
my interviewees insisted that the absence of independent unions at the shop-floor level was 
not synonymous with the absence of militancy. In such cases, the working class continued to 
struggle the way it did under Mubarak through wildcat strikes to achieve their unmet demands 
(Interview with Suez unionist; Interview with Labor Journalist 2).  
Even when workers succeeded in establishing an independent union, they faced 
numerous challenges. The most important was acquiring legal recognition under a hostile 
military rule committed to obliterate independent unions. Equally important is that 
independent unions were not tied to their base. I argued in my introduction that this is a vital 
measure of the question of union strength, which transcends the question of union density and 
representation in critical sectors of the economy. Unions that remained firmly tied to the 
shop-floor level, and held accountable to their base therefore reduced the likelihood of the 
bureaucratization of the union leadership. In Egypt, the union leadership namely the leaders 
of independent federations were transformed into a new union bureaucracy coopted by their 
relationships with transitioning regimes and international organizations.  As they became 
more bureaucratized and tied to the circles of power, they also became more distant from their 
base. The consequences of such distancing were dire for implementing a pro-labor agenda and 
for pursuing a greater democratization of state and labor relations. In this regard, and while 
independent unions rushed to join independent federations (Chapter 3), their revolutionary 
aspirations were derailed as they faced an increasingly bureaucratized and divided 
independent union leadership and a hostile military.  
Before investigating the nature of these divisions and how they undermined prospects 
for counter-hegemonic labor organizing, a map of the post-Mubarak independent federations 
is in order. The EITUF (Egyptian Independent Trade Union Federation) was created in 
January 2011 bringing under its umbrella the main independent unions that emerged before 
and during the revolution. EITUF included the independent union of tax collectors (more than 
50 000 members), the pensioners’ union, health technicians and school teachers (almost 40 
000 members) and consequently a highly middle-class representation within the federation 
(Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 240-241). By October 2011, the EITUF declared that it 
included 72 independent unions representing more than 1 million workers in various sectors 
of the Egyptian economy out of a labor force of almost 22 million (Ibid, 240-242). But the 
problems were not only that it was numerically non-representative of the working-class, an 
investigation of the EITUF suggests that such statements are an exaggeration both regarding 
numbers and representation (Interview with Labor journalist 2). The EITUF did not include 
independent unions from the most significant and most strategic textile, steel, and aluminum 
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industries (Beinin 2016, 111). More importantly, the EITUF was not the only umbrella 
federation of independent unions; it shared the space with other competing labor federations 
namely the Egyptian Democratic Labor Council (EDLC). By October 2011, the EDLC 
declared in a press conference that it had already 300 unions under its wing in various sectors 
of the economy including the industrial sectors and the services sectors (Ibid, 243). 81 The 
EDLC remained the number one competitor to the EITUF even though post-Mubarak Egypt 
also witnessed the proliferation of regional councils. The Alexandria Permanent Council is 
one example of such councils, which often was in disagreement with the EITUF and the 
EDLC claiming that they both sought to monopolize the representation of the working-class 
(Interview with founder of the Alexandria Permanent Council).  
The plurality of these federations is not a sign of a healthy labor organizing. It is 
emblematic of the divisions that rocked the federations at a very critical period impeding the 
capacity of the working-class to pursue its revolutionary demands. The deep divisions 
between the EITUF and the EDLC are the most important to consider in this chapter as they 
made their way to news headlines, came up in most interviews and were acknowledged by the 
scholarship that examined the post-2011 labor movement (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014; 
Beinin 2016; Abdelrahman 2015).  
The origins of the divisions are rooted in the competition between the two EITUF 
founders: Kamal Abbas and Kamal Abu Eita (Alexander and Bassiouny 2017; Beinin 2016; 
Abdelrahman 2015; Interview with Labour Journalist 2). Personalism at a very early stage of 
the transition process divided the nascent union movement irreparably. In this respect, the 
EDLC ceded from EITUF only a few months after Mubarak’s departure. Abbas pursued this 
move when Abu Eita prohibited Abbas’ CTUWS to control decision-making positions in the 
newly created EITUF (Beinin 2016, 112-113). Former EITUF administrative committee 
members argued that the CTUWS is a civil society organization (see chapter 3) not a union 
and could not claim the representation of the working-class (Interview with Giza unionist). 
Their cohorts opined that neither one of the two men was committed to greater 
democratization of state-labor relations. Instead, they used their popularity among workers to 
carve a successful career in politics (Interview with Former EITUF board members 1 and 2, 
Labor Journalists 1 and 2). Such voices were highly critical of the leaders’ trajectories. In the 
absence of a workers’ party, Abu Eita claimed representation of the working class in the first 
parliamentary elections running on a slate with the Brotherhood. The latter as it will be shown 
																																																								
81 For the EDLC creation see: http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/326830.aspx 
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were committed to abort a pro-labor agenda. Abbas did not run for elections but was criticized 
for the “NGOization” of trade unionism creating a situation where complex structural 
problems such as the question of state and labor relations were transformed into “campaigns” 
for “trade union freedoms” (Interview with Suez unionist). Critics opined that the 
“NGOization” of unionism led to the de-radicalization of working-class militants 
transforming those who benefited from the CTUWS’ services into clients for the center and 
the international community (Interviews with Labor Journalist 2 and 3, Interview with Cairo-
based unionist, Suez unionist, Giza unionist, Alexandria Unionist; Alexandre and Bassiouny 
2017). According to one of my interviewees, “they (affiliates of the CTUWS) care about 
getting money and traveling from one place to another for their prestige and for the 
insignificant prizes that they give them there” (Interview with Alexandria Unionist). 
However, and as the two leading figures of the EITUF and EDLC gravitated in the world of 
policymakers, they became bureaucratized and distanced from their militant base. All of this 
fed into SCAF’s strategies of weakening the labor movement and bringing an end to its 
transformative capacity (Interviews with Suez Unionist; A. Alexandre and Bassiouny 2017; 
32-33).  
Personalism also closed the doors to an important discussion revolving around the 
forms of counter-hegemonic organizing in post-2011 Egypt. The EITUF and the EDLC 
disagreed on the list of priorities and whether the radicalization of the working class should 
precede their mobilization and organization or whether organization should come first and 
radicalization would follow. EDLC was a proponent of radicalizing and mobilizing at the 
shop floor level before creating independent unions (Abdelrahman 2015, 89). While the 
EITUF was a proponent of a top-down approach that pushed for creating independent unions 
first and radicalizing the working-class at a later stage (Ibid). Such debates were cutting at the 
heart of maintaining sustainable union organizing in the face of adverse conditions. As 
leading scholars argued, it was not too hard to convince the working-class to separate from 
the corporatist federation (Ibid, 88). The real problem was that even when new unions 
emerged, the most militant among them remained financially tied to the corporatist federation. 
Workers had kept all their pension money there, and it became impossible under military rule 
to transfer them to the new unions. New unions were not recognized by the generals and were 
starved from resources to support the militant working-class (Interview with Giza unionist). 
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Under the transitional military rule, the military could not resort to traditional 
strategies of repression and corporatism to kill the power of counter-hegemonic labor 
organizing. A more direct repression against the working-class could further antagonize the 
streets against SCAF. In fact, only a few months into the transitional military rule, the 
military was no longer perceived as the guardian of the revolution. The Maspero massacre, 
bloody clashes of Mohammed Mahmoud Street along with the virginity tests used against 
women turned the streets against them. While large-scale repression against the working-class 
was not an option for SCAF, the GETUF also could no longer discipline and control the 
working-class. GETUF came under public scrutiny for its direct involvement in repression 
against peaceful protesters during the 18 days revolution (Interview with labor journalist 1). 
Workers attacked its premises and demanded its complete dismantling. 82 The dissolution of 
the ruling party also delegitimized the federation, which acted as its union arm for years under 
Mubarak. The GETUF lost many of its members to newly created independent unions (A. 
Alexandre and Bassiouny 2013, Abdelrahman 2015). SCAF was therefore aware that it could 
not rely on the corporatist federation to achieve its long-term goals. SCAF’s rule was marked 
by false promises that gave workers the semblance that generals conceded to the demands for 
freedom of organization and association while pursuing policies to reinvigorate and deepen 
corporatism.  
One of the first steps pursued by SCAF that reflected their anti-labor stances was the 
appointment of the GETUF treasurer under Mubarak to the position of the Minister of 
Manpower and Labor. Their decision came under scrutiny by independent unionists forcing 
SCAF to roll back their decision and appoint a labor lawyer supported by independent 
unionists (Beinin 2016, 110). However, the new minister of labor was both constrained by 
SCAF’s veto power (see below) and at the same time failed to adopt a confrontational 
approach. His first decision was limited to dissolve the GETUF’s executive board (Ibid). A 
closer look at the 2006 SAC court rulings suggest that the GETUF elections were fraudulent 
and that the minister could have dissolved the corporatist federation altogether (Chapter 3).83 
Instead, the minister maintained the GETUF structure and created a temporary executive 
committee to oversee union operations awaiting the results of new elections. Furthermore, a 
closer look at the composition of the executive committee shows that his primary concern was 
to reflect the balance of power rather than push forward a pro-labor agenda. The committee 
maintained seven members of the GETUF, 13 independent unionists as well as three 
																																																								
82 For the documentation on the wave of strikes during this period, see the Revolutionary Socialists: https://revsoc.me/workers-farmers/brkn-
lgdb-lmly-ywsl-thdyh-lqrrt-lhkm-lskry/  
83 The texts of the court decisions since 2006 are available online in Arabic: http://qadaya.net/?p=4452 
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Brotherhood representatives who have criticized union freedoms and a plurality of unionism 
(Hartshorn 2015, 115). 
 The minister paved the way for workers to establish their independent unions as soon 
as they handed their papers to the Ministry of Labor. The temporary procedure was framed as 
a “revolutionary step” (Interview with Former EITUF Board member and labor Unionist, 
Cairo). However, the minister’s incomplete step became subject to abuse by his successors. 
SCAF left Law 35 of 1976 intact, depriving independent unionists from their capacity to 
represent workers in collective bargaining procedures and collect membership dues (Interview 
with Giza unionist; Alexandria Unionist; Adly and Ramadan 2015). This was the most serious 
problem for independent unionists, starving them from financial resources. One of my 
informants drives the issue home when she highlights this dilemma “When I am an 
independent union who can not negotiate on behalf of the employees. I cannot represent them 
in the National Wages Councils, the Emergency Fund and the Central administration for 
Collective Bargaining, then why would workers join the union in the first place?” (Interview 
with Giza Unionist) 
Furthermore, when the minister presented a trade union law expressing a commitment 
to union freedoms, SCAF vetoed the law and shelved it under the pretext that this would fall 
under the responsibility of a future civilian government (Interview with Labor Journalist 2). 
The minister finally resigned but more importantly, his last decision contradicted all his self-
proclaimed commitment to union freedoms when he dissolved the temporary committee and 
restored the GETUF board (Beinin 2016, 113). Beinin (2015) suggests he was under pressure 
from the military and GETUF bureaucracy to reinvigorate the federation. However, the 
minister who lamented the fact that nothing could be achieved under military rule accepted 
later on a cabinet portfolio under the 2013 military regime. 
The discussion so far showed that by the end of SCAF’s term, the prospects for 
counter-hegemonic labor organizing were grim. SCAF’s commitments to pursue 
neoliberalism were made very clear from the beginning. This had dire implications on the 
question of the working-class’ capacity to organize and consequently on the question of 
balance of class power. SCAF continued to criminalize labor action and derailed prospects for 
counter-hegemonic labor organizing. It is important to note however that under SCAF’s 
transitional rule, the military realized the necessity to tolerate working with leftist and 
Nasserite independent unionists. Recognizing them in order to co-opt them later on was a 
smart strategy devised by the generals. SCAF turned this same leadership against the 
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Brotherhood and facilitated the 2013 military coup, a necessary step to deepen the military 
counter-revolution and neoliberalism (Springborg 2017).  
 
4.3	Pious	neoliberalism:	The	Political	Economy	of	the	FJP	(July	2012-July	2013)	
4.3.1 Pious neoliberalism: The Political Economy of the FJP (July 2012-July 2013) 
 I argued that SCAF initially sought an alliance with the MB to preempt the 
radicalization of the Egyptian streets and to undermine the implementation of radical demands 
for bread, freedom and social justice. The Brotherhood benefited from this alliance to run for 
presidential and parliamentary elections out of which they emerged as the biggest winners 
(Masoud 2013; Anani 2015; Wickham 2013). When Mohammed Mursi, the FJP president 
won the first elections, he inherited an ailing economy (Annex) and a constrained political 
environment. To this situation, the FJP responded by pursuing a commitment to unpopular 
structural adjustment policies and a neoliberal model. From the class power perspective, 
FJP’s political economy did not move away from punishing the subordinate classes and 
privileging capital’s interests (see below).  A brief overview of Mursi’s one year in power 
illustrates that the president was equally committed to punish and criminalize the formal and 
informal working-class, ignore their demands and burden the poor with higher taxation and 
subsidy cuts. At the same time, the FJP’s model was initially designed to trickle down the 
effects of “pious neoliberalism” to a handful of FJP business tycoons. The 2013 military coup 
quickly reversed such strategies. 
The basic tenets of the FJP’s neoliberalism were reflected in its electoral platform, Al 
Nahda (Renaissance) 84 crafted by its most famous business tycoon and financier, Kheiret al 
Shater (Dalacoura 2016; Joya 2018 a). The program engaged the “private sector” in the 
economy and “opposed nationalization and renationalization” of companies. It promised to 
provide guarantees for the “protection of private property” (Ibid, 69) and promoted a capitalist 
model geared towards achieving growth through productive rather than rentier means (Joya 
2018 a, Kindle Location 2727). At the heart of the FJP neoliberal program was a commitment 
to expand the market to privilege the small and medium enterprises  (SMEs) dominated by the 
FJP investors operating mainly in the clothing, furniture and food industries and to insert its 
own businessmen in megaprojects such as the expansion of the Suez Canal (Joya 2018 a, 
Kindle Location 2727, Kindle Location 2842). As pertaining to the salient questions of 
economic redistribution and addressing income inequality in Egypt, one of the most unequal 
																																																								
84  The text of the Renaissance Program is available online: https://www.uni-
marburg.de/cnms/politik/forschung/forschungsproj/islamismus/dokumentation/dokumente/praesidentmursi.pdf  
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societies in the Arab world, the FJP renaissance program did not move beyond advocating for 
the attainment of social justice through Islamic Charity Zakat and a “100 projects worth 
US$100bn” geared towards the betterment of poor citizens’ conditions. However, the 
program fell short of determining a clear policy to address income inequality and poverty in a 
country where almost 25% lived below the poverty line and where the demands for income 
redistribution figured prominently in the 2011 revolution (EIU August 2012, 4; Joya 2018 a, 
Kindle Location 2811). 
 In line with the FJP’s neoliberal policies, Mursi re-initiated talks with the IMF and 
appealed to international creditors. Few months after he assumed power, Mursi and the IMF 
negotiated to increase the IMF loan to $4.8 billion. The agreement never saw the light of day. 
At the time of the negotiations in March 2013 and April 2013, there were already 860 and 876 
social and economic protests (ECESR 2013, 40; Annex). The working-class alone organized 
354 and 371 labor protests respectively demanding the same unfulfilled demands of the 
previous periods such as a betterment of wages and job security (Ibid, 20). Political instability 
facing the MB administration urged the IMF to bring such negotiations to a halt. The FJP then 
turned to its regional allies to secure aid assistance. Turkey and Qatar’s diplomatic and 
financial support were crucial under FJP rule. While Turkey pledged $2 billion in loans; Qatar 
pledged $3 billion in addition to promising investments worth $18 billion  (Ayata 2015, 105). 
In line with its neoliberal model, the FJP pursued policies that continued to lay the 
burden on the poor and the working-class, banned informal work, criminalized strikes and 
pursued alliances with local and international capital. Mursi cut food subsidies, increased 
consumption taxation, and shelved progressive taxation (Joya 2017, 349). He also issued a 
presidential decree raising taxes on 50 essential goods “including housing, transportation, and 
medical care” (Ibid). It was only under popular pressure that he was forced to roll back his 
decision. Furthermore and even though the FJP’s electoral program promised a decent 
minimum wage, Mursi’s term was synonymous with the policies of his predecessors. Like 
SCAF, he tamed public sector employees by increasing their salaries by 15% and refrained 
from implementing salary increases in the private sector (EIU July 2012, 5). FJP’s term was 
also synonymous with an assault on both the formal and the informal working-class. One of 
the few laws that Mursi passed tightened the government’s grip over Egypt’s informal 
economy as well as laws that criminalized strikes.	To this end, Mursi imposed a five-year 
prison sentence on street vendors, renewed the emergency law and SCAF’s ban on strikes, 
issued a ban on all forms of labor organizing inside ministries, and issued the “Law to Protect 
the Revolution” equating workers with the “enemies of the revolution” (CTUWS 2012).  
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 Despite Mursi’s reassurances to capital, he was unsuccessful in appealing to the 
business community. With his rise to power, some of FJP businessmen tried to exert 
monopolies over the Egyptian market. However, such attempts were aborted by the 2013 
military coup (Adly 2017). Mursi also took several steps to appeal to Mubarak’s businessmen 
(Adly 2017, 14). He established the Egyptian Business Development Association (EBDA) to 
assist the FJP administration in the reconciliation process with the Mubarak businessmen who 
were not involved in corruption and encouraged foreign investments (Ibid, 15). One of the 
examples illustrating this conciliatory approach is when he visited China accompanied by FJP 
businessmen and Mubarak’s businessmen (Interview with Cairo unionist). However, the FJP 
strategy failed to draw Mubarak’s business community entirely to his side. In fact, Mursi 
antagonized big business tycoons accusing some of them of tax evasions whenever they 
criticized his “authoritarian” style of rule and important business tycoons such as the famous 
Sawiras had channeled funds to finance the 2013 campaign that supported his removal from 
power. 
As will be shown in the following section, the FJP appealed to the military and to the old 
guards and as it had been shown, the Brotherhood did not drift away from neoliberalism. 
Rather they sought to promote themselves as the ones capable of ensuring a cleaner version of 
developmental rather than rentier capitalism. However, the FJP’s attempt to realign Egypt at 
the regional level and to place it under the Turkish and Qatari influence rather than the GCC 
and the KSA and UAE in particular, combined with their efforts to insert the pious MB 
business community As it did so, it also sought to expand the involvement of its own 
businessmen in the economy and at the same time eclipsed Mubarak’s cronies and the 
military from the post-Mubarak megaprojects (Joya 2018 a, Kindle Location 2842).  
4.3.2 The FJP’s alliances, and The Road to Political Isolation  
 The FJP’s neoliberal economic agenda was also reflected in the political alliances that 
it pursued at the domestic level. The FJP turned its back on the revolutionary forces and 
cemented its alliance with the military, the internal security forces and its conservative 
competitor, the Salafi Nur party. Moreover, the Brotherhood appeased the military at a time 
when the latter was showing signs of abandoning the FJP and was already pushing for its 
political isolation to legitimate the 2013 coup. The FJP’s continued commitment to pursue 
neoliberal economics amid a political environment conducive to its political isolation became 
a recipe for disaster and sat the stage for the 2013 military coup.  
This political isolation resulted from several factors: the constrained context inherited 
from SCAF, the FJP’s inexperience in governing the country and the nature of its shaky 
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alliances (al-Anani 2015). When Mursi was elected, SCAF ordered the Supreme 
Constitutional Court (SCC) to dissolve the Brotherhood controlled lower-house (Springborg 
2018). The military designed “a weak presidency and robbed it from other elected institutions 
or a constitution that might support it” (Stacher 2012). SCAF’s strategy aimed at subverting 
prospects for the Brotherhood to monopolize power in post-Mubarak Egypt. Its decisions 
forced Mursi to centralize power to be able to govern (Ibid). While the military could escape 
with almost no scrutiny of its overt manipulation of the rules of the game, it succeeded in 
projecting the image that Mursi is Egypt’s new Mubarak (Ibid).  
According to many, the FJP missed a golden opportunity as when it sided with the 
deep state (the military, the security apparatus and Mubarak’s old guards) and its competitors, 
the conservative Salafi Nur party (Interview with Labor Lawyer, Journalist 1). Furthermore, 
restrictive measures85 under Mursi along with his November 2012 decree sent the message 
that the FJP was committed to centralize power and to the Brotherhoodization of the state 
(Akhwanat al Dawla). Brotherhoodization became synonymous with maintaining the 
authoritarian structure intact and appointing the FJP members to key decision-making 
positions in the state bureaucracy (Wickham 2013; Joya 2018 a; Interview with Labor 
Lawyer). This situation worsened when Mursi passed his controversial constitutional 
declaration, which made any presidential decision exempt from any judicial review, which 
consequently turned many against the FJP.86 In fact, the MB was seen as “power grabbers 
rather than power sharers” (Joya 2018 a, Kindle Location 2842). 
Even though there were visible signs that the military had already turned its back on 
the FJP when Mursi assumed power, the FJP continued to appeal to the military while 
antagonizing leftists, liberals, and Nasserites (al-Anani 2015; Wickham 2013). Mursi 
appeased the military by shelving the issue of civilian oversight over the military budget and 
preserving the military courts for civilians (Ibid). The most important concession awarded to 
the military took the form of constitutional guarantees for the military’s autonomy, which 
gave the military-dominated National Defense council unprecedented privileges (Springborg 
2018). The FJP did not only make concessions to the deep state, but it also dropped vital 
revolutionary demands such as the issue of police reforms. While doing so, the FJP further 
antagonized the streets (al-Anani 2015). 
Liberals, the Nasserites, and the leftists also criticized the FJP and Mursi for 
cementing the alliance with the Salafi Nur Party and marginalizing them from the ruling 
																																																								
 of intimidation and assaults on women, Coptic Christians, and Shiʾite Muslims, and several incidents in which the regime attacked anti-
Mursi protesters » (Wickham 2013, 294).  
ded to dissolve the commission » fueled opposition asking him to rescind his decision (Wickham 2013, 294).  
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coalition. While Mursi reassured in his public speeches that he was committed to protect the 
revolutionary but his promises fell on deaf ears. The FJP betrayed liberals, leftists, and 
Nasserites. They argued that the FJP utilized their support while running for parliamentary 
and presidential elections to neutralize Mubarak’s old guards (Wickham 2013, 293). 
Furthermore, the FJP was criticized for protecting the 2012 constitution opening a Pandora’s 
box on whether Islamic Sharia law is the source of legislation in Egypt. The most important 
implication of all such debates is that the FJP’s term shifted focus from revolutionary 
demands of bread, freedom and social justice to questions of Islamization and secularism, 
which never figured in the Egyptian streets. 
 
4.3.3 The FJP, Unions and the Working-class    
In the previous section, I analyzed the political economy of the FJP. I showed that 
despite its commitment to pursue neoliberal economics and appease the business community 
and the military, it failed to achieve its objectives. In addition, the FJP antagonized broad 
sectors of the working-class. While this has to be read in line with its quest to pursue 
neoliberal economics, the FJP also came under public scrutiny for pursuing a 
Brotherhoodization of the labor movement, the way it sought to pursue similar policies vis-a-
vis the Egyptian bureaucracy at large (Interview with Labor Lawyer, Labor Journalist 1, Giza 
unionist).  
Mursi’s choice of the Minister of Labor and Manpower, Khaled Al Azhari, signaled 
that the FJP was adamant on tightening its grip over the working-class. The question of union 
pluralism triggered FJP anxiety as it called into question their monopolies over professional 
syndicates. Consequently, the president and the minister of labor kept a 1976 trade union law 
intact and emptied the abovementioned trade union law from its content (Interview with Cairo 
unionist).  
Furthermore, according to many independent unionists, union elections were overdue 
since 2011. Mursi’s move to appoint a non-elected board to rule over union affairs raised the 
ire of the independent unionists. The latter argued that the ritual, to prolong the term of the 
GETUF by presidential decree, was practiced by successive leaders to gain control over the 
federation and the working-class (Interview with Giza Unionist). “Their logic went as 
follows: the GETUF is for those who are in power, and since we (FJP) are in power, this 
federation should belong to us (the FJP)” (Ibid). 
The most controversial aspect was the FJP’s quest to pursue Brotherhoodization at the 
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level of the GETUF (Interview with Labor Lawyer; Giza Unionist). Mursi issued two 
presidential decrees extending the GETUF board’s term for six months, dismissed union 
leaders over the age of 60 and appointed FJP members who were alien to unionism and the 
working-class (including the FJP minister of manpower) (Interview with Giza Unionist; Suez 
unionist, CTUWS 2012).  
The divided independent union leadership unified their position for the first time since 
SCAF’s rule to express their dismay with such strategies. Both the EITUF and EDLC 
launched a campaign “against the Brotherhoodization of trade unionism” and called for 
dismissing the current minister (Maher 2012). The GETUF leaders who were equally 
antagonized by FJP policies accepted to bargain with the minister of labor. At the heart of the 
bargain between Mubarak’s men and the FJP was the commitment by the minister to leave 
some of Mubarak’s corrupt leaders in their position of power. In return, the GETUF did not 
resist the FJP policies. Mubarak’s men accepted the bargain “otherwise; they would risk 
landing in jail” (Interview with Giza unionist).  
Furthermore, the 2012 FJP constitution dismissed working class demands. While the 
GETUF remained silent, the EITUF criticized FJP’s monopoly over workers’ representation 
in the constitutional committee and the failure to provide real protection for the working-
class. To start with, the committee in charge of drafting the constitution did not include one 
representative of the working-class. Rather, workers’ representation remained a prerogative of 
the Minister of Labor. On issues relating to workers’ rights, the 2012 constitution copied the 
1971 constitution (effective under Sadat and Mubarak). Independent unionists criticized how 
calculating a minimum wage was tied to productivity instead of costs of living and inflation. 
This practice, they argued, continued to lay the burden on workers rather than investors. The 
constitution recognized the right to strike and left it for legislation to regulate this right. 
However, the FJP legislation criminalized and banned strikes (Ibid). Independent unionists 
also criticized the set of incentives and guarantees given to capital in the constitution 
reiterating a commitment to the 1971 constitution (EITUF 2012; CTUWS 2012). While none 
of this contradicts the FJP electoral program, it came to the surprise of many who expected 
more of the first democratically elected president and parliament who pledged to protect the 
revolutionary demands.  
While appealing to investors, the FJP preserved the 2003 labor law. Along with a ban 
on strikes, and in the absence of a new trade union law, the FJP gave the upper hand to 
entrepreneurs to discipline workers. For example, entrepreneurs in the private sector either 
implemented partially or did not implement Mursi’s 15% salary increase, which ignited labor 
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resistance. Furthermore, owners of businesses responded by mobilizing to their advantage the 
anti-strike law and dismissing militants (CTUWS 2012). When new independent unions were 
created, unionists sent their papers to the Ministry of Manpower to find themselves being 
spied upon by the ministry, the security apparatus, and businesses. 
In most cases, the minister informed businessmen that workers were preparing to 
organize, leading to severe measures against them. Some were dismissed and were replaced 
by MB loyalists (Interview with Cairo-based unionist). Others were transferred to another 
plant (CTUWS 2012). Still others bore the brunt of police brutality (Interview with Cairo-
based unionist). 
One year of FJP rule was enough to disappoint and exhaust the Egyptian working-
class (Interviews with Giza unionist; Cairo unionist; Labor Journalist 1). While workers 
initially opted to give the newly elected president a chance of 100 days, they started to 
mobilize shortly after seeing that none of their demands were met. As some argued  
He did not suggest one law. The law on freedom of association that we suggested 
before the FJP came to power was shelved and emptied from its content. He could 
have activated the wages council, but he did not. He could have launched a discussion 
about the minimum and the maximum wage, and he did not. He could have suggested 
something concerning inflation, but he did not. What he did instead is that he legalized 
for things related to Islamic Sharia. Do we increase or decrease the legal marriage age 
of a nine-year-old? Is he stupid or what? Is he legalizing the rape of a child? 
(Interview with Cairo unionist and former EITUF board member) 
  
Workers found themselves striking to purse the same unfulfilled demands under Mubarak. As 
one of my interviewees argued, “the MB was very busy in standing against the labor strikes, 
but the strikes were too large to be contained easily” (Interview with Suez unionist). By 2013, 
2239 labor actions were recorded reaching their highest levels since 2003 (ECESR 2015). 
Workers demanded the betterment of the minimum wage, the implementation of court 
decisions concerning the renationalization of industries, fixed contracts, financial allowances 
and incentives, and the right to freedom of organizing and association (ECESR 2015; 
CTUWS 2012). According to one of my interviewees, the “change was not qualitative but 
quantitative. It was not necessarily aimed at the political structure but at achieving the 
unfulfilled social and economic demands” (Interview with Labor journalist 1). Workers like 
everyone else were tired of Mursi and the FJP policies (Interview with Giza unionist) and 
took part in the 2013 anti-Mursi protests. However, some have argued that the 2013 working-
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class participation was not comparable to 2011 “it was not like 2011. It was not the same 
demands and not the same energy and not the same courage and boldness. It was a state-
sponsored coup” (Interview with Labor Journalist 2).   
 Furthermore, the leaders of the independent unions politicized workers’ struggles to 
legitimize the military coup and cement Sisi’s military rule. Abu Eita, former EITUF 
president, “welcomed mass protests mobilized by the Tamarud movement on June 30,87 and 
supported the role played by the military in giving Mursi an ultimatum that forced him out of 
office” (Charbel 2013 a). Tamarud gathered 22 million supporters and called for early 
presidential elections and Mursi’s removal. The acceptance of the independent union leaders 
to take part in the Tamarud campaign entailed that they internalized that the main issues at 
stake under the FJP was the Brotherhoodization of the state rather than the persistence of 
neoliberalism. Abu Eita and the strong public sector’s main concern was the fear of losing 
their tenured jobs to FJP loyalists. In addition, the leadership, which continued to be 
disconnected from the shop floor, failed to articulate and represent the real struggles of the 
working class and their resentment towards the FJP’s neoliberal economics. The result was 
that the independent union leadership manipulated the working-class to achieve its narrow 
political objectives.  
4.4 El-Sisi’s Military Neoliberalism  
4.4.1 El-Sisi’s Counter-Revolution: Delegative Militarism as a precondition for the 
deepening of military neoliberalism 
I argued that both SCAF and Mursi tried to bring back Egypt on a neoliberal track but 
failed to formalize the process. The signing of the loan agreements with both the IMF and the 
WB never saw the light. Both the Brotherhood and SCAF lost popular support and legitimacy 
and the capacity to burden Egyptian citizens with further loans. It is against this background 
that the following section offers a reading of Abdel Fatah El-Sisi’s military coup, which 
became a precondition for the deepening of military neoliberalism. In this regard, El-Sisi’s 
counter-revolution was a necessary step to pursue unpopular structural adjustment in post-
Mubarak Egypt. Unlike SCAF and Mursi, El-Sisi presented himself as officially delegated by 
Egyptian citizens (except the MB and its supporters) to end Egypt’s political and economic 
crisis. That question of the popular delegation was a crucial first step for El-Sisi to overcome 
the roadblocks that undermined his predecessor’s way to formalize loan agreements with the 
																																																								
87 Tamarud is a movement that sought to emulate the 2011 revolution. It sat for itself the objective of gathering more than 22 million 
signatures, organizing mass protests and forcing Mursi out of office while calling for another term of presidential elections 
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IMF.  
Securing this popular legitimacy by undemocratic means took shape when El-Sisi and 
the military intelligence services supported the Tamarud campaign and facilitated Tamarud’s 
financing by GCC (minus Qatar) money and local businesses (Adly 2017). On top of the 
important regional and international support, media circles and intellectuals depicted the coup 
as Egypt’s victorious moment only second to Egypt’s 1973 victory against Israel. The 
analogy with the 1973 war is an important one. In the wake of the 1973 war, Sadat launched 
liberalization policies amid public discontent and resistance. From this perspective, the 2013 
coup promised to initiate harsh structural adjustment measures under military rule. While 
emerging as a national hero and after winning the landslide victory in the 2014 presidential 
elections, El-Sisi depicted himself as a savior promising structural adjustment to save an 
ailing economy (Joya 2017).   
El-Sisi’s counter-revolution and neoliberal militarism received broad support from 
GCC countries (minus Qatar), the USA and Europe. El-Sisi broke the international 
community’s siege, imposed on the FJP under Mursi’s mandate (EIU June 2012-June 2013). 
The GCC (except Qatar) rushed to channel $12 billion in less than 24 hours following the 
2013 coup. By 2015, the amount of GCC aid reached $20 billion (Marshall 2015). When oil 
prices plummeted, and GCC aid dried, the IMF stepped in to award El-Sisi’s Egypt with a 
$12 billion agreement, the largest in the institution’s history, and which officially set Egypt 
back on a neoliberal track after years of failed negotiations (Adly 2016). 
To pursue the implementation of unpopular policies, El-Sisi inaugurated his term with 
the Rabaa massacre, killing more than 800 FJP supporters by the security forces and the 
army.  The MB leadership were convicted of various charges including corruption and 
terrorism; they were given long prison or death sentences and their assets were frozen (Joya 
2018 a, Kindle Location 2842). The FJP social institutions and facilities were closed (Ibid, 
Kindle Location 2857) and a year later a court ruling ordered the dissolution of the FJP (Ibid). 
The violence and the criminalization perpetrated against the MB were used by El-Sisi to tame 
all forms of resistance to his neoliberal policies and to launch a frontal attack on the 
revolutionary forces (Interview with Political Economist 1, 2, Labor Journalists 1, 2 and 
Cairo-based Unionist). In no time, the association between the January 25 uprising and the 
Brotherhood made its way to media circles. The state-controlled media did not wane from 
depicting the January 25 as Amal Ikhwani  (the work of the brotherhood). Furthermore, 
anyone who dared to challenge the military regime was immediately labeled as Ikhwani (a 
Brotherhood member) no matter his ideological affiliations (Interview with Cairo unionist).  
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To further undermine social and political resistance to neoliberal policies, El-Sisi 
renewed the emergency law. He also issued a ban on protests, and a ban on strikes in all vital 
facilities, (Interview with Cairo-based unionist), reinvigorated military courts where innocent 
civilians could face up to death sentences, built new prisons to accommodate an increasing 
number of political prisoners and pursued a deliberate attack on civil society organizations 
(HRW 2014; AI 2018). By 2016, Egypt ranked the 6th country with the most significant 
number of executions and a large prison population out of which a little bit more than 60 000 
are political prisoners (Middle East Monitor 2016). Furthermore, the small group of youth 
activists who expressed solidarity with workers faced long prison sentences.88 Moreover, the 
working-class lost the safe spaces that provided them with legal support when El-Sisi signed a 
new law giving broad powers for the authorities to tighten the security grip over civil society 
organizations (Amnesty International 2017; 2018). Many centers that once catered to workers 
closed their doors fearing the security crackdown. Furthermore and while the revolutionary 
forces languish behind bars, Mubarak who was sentenced in 2012 to life in prison, was 
acquitted of charges and released (Narayan 2017).  
The internal security services who had come under powerful critic by the 
revolutionary forces, for their record in humiliating citizens under Mubarak were given a 
broad mandate to spy, detain and torture activists under El-Sisi (HRW 2018; The Guardian 
2017). At the same time, the military intelligence pushed to a secondary role since Sadat, was 
ordered to oversee the work of other intelligence sectors. Today, it orchestrates and intervenes 
in local and foreign politics more than ever (Springborg 2018). For example, El-Sisi involved 
the military in bringing together parliamentary candidates under a military-backed list (“For 
the Love of Egypt”) (Ibid). The expansion of an intrusive security and military apparatus, one 
that served El-Sisi to terrorize and deter the streets, benefited from the support of the USA 
and European countries (Germany, France, the UK, and Italy) (Shama 2017). By 2015, Egypt 
ranked the fourth largest recipient of weapons in the world and the twelfth largest military in 
the world (Ibid). All such strategies increased the capacity of El-Sisi to undermine prospects 
for class mobilization.  
 
4.4.2 Deepening Military Neoliberalism  
Military neoliberalism under El-Sisi did not only invite painful structural adjustment 
measures that deeply hurt the poor, but it transformed the relationship between the military 
																																																								
88 To name but a few, this is the case of Alexandrian lawyer and activist Mahinour el Masry, the April 6th activists such as name missing here 
and Zizo Abdo, and the Labor Lawyer Haitham Mohamedeen.  
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state and subordinate classes (the poor and the formal working-class). Under military 
neoliberalism, the poor were now under tight surveillance by an expanding military intruding 
in every aspect of their lives. At the same time, the formal working-class was turned into 
surplus labor when military conscripts substituted it, and Military Inc eclipsed business 
tycoons. El-Sisi, therefore, displaced Mubarak’s police state to entrench a military state where 
his generals reaped the benefits of neoliberal economics inserting themselves in global 
networks of cooperation with regional and transnational capital. 
El-Sisi presented painful structural adjustment measures as necessary to save an ailing 
economy. Cutting public spending, devaluating the currency, liberalizing prices and 
introducing a VAT system became the order of the day (Joya 2017). The erosion of the real 
value of wages took shape amid El-Sisi’s commitment to devaluate the currency and deal 
away with the problem of declining foreign reserves. By 2018, one dollar was equivalent to 
17.84 EGP. Inflation climbed from 9.4% in 2013 to reach its highest levels in 2017 of 29.5% 
and consumed the income of the poor and the working class (Annex). 
Furthermore, El-Sisi introduced the Value Added Tax and maintained a non-
progressive income tax hurting low-income wage earners (ECESR 2013, 2; EIPR 2018; 9). A 
2018 EIPR report stated, “there is no trend to increase the tax burden of corporations or taxes 
on wealth and higher incomes or impose fairer taxes such as a tax on real-estate wealth, and a 
tax on available apartments” (Ibid). Furthermore, El-Sisi liberalized fuel prices and reduced 
fuel subsidies. The price hikes hurt the average citizen and shielded energy-intensive 
industries. In fact, “the allocations for subsidies on petroleum products increased threefold in 
the fiscal year 2017–18 due to currency devaluation” benefiting mostly energy-intensive firms 
(EIPR 2018, 10).  
To contain the streets and a revolution by the poor, El-Sisi stepped up some programs 
aimed at low-income families. In collaboration with the World Bank, El-Sisi maintained a 
program by the ministry of social affairs and launched two cash transfer programs (Takaful 
(Solidarity) and Karama (Dignity)) aimed at the elderly and the disabled. The cash transfer 
programs remained limited in scope covering a total of 6 million Egyptians (out of a 
population of 95 million). Moreover, the symbolic cash transfers (325 EGP monthly 
allowance) were far below the poverty line (1000 EGP in 2017) (EIPR 2018). To tighten the 
surveillance over the poor, El-Sisi ordered the regulation of the subsidy program through a 
new card-system produced and regulated by the ministry of military production. The ministry 
was therefore charged with data gathering and decisions over who could receive access to the 
new subsidies thus entrenching the capacity of the military to reward supporters and punish 
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defectors (Noll 2017, 5). To further tame the streets, he ordered the expansion of the 
military’s civilian production and involvement in mega-projects aimed at lower-income 
groups. In the context of currency devaluation and price inflation, he ordered the military to 
step in, increase the production of its cheap food items and expand the military-owned 
supermarket chains to poor neighborhoods (Ibid, 3). Furthermore and in cooperation with 
Gulf countries, the military became involved in a project of social housing for low-income 
groups, the expansion of the Suez Canal, infrastructure projects, and the building of a new 
capital city outside Cairo (Marshall 2015; Adly 2017).  
However, all such projects were not tied to job creation as the unemployment level 
continued to climb under his mandate (Annex). In addition to tax exemption, the military 
economy benefited from “free land, free labor, and free resources” (Interview with Political 
Economist 1). El-Sisi substituted the civilian workers with a demobilized working-class of 
more than 300 000 military conscripts. Conscription is mandatory in Egypt and served the 
purpose of expanding the military’s businesses by recruiting a docile, disciplined and cheap 
labor force (Springborg 2018). This substitution process silenced the formal working-class, 
reduced their density at the military-run industries and undermined their capacity to organize 
and mobilize.  
Furthermore, El-Sisi turned his back on the working-class demands for the 
renationalization of privatized industries. Instead, El-Sisi ordered the minister of the 
workforce to increase support for the Emergency Fund created under Mubarak in 2002 and 
linked to the Ministry of Manpower to mitigate the impact of privatization and closing 
businesses on the working-class.89 By expanding financial compensation for the workers who 
lost their jobs as a result of privatization, El Sisi exacerbated the unemployment problem, 
which reached its highest levels under his term (Annex). Once again, the implications for 
formal working-class organizing under El-Sisi were dire. Not only the working-class was 
under a tight military siege, its relationship to the "military economy," was radically 
transformed. That surplus labor power was either forced to immigrate to neighboring 
countries or to join the ranks of the unemployed and the informal sector.    
As neoliberalism is a class power project that privileges the interests of the business 
community, El-Sisi continued to appeal to private capital. The general was well aware that the 
private sector was “too big to fail” (Adly 2017). It controlled the most significant share of 
agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, telecommunications, construction, transportation, 
																																																								
89  See The Democracy Barometer Report in Arabic (Accessed March 1, 2018): https://demometer.blogspot.com/2017/04/744-2016-
2017.html  
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wholesale trade and real estate (Adly 2017; 6). In this regard, a new investment law was 
passed awarding capital a variety of incentives including tax breaks and guarantees against 
renationalization (Joya 2017; Adly 2017). Furthermore, the taxation system maintained a 
corporate flat tax rate of 25%, one of the lowest according to the WB (ECESR 2013, 3). After 
years of being brought to a halt by workers’ resistance, El-Sisi reinvigorated privatization by 
inviting public-private partnerships in different sectors of the economy (Joya 2017, 352). 
However, this relationship between the military and the business community became strained 
with the expansion of the military economy. El-Sisi repetitively reassured businesspeople that 
the expansion of the military economy would last for two to three years and that the military’s 
share of the GDP does not exceed 2% (Noll 2017). The relationship worsened when the 
general suggested that big businesses donate part of their wealth to a fund created by the 
president to support public works project. To his disappointment, by the end of 2016, “the 
fund only secured 6 billion EGP causing tensions between the political leadership and large 
businesses” (Adly 2017, 18).  
 
4.4.3 Cooptation of the Independent Unions and the Reinvigoration of the GEFTU 
Besides entrenching the iron fist, which played an important role in deepening 
neoliberalism, restructuring the relations of production, and silencing the working-class and 
the revolutionary youth, El-Sisi upgraded new strategies to neutralize the fragmented 
independent union federations. The effects on the working-class were dire. Not only the 
cooptation of the independent leadership cemented military neoliberalism, but it also 
demoralized the working-class "making them lose faith with their leadership" (Interview with 
Giza unionist). El-Sisi appointed the two Kamals to decision-making positions turning them 
into his “yes” men only on par with the leaders of the corporatist union. Abu Eita was 
appointed a minister of the workforce and Abbas was named to the National Council of 
Human Rights (Adly and Ramadan 2015). Such cooptation guaranteed that the two would 
drop pursuing the democratization of state and labor relations or putting pressure for the 
recognition of the independent unions. 
As the new minister of labor, Abu Eita moved swiftly to delegitimize the independent 
unions that he had created. He also followed the MB’s strategy purging the GETUF from his 
enemies and appointing loyalists from the Nasserite Karama party (Charbel 2013). Moreover, 
and as soon as the military staged its coup, Abu Eita immediately called workers “to forfeit 
their right to strike” and give the military regime a chance (Ibid; Beinin 2016, 118-119). 
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Whenever workers did not concede to such demands, the minister broke strikes and sided 
with businessmen. For example, he ordered police officers to intimidate Petrojet workers 
(Interview with Cairo unionist) and watched the military brutally end a strike in the Suez steel 
industry (Interview with Suez unionist). More worrisome, Abu Eita was keen on adopting and 
reproducing the state’s discourse depicting workers as being used and manipulated by the 
Brotherhood to destabilize the country (Interview with Suez unionist). Abu Eita along with a 
coopted leftist, Nasserite, and liberal leadership played an instrumental role in mobilizing the 
working class to support the 2014 constitution, which gave unprecedented privileges to the 
military and reinvigorated military courts against the working-class.  
The liberals, the leftists, and the Nasserites were all against Mursi and his constitution. 
They were the ones to mobilize unionists and ask them to vote for the 2014 
constitution. Abu Eita was traveling around and attending conferences and convincing 
workers to vote for the constitution. The communist party was defending the 2014 
constitution although it seriously violated the rights of the working-class (Interview 
with Giza unionist).  
In the 2014 constitutional committee, only two people represented workers. Both were regime 
loyalists drawing from a defunct corporatist federation and the security apparatus (Adly and 
Ramadan 2015). 90 The 2014 constitution erased the 51% quota for workers and peasants in 
the parliament and removed the Social and Economic Council (Interview with Giza Unionist). 
Although pro-regime incumbents controlled the quota, critics argued, “instead of removing 
this quota what you need to do is simply to prohibit the retired generals from running for 
elections” (Interview with Cairo unionist).  
After co-opting the independent leadership, the military moved to appropriate the 
EITUF. In post-2013 Egypt, the EITUF’s administrative board was completely controlled by 
the security and military. The president hailed from the military institution, and the secretary 
general was affiliated with the security apparatus (Interview with Cairo unionist). Moreover, 
they have both made their way to power through vote buying, a practice that mirrors a general 
significant trend in the country. 
 
He (the president) bought the votes. He was generous, so he used to spend money, and 
everyone loved him. When he ran for elections he used to win because this is the 
																																																								
90 These were Gabali al Maraghi, the head of the GETUF charged with corruption scandals and Ahmad Khairi who deemed by independent 
unionist as a member of the “security apparatus” policing workers. 
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degree of consciousness, he does not have a program per se and thinks with the old 
mentality, and this is how he gathered support (Ibid).  
 
This infiltration by the security apparatus owes to the EITUF’s open door policy, 
which paved the way for an independent union to join its ranks leading some unions affiliated 
with the security apparatus, non-existent unions, and paper unions to infiltrate the structure 
(Interview with Labor Journalist 2 and Cairo-based Unionist and Former EITUF board 
member). At the same time, the militant leadership of the EITUF, which expressed a real 
commitment to the democratization of state and labor relations, was gradually marginalized 
from decision-making circles or was forced to resign (Interview with Labor Journalist 1 and 
2; Cairo-based unionist). 
Like the corporatist federation, the EITUF now reproduces the state discourse and 
entrenches military neoliberalism paving the way for El-Sisi to deprive workers of their 
fundamental rights including the right to organize and the right to strike (Interview with 
Labour Journalist 1). The EITUF was among those who provided unconditional support to El-
Sisi’s campaign and supported his electoral objectives of “violence and terrorism” (Beinin 
2016, 119), which later on was used not only against the MB but to undermine any forms of 
resistance to his rule including worker’s militancy. In post-2013, the EITUF openly endorsed 
El-Sisi’s presidential campaigns and his austerity measures laying the burden on the working-
class (Mahsoub 2017).  
The EDLC was immune to infiltration by informants and the security apparatus, which 
owes to the strategies of its founders. Abbas imposed a precondition for joining the EDLC by 
pursuing building strong ties at the base level (Abduallah 2017). However, Abbas and the 
CTUWS took controversial stances. They criticized the continuous assault on workers and 
monitored violations under military rule but avoided criticizing the president. Moreover, 
when the Supreme Court issued a decision that imposed on workers obedience to the 
president, neither the EITUF nor the EDLC opposed the decision (Beinin 2016).  
Despite the cooptation of the EITUF leadership and the weakening of independent 
unions, the regime could not transform the EITUF into its union arm. By the end of the day, 
the EITUF incorporated under its independent umbrella unions “created by workers and not 
the state” (Interview with Labor Journalist 1). In this regard, El-Sisi moved quickly to 
reinvigorate the state-created GETUF federation. El-Sisi met with GETUF leaders to garner 
their support in the lead up to the presidential elections. The latter responded that “the 
federation will campaign for the field marshal, and offered El-Sisi to use its premises and 
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offices” (Ibid). As soon as he was elected, El-Sisi prolonged the GETUF board’s term by 
presidential decree and postponed overdue elections. The 1976 trade union law was amended 
once again to prolong the term of military loyalist senior leaders. 
Furthermore, labor representatives elected to the 2015 parliament hailed from GETUF 
ranks. They made their way to the parliament by running on El-Sisi’s list “For the Love of 
Egypt” and colonized the Manpower Committee responsible for crafting the civil service law, 
the labor law, and the trade union law. Throughout their tenure, they acted as a safety valve 
for the passage of controversial policies serving the investors’ interests. El-Sisi then used the 
GETUF to open court cases against independent unions in an attempt to officially 
delegitimize them (Charbel 2016). The court cases were finally dropped when leaders of the 
two federations: the EITUF and GETUF “unified” the ranks of what they both deemed a 
“fragmented” labor movement leading one of my informants to argue that the two federations 
are resembling each other (Interview with Labor Journalist 1).  
The parliament also passed a new trade union law 213 of 2017. The law presented by 
the Manpower Committee in the Parliament headed and chaired by GETUF imposed stringent 
conditions on the creation of new unions and entrenched the power of the GETUF. The 2017 
law kept the GETUF intact and ordered dissolving independent unions to recreate them in 
compliance with the new requirements. This step laid the foundations for reintegrating the 
independent unions within the existing state-controlled unions. The new law constrains 
freedom of association as it imposes stringent measures on the creation of new unions. Article 
11 stipulates that for a union to be legally recognized it ought to gather 150 workers/industry 
or workplace, which barred the majority of workers in small and medium enterprises to 
establish their own. 
 
“We are Under Siege:” The Militant Working-Class under Military Neoliberalism 
The regime improved its surveillance strategy and imposed a tight siege on militants at 
the shop floor level. A labor activist no matter his identity would be immediately flagged as 
Ikhwani (a member of the brotherhood) to legitimize the punitive measures taken against him. 
When labor action under military rule involved a larger collectivity, the military mobilized 
military courts to discipline the working-class. Article 204 of the 2014 Constitution gave a 
broad mandate for the military to bring innocent civilians to trial if they organized for a strike 
in a military facility (Aziz 2016). 
Under military neoliberalism, labor unionists described that they were under siege 
from the security apparatus, the state and the corporatist federation (Interview with 
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Alexandria Unionist; Suez unionist). Businessmen took advantage of the military regime’s 
hostility towards independent unions and the absence of a fair labor law that protects workers 
from arbitrary dismissals. To demobilize militant workers and independent unionists, 
businessmen transferred workers to another plant, withdrew the payment of their salaries, and 
in the worst cases dismissed the administrative committee of an independent union. "There 
has been a massacre against independent unionists. You see massive layoffs in huge numbers 
for an entire administrative committee of the independent union" (Interview with Giza 
unionist). A business tycoon connected to the Mubarak regime transferred the entire 
administrative committee of the independent union to another plant  (Suez unionist 
correspondence). Other militant unionists were deprived of their incentives. A unionist opined 
that such strategies “mean breaking our backs. Incentives are half our salaries” (Interview 
with Alexandria unionist).  
While workers continued to fight for their reinstatement, El-Sisi’s Egypt made it 
impossible for dismissed workers to win court cases. The Judiciary and the military regime 
are both stacked against the January 25 support base including the revolutionary forces and 
the working-class. In the best scenario, court cases could end up taking several years 
(Personal communication with unionist from Alexandria). In the meantime, the dismissed 
workers would perform precarious jobs for lower pay or join the informal sector or even the 
unemployed (Interviews Alexandria Unionist, Political Economist 2). 
In the context of the regime’s “war on terror,” workers who challenged neoliberal 
policies were faced with fabricated accusations such as “plotting against the regime,” 
“affiliation to a banned organization (The Muslim Brotherhood)”, “participating in protests” 
and “inciting their colleagues” to join “illegal strikes and protests.” Workers were also subject 
to a long interrogation process that extended for days. A labor activist from Alexandria told 
me that the prosecutor openly acknowledged that he was “ready to fabricate an accusation 
against him to throw him at least one year in prison.”91 While conducting my fieldwork, a 
unionist in Bolivara, the textile industry in Alexandria, was resisting the privatization of his 
industry. One day before sealing the deal with the investor, security forces raided his house, 
detained him and sentenced him to renewable 15 days in prison.92 Furthermore, the security 
apparatus chased a founder of the Alexandria Permanent Council. They raided his house, and 
his older son was arrested forcing him to surrender to security forces (Interview with 
																																																								
91 Personal communication with unionist from the Alexandria Food Industry, Alexandria- Montreal, May 24, 2016.  
92 The unionist was arrested on the day preceding final negotiations concerning the privatization of his industry. This information is based on 
discussions with his lawyer at the ECESR. The unionist was arrested him a day before the final negotiations relating to the sell-off of his 
industry. Chehata was affiliated to the Democratic Labor Party since 2011.  Repetitive – rephrase. 
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Alexandria Unionist). Some from the Alexandria Cement industry reiterated: “our goals are 
justice and freedom and the day we raise our voices, because we are disenfranchised with this 
whole situation, they would throw us in jail” (Group interview with Cement Alexandria). 
The working-class at the shop-floor level was now under tight surveillance. 
Informants monitored labor activists and prohibited them from communicating with their 
colleagues (Interview with Alexandria Unionist). Unionists were prohibited from carrying any 
forms of technology at the industry level to undermine them from using social media tools to 
mobilize fellow workers (Ibid).  Furthermore, workers like many civilians under El-Sisi faced 
military courts. The most prominent case was when 26 civilian workers from the Alexandria 
Shipyard were sent to military courts when they raised simple demands such as the betterment 
of wages and work conditions. A 2017 ITUC report (International Trade Union 
Confederation), listed Egypt as one of the worst and most dangerous countries for workers 
and independent unionists (ITUC 2017, 21). 
Although prospects for working-class organizing were grim, resistance at the shop-
floor level did not disappear. As had been the case under Mubarak, the militant working-class 
continued to organize wildcat strikes. Such strikes, as has been the case in the previous 
decade, did not necessitate the existence of an independent union. Rather workers alarmed by 
degrading work conditions pressed for the betterment of wages, their reinstatement and at 
times demanded an end to arbitrary dismissals (Democracy Barometer 2017).93 Between May 
2016 and April 2017 alone the working-class organized 744 labor strikes. On a more 
symbolic level, the continuation of the strike activity attests to the fact that workers would not 
concede to a neoliberal model bent on dispossessing them.   
The strikes are still going on until now despite all what is known about El-Sisi’s 
dictatorship, the bloodshed and the way he is trying to contain the labor movement. 
The Maritime Suez and seven other companies were on strike for three weeks to raise 
their salaries and benefits. The labor movement will pursue its struggles because there 
are policies that are persisting. There is a commitment to privatization and there are 
laws that would transfer the property from the state to the private sector so as long as 
there are such policies and a commitment to the privatization of services such as 
education, electricity, low wages, and floating prices, workers will resist (Interview 
with Suez unionist).  
 
																																																								
93 See the Democracy Barometer Report (Accessed  March 1st, 2018): https://demometer.blogspot.com/2017/04/744-2016-2017.html 
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Others did not shy from directly criticizing the military regime asserting that El-Sisi brought 
Egypt to the middle ages.  
 
You cannot talk about economic policies without taking into consideration the fact 
that it is embedded in the political and the political environment is very corrupt. We 
are back to Europe’s middle ages, the only difference is that back then it was a 
question of religion, and now it is the military regime. This state is Janus faced (Group 
Interview with Cement Industry unionists in Alexandria).  
In this regard, the visible and invisible forms of working-class resistance to military 
neoliberalism only reinforce the idea that the independent unions and their leadership were 
never good representatives of the more militant base (Interview With Suez Unionist).  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
I argued in this chapter that the Egyptian military, the main agenda-setter in post-
Mubarak Egypt, was bent on deepening military neoliberalism. El-Sisi displaced Mubarak’s 
police state to deepen and entrench a military state one that benefited senior generals and their 
transnational and regional allies. The chapter argued that neoliberalism impedes democracy 
and more importantly a substantive democracy that brings social justice to the poor and the 
working-class. It became more the case when the military gathered regional and international 
support all of which have boosted its repressive capacity bent on silencing any forms of class 
organizing and demobilizing the social and political forces behind the January 25 revolution. 
The chapter adopted a political economy approach to show how the military was committed 
from the very beginning to push forward a neoliberal agenda and to maintain “business as 
usual” in post-Mubarak Egypt. That project could not take shape immediately after 
Mubarak’s removal. Initially, the Egyptian military was faced with a highly mobilized street 
that it could not overlook and which forced them to pursue a gradual approach to tame the 
January 25 revolution and deepen neoliberalism. As the social protests continued to 
overwhelm SCAF’s and Mursi’s regimes, forcing both regimes to rescind concluding loan 
agreements, the military stepped in to stage the 2013 coup. In this regard, the counter-
revolution became a necessary precondition to deepen neoliberalism and to protect the 
military interests. Pursuing neoliberalism by the force of arms is the order of the day under 
El-Sisi’s Egypt.  
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The chapter also showed that setting the stage for the 2013 coup entailed that the 
counter-revolutionary forces chief among them the Egyptian military regain their forces after 
the 2011 revolution. The build up to 2013 was therefore gradual and took shape over time. 
This is mainly because the military could not ignore the social and political mobilization of 
the 2011 revolution. In this regard, SCAF pursued policies that divided the revolutionary 
momentum and undermined prospects for inter-class alliance formation among subordinate 
classes namely the working-class and the middle-class. On the one hand, the military played 
on the divisions that rocked the middle-class. At times empowering the Brotherhood and at 
others turning their Nasserite, liberal and leftist counterparts against them. On the other hand, 
SCAF was keen on keeping the middle-class and the militant working-class separated. From 
the beginning, a mobilized working-class threatened the military’s economic and foreign 
policy interests and promised a radicalization of Egyptian streets that did not bode well for 
military neoliberalism. Moreover, the working-class was used by the national forces for the 
latter to fulfill their own political goals. Throughout the middle-class treated working-class 
demands as secondary to political reforms. Furthermore, national forces embodied by the 
revolutionary youth in 2011 were not committed to a substantive democracy. This model of 
democracy upsets their social and economic interests as well as their cultural capital. In fact, 
their interests became threatened by the rise of the proletarian and subaltern subjects 
embodied by workers and the informal sector.   
While the chapter examined the external factors that impeded the radicalization of the 
streets and a transition to substantive democracy, it also delved into the challenges of post-
Mubarak’s working-class organizing. There are two critical moments highlighted in this 
chapter that contributed to weaken the capacity of the working-class to overcome its 
fragmentation. Firstly and in the wake of the 2011 revolution, workers organized in unions 
autonomous from the state-created corporatist federation. The reach of these newly created 
unions remained very limited. Most importantly, the competitive leadership of the newly 
created independent federations divided the movement at a very critical moment in 2011. This 
had dire implications for their capacity to mount counter-hegemony to neoliberalism in post-
Mubarak. Such divisions put into question their commitment to a substantive democracy. At 
the same time, the bureaucratization of this leadership widened the gap between the base and 
the independent union leaders. The working-class base remained more militant and more 
defiant to neoliberalism (Interview with Labour Journalists 1 and 2; Suez unionist). Workers 
pursued their strikes, occupied factories, fired their managers, and in some cases they tried to 
self-manage their factories. Such militancy was not matched at the upper level of the 
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independent federations, which remained marred in its internal struggles for the monopoly 
over representation to pursue self-promotion. This latter issue becomes even clearer in the 
lead up to the 2013 coup. This moment was important because it exposed the agendas of some 
independent union leaders and their motivations behind establishing independent unions. It 
revealed for example that the leaders of the independent unions were bent on supporting 
neoliberal authoritarianism, which came at the expense of a greater democratization of labor 
relations and the regime. The leadership was also willing to capitalize on workers’ grievances 
developed under one year of FJP pious neoliberalism and make their way to political power. 
The support of few prominent leaders to the military coup against the Muslim Brotherhood 
and their cooptation by military neoliberalism undermined prospects for counter-hegemonic 
labor organizing in post-Mubarak Egypt. Other voices committed to the real democratization 
of state-labor relations were fooled by the aforementioned leadership commitment to the 
democratization of state and labor relations. When they became aware of their agendas, they 
were silenced and marginalized. Such voices include few members within the EITUF’s 
administrative board who resigned in the wake of the 2013 coup and stated that, “when in 
2011 we came to establish independent unions none of us knew the other. But right now, we 
all know each other and if there is going to be a step towards organizing, it is going to be a 
much better one” (Interview with Former EITUF board member and Giza unionist).  
Under the military regime, the Egyptian working-class is under a tight siege imposed 
by a reinvigorated corporatist federation, the military regime and the business community 
bent on replacing labor power by military conscripts and disciplining dissenting workers by 
the force of arms. Despite the extremely tight space left for the working-class, workers did not 
concede to El-Sisi’s military neoliberalism. However, a commitment to change by the 
Egyptian working-class has to take more seriously the question of a strong and autonomous 
labor organizing and to embrace the struggles of the precarious and temporary workers, the 
unemployed, the informal sector and the peasants. Challenging the hegemony of the military 
regime entails more than demanding a betterment of wages, reinstatement, incentives, and 
improving work conditions (Interview with Founder of the Alexandria Permanent Council 
and Alexandria Unionist). It should embrace the demands for freedom of organization, which 
underpins the greater struggle of a freedom from a regime that has benefited from regional 
and international assistance to transform Egypt into the largest jail for workers, and the youth 
all veiled behind a “war on terror.” It should also wed the demands for such freedoms to 
demands for urban reforms and land reforms that continue to lay the burden of the neoliberal 
model on the poor and the working-class.  
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Chapter 5: Capitalist Development in Brazil (1930-1985) 
5.1 Introduction  
Brazil’s experience transitioning from an agro-export economy to an industrial one is 
one of the most successful such experiences in late-capitalist development. Compared to 
neighboring Latin American countries and the Arab world, Brazil underwent three phases of 
industrial development. It transitioned from the production of consumer non-durables (food 
and beverages) to consumer durables (household equipment and car assembly) and 
pharmaceuticals, and finally reached the third stage of capital goods (steel, industrial 
machinery, aircraft, and shipbuilding) (Filho 2012, 119).  In this chapter, I argue that the 
military regime (1964-1985) in Brazil served the specific purpose of deepening 
industrialization by pursuing debt-driven growth that ended up bringing Brazil to a debt crisis 
worst in scale and magnitude than the one experienced under the last years of populist rule. 
The model pursued by the generals marginalized excluded and repressed the working class 
from social and economic life.  
This chapter traces the economic and political transformations in Brazil from the 
adoption of Import Substitution and Industrialization (ISI) (an economic policy advocating for 
replacing foreign imports with local goods) until the end of the military rule in 1985. It 
constitutes the first step of the analysis, in which I reflect on the effects of these 
transformations on the material and immaterial conditions for both capital and labor. The 
chapter is inspired by O’Donnell’s work (1978; 1979). I argued in Chapter One that this 
dissertation is inspired not only by his formulation of the foundations of a Bureaucratic 
Authoritarian (BA) regime, but also more particularly by how he conceptualized the 
interaction between the economic and political realms. The economy in O’Donnell’s work 
shapes the rise of political regimes, which in turn erect a pact that brings together social 
classes benefiting from and participating in the capitalist transformation and the political 
actors overseeing its implementation. These social classes are appeased by the emergence of 
state functions and tamed through strategies of social engineering. State corporatism is one 
such strategy which according to Schmitter is “a system of interest representation in which 
the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized 
or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
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articulation of demands and supports” (Schmitter 1974, 93-94).  
Based on O’Donnell’s approach, populism and the populist pact underlying it was a 
function of the early ISI phase in Brazil. The populist pact, underlined by a redistributive and 
developmental state, appeased the needs of both local industrial capital involved in the 
horizontal expansion of consumer non-durables and the consumerist needs of the industrial 
working class, the critical engine behind industrialization. When the first and early phase of 
ISI had run its course, Brazil branched out to the second phase wherein the question of growth 
was no longer governed by a horizontal expansion of consumer non-durables; the second 
phase of capital-intensive industries necessitated foreign investments because they were better 
equipped both technologically and financially to pursue a deepening of capitalism. Hence, 
growth was governed by attracting foreign investments and by an increased demand, 
especially from the upper and the middle-classes for consumer durables. The coexistence of 
this second phase with populism proved to be contradictory. Transition to the second phase 
resulted in a need to finance and support international investors rather than local capital and to 
cut costs in the production process, neither of which could be achieved under populism as 
they risked upsetting elements of the populist pact. Hence, the BA regime emerged to narrow 
the governing coalition by closing the door to working-class politicization and by driving 
their material conditions in a race to the bottom. This chapter agrees with O’Donnell’s 
findings, but departs from his account on the three levels that I addressed in Chapter One and 
that I will restate briefly here.  
Firstly, O’Donnell’s account suggests that the political is subordinated to the 
economic realm. This observation is just one side of the story that I have discussed in Chapter 
One. In Brazil, for example, the emergence of the security apparatus that became tied to the 
survival of the military regime is a case in which the BA regime served not only the interests 
of capital per se but also the ideological and material interests of the security apparatus. 
Secondly, and in relation to this argument, O’Donnell’s work on the BA state treats the state 
as a unitary actor. It is in his later work that he acknowledges divisions among the ruling 
elites. I argued in Chapter One that Stepan’s (1988) understanding of the military is better 
equipped to disaggregate the state and to explain such divisions within the military institution. 
Stepan (1988) embeds the question of divisions within the military in the institutional factors 
that evolved under military authoritarianism. This chapter emphasizes such divisions and the 
changing political role of the military within the state but it also borrows from Angela Joya 
the idea that a better understanding of the military should take into consideration its 
“changing relationships with other social classes and other fractions of the ruling class” (Joya 
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2018 a, 2). Finally, O’Donnell proposes two categories of state corporatism, populist and BA, 
but this approach needs to be wedded to an approach that sheds light on how the political 
leaders manipulated union membership, coopted its leadership, and controlled the right to 
strike and collective bargaining to tame the working class. While doing so, I propose to reveal 
how the state engineered social relations to obviate prospects for working-class organization 
and resistance. At the same time, I unpack how power relations become vulnerable to 
transformation from below.  
This chapter adopts a structural historical and a political economy approach to the 
capitalist transformation in Brazil. It provides the background for the next two chapters. 
Chapter Six sheds light on the class struggles that emerged under military rule to delegitimize 
the regime. Chapter Seven reflects on the political economy of the post-military regimes, to 
trace both the continuity and change of this model and reflect on their effects on the 
contemporary Brazilian working class. The next section traces the genesis of the 
developmental model under populism (1930-1964). The third section examines the changes 
that accompanied the model under military rule (1964-1985), and the last section is the 
conclusion.  
5.2 The Origins and Limits of Brazilian ISI under a Populist Regime (1930-1964)  
When ISI was adopted in Brazil, the country was the leading global coffee exporter. In 
the wake of the 1929 financial meltdown, Brazil faced a negative balance of payment (BOP) 
and a sharp economic downturn when demands for coffee declined. To overcome the problem 
of too much dependence on external demands for primary products and to substitute for the 
import of foreign goods, Brazil transitioned to industrialization. By 1960, the shares of 
industry, agriculture, and services were 32%, 17.76%, and 50% of GDP respectively (Annex). 
As a result of industrialization policies, Brazil experienced high levels of economic growth. 
Between 1947 and 1956, the GDP annual increase hovered around 6%, and between 1956 and 
1962, it was 7.8% (Baer 2018, 93)(See Annex). 
ISI under the populist regime can be divided into two phases. The early and easy 
phase (1937-1956) promoted economic development by incentivizing local/domestic markets 
(Sikkink 1988, 17). The consumer non-durable industries (food, textile, etc.) supported during 
this first phase benefited from the productive force and the consumption patterns of low-
income wage earners, in particular the urban industrial working class (Wallerstein 1980, 15; 
Sikkink 1988; G. A. O’Donnell 1979; de Abreu, Bevilaqua, and Pinho 2000, 163). As 
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demand from the local market increased, an expansion of horizontal, labor-intensive small- 
and medium-sized national industries took place (Sikkink 1988). Growth during this phase 
was dependent on working-class demands for consumer non-durables. It was also marked by 
a state bias toward promoting and supporting local industrialists rather than international 
investors (Ibid, 17).  
Despite the overtly nationalist rhetoric, the Brazilian economy became 
internationalized (Wallerstein 1980). As of the mid-1950s, vertical integration was inevitable. 
This shift was produced by the “exhaustion of the easy stages of industrialization”(G. A. 
O’Donnell 1979, 57). The dilemma at the end of the early phase was linked to the necessity of 
moving away from import-substitution to exporting locally manufactured but capital-intensive 
commodities to the international market. The shift was dictated by the necessity to once again 
deal with the shortage of foreign exchange, as the primary exporting sector at the time, the 
agriculture sector, failed to guarantee the desired foreign revenues (Ibid, 58). In O’Donnell’s 
narrative, at this stage, the dilemma “became a question of importing either raw and 
intermediate materials (thus maintaining existing levels of industrial activity, but hindering 
growth), or capital goods (thus favoring growth, but creating serious socio-political crises as a 
consequence of drastic short-term drops in output)” (Ibid, 59). Brazil opted for the second 
option. Industrialization branched out to the manufacturing of luxury consumer durables such 
as household appliances, cars, transportation equipment, and pharmaceuticals, which were 
accessible to the local and international upper and middle classes. While in the early phase, 
economic growth had been a function of the consumer needs of the low-income wage earners, 
in this phase, growth was a function of both the consumption patterns of the upper and middle 
classes and, more importantly, of the investments especially by large transnational 
corporations (TNCs) (Sikkink 1988, 17). It was during this more complex ISI phase that 
Brazil opened up to subsidiaries of TNCs as local industries were unequipped with the 
technological know-how to participate in this vertical integration (Wallerstein 1980; Sikkink 
1988; O’Donnell 1979; Rocha 1989). 
In order to serve the economic transformation from an agro-exporting economy to 
industrialization, a populist regime was erected that spanned more than three decades. The 
regime changed from a populist dictatorship under Getúlio Vargas’ Estado Nôvo (The New 
State) (1937-1945) to a populist but limited democracy (1945-1964). Successive populist 
leaders backed by Brazil’s generals supported the expansion of the industrial sector, replacing 
an agrarian export-oriented economy. Populism maintained a façade of a class harmony 
among the urban working class and the industrial bourgeoisie, especially during the first and 
	 198	
easy ISI phase. However, the populist pact soon became defunct, with the deepening of 
industrialization setting the stage for the disintegration of the populist regime as a whole. 
Before delving into the disintegration of the populist pact, a discussion is in order of populism 
and of the underlying populist pact, which underlined the class harmony between the urban 
working class, the local industrialists, and the populist leader. 
Initially, the Brazilian military played an important role in moderating the transition to 
ISI under the auspices of a civilian populist regime (1930-1964) (Stepan 1973). The military 
viewed Brazil’s Old Republic (1889-1930) with contempt (Skidmore 1999). They blamed the 
coffee-linked oligarchies for hindering Brazil's modernization and industrialization, and 
thereby challenging the institutional and economic interests of the post-colonial military 
(Skidmore 1999; 2007). Support for the rise of the national steel and oil industries was at the 
heart of the military's drive to further Brazil's industrialization. Both steel and energy were 
vital for the emergence of a robust military-industrial complex (Mani 2011). Brazil’s generals 
therefore accepted a bargain with the populist civilian leaders. At the heart of this bargain was 
that the generals retained a privileged position in shaping the country's economic 
development by providing guarantees for political stability. Under this civilian period (1930-
1964), the military continued a historical tradition whereby the military was charged with 
maintaining internal stability and order in a country where weak parties have coexisted with 
high levels of inequality (Stepan 1988, 103).94 The military during this populist phase enjoyed 
important prerogatives pertaining to “their role in the constitution, the control over the 
defense sector, their role in the cabinet, and their control over civilians who were involved in 
defense policies” (Ibid). They also controlled the Ministries of Army, Navy and Air Force 
(Ibid, 104). Hence, the military’s role in supporting or withholding support from populist 
leaders was crucial for the implementation of ISI while ensuring political stability and 
protecting the national (i.e. capital's) interests (Stepan 1973).  
Between 1930 and 1964, the executive power was entrusted to a Brazilian populist 
leader who “on the one hand, expressed the national project. On the other hand, he personified 
the people, articulated their demands and delivered, material improvements. In return, the 
people provided him with personal adoration and if necessary with votes”(Saad-Filho and 
Morais 2018, 20).  
To maintain this class harmony, top-down state corporatist organizations were created. 
These organizations limited political participation for both capital and labor to state-
																																																								
94 Stepan (1988) discusses 11 variables that shape the question of military prerogatives in general and in Brazil in particular see Stepan 
Rethinking Military Politics, pages 93-97. 
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sanctioned parties, business associations, and trade unions (Diniz 1989; Riethof 2018, 64). On 
the one hand, the Partido Social Democrático (The Social Democratic Party [PSD]) 
represented the industrialists and the large landowners. On the other hand, the Partido 
Trabalhista Brasileiro (The Brazilian Workers’ Party [PTB]), a state-created workers’ party, 
weakened the appeal of the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party [PCB]) 
among the industrial working class (R. J. Alexander and Parker 2003; Skidmore 1999, 97). 
Both the PTB and the corporatist union structure played an important role in subordinating 
working-class interests to the state and to capitalist development and in diverting working-
class participation from confrontation and radicalization (Ibid). Finally, the political 
opposition under populism revolved around the União Democrática Nacional (National 
Democratic Union [UDN]), an elitist opposition party drawing mainly from the ranks of 
middle-class professionals. Even though the UDN was never able to assume political power, 
except for few months in 1961 after which the UDN president resigned, it played an 
important role in supporting the 1964 military coup against the last populist leader, João 
Goulart (Skidmore 2007).   
The populist regime thus forged an alliance with the urban classes to weaken rather 
than totally dismantle the power of the large landowners. This regime strategy was governed 
by important economic considerations. Agriculture and in particular the coffee sector 
contributed to the generation of foreign currency (de Abreu, Bevilaqua, and Pinho 2000, 32). 
In fact, fifteen years after the 1930 coup, coffee was still responsible for 59% of exports, as 
measured in 1945, and the numbers only declined slightly by the end of the populist phase to 
reach 53% in 1964 (Baer 2018, 94). Hence, given the important role that large landowners 
played in generating foreign currency, they shared the political space with a growing 
industrial sector and formed a ‘ruralist block’ within Congress (Sikkink 1988, 258). The 
block, which was made up of PSD deputies, worked to systematically obstruct any projects to 
reform the agrarian structure (Ibid). The continuing existence of this lobby explains why all 
populist leaders relegated agrarian reforms to a secondary order (Ibid, 23).95  
In order to maintain the class harmony that underlined the populist pact, the state 
assumed developmental and redistributive functions. These functions responded to the 
exigencies of industrialization in Brazil by creating avenues for capital, local in the first phase 
and international in the second, to invest. It also incentivized consumption among the urban 
industrial working class, deemed necessary for growth during the easy ISI phase. To perform 
																																																								
95 It was only during Vargas' second term (1951-54) and Goulart's presidency (1961-64) that the issue of land reform was raised (Skidmore 
2007). 
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these functions, the populist regime engineered state and society relations along state-
corporatist lines. The regime tied unionism to the guiding principle of class harmony overseen 
by the populist leaders and guaranteed that the working class would never develop a radical 
agenda.  
The populist phase was marked by the erection of a developmental state that deepened 
its regulatory and entrepreneurial functions to facilitate private investments and a private 
accumulation of capital by local and foreign investors (Rocha 1989; Evans 1979). The state 
provided infrastructure, transportation, and public utilities to facilitate capitalist development. 
It also monopolized production in strategic sectors, including petroleum, electricity, and steel 
(Evans 1979, 87), and in areas requiring “complex technologies with long lags and low 
returns” (Filho and Morais 2018, 18-19). Petrobras and Eletrobas, respectively the state-
controlled oil and electricity companies, were created in the 1950s and subsequently were 
granted state monopolies over these strategic sectors (Evans 1979; 1994; Rocha 1989, 91). 
These monopolies maintained national sovereignty over the strategic energy sectors deemed 
crucial for industrialization.  
In Brazil, the state directed and facilitated capital’s investments in industrialization but 
it did not eclipse capital or take the lead in the industrialization process. Instead, the state 
provided greenhouses for capital to invest, best expressed in the creation of a national 
development bank, the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (National 
Bank for Economic and Social Development [BNDE]). The BNDE financed private and 
public enterprises (Baer 2018, 92; Evans 1979; Skidmore 2007; Filho and Morais 2018). The 
state also erected high tariffs ranging between 60% and 150% to protect local industries (Baer 
2018, 92). Such high tariffs were necessary during the initial ISI phase, which rested on 
supporting national industrialists. As soon as Brazil branched out to the second and more 
complex ISI phase, the state had to appeal not only to local capital but also to TNCs. As a 
result, it adopted Instruction 113. Issued by the “Superintendency for Money and Credit 
(SUMOC) a powerful semi-autonomous branch of the Bank of Brazil responsible for 
monetary policy,” Instruction 113 treated any form of imported goods as a form of foreign 
investment (Sikkink 1988, 228-229). As the first ISI phase ended, local industrialists were 
already sharing state support with international investors. 
 Brazil also witnessed the emergence of a redistributive state that provided welfare to 
the working class. These redistributive functions were geared toward supporting 
industrialization and especially the early ISI phase, which rested on expanding the local 
domestic market and in particular the local demand from low-wage income earners (Sikkink 
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1988; O’Donnell 1979; Abreu 2000; Rocha 1989). Moreover, the welfare functions served to 
maintain the abovementioned class harmony by meeting basic working-class needs and 
eliminating labor militancy at the factory/industry level. Social security funds,96 workers’ 
education and training,97 medical coverage, and pensions tied workers to the state and 
guaranteed labor docility at the industry level (Erickson 1977). 98  Work stability was 
guaranteed through a tenure law that protected employees against arbitrary dismissals after 
ten years of experience in the same workplace (Baer 1965, 97). The salário mínimo 
(minimum wage) was regulated by a 1941 law and was revised periodically (Ibid; Annex). 
However, all such benefits were aimed at the formal industrial working class but “excluded 
the rural workers, women, the unemployed and the informal sector” (Filho and Morais 2018, 
44; Riethoff 2018, 67). While these classes and social groups were officially recognized as 
citizens, they were deprived of the social and economic privileges conferred upon the formal 
working class (Riethoff 2018, 68).  
While the redistributive functions of the state co-opted the working class into the 
populist pact, state corporatism subordinated working-class organization and mobilization to 
the exigencies of the developmental model. The industrial working class expanded with the 
transition to ISI and was not immune to radical leftist ideologies. In fact, when Vargas 
assumed power, he was faced by a highly mobilized and plural union movement, which 
challenged capitalist development (Skidmore 2007, 42). To overcome such hurdles and 
preserve industrial peace, state corporatism along the fascist Italian model saw the light 
(Skidmore 1999, 16; R. J. Alexander and Parker 2003, 74). 
 The main instrument used to tighten the regime’s grip over the working class was the 
1943 Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (Consolidation of Labor Laws [CLT]), which 
provided the legal framework for compromising union autonomy and subordinating working-
class interests to the exigencies of the developmental state and consequently to capital’s 
interests. The CLT played an essential role in shaping working-class organization and 
mobilization, directing them away from militancy and confrontation toward mediation and 
conciliation. It is also important to note that the CLT incorporated important provisions 
concerning job security and arbitrary dismissals, the right to organize and form unions, the 
right for a minimum wage, unemployment insurance, and a ban on child labor (Mayer 2016, 
																																																								
96 In total under Vargas, there were 38 Funds (Baer 1965, 97). 
97 Vargas created the SENAI (Servico Nactional de Aprendizagem Industrial) (National Service of Industrial Learning) and SENAC (Servico 
Nactional de Aprendizagem Commercial) (National Service for Commercial Learning) (Baer 1965, 97).  
98 The tenure law stipulated that an employee who has more than ten years of service in the same firm cannot be dismissed except for grave 




At the level of structure, the CLT imposed important restrictions concerning the 
creation of confederations and federations and undermined the ability of workers to form peak 
associations that represent different work categories (Ibid, 101). For example, the highest 
level in the union hierarchy was reserved for confederations that could only be established in 
designated fields (R. J. Alexander and Parker 2003, 68). Moreover, the confederations could 
only be officially legalized if they brought together at least three federations (Ibid). The 
federations were only recognized if formed of at least five unions in the same trade (Ibid). 
Finally, the occupational and geographical fragmentation was carried out at the lowest level 
of the hierarchy, the unions. This process was guaranteed through unicidade sindical (union 
unity), which entailed that only a single union could be recognized in a given trade and in a 
given municipality (município) (R. J. Alexander and Parker 2003, 71; Mayer 2016, 101). 
Practically, a union could represent neither workers in another trade in the same region nor 
workers in the same trade in another region. Such strategies undermined working-class unity 
and the capacity of unions to unify working-class demands and appeal to the entirety of the 
working class (Mayer 2016 101-102; Erickson 1977, 32-22).  
The state also imposed important constraints on registering and legalizing unions, 
regulating their main activities and the allocation of resources that tied union organizing to the 
state-sanctioned corporatist structure. The Ministry of Labor legalized the work of the unions 
and silenced radical voices by placing regime loyalists (pelegos) in leadership positions 
(Skidmore 2007, 42). Union financing was another important area that enabled the state to 
tighten its grip over unions. The imposto sindical (union tax), a mandatory tax equivalent to 
the amount of a one-day salary per year, was immediately deducted from workers’ salaries 
(Skidmore 2007, 40; Alexandre 2003, 69). To extend its disciplinary power, the state 
channeled the funds through the Ministry of Labor to unions that were recognized by the state 
(Skidmore 2007, 40; Mayer 2016, 101-102). The funds were intended for social service 
provision that entrenched the role of unions as social service providers, thereby contributing 
to their de-politicization. Furthermore, oppositional unionists could not possibly compete with 
the state-recognized unions, as the former were starved from the necessary funds to appeal to 
their bases (Riethoff 2018, 66). 
Moreover, the state mobilized the court system to impose constraints on the right to 
strike and on collective bargaining. Strikes were banned under Vargas' Estado Nôvo, and were 
then legalized but became regulated by law. However, the judges representing the state 
withheld ruling in favor of a “legal strike” (Mayer 2016, 101). Labor courts mediated between 
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employers and employees (Erickson 1977, 30) and substituted for collective bargaining 
processes (R. J. Alexander and Parker 2003, 70). 
The Limits of Populism and the Deepening of Industrialization   
 
In 1964, the military staged a coup against João Goulart, Brazil’s last democratically 
elected populist president, and installed a BA regime under the auspices of the Brazilian 
military and civilian technocrats, blessed and protected by the USA (O’Donnell 1978). The 
1964 moment illustrated the limits of deepening industrialization under populism. Firstly, ISI, 
which was initially intended to end Brazil’s dependency on the export of primary goods, only 
changed the face of dependent development. As Brazil embarked on the more complex ISI 
phase, it became more dependent on the foreign investments and loans that were necessary to 
support the transition to capital-intensive industries (Wallerstein 1980). Growth was no longer 
measured by the increased production of consumer non-durables and by increased 
consumption among the low-income wage earners. Instead, growth was assessed based on the 
capacity to attract foreign investments and the increased capacity by the upper and middle 
classes to purchase consumer durables (Sikkink 1988). Therefore, the state had to spend more 
on larger infrastructural projects, provide incentives (credit) for the middle and upper classes 
to purchase locally manufactured consumer durables, and keep working-class wages low to 
make Brazil appealing for foreign investors.  
 These objectives exposed the limits of class harmony under populism and the tensions 
between the developmental and the redistributive functions of the state. On the one hand, a 
developmental state committed to enabling a greater private capital accumulation could no 
longer rely on the strategy of encouraging the horizontal expansion of local industries. With 
the transition to capital-intensive industries, the state had to play a role in the private 
accumulation of capital through cutting costs in the production process (wages, social benefits 
and workers’ protection, etc.). On the other hand, a redistributive state could not achieve these 
objectives because the populist leaders drew their legitimacy and support from the working 
class. Populism and the underlying class harmony that maintained this regime for an extended 
period were thus seen as impediments to the accumulation of badly needed revenues, 
transferring them away from deepening industrialization into a pact that gave populist leaders 
political legitimacy (Hurtienne and Sperber 1983). 
 The tensions between the redistributive and developmental state were further 
exacerbated amid chronic inflation and a negative balance of payment that started to appear 
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when Brazil branched out to the more capital-intensive industries in the mid-1950s. This 
situation left Brazilian leaders facing the necessity of adopting stabilization policies. 
However, maintaining the populist pact and pursuing locally administered austerity policies 
were two contradictory goals. The former entailed increasing spending to support the populist 
pact (Filho and Morais 2018, 21). The latter invited austerity measures, hurting vulnerable 
groups to maintain creditworthiness, and promoted an enabling environment for foreign 
developmental and financial capital to invest.  
Furthermore, Brazil’s version of populism was linked to a limited democracy, an 
impediment to further industrialization as it kept the channels of the state open for the 
working class. Though initially coopted by populist leaders and controlled by the corporatist 
structure, the workers were also included for the first time in the largest, albeit corporatist, 
national labor union organization. As they had been awarded more rights and privileges under 
populism, they became aware of their rights and were no longer ready to forfeit them, hence 
the increase in labor militancy in Brazil’s urban centers in the last years of populism 
(O’Donnell 1979). This mobilization illustrated the limits of corporatism in compromising 
working-class autonomy and impeding their mobilization under a populist democratic regime. 
Moreover, the working class inspired mobilization among peasants. The latter, who had been 
neglected and marginalized by populist leaders, now sought the advantage of being free from 
state corporatism to organize and mobilize, demanding land reforms and the right to vote, of 
which they had been deprived. In sum, empowered subordinate classes demanding 
fundamental rights risked becoming too threatening for local and international investors and 
the local elites. These threats were exacerbated by the fears of a Cuban scenario in Brazil 
(O’Donnell 1979). Hence, the heightened working-class mobilization could only be met by 
repression and tighter corporatist control. To be able to mobilize these repressive tools, 
populism, as a regime that relied significantly on working-class support, had to be dismantled.   
5.3 The Political Economy of Military Rule (1964-1985): The Financialization and the 
Internationalization of the Economy  
In this section, I show that the military's quest to internationalize the economy 
exacerbated the debt problem. By the end of military rule, the crisis facing Brazil was more 
significant in scale than the one inherited from Goulart (Annex). The economic model 
pursued by the generals exacerbated the economic conditions for the poor and the working 
class, but also for the military’s base of support, the middle class. Moreover, the local 
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industrialists became wary of the military’s internationalization and financialization of the 
economy. In addition to their growing feelings of encroachment on their interests, the local 
bourgeoisie was antagonized by the way the military closed channels for the articulation and 
representation of their “private interests”. The gap between the military regime and the 
business community widened, facilitating capital’s withdrawal from the post-1964 
authoritarian alliance. Combined with the de-legitimization of the regime from below by the 
struggles of the poor and the working class, this condition narrowed the support for the 
authoritarian coalition that governed Brazil since 1964.  
5.3.1 Political Restructuring: The BA Regime, the Civilian Technocratic-Military Alliance, 
The Security State, and the Bureaucratization of Unionism (1964-1985)  
Between 1964 and 1985, the military relinquished the mediating role that it had 
acquired under populism and became the main actor overseeing the deepening of 
industrialization. The military no longer believed that a democratic and open political system 
could lead to “economic growth” (Skidmore 1988, 108). Empowered subordinate classes 
demanding fundamental rights were too threatening for the military and for its local and 
international allies. After all, regional borders are permeable, and the fears of a Cuban 
spillover loomed large (O’Donnell 1979). Moreover, Brazil turning to the left challenged the 
foreign policy interests of a military that had long been an important American ally. At this 
critical moment, the military resolved that it would not tolerate negotiating with the popular 
sectors anymore. The only language that they would utilize was the language of exclusion, 
repression, and violence (Skidmore 2007, 1988). 
Therefore, the generals dismantled populism and erected a BA regime, the first in 
Latin America (O’Donnell 1978; Skidmore 1988). The BA state was characterized by: 
“(a) higher governmental positions usually are occupied by persons who come to them 
after successful careers in complex and highly bureaucratized organizations - the 
armed forces, the public bureaucracy, and large private firms; (b) political exclusion, 
in that it aims at closing channels of political access to the popular sector and its allies 
so as to deactivate them politically, not only by means of repression but also through 
the imposition of vertical (corporatist) controls by the state on such organizations as 
labor unions; (c) economic exclusion, in that it reduces or postpones indefinitely the 
aspiration to economic participation of the popular sector; (d) de-politicization, in the 
sense that it pretends to reduce social and political issues to "technical" problems to be 
resolved by means of interactions among the higher echelons of the above- mentioned 
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organizations; and (e) it corresponds to a stage of important transformations in the 
mechanisms of capital accumulation of its society, changes that are, in turn, a part of 
the "deepening" process of a peripheral and dependent capitalism characterized by 
extensive industrialization.” (O’Donnell 1978, 6) 
 
Underlying the BA regime was a new civilian-military technocratic alliance, which 
was initially supported by local capital, and appealed widely to foreign investors and foreign 
capital. However, the heterogeneous local alliance that played a role in mobilizing support to 
the 1964 military coup against Goulart was not reflected in the BA civilian-military pact. In 
fact, the conservative social and economic factions, who pushed for the military coup, 
envisaged capturing political power by holding general elections in post-Goulart Brazil 
(Napolitano 2018). This agenda contradicted the military’s aspirations. The military blamed 
the two pillars of the populist regime – capital and labor – for political instability and 
deadlocks. Moreover, the military projected itself as the only institution capable of 
overcoming the political stalemate that emerged under Goulart, by insulating itself from 
"private interests." Local capital would figure in the technocratic-military alliance again at a 
later stage of military rule and would be deemed the latecomer to the alliance bringing 
together international capital and the state.  
 Under military rule, the military enjoyed high prerogatives on basically all fields 
pertaining to civil-military relations, the situation only changed slightly under the proponents 
of liberalizing military rule (the fourth military president, Geisel) during which the “military’s 
control over the promotions were reduced from high to moderate” (Stepan 1988, 103). In 
addition to controlling the presidency, they also controlled an important number of cabinet 
positions (“Ministries of Army, Navy, Air Force, the Chief of Military Cabinet (Secretary 
General of the National Security Council), Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff” and The 
Chief of Intelligence Services was awarded a cabinet position (Stepan 1988, 104). A 
militarization of politics took shape over the years, with the passage of more than 17 
institutional acts that entrenched military rule and insulated the executive from pressure from 
below (Napolitano 2018). The first president, Castello Branco, presided over the most critical 
institutional acts, namely the ones that legalized the process of appointing generals to the 
presidency, depriving Congress of the power to oppose or propose legislation, and abolishing 
previously established parties (Skidmore 1988). The parties that operated under populism 
were abolished and banned. A two-party system was erected and revolved around the 
military-controlled party Aliança Renovadora Nacional (National Renewal Alliance 
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[ARENA]) and the legal and elitist opposition, the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro 
(Brazilian Democratic Movement [MDB]) (Filho and Morais 2018, 22). 
 The second central pillar of this civilian-military alliance was the new class of 
technocrats: the salaried middle-class employees who owed their existence to the national 
developmental model under populism. They became antagonized by populist politicians who 
offered “them only precarious tenure in public office and were usually unwilling, and always 
unable to follow their advice” (O’Donnell 1979, 70). As Goulart faced declining state 
revenues, technocrats faced wage compression and a deterioration of career promotion (Ibid, 
72). They also became dependent on the military to entrench their power (Skidmore 1988, 
108). For example, the most prominent figures occupied key ministerial posts under military 
rule and were trained in prestigious local and international universities. They orchestrated and 
enforced stabilization policies that would later invite a rapid expansion of TNCs and state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy (O’Donnell 1979; Skidmore 1988).  
To further insulate politics from working-class pressure, the military erected a national 
security state charged with spying, and abducting and torturing citizens. At the institutional 
level, the security apparatus was represented by the Serviço Nacional de Informações 
(National Intelligence Service [SNI]) and other subdivisions that had recruited personnel 
within and outside the military and were charged with censorship and counter-insurgency 
operations, as well as spying on and torturing activists. The Centro de Informações do 
Exército (The Army Information Center [CIE]), created in 1967, was charged with 
censorship. Operaçáo Bandeirantes [OBAN], a paramilitary secret police operation 
combining the police and military security officers, spied on and abducted labor activists 
(Skidmore 1988, 127-128). Large corporations such as Volkswagen, Ford, Toyota, Mercedes 
Benz, and Chrysler financed the OBAN and reported back to the security apparatus by tracing 
the activities of the working–class militants (Annex).99 Consequently, a large number of 
workers faced punitive dismissals and were blacklisted, making it even harder to find jobs in 
other companies. Finally, the Departamento de Operações de Informações - Centro de 
Operações de Defesa Interna (Department of Information Operations - Center for Internal 
Defense Operations [DOI-CODI]) acted as the major policing and counter-guerilla unit. It 
played the most important role, ending the guerilla operations and later abducting, torturing, 
and killing unionists, journalists, and lawyers (Skidmore 1988, Alves 1985).  
																																																								
99 The Metallurgic union in ABC made available the archives of the Departamento Estadual de Ordem Politica e Social – DOPs, 
documenting the names of the unionists under surveillance listed by each company. See also a recent report on this case, discussed in the 
following article from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/brazil-dictatorship-companies/. For Volkswagen spying 
on former president Lula, see: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-dictatorship-volkswagen/exclusive-volkswagen-spied-on-lula-other-
brazilian-workers-in-1980s-idUSKBN0H017P20140905 
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Between 1964 and 1973, there was a fusion of the three components of the military: 
the military as an institution that “carries the routine training and manages the complex 
network of a military bureaucracy”; the military as government, “the core of the leadership 
who direct the government or the polity”; and the military as security apparatus, “the elements 
of the regime more directly involved in the planning and execution of repression” (Stepan 
1988, 30). In post-Médici Brazil, the military-as-government and the military-as-institution 
were alarmed by the powerful security apparatus. The security apparatus grew stronger and 
more autonomous over the years (Stepan 1988, 13-20). The SNI vetoed presidential 
candidates, held ministerial positions (Ibid, 20), became part of the political landscape by 
infiltrating every state department (Ibid, 22), and was totally shielded from any form of 
review (Ibid). It therefore acted as the most important bulwark against the liberalization and 
democratization of the country, fearing that democratization would curtail their privileged 
positions, deprive them of their bargaining chips, expose their criminal activities, and deprive 
them of their “special allowances, such as special access to cars, planes, and personal 
budgets” (Ibid, 25). Hence, while the BA regime emerged to support the deepening of 
industrialization, the security apparatus developed material and ideological interests that 
became tied to defending the persistence of the BA regime.  
The BA regime inaugurated military rule with Operação Limpeza (Operation 
Cleanup) (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 64). This large-scale operation 
purged the federal and the state levels (the military, the administrators, the police, the 
judiciary, and unions) of what the generals deemed “subversives”: communists, populists, and 
leftists (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 64). Workers, unionists, and political 
activists were all subject to a brutal campaign of forced disappearances, torture, and jailing. In 
the particular case of the labor unionists, the military regime mobilized the restrictive 
elements of the CLT. Article 5 of the CLT provided a legal shield for the ministry of labor to 
“directly intervene in a union and remove elected officials from office, appoint governmental 
administrators, or officially extend the period of intervention decreed by a local, regional 
labor delegate” (Alves 1985, 190).  This purging process was accompanied by appointing 
regime loyalists from the same unions or even military or police officers (DIEESE interview 
with Enîo Seabra; R. J. Alexander and Parker 2003, 145). In the same year as the coup, the 
generals presided over 496 interventions in 3 confederations (out of 7), 43 federations (out of 
107), 49 large unions (out of 71), 94 medium size unions (out of 260), and 307 small unions 
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(out of 1648).100 As these numbers make clear, the highest percentage of purging targeted the 
top union hierarchy.  
Despite the military purge, there were fears that the communists, leftists, and populists 
would reinvade the union hierarchy by winning union elections (R. J. Alexander and Parker 
2003, 147). To preempt this scenario, the Ministry of Labor issued a set of rules to constrain 
the participation of "subversives" in union elections. The military pursued cassação, which 
deprived the purged leadership of their political rights and undermined their capacity to "re-
conquer" the corporatist union structure (R. J. Alexander and Parker 2003; Sandoval 1993; 
Alves 1985; Keck 1992; Sluyter-Beltrão 2010). This strategy was followed by the August 
1965 regulation, which determined eligibility to run for union elections. The regulation 
stipulated that those "who have bad conduct duly proven, which includes temporary or 
definitive loss of political rights" (R. J. Alexander and Parker 2003, 147) were banned from 
running for elections. Under this legal provision and following the cassação policy, the 
former leaders were automatically prohibited from presenting their candidacy for union 
elections. Even in cases where the candidates were not stripped of their civil and political 
rights, the Regional Labor Boards would ban "suspicious" or oppositional candidates from 
running because these candidates had participated in union elections before the 1964 coup 
(DIEESE interview with Enio Seabra, Alves 1985, 86).    
The military also appointed pelegos to the higher echelons of union hierarchy. The 
functions of the pelegos changed under military rule. Under populism, they had been 
politicized and were tied to the PTB. They acted as the conduits for populist leaders, 
facilitating the mobilization of working-class votes and conferring political legitimacy on 
populist leaders. Military presidents, however, did not draw legitimacy from working-class 
voting, but were appointed by an electoral college, which consisted of senators and deputies 
and state deputies. The changing relationship between the presidency and the working class 
brought changes in the functions fulfilled by the pelegos. Under military rule, the pelegos 
spent their time on administrative tasks rather than political mobilization and organization 
(Keck 1989, 257). They were turned into a union bureaucracy incorporated in the military 
strategy to pursue stabilization policies and deepen capitalism. This incorporation was made 
possible through a policy of renovação sindical (union renovation). By virtue of this policy, 
the pelegos were turned into managers of the social services financed by the union tax 
(Sandoval 1993, 107). They therefore presided over the most significant funds aimed at 
																																																								
100 See Historical Atlas for Brazil: https://atlas.fgv.br/marcos/de-castelo-branco-medici-1964-1975/mapas/expurgos-da-ditadura-sob-castelo-
branco-intervencoes (accessed January 26, 2019)   
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catering to working-class social needs amid state retreat from social service provision. 
Moreover, the ministry of finance and the ministry of labor imposed prohibitions that 
undermined the capacity of union leaders to use these funds for political ends, such as 
sustaining strikes or supporting political parties. To further coopt the pelegos, the ministry of 
labor under military rule rewarded them with prestigious access to training and education 
(Alves 1985, Kindle Location 1973) 
 Moreover, the BA regime deprived the working class of its most important weapons: 
the right to strike and the right to collective bargaining (Hurtienne and Sperber 1983). 
Collective bargaining was abolished and wage settlement under military rule came under the 
purview of the ministry of finance, which set the minimum wage according to a complex 
formula (Sandoval 1993, 108). This situation remained intact until the late 1970s when the 
working class rose defiantly to redeem from the military and capital its position in collective 
bargaining. Furthermore, the first general-president, Castello Branco, issued law N0.4330 
(Lei N0.4330)101 setting the parameters for strikes and making these conditions impossible to 
meet (Keck 1989, 257). The law banned strikes for public sector employees (Amadeo and 
Marcio Camargo 1993, 162) and in sectors that were considered by the BA regime to perform 
“vital functions.” Chapter 3, Article 12 of the Law reads that such vital sectors include the 
“water, energy and gas services, communications, transportation, funeral services, hospitals, 
food shops, pharmacies and drugstores, hotels and basic industries or industries” (Ibid).  
While the military regime's corporatist and repressive strategy controlled the working 
class for more than a decade, such strategies had run their course by the mid-1970s. The 
military regime's strategy was focused primarily on controlling the upper echelons of the 
union hierarchy. In the lower echelons, there was still some room for maneuvering. 
Participation in the union hierarchy under military rule was not conditional on the unionist’s 
affiliation to the ruling party, ARENA. Moreover, the authentic union leaders, who are 
described in Chapter Six, had built on the regime strategy to silence the traditional left and the 
populists within the union hierarchy and subsequently broke away from both identities, won 
union elections, redeemed the structure from below, and led the largest wave of strikes under 
military rule. The regime strategy to bureaucratize unionism thus also paved the way for 
authentic union leaders to brand themselves as an active union leadership held accountable to 
the rank and file, contrasting themselves with the image of the pelegos who were inactive, 
coopted by the military, and distant from their base. This strategy was best expressed by the 
																																																								
101 The text of Lei No.4330 the law is available on the following link: http://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/lei/1960-1969/lei-4330-1-junho-
1964-376623-publicacaooriginal-1-pl.html (Accessed April 2018). 
	 211	
concept of sindicalismo de base (shop-floor level unionism), which also became the nucleus 
for the transformation of unionism and for redeeming the rights of the working-class.  
There were also loopholes in the anti-strike law that made the military corporatism 
vulnerable to change. The law did not apply to the strategic and growing car industry sector, 
which became a hotbed for labor militancy under military rule. Moreover, corporatism under 
military rule controlled the formal working class but ignored the precarious, impoverished, 
and growing informal sector. This condition paved the way for the mobilization of the 
informal sector, as will be shown in Chapter Six. Finally, some of the strategies devised to 
demobilize the working class did not shield other classes, namely the middle class activists, 
from state repression. As a result, the military antagonized its traditional base of support, the 
middle class. As will be shown in Chapter Six, the limits of corporatism and the strategies 
used to tighten corporatist control ushered in working-class struggles and inter-class alliances 
that would delegitimize the regime. 
5.3.2 Stabilization, The Economic Miracle and The Economic Crisis (1964-1985)  
The following section traces the changes in economic policies under the five generals 
who presided over the internationalization and the financialization of the economy. Regarding 
economic policies, the first phase (1964-67) under the first two generals, Castello Branco and 
Costa e Silva, was a period of stabilization. The military embarked on a wide range of anti-
inflationary policies ranging from wage compression to increasing taxation and cutting public 
spending. At the same time, the generals stifled any form of resistance to their unpopular 
policies. The second phase (1967-1973), under general Emílio Médici, was the period of the 
"Brazilian miracle." The economy grew at one of its highest rates, 10% per year, during his 
term (Annex). However, the high levels of growth could only be felt by the upper classes. A 
third phase (1974-1981) was inaugurated with the first oil crisis in the wake of the 1973 Arab 
Oil Embargo. Ernesto Geisel, the fourth general to rule Brazil and a proponent of a gradual 
transition to civilian rule, opted for countercyclical policies. His term was synonymous with 
an expansion of SOEs in development and a debt-driven growth (Annex; Baer and Coes 
2006; Hurtienne and Sperber 1983; Baer 2014; Macrone 1987). Finally, the last phase, under 
João Figueiredo, followed the second oil crisis and the 1982 Mexican Debt Crisis. It was a 
period marked by negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), taking Brazil 
from locally administered structural adjustment measures to IMF structural adjustment 
measures, for a brief period of time ending with the democratization campaign (Macrone 
1987, Filho and Morais 2018, Geisa Maria 1989). 
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To cover up the negative BOP, the generals relied on generating foreign currency 
through foreign investments and loans (Geisa Maria 1989). Brazil’s capacity to attract the 
latter was dependent on the level of the former. Foreign loans and investments were tied to 
the conditionality imposed by international financial institutions on the Brazilian economy. 
Though Brazil did not transition to a neoliberal accumulation regime, the IMF and the World 
Bank (WB) pressured the military to pursue austerity measures, laying the burden of such 
measures on the poor and the working class. These austerity measures were deemed necessary 
by international creditors to regain international creditworthiness and make Brazil more 
attractive for foreign investors (Wallerstein 1980). As Brazil implemented these austerity 
measures, the country was set on a track of debt-driven growth that invited the expansion of 
TNCs supported by SOEs and in some cases by local capital, which participated as a junior 
partner (Evans 1979).   
The first phase of military rule was therefore governed by the implementation of 
stabilization policies and austerity measures that deeply hurt the working class. These 
measures ranged from wage compression and increasing taxation to cutting public spending 
and repealing the provisions that guaranteed job stability (Baer and Coes 2006, 28). In order 
to deal with the public sector deficit, the military increased the prices of services leading to 
price hikes in essential consumer goods such as transportation (Skidmore 1988, 30). Oil and 
wheat subsidies were lifted, which in turn raised the price of bread and transportation (Ibid).  
 In order to make Brazil more appealing to foreign investors, the BA regime 
dismantled the 1940 stability law and created the Fund for the Guarantee of Time in Service 
(Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço [FGTS]), which governed all labor contracts except 
for those in the civil service (Amadeo and Marcio Camarago 1993, 164; Rocha 1989, 381). 
FGTS was financed through savings forcing every worker to contribute 8% of their salaries to 
the fund. In fact, the workers could only “draw from this fund either when fired or to buy a 
house, under certain conditions” (De Holanda Barbosa 2018, 110). The FGTS fulfilled other 
functions as well. Along with other funds, the FGTS served to finance the capitalist 
transformation and deepen industrialization (Trebat 1983, 16; Rocha 1989, 381, 384). The 
federal government, which oversaw a massive accumulation of funds through the “forced 
savings,” used them for development and infrastructure projects (Trebat 1983, 16).  
 The most critical aspect of these austerity measures was the adoption of a policy of 
arrocho salarial (wage squeeze). At the heart of the policy was that wages should be "kept 
from rising faster than a declining inflation rate" (Skidmore 1988, 34; Rocha 1989). A yearly 
revision of the minimum wage was considered an area of expertise for technocrats and in 
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particular the ministry of finance. Revisions were based upon a constant policy of 
underestimation of the inflation rate, which radically diminished the minimum wage (Annex). 
For example, the implementation of this policy led to a 30% wage squeeze in the first three 
years under military rule (between 1964 and 1967) (Annex). The value of the real wages 
eroded further when technocrats and generals expressed a commitment to devaluating 
Brazilian currency and cutting public spending and subsidies, thus increasing living costs and 
profoundly hurting the poor and the working class (Skidmore 1988, 37).  
Within no time, the austerity measures started to weigh heavily on the most vulnerable 
population. High levels of income inequality appeared within the first two years of military 
rule.102 In 1965-1966, “there was a considerable concentration of income in the upper 20 % of 
income receivers in the industry and the upper 30 % in commerce and services” (Hurtienne 
and Sperber 1983, 117). In fact, this concentration of income served the capitalist 
transformation under military rule. Both the level of income and the expansion of bank credits 
to the middle class incentivized the upper and middle classes consumption of consumer 
durables (Ibid; Skidmore 1988, 63-64). Those who were earning low wages saw their capacity 
to purchase and consume dramatically reduced and they did not increase the demand for 
primary and inexpensive goods (Ibid).  
The stabilization phase (1964-1967) ended with lowering inflation from a high of 86% 
in 1964 to 25% in 1967 (Annex). By curbing inflation and adopting stabilization policies, the 
military regime met the expectations of the IMF and WB. The latter rewarded the BA regime 
by giving a green light to foreign capital to invest in Brazil. While FDIs had dropped to their 
worst levels under Goulart (28 000 000 USD), they nearly quadrupled in the first three years 
of military rule (72 000 000 USD in 1965) (O’Donnell 1978, 21).103 As a result, foreign 
investors and international creditors gave their confidence to the Brazilian economy, a 
necessary first step to dealing with the negative BOP.  
State functions were geared toward facilitating foreign investments and capital 
accumulation by big local and international conglomerates (Filho and Morais 2018; Evans 
1979; Rocha 1989; Rocha 1994). While driving labor conditions in a race to the bottom, the 
military and the technocrats enticed foreign investors to relocate their industries in Brazil by 
providing incentives related to the repatriation of profits.  The most important instruments 
																																																								
102 Skidmore shows that data on inequality in Brazil must take as its starting point the 1960s "because that was the first year in which a 
Brazilian census collected data on income distribution" (Skidmore 2004, 134). Even after 1960, a discrepancy is apparent between the 
numbers reported by IBGE102 (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística) and secondary sources (Skidmore 2004 and Abreu 2008). 
Despite the discrepancies, the sources all agree that inequality was on the rise. Between 1960 and 1990, Brazil was one of the unequal 
countries in the world with GINI coefficients higher than the Middle East and other Latin American countries (Abreu 2008, 461). 
103 For comparative data on FDIS under Goulart and the first two generals, see: https://atlas.fgv.br/marcos/de-castelo-branco-medici-1964-
1975/mapas/indices-economicos-no-governo-castelo-branco 
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were SUMOC Instruction 289 and, later, Law 4131. Instruction 289 “allowed a direct line of 
credit between the parent country, and local TNC subsidiary in Brazil” (Rocha 1989, 390). 
Law 4131 became an important instrument regulating foreign borrowing and investment. It 
set up equality between TNCs and local capital and considered the capital base of foreign 
investors to consist of “capital goods, machinery, and equipment introduced to Brazil as well 
as financial and monetary resources introduced to the country.”104 SOEs and TNCs were 
given advantages in and benefited from Law 4131, mainly due to their privileged position, 
which enabled them to access foreign credits (Ibid). Other regulations increased the capital 
base and the capacity of foreign investors to accumulate and repatriate capital. One rule was 
that “profit restriction was revoked, and reinvested profits could once again be included in the 
‘capital base’ figure on which allowable profit remittances were calculated” (Rocha 1994, 
78). Brazil turned into a profit haven for TNCs as foreign capital was allowed to make profits 
not only through developmental means but through financial means as well, i.e., from the 
profits that they had already accumulated.  
In line with the internationalization of the economy, the first two generals, Castello 
Branco and Costa e Silva, pursued policies that kept local industries at a clear disadvantage. 
Withholding credit from what the generals deemed the "inefficient" and "non-productive" 
local industries deepened the denationalization of the economy. Local industries, as a result, 
faced bankruptcies and were forced to sell their assets to foreign capital (Skidmore 1988; 
Rocha 1989; Rocha 1994). The privileges awarded to the TNCs and the denationalization of 
the Brazilian economy raised the ire of local industrialists, who started to agitate against the 
generals' policies, leading to some changes in the military strategy vis-à-vis local capital 
(Rocha 1994). This activism led general Costa e Silva, the second general ruling Brazil, to 
appoint Delfim Netto, São Paulo industrialist, as the minister of finance. Netto issued 
Resolution 63, paving the way for local industries to borrow in foreign currency through the 
intermediation of local banks (private and public, investment banks, and the BNDE).  
Resolution 63 allowed for $21.6 billion to “enter Brazil between 1972 and 1981” (Ibid, 80). 
With the conclusion of the stabilization phase, technocrats and Brazil’s generals 
embarked on a policy of debt-driven industrialization. The Central Bank, created in 1964, 
mediated all foreign loans and strengthened its oversight over the economy by setting high 
interest rates for private banks. Private banks emerged as one of the biggest winners from this 
equation. They mediated the channeling of large foreign loans to domestic capital and SOEs. 
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As they opened branches worldwide, they borrowed money and loaned it in dollars to local 
investors (Martone 1987, 8). Between 1966 and 1984, private banks controlled the largest 
share of the external debt (84.1% in 1982) (Ibid). Equally importantly, they charged high-
interest rates on debt (11.7% in 1984) (Ibid, 23). Furthermore, private banks also played an 
instrumental role in the expansion of credit, primarily to the middle class, in order to 
incentivize the consumption of consumer durables produced at home (Filho and Morais 2018; 
Evans 1979; Rocha 1989; Rocha 1994; Martone 1987).  
 All the aforementioned transformations set the stage for the economic miracle (1967-
1973), opening the economy to American and European transnational corporations (Skidmore 
1988, 138). The growth of the industrial sector led to an economic boom (Hurtienne and 
Sperber 1983; Filho and Morais 2018; Skidmore 1988; Baer 2014).105 The volume of exports 
between 1970 and 1974 almost quadrupled, reaching a high of 7.9 billion USD in 1974. The 
share of the locally manufactured goods in exports increased from 15.2% in 1970 to 29.2% in 
1974.106 Brazil diversified its industrial production, which now included “motor cars, aircraft, 
armored vehicles and capital goods” (Abreu 2000, 170). The sector responsible for the 
economic miracle was the car industry and the size of the labor force working in the 
automobile sector increased threefold between 1965 and 1975 (Annex) and produced 930 000 
cars in 1975 (Annex).  
The main implication of the rapid growth under the economic miracle was the 
denationalization of the economy. Of the ten most important industries, TNCs controlled the 
largest share (Evans 1979). By 1968, foreign investors controlled the pharmaceutical, 
automobile, food, textile, and many other industries (Hurtienne and Sperber 1983; Evans 
1979). In 1973, the share of multinationals in exported manufacturing goods was 62% of the 
total exports (Evans 1979, 74). Moreover, foreign firms were responsible for the most 
significant share of long-term currency loans. They led “the way with 47.8 %, 37.3 %, and 
50.8 % of the total loans to the private sector” in 1972, 1973, and 1974 respectively (Rocha 
1994, 78). The twin processes of foreign firms’ share in the economy and the fact that they 
controlled large shares of foreign loans fomented concerns among local industrialists that the 
military was denationalizing the economy and serving the interests of foreign capital. This 
condition would add to the series of criticism that local industrialists would use against the 
military when they withdrew their support from the BA regime.  
																																																								
105  See the World Bank Data, GDP % annual change (Accessed on April 14, 2018): 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=BR  
106 See The Historical Atlas of Brazil https://atlas.fgv.br/capitulos/ditadura-militar-1964-1985 (Accessed February 19 2019)   
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  To exacerbate the situation, the years that recorded the highest level of growth 
(Annex), witnessed one of the most acute concentrations of income (Anglade 1985, 68; 
Hurtienne and Sperber 1983, 118; Rocha 1989, 430; Baer 2014; Bresser-Pereira 2016). By 
1970, the wealthiest 5% received 34% of income, while the bottom 50% received only 14% 
(Hurtienne and Sperber 1983, 118; Anglade 1985, 68). The high levels of inequality raised the 
eyebrows of international institutions including the World Bank. Robert McNamara, then WB 
president, criticized the Brazilian miracle for failing to make the “fruits of growth more 
widely available” to lower classes (Baer 2014, 77). What shaped the WB argument at the time 
were the fears that higher levels of inequality and poverty would turn into a bulwark against 
capitalism and make Brazil a fertile ground for the rise of communism or socialism (Hirst 
2007).  
The Brazilian miracle did not only benefit large multinational corporations, but the 
civilian technocrats also benefited from this phase. The Brazilian miracle brought about an 
expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus and the creation of 231 SOEs to meet the growing 
industrialization needs (Trebat 1983, 48). The majority of SOE managers were holders of 
engineering degrees from prestigious universities and with managerial experience (Trebat 
1983; Evans 1994). Brazilian generals were also sitting at the top of strategic SOEs such as 
the National Steel Company (CSN) and Petrobras, considered necessary by the generals for 
national security (Trebat 1983, 91).  
 The civilian-military technocrats were transformed into a state bourgeoisie (Evans 
1994). As they oversaw the expansion of SOEs, they continued to present themselves as 
impartial administrators. In reality, they developed their class interests, which they shared 
with multinational managers and the employees in large-scale organizations (Evans 1994, 
197). More importantly, they were earning astronomical salaries in the range of USD 50,000 
and USD 60,000 (Trebat 1983, 92). For example, the salary of the Central Bank’s governor 
reached 1 million Cruzeiros, which would be equivalent to 4,2 USD million today, and the 
Eletrobas manager was earning a 17-month salary (Dossier Superinteressante 2016, 41).  
 The internationalization of the economy and statism were met with exogenous shocks 
that shattered Brazil’s dependent development and started to expose the contradictions of 
debt-driven industrialization under the auspices of a BA regime. The external debt during the 
miracle years rose from 14.9 US $ Billion to reach 24.8 US $ Billion in 1974 (Martone 1987). 
Debt service also rose from 4.4 US $ Billion to 6.5 $ US $ Billion in the same period and 
exacerbated the account deficit (Ibid). To complicate the problem further, at the time of the 
1973 oil embargo, Brazil was entirely dependent on the import of oil, which served the 
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expansion of its consumer-durable industry. In 1973, 80% of Brazil's oil reserves were 
imported, and the rise of oil prices fourfold worsened Brazil’s account balance (Ibid, 4). 
Furthermore, as a result of the quadrupling of the oil prices in light of the 1973 oil crisis, the 
sectors affected by the price hike “passed on their increased costs in the production process in 
the form of price increases” (Baer 2014, 101).  
In 1974, the fourth president, General Geisel, pursued political liberalization to cover 
up the public deficit and combined it with the adoption of countercyclical policies that 
increased spending and an expansion of state-led investments during the recession (Baer 
2014, 77; Baer 2018). The embodiment of these countercyclical policies was the Second 
National Development Plan (PND II) (1975-79). PND II modified the structure of the 
economy through ISI and the expansion and diversification of the export sectors as well as by 
attracting more international creditors to “finance the current account deficit and to postpone 
external adjustment” (Baer 2018, 98). PND II, therefore, inaugurated another phase of debt-
driven industrialization and promoted heavy industries under the auspices of SOEs in 
collaboration with local and foreign capital (Rocha 1989; Baer 2014; Filho and Morais 2018). 
Some of these projects were indeed aimed at overcoming Brazil’s dependency on oil imports 
and promoted a rapid expansion of infrastructure (Filho and Morais 2018; Baer 2014).  
To match the grandeur of these mega projects, SOEs assumed an immense role under 
PND II. SOEs were involved in mega projects, such as building the largest hydroelectric dam 
in the world, large infrastructure projects, “nuclear power stations, and new 
telecommunications” (Filho and Morais 2018, 25). PND II also led to the rise of a whole 
“new generation of high technology industries revolving around the chemicals, aeronautics, 
and shipbuilding” (Ibid). While achieving a positive growth rate with “GDP expansion of 7% 
led by the industrial sector industrial sector growing at 7.5% per year” (Baer 2018, 97), 
PNDII was also responsible for tripling the size of the external debt. As the plan ended, the 
size of the external debt rose from 24.8 US$ billion in 1974 to 60.8 US$ billion in 1979. The 
BOP was exacerbated by Brazil’s growing debt service, which rose from 6.7 US $ billion in 
1974 to 14 US $ billion in 1979 (Baer 2014; Filho and Morais 2018). 107 
A significant development during this period of time was the rise of a competitive 
military-industrial complex that would in the early 1980s place Brazil as one of the top 
exporters of arms to more than 40 countries (Stepan 1988, 82-83). The first three years of 
military rule witnessed the close collaboration between the FIESP and the military in the arms 
																																																								
107 For data on external debt stocks (April 15, 2018): https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.DOD.DECT.CD?locations=BR 
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industry (Ibid, 82). In subsequent years, the military oversaw the emergence of the largest 
military corporation at the time, Embraer that had developed military and civilian airplanes 
(Ibid). As of the mid 1970s, the cooperation between the National Security Council, the 
Foreign Ministry, the National Industrial confederation (Ibid, 82) led to the “the 
modernization of armed forces and communication networks and the development of strategic 
areas such as nuclear power” (Diniz 1989, 113).  Moreover, these developments would move 
Brazil from being a non-exporter of arms to the rest of the world to one of the largest in the 
mid 1970s that would only deepen and expand in the last five years under military rule (269 
000 000 in 1984 compared to none in 1971, See Annex Arms Exports). 
The last years of military rule (1979-1985) witnessed the deepening of the economic 
crisis. In 1979, oil prices doubled and a sharp rise in international interest rates in the early 
1980s increased inflation from 40% to 85% between 1978 and 1980 (Annex). With a 
worsening external deficit, the last general-president, Figueiredo, became convinced of the 
necessity of pursuing locally administered structural adjustment measures (Baer 2014, 83). 
The policies included, among other issues, limits on the growth of loans, reducing subsidies 
on basic utilities, freeing prices of specific industrial sectors, downsizing public investments, 
and a devaluation of the currency by 30%  (Filho and Morais 2018, 25).  In 1982, Brazil also 
had to deal with the repercussions of the Mexican Debt Crisis, which led to the closure of “the 
international markets that had financed Latin American debt” (Baer 2014, 83). Brazil was at 
this point the most heavily indebted country in the world. 108  Foreign debt reached 
astronomical levels and debt service was 18.8 USD$ billion, “taking up 83 % of export 
earnings (with interest payments alone amounting to 52%)” (Baer 2014, 84) (Annex).  
 Although the last military government tried to avoid signing an IMF loan agreement, 
fearing a backlash from the popular sectors, the international institutions deemed locally 
administered structural adjustment policies inadequate to deal with a crisis of this scale (Baer 
2014, 84). Brazil finally signed the IMF loan agreement in 1982, which led to further 
devaluations of the currency, “the reduction of domestic demand by finding ways of reducing 
private consumption, investment and public expenditures and increasing tax rates” (Baer 
2014, 84). The fund also required changes to the wage policy adjustments that had been 
occurring biannually since 1979. The IMF requirements laid the burden on the working class 
even further (Ibid, 85). The program resulted in negative growth rates, while unemployment 
was on the rise and the number of extremely poor and poor households increased, with the 
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percentage of people living below the poverty line reaching one of its worst levels (Annex). 
By 1983, the share of total income of the poorest 40% was 8.1%, while the share of the 
richest 10% of total income was 46.2 %, all of which confirms that those who bore the brunt 
of structural adjustment were the lower classes.109 The government proposed an emergency 
plan and nationalized foreign debt to avoid a complete collapse (Ibid, 27). While "the state 
owned 20% of Brazil's foreign debt in the 1970s, by the late 1980s it owned 90% of the 
foreign debt" (Ibid). The controversial move imposed significant roadblocks on the civilian 
rulers in post-military Brazil. With high levels of public debt, the post-military governments 
had to deal with the question of financing debt interest payment and with the astronomical 
levels of inflation that had reached into three digits under military rule. 
Two decades of military rule brought Brazil into a more severe crisis than the one 
experienced under Goulart. The crisis exposed the limits of debt-driven industrialization 
under the auspices of a military regime. The generals' policy, as has been argued, was driven 
by the beliefs that the poor and working class' consumption patterns were no longer necessary 
at this stage of industrialization and that the working class’ labor power ought to be controlled 
and repressed to appeal to international investors.  
Despite the military’s quest to expand the industrial sector, the policy reached its 
limits amid growing dependence on international stability, the flow of foreign aid, and 
investments. Amid a growing economic crisis, the industrial sectors could no longer absorb 
the waves of rural migrants seeking jobs in the formal industrial sector. By the end of the 
military’s rule, the percentage of the population living below the poverty line had reached its 
highest levels (23% in 1983) in the modern history of Brazil (Annex). The number of poor 
and extremely poor households is also recorded at astronomical levels (Annex). 
Unemployment, as a result of both the economic recession and punitive dismissals, was also 
on the rise.  
The astronomical rise of living costs ushered in a wave of activism among the urban 
poor that became an expression of their disenchantment with the deliberate policies of 
marginalization and state neglect. The struggles led by residents of urban peripheries were 
therefore crucial to mounting a counter-hegemonic project to the regime in power. The "cost 
of living" movement that they had launched in the mid-1970s set the stage for labor militancy 
in the late 1970s. In turn, the formal working class, repressed and silenced politically and 
exploited economically, rose defiantly amid wage depreciation and an open attack on job 
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stability and the right to work (Annex). Those who earned the minimum wage had to spend it 
all back to secure necessary living conditions (Rocha 1989). A 1984 household survey by 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (The Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics [IBGE]) found that by 1984 more than 50% of Brazilian families lived in extreme 
poverty (Ibid, 527).  
Initially, the regime sought to promote better salaries for the middle class and to 
incentivize their consumption by including them in the cycle of consumer durable production 
of the miracle phase. As a result of high levels of inflation, the middle class saw their capacity 
to consume dramatically slashed and the value of their wages eroded. Between 1980 and 
1984, the middle class suffered a wage compression of 24% (Rocha 1989, 527). White-collar 
workers, teachers, and health professionals, as well as workers in the services sector and the 
banking sector, also led an unprecedented wave of strikes (Alves 1985). Middle-class 
professionals, namely lawyers and journalists, were not only alarmed by the worsening 
economic conditions, but also by state repression, which put their careers at sake.  
5.3.3 The Military and the Local Business Community  
The local business community, which supported the 1964 coup against Goulart, grew 
skeptical over time of the economy’s internationalization and financialization, and of the 
deepening of state intervention therein. Adding to the growing feelings of encroachment on 
their interests, the local bourgeoisie was antagonized by the way the BA regime closed the 
channels for “private interests”. The regime became too independent from local industrial 
capital, which in turn facilitated capital’s withdrawal from the post-1964 authoritarian 
coalition. As Diniz has argued, “their joining the anti-statist coalition contributed to the 
collapse of the authoritarian regime, and thus they participated in the political liberalization 
and the inauguration of a new democratic order of the period between 1975 and 1985”(Diniz 
2011, 60). 
Initially, the tensions between the local business community and the military flared up 
early on when the military tried to eliminate support of the “inefficient” local industries and 
instead support foreign capital investments. Through effective lobbying, they regained control 
of the ministry of finance under Costa e Silva (Rocha 1989). This move appeased the local 
industrialists only temporarily. Following the miracle years, the local business community 
was alarmed by the expansion of SOEs that they viewed as eclipsing their business interests. 
This expansion, as has been argued, was prominent under Geisel’s countercyclical policies. 
Moreover, as the economic crisis worsened, local businesses were antagonized by the military 
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regime’s bending for international creditors and transferring funds away from 
industrialization to pay the debt service. In sum, the local industrialists saw that the military 
prioritized monetary and financial policies to deal with their astronomical debt, at the expense 
of industrial policies (Rocha 1989).  
The local bourgeoisie hoped that a democratic system, rather than authoritarianism, 
would allow the representation of their interests (Diniz 1989; Filho and Morais 2018). As the 
military regime insulated itself politically and became autonomous from this important class, 
the business community argued for the implementation of a more liberalized political system 
that would pave the way for them to exercise some “control over decisions that affected their 
long-term interests” (Filho and Morais 2018, 116). However, unlike the militant working 
class, they did not advocate for a radical overhaul of the system. It can hardly be argued that 
they totally withdrew from the authoritarian pact; instead, they sought to reform it (Diniz 
1989).  
5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter offered an analysis of Brazil's capitalist transformation between 1930 and 
1985. The chapter confirms the arguments made by O’Donnell pertaining to the conditions 
underlying the transition from ISI under the auspices of a populist regime to the deepening of 
industrialization under military rule. The chapter has also shown that the conditions, 
discussed in the Introduction and the Theoretical Chapter of this dissertation, leading to the 
delegitimization of the military rule were present in the case of Brazil. The first condition 
pertains to the capacity of the working class to challenge state corporatism that emerged under 
military rule. I showed that the corporatist structure that controlled the working class for two 
decades was vulnerable because the military concentrated all of its efforts on controlling the 
top leadership. In the lower levels, there was more tolerance for the participation of union 
candidates if they were neither traditional leftists nor populists. This military strategy opened 
the doors for the new union leaders who distanced themselves from the populist and the 
traditional leftist parties to strategize and conquer the union structure and thereby to transform 
it.  
The other contradiction was that the repression, tightening of the political space, and 
policies of economic dispossession that were implemented under military rule to exclude the 
working class politically and economically had widened the array of the social classes who 
were dispossessed and repressed by the generals. As the military faced an acute economic 
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crisis in post-1973 Brazil and as the crackdown did not shield the middle class, which had 
supported the 1964 coup, struggles for political freedoms signaled the narrowing of popular 
support for the post-1964 authoritarian coalition. The repression affected the working class 
primarily but did not shield the middle class, including guerilla fighters, lawyers, and 
journalists. Finally, the rise of the informal sector, which had escaped corporatist control, also 
contributed to its demise (Power and Doctor 2004, 227). The economy in the last years of 
military rule could no longer absorb the surplus of impoverished rural migrants in the formal 
sector. Under conditions of state neglect and marginalization, the informal sector was 
mobilized to resist their dispossession, supported by a progressive Church. All of these factors 
provided grounds for dismantling military rule. 
The chapter also showed that the other condition discussed in the Introduction of this 
dissertation, pertaining to the divisions between the military and the local business 
community, was also present in Brazil. Under Brazil’s military rule, the local business 
community, which had initially supported the coup, grew wary of the generals’ economic 
policies that seemed to benefit high-ranking technocrats and military personnel, local banks, 
and international creditors as well as TNCs. The military regime therefore fulfilled the 
ambitions of a handful of a political and economic elite, which came at the expense of an 
impoverished majority as well as local industrialists. Moreover, as the military personnel 
governing the country became aware of the fact that the regime was starting to loose popular 
legitimacy, and as the security apparatus grew stronger and hence detrimental to the military 
institution’s interest, the prospects for regime change in Brazil became more promising. 
However, as will be shown in the following two chapters, it was the struggles of the formal 
and informal working class that changed the terms of the transition to civilian rule and that 
have shaped the process of constitution-making so that social and economic rights are part 
and parcel of the negotiation of the post-military citizenship.  
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 Chapter 6: Social and Political Mobilization under Military Rule in Brazil (1964-1985) 
6.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 5, I traced the changes that accompanied Brazil’s capitalist transformation, 
focusing on its effects on both capital and labor. This chapter identifies the classes that played 
a protagonist role in pressuring for democracy, and investigates the cross-class mobilization 
and the nature of inter-class alliances that shaped the transition to civilian rule in Brazil. In 
this regard, this chapter argues that as of the mid-1970s the poor and the working class were 
the ones to play the protagonist role in delegitimizing military rule and the struggles for 
democracy. I show however that this working-class militancy of the mid- and late 1970s was 
not born in a vacuum; instead, it was based on political learning that took shape over the years 
and became embedded in grassroots activism. The argument proceeds in several steps.  
Firstly, the struggles that preceded the rise of the working-class in the industrial hubs, 
Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, and São Caetano do Sul (ABC), in the late 1970s 
failed to delegitimize the military regime because the military was still committed to using 
repression. However, these struggles taught workers important lessons and set the stage for 
the late 1970s working-class activism. The guerillas in the late 1960s made explicit to the 
working class the parameters of the permissible and the non-permissible action under military 
rule. The military’s crackdown on leftist armed groups made it clear for those who wanted to 
contest the regime that a violent option would not yield results in the case of Brazil. The 
guerillas are also important to consider given that some of their members have joined the first 
anti-establishment party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (The Workers’ Party [PT]) (Gómez 
Bruera 2013, 31). Moreover, the chapter also examines the rise of the progressive Church that 
had politicized the struggles of the urban poor and the peasants through Church-based 
communities. Some fractions of the Church influenced by Liberation Theology played an 
instrumental role by providing alternative spaces for organizing, and mediating the 
relationship between the formal and the informal working class, the peasants and the 
industrial working class. In this respect, it broadened the appeal of the PT beyond the 
industrial centers and the industrial working class to incorporate also the rural areas and the 
urban peripheries (Houtzager 2001; Gómez Bruera 2013).  
Secondly, the working-class strikes and mobilization in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
delegitimized the regime in power by spreading a culture of protest in various regions across 
Brazil and across different work categories. The horizontal spread of mass mobilization drew 
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into this circle of opposition white-collar employees, the employees of the services sector, the 
landless peasants, and the residents of the urban peripheries. Moreover, grassroots militancy 
at the workplace drew the new union leaders closer to their bases and to their communities. 
For example, the sindicalismo de base (shop-floor level unionism) became the basis for 
imagining alternative citizenship premised on horizontal ties.  
Thirdly, as these forms of class mobilization delegitimized military rule, they were 
met with the creation of the PT and the anti-corporatist federation, the Central Única dos 
Trabalhadores (Unified Workers’ Central [CUT]). These two anti-establishment institutions 
were the culmination of the class struggles and the inter-class alliances that emerged under 
military rule.  
I also argue that in Brazil there were important conditions that facilitated the rise of 
subordinate class organizing. The military's commitment to leaving power and pursuing a 
controlled liberalization gave the subordinate classes time and space to hone their political 
skills and to translate their demands into party and union formation. The process of political 
liberalization took at least a decade. This extended period allowed the new union leaders to 
build on the gains they had achieved during the last decade of military rule. Moreover, the 
long liberalization process paved the way for the combative unionists to learn more about 
other union tendencies that were not necessarily willing to engage in combativeness or a 
greater democratization of labor relations. Timing allowed the combative leadership to better 
position itself not only with respect to the dominant classes and the ruling elites but also with 
respect to the members of the union movement that continued to compromise with the 
military and capital at the expense of workers. The chapter illustrates this argument by 
focusing on the struggles under military rule. It then moves to address the rise of the PT and 
CUT. The last section is the conclusion. 
6.2 Social and Political Mobilization under the Military Rule (1964-1985) 
6.2.1 Working-class Mobilization under The Military Presidents: Castello Branco and 
Costa e Silva (1964-1968) 
This section examines the first wave of working-class militancy under the first two 
military presidents, who oversaw the implementation of stabilization policies and military 
repression that obliterated prospects for working-class organization and mobilization between 
1968 and 1976. I argue that the working-class strikes of the late 1960s are important to 
examine firstly because they attest to the fact that the working class did not agree to the 
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military policies; indeed, it was the first class to resist these policies, and did so from the very 
beginning. The second important implication is that these early working-class struggles taught 
the union leaders of the late 1970s important lessons. Chief among them was the necessity to 
preserve the factory committees, i.e., not to dissolve them even if workers achieved 
immediate material gains. Thirdly, lessons from the strikes of the 1960s informed how the 
new leaders in the late 1970s could brand themselves and their awareness of the necessity of 
creating a new identity that would shield them from state repression. The experiences of the 
late 1960s showed that the new union leaders could not openly label themselves as leftists or 
populists, as these identities triggered the anxiety of the military and invited outright 
repression. The fourth lesson for the new union leaders was in relation to strategizing and 
conquering rights. An inter-union movement that transcended the divisions imposed by the 
regime emerged in 1967; the movement was repressed, but it sowed the seed of the possibility 
of spreading the struggle both geographically and across different categories to weaken the 
corporatist grip. The following section proceeds chronologically to address the rise and fall of 
the union movement of the late 1960s. First, however, it provides the historical and political 
context for this movement. 
Castello Branco, the first general-president, inaugurated his term with explicit 
statements that the military was abandoning the class harmony that had underlined populism 
in order to implement a series of fiscal and monetary policies treating the right for decent 
wages and employment as an impediment to investments. Wage squeezes, cuts to state 
subsidies on oil and bread, currency devaluation, and abolishment of employment stability 
were the order of the day. Branco's stabilization policies were accompanied by the military's 
quest to deactivate the working class and depoliticize its demands. Union interventions were 
made and the PTB, along with several other parties, was abolished in 1965. As the Castello 
Branco administration was under attack for torture cases that made news headlines (Alves 
1989, 282), Costa e Silva inaugurated his term with the policy of relief (Alves 1985, Kindle 
Location 1842). The Costa e Silva initiative initially offered a liberal interpretation of the 
restrictive 1967 Constitution and proposed to meet with the opposition offering, "limited 
concessions in exchange for limited legitimacy" (Ibid). Rather than achieving its objective of 
co-opting the opposition, the policy ended up renewing class mobilization but the military 
brutally ended this mobilization with the deepening of repression. 
During the early years of military rule, the middle class, university students in 
particular, some elements of the upper class, and some members of the Church started to 
voice their opposition to the military regime. The main rallying point for the middle class was 
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regime brutality and far-reaching repression of the civilian population by the military police. 
At the forefront of middle-class organizing were university students, whose struggles drew 
the attention of the press, artists, and intellectuals. Moreover, some members of the Catholic 
Church abandoned their conservative stances (Della Cava 1989, 146). It is worth noting, 
however, that the upper spheres of the Church remained tied to a conservative and elitist 
agenda and continued to support the military. One of the primary developments that triggered 
this division within the Church was the Second Vatican Council, which urged clergy to be 
“more present in the lives of the faithful” (Ibid; Ondetti 2008, 53). Vatican II was followed by 
the Second Conference of Latin America’s bishops in Medellin/Colombia in October 1968 
(Ibid).110 With the conclusion of the Medellin Conference, some of the Brazilian bishops 
who embraced Liberation Theology adopted a pro-poor stance, which stipulated that the 
“Bible itself demands that the faithful act against the ‘sinful structures’ of social injustice” 
(Ondetti 2008, 53). The Church’s Liberation Theology shaped oppositional politics during 
this phase, supporting the student movement. In addition to the Church’s new stance and to 
student mobilization, some of the elites were antagonized by their marginalization by the 
military. This elitist opposition materialized with the Frente Ampla (The Broad Front) 
demanding political democratization, but the Frente Ampla was immediately repressed (Alves 
1989, 282).  
It is against this background that the working class organized the two most important 
strikes since the 1964 coup in the two cities of Contagem (State of Minas Geraïs) and Osasco 
(State of São Paulo). The strikes took place amid two main developments that shaped 
working-class militancy. Firstly, in 1967, an inter-union movement emerged against the 
policy of wage squeeze with the intent of redeeming the union structure from the regime. The 
movement was not tolerated by the military because it became the seed for union opposition 
(Giannotti 2007, 197; Alves 1985, Kindle Location 1971). Before being obliterated by the 
military, this movement inspired the aforementioned strikes (Ibid; DIEESE Interview with 
Enîo Seara). Secondly, Costa e Silva, the second military president, pursued a policy of 
“union renovation” to slightly relax repression against the working class by trying to co-opt 
trade unionists through their incorporation in a dialogue with the regime  (Alves 1985, Kindle 
Location 1842). Driving this initiative was the military’s awareness that although they could 
shield themselves politically from the working class, they could not ignore them totally; 
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workers were still very important for the sake of deepening industrialization. This policy 
ushered in the rise of unexpected working-class organization and mobilization (Ibid).  
The first strike hit the industrial city of Contagem. Oppositional unionists presented 
themselves to run for union elections but were banned from doing so by the Regional Labor 
Board (DIEESE interview with Enîo Seabra). The greatest fear of the generals was that the 
opposition union leader, an employee of Mannesmann, the largest and most important 
German corporation in Contagem, would turn the members of the working class (nearly 12 
000 workers) against the military (Ibid). To add to the military anxiety, the leader of the 
union, Enîo Seabra, had also formerly been affiliated with a leftist group, the Ação 
Libertadora Nacional (ALN), an offshoot of the Partido Communista Brasileiro (The 
Brazilian Communist Party, [PCB]) created in 1968 to resist the military regime (Ibid). While 
the PCB pursued a quietist policy after being repressed, the ALN drew support from the 
workers and turned to urban guerilla warfare (Ibid).111 All of these factors triggered the 
anxiety of the generals and motivated them to silence Seabra. Even though the military 
banned him and his colleagues from running for union elections, the working class in 
Contagem organized a wildcat strike in the largest mining company, Belgo Mineira. The 
factory committee in Contagem demanded an end to the wage squeeze and a 25% wage 
increase (DIEESE interview with Enîo Seabra; Alves 1985). Workers pursued the militant 
strategy of taking their managers hostages and inspired their fellow workers to launch a strike 
that lasted 20 days (Alvez 1985; Giannotti 2007, 198; DIEESE interview with Enîo Seabra). 
Already by the first week, 15 000 workers from Contagem were on strike (DIEESE interview 
with Enîo Seabra; Alves 1985). However important the Contagem strike was in showing that 
the working class was not supportive of the regime, the demands raised by the workers were 
limited in scope. This fact left room for the military to immediately demobilize them by 
announcing a national 10% raise, after which workers in Contagem resumed work (Alves 
1985; Giannotti 2007).  
 
The working class in Osasco, one of the important industrial cities in the state of São Paulo, 
rose a few months later (Alves 1985, Kindle Location 1983). Given the history of working-
class militancy in Osasco, the strike there was less of a surprise, and hence the military was 
much more prepared to pursue repression. Osasco had been home to labor activism in 1961 
and 1962, which made it one of the first targets for military intervention (DIEESE interview 
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with José Ibrahin). In Osasco, the 1967 Metallurgic Union election brought new blood to the 
union, which was neither populist nor traditional leftist. Rather, the elected leadership enjoyed 
good ties with the Church and the student movement (Giannotti 2007, 197). A large number 
of the workers there were secondary school students by night (Alves 1985, Kindle Location 
2008). The strike began with the factory committee in Cobrasma, an automobile industry with 
10 000 workers, declaring a strike (Alves 1985, Kindle Location 1995). When the strike 
spilled over to other industries in Osasco, 6000 workers were already demanding the end of 
the wage squeeze and the reinstatement of collective agreements (Giannotti 2007, 198). As 
was the case for Contagem, the military heavily repressed the strike. On the second day of the 
strike, the military intervened in the union. The main leader was jailed, and when he was 
released, he was forced into exile and only allowed to return after the 1979 political amnesty 
campaign (DIEESE interview with José Ibrahin). The strike also ended with the enactment of 
more repressive measures, including Institutional Act No.5, which ended the rule of law, 
closed Congress for a whole year, and initiated rule by executive decree. Institutional Act 
No.5 was accompanied by the National Security Law (1969), which criminalized all forms of 
opposition to the regime (Alves 1989, 285). 
Repression weighed heavily on the working class and ended two crucial developments 
that had started under military rule: the realization by workers of the necessity of pursuing 
cross-class alliances and soliciting support from the progressive Church, and the mobilization 
of factory committees and the inter-union movement. The late 1960s thus provided essential 
lessons for new union leaders in the late 1970s. First of all, the issue of factory committees 
was raised at the 1967 National Congress for Union Leaders (Keck 1989, 259). At the heart of 
the debate was whether these committees ought to be created and subsequently dissolved once 
they achieved their objectives or remain mobilized, and hence tied to the rank and file, to 
become the nucleus for continuous activism and politicization of the working-class and its 
demands (Ibid). This debate would be carried out by the union leaders of the 1970s, who saw 
the factory committees as the central pillar supporting the rise of strong grassroots working-
class organizing in the late 1970s and for creating an alternative relationship between the 
unionists and the rank and file “in which the latter would have to be organized for an on-
going shop-floor or local activity” (Keck 1989, 259). In the late 1970s, the unionists who led 
the wave of strikes would build on this idea of factory committees to create strong unions at 
the base level. Moreover, the leaders of the 1970s also built on the idea of an inter-union 
movement that transcended occupational and regional categories imposed by the state to 
appeal to the entirety of the working class in the whole country. 
	 229	
The new union leaders of the 1970s were also aware of the necessity of creating a new 
identity that would appeal to their rank and file but simultaneously remain shielded from 
outright repression in order to achieve immediate gains and redeem the union structure. The 
most important lesson of the late 1960s was that the regime expressed zero tolerance towards 
leftist unionists. This zero-tolerance policy would become more explicit between 1968 and 
1973, when radical leftist armed guerilla groups suffered heavy-handed repression. Finally, 
the working class also learned that the military’s decision to tighten its grip by enacting 
Institutional Act No.5 and the National Security Law entailed that workers had to wait for the 
military’s decision to liberalize the regime to rise in opposition a decade later.  
 
6.2.2 1968-1973: The Economic Miracle And The Repression of the Armed Guerillas  
Medíci, the third military president inaugurated his term with a closed Congress and a 
crackdown against civil and political liberties (Ondetti 2008, 52; Skidmore 1988). Ensuring 
political stability, containing the communist threat, and undermining prospects for any form 
of resistance to his economic policies were necessary to achieving the objectives of the 
economic miracle. Under Medíci, the working class had no other option but to relinquish the 
strike (Interview with CUT unionist, Former Union Militant at Ford). Repression obliterated 
workers’ capacity to mobilize and the military spread fear among workers. 
The protagonists of the struggles during this period were university students, who 
turned to armed rebellion (Alves 1989, 285). The PCB and the Church embraced non-violent 
resistance, leading some activists who believed in the armed struggle option to create their 
own organizations. Some of these organizations still enjoyed ties with the Church, including 
the Ação Popular (Popular Action [AP]), a leftist organization prominent among students 
(Alves 1985). The other central split within the ranks of the PCB led to the ALN, which I 
have already discussed. Another leftist organization that pursued aggressive actions in urban 
areas was the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR), which brought together radical 
nationalists and Marxists (Napolitano 2018). Finally, the Partido Communista do Brasil (The 
Communist Party of Brazil [PCdoB]), a Maoist offshoot of the PCB, organized a base in the 
Amazon between 1967 and 1971, when the military uncovered and ended their activities 
(Napolitano 2018). 
These guerilla organizations were committed to ending military rule by instilling a 
revolutionary alternative that promised radical income distribution. Their operations freed 
some political prisoners and brought about some improvements for Brazil’s poor. However, 
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they failed to achieve their broader objective of freeing Brazil by the force of arms because 
they could not draw significant support to their struggles. Firstly, they hailed from an urban 
middle class who tried to reach out to Brazil's poor and rural areas but had no knowledge of 
their real conditions (Skidmore 1988, 119-122). Secondly, some of these guerillas launched 
their operations "in the rural side with no connection to what was happening in the urban 
areas" (Alves 1989, 285). Thirdly, the rise of the guerrillas did not gather popular support. 
The acts of vandalism that the guerillas used to finance their activities led to a generalized 
perception that it was these acts that led to the deepening of state repression (Ibid).  Fourthly 
and most importantly, the Medíci government successfully obliterated the guerillas by 
launching a special unit, the Internal Defense Operations Center–Operation and Information 
Detachment (DOI-CODI) (Napolitano 2018). The population, as the result of these four areas 
of failure, blamed the guerillas rather than the regime for the deepening of repression; in the 
public perception, it was the guerilla movement that gave an excuse "for implementing the 
most violent policy of repression in the history of the country by enforcing press censorship, 
spreading armed guards in the newspapers offices, radio and TV stations, closing universities 
and repressing with military invasions of premises and troop occupations, faculty purges and 
intolerance of student dissent" (Alves 1989, 285). Hence, with the poor and working class 
ruled by the iron fist and the middle class still seduced by astronomical growth and "full 
employment, good wages, and widespread consumption of durable goods" (Napolitiano 
2018), the guerilla groups failed to provoke democratic change. 
The lessons drawn from the failure of the guerilla movement were equally important. 
First of all, it confirmed once again the regime’s hostility to factions that had openly labeled 
themselves leftists. Secondly, the guerilla movement taught the new union leaders that the 
armed option was not viable. The Brazilian military had no qualms about using all its capacity 
to abort an armed revolutionary alternative. Hence, the only viable option was the non-violent 
peaceful one. Finally, and equally importantly, the violent alternative did not elicit support 
from the Brazilian population at large.  
6.2.3 Geisel’s Distencão (1974-1978) and the Reemergence of the CEBs and CPTs: 
Politicizing Daily Struggles in the Urban and Rural Areas 
Geisel the fourth general-president was a proponent of political liberalization who 
assumed power at a time when the security apparatus was growing stronger and more 
intrusive in Brazil. Geisel’s objectives of promoting a gradual and secure transition to civilian 
rule was met with the security apparatus resistance that had a deep interest in maintaining the 
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authoritarian structure intact and in impeding the liberalization process (Skidmore 1988, 167; 
Stepan 1988, 25). In fact, as soon as Geisel announced his policy of distenção 
(decompression) to “reduce the power of the executive, remove prior censorship on 
newspapers and radio, and reinstitute habeas corpus for political prisoners” (Ondetti 2008, 
55), he faced important resistance from this sector (Skidmore 1988, 164). In the first few 
months of Geisel’s term, the military had come under scrutiny by its former allies including 
the Bar association and the media, for failing to control the security apparatus after recurrent 
attacks on journalists, lawyers, and researchers (Skidmore 1988, 168-169). The crackdown 
alienated the pro-military middle class from the regime (Napolitano 2018; Alves 1985). For 
example, the elitist bar association, which had historically sided with the military, supported 
one of its lawyers who dared to sue the military after being tortured by the DOI-CODI 
(Skidmore 1988, 168). Moreover, newspapers criticized the government for failing to keep up 
with their promises concerning the phasing out of censorship (Ibid, 169). It was against this 
background that the 1974 Congressional elections were held. The government allowed free 
media time for all candidates and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) seized the 
opportunity to present itself as better suited than the ruling party to carry out Geisel’s 
liberalization plan (Ibid, 172). This winning strategy was reflected positively at the ballot box 
when the MDB doubled and tripled its representation in the lower house and the senate 
respectively (Ibid; Ondetti 2003, 53).  
Equally important to the question of a military loosing its base support during this 
period of time was the growing Church criticism of the military regime (Stepan 1988, 37). 
The church based organizations linked to liberation theology were the most significant forms 
of non-violent resistance to military rule preceding the working-class militancy in the late 
1970s. In the mid-1970s, the proponents of Liberation Theology started to assume an 
important role in organizing the poor and politicizing their daily struggles. 
I have argued in Chapter 1, that in the context where the religious institution is 
autonomous from the state (in terms of financing, appointing religious leaders, etc) and 
whenever it opts for siding with the poor and the working-class, it could play an important 
role in the democratization process. This is the case for Liberation Theology in Brazil which 
was not tied to the military authoritarian structure, departed from the Church’s historical 
alliance with the elites, and was in a unique position to “secure resources from abroad which 
came in the form of international cooperation projects and were used to support” the 
subordinate classes (Gómez Bruera 2013, 31). The Church also provided an arena where 
inter-class alliance and cooperation could be formed. The formal working-class and the 
	 232	
informal working-class’ participation in the Church based communities sowed the seeds of 
cooperation which helped the workers and the residents of the urban peripheries to perceive 
the struggles over daily life (ushered in by the residents of the urban peripheries) and the 
struggles for the betterment of work conditions and living wages (the struggles of the formal 
working-class) as interconnected (Seidman 1994; Riethof 2018). The Church organized the 
most vulnerable social classes, the residents of the urban peripheries and the landless peasants 
(Keck 1992, 48-49). Throughout, the progressive Church contributed to the PT’s “pluralistic 
character because it helped the party to acquire a strong presence in a number of rural areas 
and became a mass based socialist party that united workers from the city and the 
countryside” (Gómez Bruera 2013, 31). 
For example, the Church-based organizations linked to Liberation Theology were the 
most significant forms of non-violent resistance to military rule preceding and setting the 
stage for the working-class militancy of the late 1970s. In the mid-1970s, the proponents of 
Liberation Theology started to assume an important role in organizing the residents of the 
urban peripheries and the landless peasants and in politicizing their daily struggles. 
Reinvigorating the Church's presence was accomplished via the creation of Comunidades 
Eclesiais de Base (Church-Based Communities [CEBs]). The CEBs became an important 
rallying point for organizing the opposition against the military (Cavendish 1994, 181).  
The residents of the urban peripheries contested the policies of dispossession and state 
neglect under military rule and were supported by the CEB associations (Monteiro 2015; 
Seidman 1994; Sandoval 1993). Several demands were raised by CEB activists and the 
residents of the urban peripheries, ranging from support for better transportation in the 
Quebra-Quebras / Break-Breaks movement; the betterment of services and public utilities, 
including water and electricity, in the neglected urban peripheries; and childcare for working-
class mothers (Seidman 1994, 203). For example, the Quebra-Quebras movement, which 
emerged from activism in poor neighborhoods, protested the rising prices of bus fares, often 
leading to bloody confrontations with the police (Seidman 1994, 204). The movement also 
reflected "concerns over the work-related issues such as low wages" (Ibid). Residents of the 
urban peripheries also tried to reclaim the right for housing and occupied lands to build 
houses amid worsening economic conditions. This movement became known as the 
movement of squatters and was prevalent in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte 
(Ibid).   
The most influential movement that emerged led by residents of the urban peripheries 
and the CEBs was the 1973 Movimento Custo de Vida (Cost of Living Movement [MCV]). 
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The MCV emerged from the Church-linked Mothers’ Club in the south of São Paulo 
(Monteiro 2015; Sandoval 1993, 115; Seidman 1994, 206; interview with PT deputy and 
former CUT president; interview with SCANIA militant and PT founder). It was led by 
women who wanted to draw state attention to the most challenging issues facing poor 
neighborhoods, such as the absence of adequate health services and the high costs of living 
(Monteiro 2015; Sandoval 1993, 115; Seidman 1994). These women activists involved 700 
CEBs, which administered a survey addressing these issues. In subsequent years, MCV 
activism culminated in one of the largest protests under military rule prior to the strikes of the 
late 1970s, bringing together about 20 000 participants from different walks of life. Protesters 
demanded a government “freeze on the prices of staple foods; increasing salaries above the 
rising cost of living and the disbursement of the 13th salary to all workers” (Monteiro 2015, 
3). 
In 1975, the Church’s grassroots organizing also spread out to the countryside with the 
creation of the Comissão Pastoral da Terra (Pastoral Commission on Land [CPT]). As Keck 
has argued, "the concentration of land ownership, the expansion of capitalist agriculture, and 
emphasis on export and industrial crops over food crops in rural areas led to an increase in 
land struggles" (Keck 1989, 261). The CPTs were created to assist combative and militant 
action there. Proponents of Liberation Theology initiated their activism in the Amazon, 
alarmed by the situation of the peasants, and sought to assist them in defending their rights, 
especially the right to farmland, eventually spreading their activism beyond the Amazon 
(Ondetti 2008, 53). Hence, CPTs played an important role in organizing the peasants and 
promoting combativeness among rural unionists (Keck 1989, 261; Ondetti 2008).  
Both the CEBs and the CPTs created an informal space outside the military's oversight 
and control. This space allowed for imagining alternative citizenship premised on grassroots 
democracy, horizontal ties, and collaboration among community members (Seidman 1994; 
Riethof 2018). These forms of activism set the stage for the working-class militancy of the 
late 1970s. The militant leaders who led the strikes were also active members of the CEBs 
who cultivated ties with their communities beyond the workplace. The rise of the CEBs and 
the CPT meant that workers had allies in their struggles and could tie their struggles at the 
workplace to broader issues of decent living and land reclamation. More importantly, the 
unionists who were also activists in the Church-based communities managed to shield 
themselves not only from repression but also from the demobilization that could ensue from 
repression (Riethof 2018, 87). Hence, as they remained tied to the CEBs, they remained 
mobilized and tied to their communities (Ibid).  
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As the working class rose in contention, they exercised one of the very first 
experiments in participatory democratic practices. Workplace and factory committees were 
turned initially into informal institutions, which were later recognized in some industries, to 
aggregate and politicize working-class demands. As the factory committees were embedded 
in their local communities and the CEBs, inter-class alliances were forged, leading to a 
horizontal practice of citizenship that determined local needs and wants and that protested the 
vertical ties imposed by the military (Riethof 2018, 87; Seidman 1994; Keck 1989). Not only 
the residents of the urban peripheries and the workers viewed their struggles as socially and 
politically constructed, (Riethof 2018, 87; Seidman 1994) the process of grassroots 
democracy at the workplace, which was tied to grassroots activism, spurred mass 
mobilization, broke fear barriers, and further delegitimized the military regime. It culminated 
in an alternative agenda that reflected the wide variety of the democratizing actors (Ibid). 
 
6.2.4 The Reemergence of the Working-Class: 1976-1985 
Industrialization, Urbanization, and Relations of Production 
This section examines the effects of industrialization and urbanization on working-
class conditions and mobilization in the last decade preceding the transition to civilian rule. 
RSS (1992) argued that the unintended consequences of capitalism (industrialization and 
urbanization) play the most critical role in applying pressure for democracy. In RSS’ view, 
the large concentration of an exploited working class in large industries facilitates their 
mobilization. They also argue that capitalist transformations bring about urbanization and 
improved transportation and communication means that facilitate working-class mobilization. 
This section tests this argument in Brazil. It argues that, alongside these contradictions, there 
needs to be a better understanding of the workplace relations that sowed the seeds of 
solidarity across different industries. As it had been previously argued, the working-class 
mobilization was embedded in other formal and informal structures that mediated and 
preceded the rise of working-class activism. The CEBs, for example, were a training ground 
for workers, arming them with experiences in grassroots mobilization and paving the way for 
their alliances with their fellow CEB members.  
The military's industrialization policies facilitated urban expansion and the recruitment 
of a large industrial and exploited labor force in Brazil's southeast (Annex). The military 
economy expanded the process of urbanization, which in turn helped the deepening of 
industrialization. Urbanization was also accompanied by the labor migration from the 
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countryside, labor that was absorbed by the industrial sector. Such policies led to a situation 
wherein by 1980, more than fifty percent of the population lived in cities of more than 20 000 
residents (Faria 2008). Accompanying this wave of urbanization, the industrial and 
manufacturing sectors’ labor power grew from 2,940,242 to 10,674,977 between 1960 and 
1980 (Keck 1989, 259).  
The industrial expansion was concentrated in the southeast of Brazil. The state of São 
Paulo alone accounted for "49% of the secondary sector (industrial) employment in the 1970s 
and 47% in the 1980s" (Keck 1989, 260).  The most prominent were metalworkers in the 
industrial region of ABC in the southeast of the state of São Paulo (Ibid). As the economic 
miracle drew to a close, ABC metalworkers constituted 32.79% of the industrial working 
class in the southeast of Brazil; the numbers rose to 34.1% in 1980 (Ibid). The ABC 
metalworkers became responsible for initiating a wave of strikes in their work category in 
1978 that would, in turn, spread a contagion of strikes to other sectors of the economy.  
 ABC's urbanization exhibited unique characteristics that also facilitated working-class 
organization and the rise of inter-class alliances. Firstly, ABC hosted a large concentration of 
big industries that were close to each other. The large concentration of exploited workers who 
were also geographically connected facilitated communication among them. Another 
specificity in ABC that facilitated mass mobilization and inter-class alliances was the fact that 
the informal working class had built up the favelas and their houses next to the industries.112 
The geographical proximity of the favelas to the industries mediated by the aforementioned 
CEBs facilitated alliances between the formal working class and the residents of the urban 
peripheries (Seidman 1994; Riethof 2018). Finally, in ABC, the Union of Metal Workers, 
which played a leading role in the workers' mobilization, was close to the Church (Seidman 
1994; Humphrey 2017). As I have argued, the progressive Church played an instrumental role 
through the CEBs in supporting the struggles of the poor and the working class. More 
specifically, in the context of working-class strikes, the Church turned into an informal place 
for workers to hold their assemblies whenever repression intensified and whenever union 
interventions were made (Sandoval 1993; Seidman 1994). The Church, therefore, shielded the 
working-class from demobilization.  
Other factors also facilitated the rise of the ABC metalworkers. Firstly, the public 
sector was prohibited from initiating strikes as per the anti-strike law. However, the 
metalworkers’ industries were not included in the economic categories where strikes were 
																																																								
112 See The Documentary of the Srikes in ABC, ABC da Greve: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hdil9CRlu4c 
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banned. As a result, the metalworkers could seize this loophole to start mobilizing. Secondly, 
the metalworkers of ABC developed a sense of solidarity from the expansion of exploitative 
automobile industry there. The deepening of industrialization expanded the production of 
cars, which invited TNCs to invest in ABC, accumulating large profits through the supply of a 
precarious and cheap labor force (Interview with Former Photo-journalist and coordinator of 
CEDOC). 
The vast majority of the precarious industrial working class employed by the 
automobile giants enjoyed a specific identity that reflected the discrimination and 
marginalization in Brazilian society at large but simultaneously facilitated solidarity among 
them. The industrial working class was composed of rural migrants, mostly of Black descent, 
who left Brazil's most disadvantaged regions, primarily the Northeast, where they faced harsh 
conditions including poverty, drought, and state neglect (Interview with former metalworker; 
Interview with PT deputy and former CUT president). At the same time, the management was 
Europeans or has European descent. Racial discrimination at the workplace shaped work 
hierarchy and fomented feelings of dehumanization among the industrial working class that 
eventually resulted in solidarity and camaraderie among workers (Interview with Ford and 
Volkswagen unionist).  
Moreover, the workers were young, and seeking employment to support their 
struggling families (Keck 1989, 260). Therefore, these workers were fresh blood with no 
connection to existing ideologies (populism and the traditional left) (DIEESE interview with 
Lula). Instead, they became motivated by their shared identity as the exploited working class 
and developed their political consciousness as a result of their confrontation with capital and 
the military regime (Braga 2015). 
Social Class Mobilization and the Transition to Civilian Rule (1976-1985)  
In this section, I argue that the working-class strikes and mobilization in the late 1970s 
and 1980s delegitimized the regime by challenging both its material and ideological 
hegemony, spreading a culture of protest in various regions across Brazil and across different 
work categories and demanding direct elections. The horizontal spread of mass mobilization 
drew into this circle of opposition white-collar employees, landless peasants, and the informal 
sector. Consequently, the strikes broadened the array of the classes opposed to military rule. I 
also argue that this horizontal spread was not born in a vacuum; instead, it was based on 
political learning that took shape over the years and became embedded in grassroots 
organizing and workplace militancy. Grassroots activism drew the new union leaders closer to 
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their base and their community and became the basis for imagining alternative citizenship 
premised on horizontal ties. Consequently, the working-class did not only force concessions 
from the owners of capital, they also imposed themselves as bargaining partners after being 
deliberately excluded by the military and the bourgeoisie.  
The struggles born from the accumulation in the production process and accumulation by 
disposession delegitimized the military regime. On the question of accumulation in the 
production process, the economic miracle would not have been possible without the 
repression and exploitation of the industrial labor force. The "workers of the economic 
miracle" became widely recognized among the working class and among scholars who 
studied their militancy (Keck 1989; Seidman 1994; Riethof 2018). Metalworkers in particular 
bore the brunt of a campaign to keep them tamed and repressed, and that kept their salaries far 
below the real inflation rate. Such strategies drove working-class conditions in a relentless 
race to the bottom and simultaneously facilitated the private accumulation of profits by TNCs 
(interview with Scania militant). In the post-miracle phase, the metalworkers became aware 
that high levels of growth experienced during the miracle years and the high profitability rates 
in the auto industry were the result of the exploitation of their labor power.113 Declining 
wages, working-class repression, exploitation at the workplace, the corporatist siege imposed 
on the formal working class, and the increasing number of work injuries created an overall 
climate for revolt (interview with Scania militant leader; interview with Ford and Volkswagen 
unionists).  
The working class was also aware that in order to improve its conditions it needed to 
reassert itself as a bargaining partner. The only way to pursue this objective was by 
dismantling corporatism, which the workers considered complicit in facilitating private 
capital accumulation and the repression of the working class. Hence, the first step entailed 
conquering the corporatist structure to transform it from within after years of passivity and 
bureaucratization. The authenticos, the new union leadership distancing itself from the 
populists and the traditional leftists, filled union positions and promoted the idea of strong 
unions at the shop-floor level. The sindicalismo de base (shop-floor level unionism) gave 
priority to “rank-and-file activism […] and the defense of the immediate interests of the 
category” (Humphrey 2017, 129). The sindicalismo de base was inspired by the activism that 
these new strike leaders pursued in local communities and in particular the CEB’s grassroots 
organizing. Sindicalismo de base also illustrated one of the very first practices of 
																																																								
113 1992 interview with Lula, for the link of the interview, see the following: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2LZhK72YjQ8&t=7s 
(Accessed May 2018) 
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participatory democracy: union leaders responded to working-class demands and were held 
accountable to them. The new union leaders held assemblies for workers to vote on specific 
decisions and they maintained the channels for dialogue with the base open. They also 
redeemed the strike weapon and reinserted themselves into wage settlement and collective 
bargaining processes, two critical areas that the military had sought to depoliticize and keep 
under its tight control. While improving the accountability mechanisms and redeeming their 
rights, this new leadership forced capital and the state to recognize them as bargaining 
partners. They thereby marginalized the state-appointed unionists, showing the limits of the 
corporatist structure in controlling the bargaining process. This process had also important 
symbolic and political implications, as it forced the elites and the military to recognize the 
workers, who had been politically excluded and forced into silence by the force of arms.   
Since reconquering the corporatist union structure from below was the first step that 
allowed for the reemergence of strikes, it is essential to start with a brief discussion of this 
movement, which first saw the light in the ABC metalworkers' union. In 1974, union elections 
in the metallurgic sector in São Bernardo do Campo resulted in new leadership when Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva (hereafter Lula) was elected president. A key factor that allowed him to 
rise to the union leadership was the fact that, like many workers in this area, he was neither 
affiliated with the populist nor the traditional leftist parties (DIEESE interview with Lula; 
DIEESE interview with Gilson Menzes). Lula had in mind to revitalize the unions by "making 
them work" after years of passivity (DIEESE Interview with Lula). Another development 
aided this initiative. In light of the regime's abertura (opening) policies, in 1976, “the superior 
tribunal of work ruled in favor of the union to become the representative of the workers and 
that the federation would only represent unorganized workers” (DIEESE interview with 
Lula). In other words, the superior tribunal’s decision elevated the metalworker union to the 
level of the ultimate representative of the metalworkers.  
Against this background, the first step taken by the Sindicato dos Metalurgicos do São 
Bernardo (SB) (The Union of Metal Workers in São Bernardo) was to launch a “campaign for 
salary repositioning” (DIEESE Interview with Lula).  
The context that ushered in the campaign was the publication of a study on wages and the 
costs of living by DIEESE (Departamento Intersindical De Estatistíca e Estudos 
SocioEconomicos), an independent research association initially based in São Paulo. DIEESE 
based their calculation of inflation on the cost of living to conclude that the regime had 
manipulated the calculation of the inflation index to keep wages low (Keck 1989, 262; 
Riethof 2018, 89). When the ABC metalworkers’ union asked DIEESE about the amount of 
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wage loss as a result of this manipulation, DIEESE confirmed that 120 000 metalworkers in 
ABC lost 34.1% of their wages (Riethof 2018, 89). The Union of Metal Workers in SB, 
therefore, launched its campaign to redeem the lost wages (Keck 1989, 262). Even though the 
campaign did not yield the desired increase, it helped the union to regain the confidence of the 
workers by showing that, after years of passivity, the union was once again close to the rank 
and file and defending their rights (DIEESE Interview with Lula). 
 A year later, the campaign inspired the metalworkers in ABC to strike. In 1978, 1800 
workers in the Saab-Scania factory crossed their arms and stopped their machines, demanding 
a 20% wage increase (Portugal 2015; Riethof 2018; DIEESE interview with Lula). As those 
who participated in the strike recalled, workers were aware of the need to "stop the machine" 
(Interview with Scania leader). In fact, the Scania case illustrates the learning that the working 
class had acquired over the years. Workers knew that they had to stop pleading with the state 
and needed instead to direct their actions against their employer (Interview with Ford Leader 
2). Stopping the machines forced the employer to listen to them, but it also shielded them 
from state repression since they avoided labeling their labor action a “strike,” which could 
have invited immediate repression (Ibid; DIEESE interview with Gilson Menezes; Alves 
1985; Humphrey 2017). The strike in Scania was also inspired by the strike leaders' 
knowledge of the National Security Law, which did not list the metallurgic sector as a 
strategic or essential sector. Consequently, the strikes were not prohibited there. Taken by 
surprise and fearing that state repression could exacerbate the losses incurred by the work 
stoppage, management pressed hard for solutions (Alves 1985, Kindle Locations 3982-3992). 
The union reached an agreement supported by the workers. However, the Anfavea, the 
official association for manufacturing vehicles, argued, that "Scania could not reach the 
agreement by itself. That it should be a joint agreement with the automobile industries" 
(DIEESE interview with Lula). Anfeva's declarations provoked a domino effect in the 
metallurgic category (Ibid). Within nine weeks, 245,935 metalworkers in Ford, Mercedes-
Benz, and Volkswagen went on strike (Alves 1985, 196; Riethof 2018), which finally led to 
an agreement that raised salaries by 24.5% (Alvez 1985, Kindle Locations 3982-3992). 
Support of working-class activism was facilitated by the presence of DIEESE, which 
diffused reliable statistics concerning wage compression and inflation and provided a meeting 
point for the new union leaders. DIEESE also provided educational tools for collective 
bargaining and training on its technical production for workers across different categories. As 
a result, DIEESE also became the place where discussions across working-class categories 
and among unionists took place (DIEESE interview with Olivio Durta). The leading figures 
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behind the 1978/1979 strikes became part of the “the flying inter-union organization which 
from 1978 on entered into contact with unions all over the country to try to unify the 
(working-class) demands and struggles” (Keck 1992, 77). The informal structure of the inter-
union movement challenged the longtime corporatist siege, which undermined workers’ 
ability to overcome regional and occupational fragmentation.  
By the end of 1978, the metalworkers had spread a contagion of protest across 
different sectors of the economy and in different regions across Brazil (Keck 1989; Alves 
1985, 196-197; Riethof 2018). In 1978 alone, there were 118 strikes, compared to none in the 
previous three years (Annex). As was the case for the metalworkers, white-collar employees 
and those in the services sector also witnessed the erosion of wages that fuelled their 
resistance (Alves 1985, 196). The geographical spread of strikes was impressive. By 1978, the 
strikes had already reached six states in Brazil and mobilized 539,037 workers including 
middle-class professionals, rural workers, industrial workers, and white-collar employees 
(Ibid). When labor strikes reached the strategic banking sector, with 10 000 workers declaring 
a strike, the government moved to contain the strike (Ibid). The military immediately 
prohibited strikes in that sector by issuing a decree that included the banking sector an 
"essential" category, and imposing a “20-year prison sentence as well as dismissals "with a 
just cause" for participating in strike action” (DIEESE Interview with Dutra; Alves 1985, 
Kindle Locations 4042-4044). 
In 1979, the metalworkers inaugurated the wave of strikes once again. They demanded 
a 78% wage increase when FIESP (Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo) 
suggested a raise lower than the real cost of living.114 The wage increase was the most 
prominent demand, and it reflected the worsening economic conditions for the poor and the 
working class in ABC. At the time, more than 20% of workers lived in the favelas. 
Unemployment levels as a result of massive dismissals left many workers without a job for 
more than three months. Children and women assumed jobs and were paid much less than 
men.115 The race to the bottom brought workers and their families to the streets in support of 
the 1979 strike. However, the element of surprise provided by immediate work stoppages at 
the factory level, which had previously incurred losses for the employer, was no longer a 
viable option in 1979. The entrepreneurs had in mind forcing a lockout, to facilitate a 
confrontation between the workers and the police and thus abort the strikes (Alves 1985, 
198).  
																																																								
114 See the following documentary on the Strike "ABC da greve": https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hdil9CRlu4c 
115 Ibid. 
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While the employers developed strategies to abort the strike, the working class 
mustered support from the local community and the Church to maintain a strike of up to 45 
days amid employers' refusal to meet their demands (Sandoval 1993, 128). During the 1979 
strike, the horizontal ties between the working class, the Church-based communities, and the 
residents of the urban periphery were evident (Riethof 2018, 92). The Church provided 
logistical and material support for striking workers to help them maintain their strike, raise 
funds, and deliver food to workers and their families (Alves 1985; Sandoval 1993; Seidman 
1994). When the police intervened in the union, churches opened their doors for workers to 
convene their meetings. Furthermore, as a result of the workers' activism in CEBs, workers 
were able to draw whole working-class neighborhoods to the strike. This cooperation between 
the working class and the residents of the peripheries was the consequence of their previous 
collaboration in the CEBs, which resulted in the idea that workers and residents of the favelas 
viewed their “wages and living conditions as socially and historically defined rather than 
static, viewing both as an object of social and political contestation” (Riethof 2018, 92; 
Seidman 1994). The Church also played an important role in encouraging cooperation 
between the workers and the residents of the favelas by "encouraging its members to 
participate in the labor unions arguing that the unions are the only weapons through which 
they could try to improve their situation" (Seidman 1994, 207). As a result, the employers' 
survival strategies drew the local community and the Church closer to the working class, 
thereby widening the circle of contention. Moreover, these networks of cooperation 
preempted the demobilization of the working class helping them to maintain their ground 
amid a fierce attack by the employer and the state.  
The military brutality toward the working-class also drew media attention. There are 
important issues to highlight in relation to the news coverage of the strikes. Firstly, TV and 
radio stations were under pressure from the threat of losing their licenses if they broadcasted 
any oppositional material (Skidmore 1988, 187). Secondly, the Institutional Act No.5 
institutionalized censorship, which had kept the Brazilian printed press under a tight control 
in turn led to the rise of leftist weeklies but that had nevertheless remained a rallying point for 
intellectuals (Ibid, 188). It was not before the military’s repeal of Institutional Act No.5 in 
1979 that the Brazilian press started to cover calls for direct local elections, the 1977 student 
protests, the 1979 campaign for political amnesty, and several accounts of torture (Dassin 
1984, 394-395). Hence, journalists’ solidarity with the working class emerged not from the 
elitist or the mainstream media but from the independent journalists who covered the 
struggles of the working class as well as news outlets created by the Union of Metal Workers 
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in SB, which kept workers informed about the major political and economic developments 
shaping their struggles.  
Amid growing military brutality and the employers’ refusal to concede to the workers’ 
demands, Lula negotiated an agreement that awarded a 63% increase instead of 78%, with the 
government agreeing to make similar wage increases on a biannual basis to demobilize the 
working class (Keck 1989, 259-260). The union had no choice but to accept the offer and 
Lula knew that he could not achieve a better one, although workers were still committed to 
pursuing the struggle (Keck 1989, 263; Riethof 2018). The more important implication of the 
1979 strike was the politicization of the working class. It demonstrated for union leaders "the 
impossibility of winning major gains for workers through purely industrial action. To win the 
gains, workers needed a political organization of their own founded and headed by and for 
workers" (Keck 1989; 282). While this party would not substitute the important role that 
unions played in mobilizing the working class, the party could bring working-class 
representatives to the Congress to support and defend their demands (Ibid; DIEESE Interview 
with Lula).  
The effects of the 1979 strike were far-reaching and the alliance between the Church 
and labor organizing became more entrenched. The most significant development was the rise 
of the landless peasants, who occupied land and resisted evictions in various states (São 
Paulo, Santa Catarina, Paraná, Matto Grasso). In 1979, an important confrontation that pitted 
the regime and the peasants against each other was the strike of sugar cane workers in 
Pernambuco. “The latter involved around 240 000 sugarcane workers … vulnerable to threats 
of dismissals and repression. The difficulties in organizing such a large number of rural 
workers made it necessary to form a coalition of 42 different rural unions and the church’s 
rural communities” (Alves 1985,207). The strike ended with the reinstatement of the right of 
the rural unions to bargain collectively, replacing the military strategy that had allowed for a 
top-down imposition of wage increase by the labor courts (Pereira 1997, 53). 
Moreover, the geographical spread of the strike action across various economic sectors 
was far-reaching in this year. In 1979, 276 strikes were recorded with "three million workers 
participating in strike action that reached, 15 out of 23 states" (Alves 1985, Kindle Location 
4060). While their demands revolved around the betterment of wages and work conditions, 
the increase in the number of strikes around Brazil attests to the strength of shop-floor-level 
organizing, which “ended up being recognized by the companies” (Riethof 2018, 91-92).   
In the following year, the metalworkers rose again despite the military’s attempt to 
tame them by issuing a bi-annual increase of the minimum wage. Metalworkers demanded a 
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betterment of wages and job security. The military was ready to use force and brutally repress 
the workers but it was taken by surprise when more than 100 000 people invaded the streets 
and occupied the football stadium of Vila Euclides (Ibid). Representatives across different 
work categories, namely those who had participated in the 1978 and 1979 strikes, were 
present to express solidarity with the metalworkers. The 1980 strike failed, however, to 
achieve its objectives ; as the businessmen declared, "there will be no negotiations," the union 
underwent intervention, and the union leaders were jailed. However, in 1980, as Lula stated, 
"we lost economically, but we gained a 100% politically […] it is in 1980 that the 
politicization of the category was complete," culminating in the creation of the PT (DIEESE 
interview with Lula). In other words, the 1980 strike saw the culmination of the subordinate 
classes’ counter-hegemonic organizing with the creation of the first party by and for workers 
premised on inclusive citizenship. 
Between 1981 and 1985, the working class was mobilizing to resist structural 
adjustment measures amid the deepening of the economic crisis. Three main demands figured 
prominently during these years. Firstly, the issue of work stability and the reinstatement of 
dismissed workers. Dismissals were both a result of punitive disciplinary measures and 
austerity measures that entered into effect in 1983, leading to high levels of unemployment 
(Annex). Dismissals resulted from the government's policy of downsizing the state and started 
to hit the strategic state-owned oil sector, to which workers responded by striking (Riethof 
2018, 100). The military retaliated and mobilized the 1964 law, which banned strikes in the 
oil sector. The union also underwent intervention and militants faced jail sentences and 
dismissals (Ibid). The repression and the dismissals put workers on the defensive, as their 
fears of losing their jobs became a reality. Another demand that figured prominently was 
wage adjustments. Workers found themselves losing most of the gains made in the late 1970s 
to high levels of inflation, hovering at 211% by 1984. As Brazil entered into the negotiation 
process to implement austerity measures under the auspices of the IMF, the Figueiredo 
administration, supported by the IMF, laid the burden of the economic crisis on the working 
class and "imposed wage increases at 80% below the official inflation rate in early July 1983" 
(Ibid, 100). 
Consequently, the workers were on the defensive, as they were protesting to demand 
quarterly instead of biannual wage increases (Keck 1989). Finally, the focus of demands was 
also on the recognition of factory committees (Ibid). The demand for recognizing the 
committees was popular among the authenticos who advocated for shop-floor-level 
organizing, which remained tied to the base and enjoyed good relations with the union (Ibid, 
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269). The first committee was recognized in the Ford factory when 9000 Ford workers went 
on strike, demanding the reinstatement of dismissed workers and the recognition of their 
factory committee (Interview with Ford Leaders 1 and 2; Riethof 2018, 100). By 1983, 
workers elected factory committees in "20 companies in Greater São Paulo, rising to 101 in 
1986 and peaking at 211 in 1993" (Ibid). The increase of the number of factory committees 
attested to the success of the workers' strategies in revitalizing unions, drawing them closer to 
the rank and file. This process would in turn usher in the creation of anti-corporatist union 
federation that would seek to democratize the labor relations. 
In 1983, the strikes had taken another turn. The two major dominant union tendencies, 
the combative strand that continued to call for a confrontation with capital and the military, 
and the reformists advocating for negotiation with both capital and the military, called for a 
national strike in July 1983 to resist the stabilization policies (Riethof 2018). The strike was 
only successful in the heartland of the combative leadership, the Greater São Paulo and the 
ABC. The combative leadership therefore became aware of the necessity of expanding its 
reach beyond their stronghold. Following the divisions that rocked the union factions 
following the first working-class conference, Conclat (Conferência Nacional da Classe 
Trabalhadora), in 1981, the authenticos created the CUT and called for another general strike. 
Their reformist counterparts divided the movement, as they did not agree to escalate the 
confrontation with the regime. The CUT presented “an ultimatum to President Figueiredo, 
including demands such as abolishing wage decrees, rejecting the IMF package, and 
introducing various labor reforms” (Riethof 2018, 102). However, this second national strike 
failed to take place, as the reformists had withdrawn their support from the CUT, dividing the 
movement irreparably (Ibid). As the union factions became more evident and more 
outspoken, the capacity of the working class to mobilize for more offensive strikes and to 
conquer more rights was weakened. This condition would continue in post-military Brazil, 
with dire consequences for the democratization of labor relations. 
 In the subsequent two years, the focus of the new unionists and the opposition parties 
drifted away from economic issues to demand direct elections. This process culminated with 
the Diretas Já (Direct Elections Now) campaign, demanding a constitutional amendment to 
directly elect the first civilian president succeeding Figueiredo (Napolitano 2018). The 
inciting event for this campaign was the decision by the military to orchestrate a transition to 
civilian rule that would transfer power to a trusted civilian leader and that would not deal a 
blow to the military prerogatives and interests (Ibid). Such a secure transition was intended to 
shield the generals from calls for public prosecution for crimes committed under military rule; 
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retain the military’s ability to control its own affairs (internal promotions, the management of 
the defense sector and policies); reinvigorate the budgetary support for the military, which 
had suffered a setback in the last decade under military rule; and retain the military’s 
influence over the state-owned enterprises associated with national security, the arms 
industry, and telecommunications (Stepan 1988, 57, 59; Hagopian 1990, 155; Napolitano 
2018). The most important concern for the generals was that direct elections would risk 
bringing to power a radical leftist unionist like Lula who could challenge the military’s 
interests (Hagopian 1990; Napolitano 2018). 
While some members of the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), 
formerly the MDB, were negotiating with the generals to guarantee the implementation of the 
military plan, other progressive elements within the PMDB forged an alliance with the PT to 
launch a campaign for direct elections. Diretas Já was the culmination of working-class 
militancy building on the workers’ experience in mass mobilization under military rule across 
different sectors and regions as facilitated by the 1982 election of opposition governors in 
Brazil’s main cities.116 Festive demonstrations led by representatives of the opposition, and 
artists, drew hundreds of thousands of people to fill up the streets of Brazil between April 
1983 and April 1984. The campaign also gathered support from different classes such as the 
business community (Encarnación 2003, 136), and for the first time since the late 1960s, the 
middle class took to the streets for a purely political demand (Napolitano 2018).  
The campaign failed to achieve its objective, as Congress voted against the 
amendment. However, an agreement was reached between the PMDB and the Partido Social 
Democrático (The Social Democratic Party [PSD]), formerly the ARENA, that the next 
president would be an oppositional civilian figure, Tancredo Neves, and his vice-president 
(VP) would be José Sarney. The agreement signaled the defeat of the military's proposed 
candidate Paulo Maluf, "the controversial former governor of São Paulo who had been 
accused of rampant corruption throughout his career"(Napolitano 2018). The opposition 
applauded Neves' appointment, as they considered him a seasoned politician and a vocal 
opposition figure under military rule. His VP, José Sarney, was a long-time PDS leader who 
shifted stances to join the PMDB as the military's term was coming to an end. However, 
Neves died before being sworn in, and Sarney became the first civilian president (Ibid).117 
According to many, the Sarney administration was a continuation of the military tutelage 
																																																								
116 See the following on Diretas Ja: http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/diretas-ja 
117 For a documentary about the Diretas Já campaign: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8O5jTahTXo 
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disguised in civilian rule, as the military continued to control six ministries and the defense 
and maintained tight control over the process of policymaking (Hagopian 1990). The Sarney 
administration and the role of the military in post-1985 Brazil will be given more in-depth 
analysis in the next chapter.  
6.3 The Articulation of Counter-Hegemony: The Rise of the PT and CUT  
In the RSS (1992) model, it is not enough for subordinate classes to struggle against 
processes of dispossession and exploitation under authoritarian rule; they also need to mount 
challenges to the ideological hegemony of the dominant classes.  They write, “it is the growth 
of a counter-hegemony of subordinate classes and especially the working classes (developed 
and sustained by trade unions and parties) which is critical for democracy promotion” (RSS 
1992, 50). This following section attends to this argument in the Brazilian case, which 
culminated in the creation of the CUT and the PT as the first two anti-establishment 
institutions to challenge the ideological and material hegemony of the regime and its pact 
with the elites.  
I argue that several factors facilitated the rise of subordinate-class organizing in the 
case of Brazil: firstly, the awareness among the new, combative working-class leadership of 
the necessity of building on their experiences struggling under the military regime and of 
creating a political platform for the articulation of working-class demands. Secondly, the 
military's commitment to leaving power and pursuing a controlled liberalization gave time 
and space for the subordinate classes to hone their political skills and to translate their 
demands in party and union formation. It is essential to keep in mind that the process of 
liberalization had taken more than a decade. While this extended period of time was designed 
by the military to protect the generals' interests, it also gave time for the combative union 
leadership to build on the gains they had achieved under the abertura. Thirdly, the long 
transition process paved the way for the combative working class to learn more about other 
union tendencies. As they adopted a combative approach toward the military and the business 
community, they were also aware of their competitors, the reformists. This awareness had 
reinforced the belief among the combative leadership of the need to strengthen their position 
and push further for their militant agenda; the articulation of counter-hegemony was not only 
aimed at the dominant classes but also at those elements within the trade union movement 
seeking to derail a real democratization of labor relations. That issue of timing allowed the 
combative leadership to better position itself as distinct from the dominant classes, the 
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military regime, and those within the union movement who continued to compromise with the 
military and with capital at the expense of defending the subordinate and working classes. 
This section contributes to the argument concerning the rise of the counter-hegemony led by 
the subordinate classes. It will proceed by examining the PT and CUT’s discourses as they 
emerged under military rule.  
 
6.3.1 The Rise of the PT 
In 1979, the last general-president, Figueiredo, announced the steps to pursuing 
controlled liberalization. The first of these steps entailed the passage of the amnesty law that 
saw the light after intense campaigning and mobilization. At the heart of this campaign were 
demands for ending the possibility of arrest without charges, freeing political prisoners, and 
restoring their political and civil rights. In exchange, the military pursued guarantees that 
military officers who were engaged in crimes under military rule would be shielded from 
prosecution (Napolitano 2018; Hagopian 1990, 155).  
The other central pillar of the military strategy was the party reform bill, which 
replaced the two-party system with a multiparty system to weaken the opposition by creating 
divisions within its ranks. The pro-regime party unfolded into the Partido Democrático Social 
(The Social Democratic Party, [PDS]). The opposition, in turn, was divided into four parties. 
The MDB, the legal opposition under military rule became the PMDB. The PMDB 
incorporated liberal democrats and elements from leftist groups such as the PCB, PCdoB, and 
the Movimento Revolucionário Oito de Outubro (The Revolutionary Movement 8 of October, 
MR-8). Former populist leader Lionel Brizola returned from exile and created the Partido 
Democrático Trabalhista (Democratic Labor Party [PDT]). The PCB was only legalized when 
the transition to civilian rule occurred, and its influence among the working class declined 
(Ibid).  
Finally, the new unionists and their allies from leftist groups and social movements 
created the PT in 1980. The PT was a reflection of the social class mobilization of the late 
1970s. The main founders were the authenticos, who revolved around the aforementioned 
flying inter-union movement, the new union leaders who had developed credibility and 
enjoyed good ties with the rank and file due to their activism (Keck 1992, 76-77). The PT was 
also the culmination of working-class alliances with social movements and in particular with 
the Church’s CEBs, which gathered support for the PT especially from the poor and 
precarious urban population that had supported the working-class strikes  (Keck 1992, 78-79; 
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Gómez Bruera 2013, Kindle Location 791; Filho and Morais 2018, 47). Finally, the organized 
leftist groups included some intellectuals, academics, artists, members of the student 
movement, and some of the former participants in the armed struggles against the military 
regime (Gómez Bruera 2013, Kindle Location 897). The PT was therefore born from the 
conjunction of the social and political forces that had led the struggles under military rule.  
I have previously discussed how the authenticos became aware of the need to establish 
a party by and for workers to act as a conduit for working-class demands in a democratizing 
Brazil. This vision was honed by the politicization of labor demands and the experiences that 
the authenticos had accumulated as a result of their confrontation with the regime and with 
the existing oppositional factions on both the left and the right of the political spectrum.  
The PT founders were aware that the existing parties were not representative of the 
working class (DIEESE interview with Lula). On the one hand, the PMDB was an elitist party 
(Keck 1989, 280). On the other hand, the PCB supported the PMDB agenda and forged 
alliances with them. The PCB leadership also argued, that "Brazil needed to experience a 
liberal democratic period, national economic development before the conditions were ripe for 
the working-class to come to power" (Keck 1989, 281). In other words, the PCB advocated 
for a vanguardist role and agenda concerning the working class, but it was not a proponent of 
workers making their way to political power. The PT, however, represented those who were 
marginalized and silenced by populist parties, traditional leftist parties, and the military and 
the elites. Unionists occupied critical positions within the PT. Therefore, the party could 
present itself as a party by workers, breaking with the elitist and populist tradition of parties 
for workers. The founders of the PT did not propose substituting the unions for the political 
party; instead, they viewed the role of the political party as one of channeling working-class 
demands to the realm of politics. 
The PT founders were also aware of the necessity of building on the new relations that 
emerged from their militancy at the shop floor level to articulate an agenda that represented a 
wide array of the working class and marginalized social groups, who were also at the 
forefront of the struggles under military rule. The PT broadened the definition of the working 
class to include white-collar and blue-collar workers, the formal and the informal working 
class, and the residents of urban peripheries, as well as the landless peasants. In doing so, it 
politicized all these categories and tied their struggles for the betterment of their work and 
living conditions to the broader question of democratization (Keck 1989; Keck 1992; PT 
manifesto). The PT also emphasized the intersection of class, gender, sexuality, and race that 
essentially constituted an alternative party to a military bourgeois alliance dominated by men 
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of European descent. It was thus not only a traditional workers' party; it also presented itself 
as the ultimate defender of those who had historically been marginalized and excluded 
economically, socially and politically (PT Manifesto). The PT, therefore, appealed to this 
broad-based alliance, which they projected would serve as a base of support and would 
facilitate the process of alliance formation now that competitive elections had been 
institutionalized (Riethof 2018, 106). 
From the beginning, the PT rejected the proposal of the military regime that a 
transition to civilian rule should happen first and democratization take place later (Gómez 
Bruera 2013; Kindle Location 923). The PT manifesto openly states that democracy will only 
happen through the "struggles led by workers" (PT Manifesto). However, the PT firmly 
rejected representative democracy, viewing it as a bourgeois project imposed on subordinate 
classes. This stance was governed by the PT founders' decision to move beyond the populist 
past and the existing political parties, such as the PMDB, that had coexisted with the military 
regime but tried to rebrand themselves as legitimate representatives of subordinate classes. 
Hence, the PT pushed the concept of participatory democracy, inspired by their experience of 
unionism at the shop floor level and of the CEBs, where democracy is underlined not only by 
inclusionary policies but also by the concept of active citizenship.  
At the heart of the PT's democratic agenda was the rejection of the class reconciliation 
approach that had underlined previous regimes and appeased capital. It presented itself 
instead as a party pushing forward a socialist and a democratic alternative that would respond 
to the various needs and aspirations of the marginalized factions that it represented (Braga and 
Bianchi 2005). The PT platform emphasized the necessity of politicizing key policy domains 
that had either been considered "non-issues" or deliberately depoliticized by the military 
regime and relegated to the sphere of technocratic expertise. These domains included, for 
example, the important issue of labor reforms, urban reforms, land reforms, and access to 
health, education, and housing. All of these issues were political for the PT, and they required 
more than quick-fix technocratic solutions. While politicizing these agendas, the PT 
appropriated them and invited a reflection among those who would be most affected by these 
policies for the betterment of their conditions.  
 
6.3.2 The Combative versus the Reformist Unionists: Conclat and the Road to CUT  
The first working-class conference Conclat, in 1981, sowed the seeds of alternative 
forms of union organizing at the workplace. Conclat paved the way for more than 5000 
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delegates from all currents of the labor movement to come together and discuss the direction 
of working-class struggles (Keck 1992; Interview with PT depute and Former CUT 
president). Participants stressed that the emancipation of the working class could only result 
from democratization (Conclat 1981). In relation to the democratization of labor relations and 
union freedoms, participants agreed on the need to fight unemployment, reduce the work-
week, establish an unrestricted right to strike and a national labor law, ensure occupational 
safety and stability, and the need for autonomous labor organizing free from any form of 
intervention (Conclat 1981). Questions of trade union freedoms and the democratization of 
labor relations became tied to the questions of democratic constitutionalism, which restored 
civil and political rights and guaranteed a society free from discrimination (Ibid). 
Because it brought together different union tendencies, Conclat became rife with 
divisions. The Union Unity (unidade sindical), or the reformists, included the “enlightened 
pelegos” and some old leftists (PCB, some elements of the PCdoB and the MR-8), who 
advocated continuing to work from within the official union structure (Giannotti 2007, 237). 
Enlightened pelegos, appointed by the military regime and collaborators with it for two 
decades (Giannotti 2007, 240), focused on results-based unionism, which “was (and still is) 
organizationally top-down, ideologically pro-capitalist, and strategically committed to the 
peaceful pursuit of worker gains through labor-state dialogue” (Sluyter-Beltrão 2010, 43). 
Their stronghold was the Union of Metal Workers in the city of São Paulo – the competitor of 
the ABC’s Union of Metal Workers (Interview with Força Sindical). Reformists promoted 
dialogue with the military rather than confrontation, and a class reconciliation approach 
between labor and capital (Giannotti 2007, 237; Sluyter-Beltrão 2010, 42-43). This 
conciliatory approach was reflected in the strategies they pursued. They considered long 
strikes "an adventure" and an impediment to the military's liberalization policies (Giannotti 
2007, 237). Their stances were clear in particular during the 1980 strike, when they refused to 
support the ABC metalworkers. They argued that the combativeness would embolden the 
regime at a time when the military was expressing a commitment to liberalizing the regime 
(Ibid, 239). The other incident was in 1983, in the wake of the national strike that had been 
initiated in July and had been most successful in the combative leadership's heartland. The 
reformists decided to relinquish support for another national strike or to resist the 
implementation of neoliberal policies (Riethof 2018, 100). During the first national elections, 
they were the ones to support the loyalist and elitist opposition: the PMDB. They also 
continued to advocate for working within the existing corporatist structure and "argued for an 
enlarged federation and confederation and the exclusion of the unions that were not 
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recognized by the CLT" (Keck 1989, 276). This union tendency would play an instrumental 
role in post-military Brazil in actively and positively promoting the neoliberal discourse 
among the Brazilian working-class. 
The other unionist tendency was the combative tendency or the new unionists, which 
stressed militancy and confrontation with the military regime and the business community, 
called for replacing the corporatist federation with new unions, and expressed a clear 
commitment to radical social change (Sluyter-Beltrão 2010, 40; Giannotti 2007, 238). The 
combative leaderships' strongholds were the São Bernardo metalworkers, São Paulo's and 
Porto Alegre's bankers, the metalworkers' union opposition in São Paulo, and the rural union 
opposition in Santarém (Giannotti 2007, 238). The splits between the reformists and the 
combative unionists deepened over the question of who could lead post-military unionism. In 
1983, CUT emerged from these divisions as an unofficial anti-corporatist central representing 
this combative tendency (Interview with PT depute and former CUT president). By 1984, 
CUT claimed to represent 937 unions in 16 out of 23 states and brought together 11 288 655 
workers (CUT 1984). 
Its founders supported the classist, grassroots, and democratic approach to unionism 
(Sluyter-Beltrão 2010, Riethof 2018). When they rose to prominence, the new leadership 
promoted a combative position vis-à-vis the state and capital (Keck 1989, 260). They 
revitalized class struggles at a time when the military sought to obliterate class mobilization 
through corporatism and repression. For the CUT, conflict rather than conciliation pitted 
capital and labor against each other. As a result of their approach, the combative unionists 
bore the brunt of military repression (Keck 1989, 276). As they were repressed, they also 
became aware of the necessity of politicizing their issues. When they revitalized working-
class combativeness, they demanded a radical transformation of labor relations. This radical 
transformation included union autonomy from "the state, the recognition of the right to strike, 
and the right to bargain with employers without state interference" (Keck 1989, 261).  
Their activism was inspired by their militancy in the Church-based communities 
(Riethof 2018; Seidman 1994). As they redeemed their right to strike and organize, they were 
aware of the need to maintain and deepen the contact between the union leadership and the 
base (Keck 1989, 260). The unionism at the shop-floor level empowered workers and fueled 
them with a sense of ownership over their issues so that this participatory approach became 
the condition to transforming corporatism (Lula in Keck 1989, 261). The bottom-up, rather 
than the top-down approach favored grassroots activism at the workplace and the community 
and was CUT's innovation. 
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 The new unionists started by “conquering the official structure to transform it from 
within” (Jair Mineguelli in Barros 1999, 66). This stemmed from their belief that at the initial 
phase of gaining legitimacy among the working class by "creating more unions, risked 
making the task more difficult; it risked to jeopardize the process of reaching collective 
agreements" (Barros 1999, 66). At a later stage, as they gained the confidence of their base, 
they rejected the corporatist structure altogether and argued that the working-class 
representation should be proportional to the base and that it should elected by the rank and 
file (Keck 1989). 
 The concept of active citizenship promoted by the CUT was underlined by the concept 
of dignified citizenship and by a socialist platform (CUT 1984, 6). This question of dignified 
citizenship defied capital and the military strategy in dehumanizing the poor and the working 
class. Hence, topping CUT's list of priorities was a guarantee for the right to vote for the 
illiterate (CUT 1984, 13). Another priority was to reassert social citizenship, which projected 
the question of redeeming fundamental workers' rights as an integral part of the social rights 
awarded to the residents of the urban peripheries and the landless peasants. In CUT's agenda, 
a dignified citizenship guaranteed access to essential needs including food, healthcare, 
education, and public housing (CUT 1984, 13). CUT and PT thus politicized the struggles of 
the subordinate classes and articulated together an alternative conceptualization of citizenship, 
which was born from the struggles under military rule. In post-military Brazil, the CUT and 
PT would play an important role in pushing for constitutional guarantees concerning social 
and economic rights and in resisting the neoliberal agenda.  
6.4 Conclusion   
In this chapter, I examined the relationship between class mobilization, class 
organization and inter-class alliances that applied pressure for democracy. My analysis 
confirmed that the working class played a protagonist role in the democratic struggles in 
Brazil through the major processes that I identified in the introduction and throughout this 
chapter. In this conclusion, it is worth revisiting the mechanisms through which class 
mobilization, class organization, and inter-class alliances put pressure on the military regime 
and the elites. First of all, the occurrence of strikes that started in the urban and industrial 
centers spread geographically and played an important role in broadening the array of those 
who opposed the regime and consequently narrowed the support for the authoritarian 
coalition that had sustained military rule for two decades. While the working class, the urban 
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poor, and the peasants had not sided with the military regime, the middle class and white-
collar employees were the backbone of this dictatorship. As they joined the oppositional class 
coalition, they narrowed the base of support for the military rule. 
Moreover, the occurrence of the strikes and the breadth of the oppositional social 
classes became also a precondition for pursuing mass mobilization at the national scale to 
make political demands, such as the direct elections campaign. This mass mobilization built 
upon the workers’ experiences in mobilizing for strikes and on the cross-class mobilization 
that had emerged, but it had also put the pressure on the military and the elites in a number of 
ways. Firstly, the military could not use repression when faced with millions of people from 
different walks of life. Secondly, the military and the elites could not enforce their preferred 
agenda. The military and the elites therefore had to accept a civilian opposition leader who 
was not directly elected but who also was not the military’s preferred option. That process of 
mass mobilization as well as the institutionalization of class struggles in the form of the PT, 
the Landless Peasants’ Movement (MST) and the CUT, would play an important role in the 
defense of democratic rights in post-military Brazil, as will be discussed in Chapter 7 and 8.  
I have also argued that the struggles under military rule have reshaped the 
conceptualization of a democratic citizenship among those who were contesting military rule. 
The workplace committees and the CEBs encouraged participatory democratic practices and 
created a space for the rise of horizontal rather than vertical ties. These committees were the 
training grounds for participatory democracy and these ties became the basis for an alternative 
and democratic citizenship. The process of bargaining for wages, recognition at the 
workplace, etc. all challenged the historical exclusion of the poor and the working class and 
the military’s and the elites’ practice of bargaining with each other. Workers imposed 
themselves as important bargaining partners, and as they did they politicized important social 
and economic demands, broadening the concept of citizenship that underlies a democratic 
agenda (Sandoval 1998).  
I also argued that the Brazilian case exhibits inter-class alliances that are essential for 
applying pressure for democracy and for defending the democratic process. One cannot 
overlook the residents of the urban peripheries, the landless peasants, and the civil servants 
who also rose in contention to resist their dispossession under military authoritarianism. The 
occurrence of inter-class alliance can be traced to cooperation during the course of strike 
activities, within church-based communities, and also at the national level. Moreover, these 
inter-class alliances were institutionalized with the creation of the PT and CUT, both of which 
broadened the concept of active and inclusive citizenship and the definition of social class to 
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include contending and excluded social groups beyond the class category (race, gender, 
sexuality, etc.). The PT also fielded candidates who had previously been deprived of 
opportunities for political participation to run for elections at the local level. Later, these 
actors would play the most important role not only in shielding the democratic process from 
the encroachment by the non-democratic actors, including the military, but they would also 
expand the meaning and the definition of democracy in post-military Brazil and shape the 
legal and institutional realms in favor of the subordinate classes (Arslanalp and Pearlman 
2017). It is through their mass mobilization in post-military Brazil that civilian leaders are 
held accountable, that a progressive constitution was adopted in 1988 and that institutions 
were drawn closer to the citizens though various initiatives including participatory democracy 
introduced initially at the local level.  
In the Introduction and the Theoretical Chapter I identified conditions that enable and 
facilitate the capacity of contending social classes and inter-class alliances to apply pressure 
for democracy. Under authoritarianism, I argued, organized religious groups could play an 
important role in either impeding or furthering democratization processes. The observation 
that I am making does not pertain to a culturalist explanation; rather it is rooted in an 
understanding of the religious groups as political actors in their own right, embedded in the 
authoritarian structures, and enjoying important ties to both the subordinate classes and 
capital. In Brazil, Liberation Theology assumed a social movement role and the progressive 
Church sided with the struggles of the poor and the dispossessed classes. It played an active 
role in organizing the residents of the urban peripheries and the landless peasants, both of 
which are difficult to organize. It also provided financial, human and logistical support for the 
working class when repression intensified, shielding them from the threat of demobilization. 
The Brazilian case of Liberation Theology confirms that when religious organizing is 
autonomous from the state, has decided to side with the subordinate classes rather than with 
the elite, and has pursued alliances with those who represent them, for example the new 
unionists and the PT, it can play an enabling role in democratization processes.  
The second condition that underlines the process of alliance formation and the 
institutionalization of class and inter-class alliances pertains to the nature of the transition 
from authoritarianism to civilian rule. It is true that the military was committed to leaving 
power while imposing its own terms on the transition. However, the process of a long 
engineered liberalization process that had preceded the transition to civilian rule allowed the 
working class and their allies to understand their roles as political actors, assume this role, 
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strategize and politicize their demands, all of which proved to be crucial for defending 
democratic rights in post-military Brazil.  
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Chapter 7: Negotiating the Democratic Transition in Post-Military Brazil: Organized 
Labor, and the Landless Peasants Under Military Tutelage and Neoliberal Brazil (1985-
2002) 
7.1 Introduction  
I argued in Chapter 6 that strikes and the spread of class struggles delegitimized 
military rule. I also argued that alternative forms of organizing born from these struggles 
freed the working class and their allies from elitist control. In this chapter, I extend these 
arguments to the period under scrutiny (1985-2002), which was characterized by: firstly, the 
continuation of previous economic policies under military tutelage (1985-1989) and secondly, 
a neoliberal phase under political elites allied with the business community (1990-2002). I 
contend that in neither one of the two periods was the balance of class power shifted in favor 
of the poor and the working class, a condition necessary for the successful transition to 
democracy in this dissertation. The first phase was marked by the adoption of the 1988 
Citizen Constitution (Constituição Cidadã) that expanded the parameters of citizenship and 
social rights. However, the military was still committed to using violence against the working 
class and the peasants. During this phase, the business community also converged over the 
necessity of dismantling ISI and overcoming the roadblocks imposed by the 1988 
constitution. Such measures were crucial for businesses seeking to deregulate the labor 
market and privatize key sectors of the Brazilian economy (Interview with Intersindical 1), 
hence the resolute steps by the proponents of the market economy to appropriate politics and 
pursue the implementation of market reforms. In terms of class power, the second phase was 
marked by the shift of the balance of class power in favor of the proponents of market reforms 
and their allies among the political elites. The latter implemented structural reforms to weaken 
working-class resistance to these neoliberal reforms.  
Nevertheless, during these two phases, the formal and informal working class 
continued to play the most important role in defending the democratic process. Firstly, I argue 
that strikes and land occupations, and hence the occurrence of daily confrontation between the 
military on the one hand and the working class and the peasants on the other hand, made it 
clear to the rest of the population that the military was not constrained and that it continued to 
showcase its might, especially against the poor and the working class. As the workers' 
confrontation with the military intensified, workers imposed heavy losses on the business 
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community. This condition led the political and business elites to realize a need to curb the 
military’s encroachment on the democratic process.  
Secondly, I argue that the workers, the peasants, and the social movements’ activists 
built on the accumulated experiences of organizing and mobilizing under military and post-
military Brazil to push for the defense and the expansion of a democratic agenda from below. 
I argued in Chapter 6 that the mobilization was tied to alternative forms of organizations 
(parties, unions, and social movements). These organizations played an instrumental role in 
the process of constitution-making. Parties, unions, and social movements supported a 
democratic agenda; articulated proposals; represented the subordinate classes; and imposed 
the working class, the peasants, and the social movements on the political and business elites 
as bargaining partners. While doing so, they expanded the parameters of democratic 
citizenship and the meaning of democracy to incorporate social and economic rights, and 
defended democratic rights.  
Thirdly, I argue that mass protests based on the accumulation of experience in 
organizing strikes mobilized support for the democratic rights-based agenda and kept the 
post-military leaders in check. 
On the one hand, the working class played an instrumental role in challenging 
Sarney’s and his successors’ economic policies. On the other hand, the working class was the 
first to rise in contention, demanding the impeachment of Collor amid corruption scandals 
that rocked his mandate. However, despite these significant gains, the working class under 
neoliberalism (1990-2002) bore the brunt of economic restructuring that downsized the labor 
force and reduced union density in the combative unions’ strongholds. Neoliberal 
restructuring placed the combative leadership and the working class on the defensive. The 
result was that workers were unable to stop the deepening of market reforms the way they had 
under military rule.  
This chapter illustrates these arguments by adopting a political economy approach to 
post-1985 Brazil. This approach, I argue, is best suited for assessing the question of the 
balance of class power. It embeds the subordinate and dominant class power in the regimes’ 
strategies and policies. As it had been previously argued in the case of Egypt, such policies 
affect the capacity and the opportunities for contending social classes to exert their material 
and ideological hegemony, determine their inclusion/exclusion in post-military Brazil and 
their capacity to defend or undermine the transition to democracy. The first section examines 
Sarney’s administration, the struggles of the working class and the peasants during his term, 
and their mobilization in the context of constitution-making. It ends with a discussion of the 
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changes that shaped both the businessmen's perspective on their preferred economic model 
and the role of the military in politics. The second section traces neoliberal reforms to argue 
that the balance of class power shifted in favor of the neoliberal elites but excluded and 
marginalized the majority of the Brazilian population. It also examines the effects of 
neoliberalism on unionism and the working class to trace changing patterns in their 
mobilization. These discussions also pave the way for a discussion in Chapter 8 of the PT’s 
regime and political economy when it comes to power in 2003. The last section is the 
conclusion. 
7.2 The Sarney Administration (1985-1989) 
I argued in Chapter 5 that the business community and the political elites were not 
pushing for a radical overhaul of the military regime. In this respect, the Sarney 
administration can be described as a period of civilian rule under military tutelage. In fact, it 
was the workers who were the first to express their dissatisfaction with changing the face of 
the regime. Workers continued to organize under Sarney to conquer more rights and to protest 
his economic policies. Their militancy was met with military repression and the military’s 
occupation of factories. As a response, workers in turn grew more combative and more 
militant, and imposed significant losses on the business community. I argue that that together 
this confrontation, the expansion of democratic citizenship to the illiterate population, and the 
persistence of statism under military tutelage played a decisive role in changing the elites’ 
perception of the military, prompting them to constrain the military’s influence in post-Sarney 
Brazil. 
 
7.2.1 Military Tutelage Under Sarney 
When Sarney assumed power in 1985, Brazil’s inflation rate was 228% and by the end 
of this term in 1989 it reached 1636% (Annex). The percentage of debt to GDP climbed from 
37.89% in 1985 to 102.9% in 1989 (Annex). Sarney’s economic plans to control inflation by 
freezing prices and wages failed to achieve their objectives and triggered popular mobilization 
and labor strikes that contested his policies and delegitimized his rule (Giannotti 2007; Baer 
2014).  
In addition to the failed economic policies, Sarney’s administration was synonymous 
with military tutelage (Hagopian 1990; Stepan 1988; Hunter 1995; 2000). The military 
retained the six cabinet positions that it had previously controlled under military rule. It also 
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maintained its absolute grip over the security sector through the National Intelligence Service 
and the National Security Council. Furthermore, the generals enjoyed absolute control over 
their affairs (defense policy, internal promotions, and defense budget) (Hunter 1995; 2000; 
Stepan 1988).  
Therefore, the military continued to shape social, economic, and political rights 
(Hunter 2000, 104; Martínez-Lara 1996, 84). The generals vetoed the legalization of strikes, 
the land reforms, and any constitutional provision that threatened to narrow their capacity to 
derail the democratic process. The anti-strike law was the subject of confrontation between 
the military and the working class, as will be discussed. The military also opposed land 
reforms and played an instrumental role in assisting big landowners to intimidate activist 
peasants by registering their names as infiltrators and radical leftists (Stepan 1988, 108-109). 
The military also withstood constitutional reforms that sought to limit its role in local politics. 
As some argued,  
 “the most critical (constitutional) clause stated that the military was a permanent 
national institution, which was not only to take charge of the external defense but also 
to maintain the internal law and order of the country and to guarantee the normal 
functioning of the three constitutional powers” (Martínez-Lara 1996, 86).    
While opposing changes to this clause, the military retained the capacity to derail the 
democratic process. The application of the abovementioned clause took shape with the 
military’s continuous repression of striking workers under Sarney.  
7.2.2 Workers, and Peasants under Sarney   
Pelegos in New Union Centrals and the Rise of the Landless Peasants’ Movement (MST)  
The Sarney administration witnessed significant transformations in labor organizing. 
It is worth noting that the centrals created were not officially recognized by the Sarney 
administration but received legitimacy and support from their working- class base. Another 
significant development at the level of labor organizing pertained to the organization of the 
reformists, discussed in Chapter 6, who advocated compromise rather than combativeness 
with the political and business elites. This form of unionism materialized with the creation of 
the 1985 Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores (General Confederation of Workers [CGT]) 
that emerged from the 1981 Conclat. While the CGT incorporated various union tendencies, it 
supported the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) and became associated 
with time with the pelegos who inserted themselves in the union centrals in post-military 
Brazil. By the late 1980s, the classist tendencies within the CGT separated from the central or 
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formed their own. CGT members affiliated with the Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCdoB) 
joined the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) in 1989, and in 1988 the Movimento 
Revolucionário Oito de Outubro (MR-8) separated from CGT to create the Central Geral Dos 
Trabalhadores (General Central of the Workers [CGT]/ [CGTB] since 2004]). The 
relationship between the CUT and the CGT was strained, as the two centrals disagreed about 
the nature of strategies to pursue (negotiation versus combativeness) and about how to 
address the corporatist past (union unity, union tax, and the labor courts). Such divisions 
played an instrumental role in impeding a full-fledged dismantling of corporatism. As the 
CUT rose defiantly to contest Sarney's economic policies, calling for national and general 
strikes, the CGT took a back seat. 
In 1985, the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (The Landless Peasants 
Movement [MST]) emerged and, as was the case for CUT, it embraced combativeness. 
Although the CUT and MST converged over pursuing this combative strategy, there was little 
room for actual coordination between the two during this period of time, given that they were 
both preoccupied with their movement formation (Brandford 2015, 337).  
It is worth noting that important changes started to take shape in post-military Brazil. I 
have previously argued that the progressive Church played an instrumental role in supporting 
the struggling of the landless peasants and in politicizing their demands. In post-military 
Brazil, the MST had to rely on its own resources, given the changes that shaped the Vatican’s 
new theological orientation. Starting in 1985, the Vatican became hostile toward the Church-
based communities and advocated silencing the progressive elements within the Church 
(Giannotti 2007, 249-250).  
Since its inception, the MST was committed to combativeness and confrontation with 
landed capital, but was subject to fierce attack by a rightwing media, landowners, and the 
state describing the movement as violent, revolutionary, and anti-democratic (Carter 2010). 
MST leaders and landless peasants were also subject to massacres orchestrated by the Rural 
Democratic Union (UDR), established by landowners as a response to MST activism 
(Giannotti 2007, 296; Martínez-Lara 1996, 81). In 1985 alone, 296 landless peasants were the 
victims of a massacre orchestrated by the UDR, and, in subsequent years, the numbers 
continued to increase. Between 1985 and 2006, almost 1,465 landless peasants were killed 
(Carter 2010, 192).  
The MST grew from the activism that had developed under military rule to advocate 
for land reform and to declare that land “occupation is the only solution” to one of the largest 
land concentrations in the world (MST 2019). The MST received support from the CPTs, the 
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PT, and CUT but it declared itself a movement independent from the state and political 
parties (Ibid).118 In line with its strategies, by “May 1985 12 occupations were carried out by 
2500 families, a phenomena that would spread to the rest of the country” (Ibid). Today, the 
MST is organized in 24 states in 5 regions across the country with a total of 350 thousand 
families who continued to struggle against the large land concentration by occupying more 
land (Ibid). 
The MST defended the democratic process by politicizing the struggles of the poorest 
and the most vulnerable population in Brazil, building their mobilization capacity, equipping 
them with educational tools and resources to support their struggles, and broadening the 
concept of democracy to incorporate land reforms and the extension of political rights for 
illiterate peasants (Carter 2010, 210).  
 
Working-Class and Peasant Mobilization under Sarney (1985-1989) 
The transition to civilian rule in Brazil did not lead to a decline in working-class 
militancy, contrary to what some scholars have argued (Ondetti 2008). DIEESE’s data on 
strikes clearly shows that in 1985, the working class has organized 621 strikes (Annex), a 
considerable increase compared to previous years. The number of strikes increased on an 
annual basis to reach their highest levels in Brazilian history, in 1989, the last year under 
Sarney. In 1989, workers organized 1962 strikes (Annex). Not only did the number of strikes 
increase considerably under Sarney but also striking workers were demanding improved 
working conditions (Annex), which suggest that the working class was committed to 
conquering more rights and that CUT was committed to pursuing a combative approach. This 
combativeness resulted in important losses for the business community with the private sector 
recording the highest number of hours lost (56% of hours lost in the private sector out of a 
total of 127,279 hours lost). 
When Sarney assumed political power, workers continued to conquer more rights at 
the workplace. They demanded an improvement in general working conditions (DIEESE 
SAG 1983-2013), a decrease in the number of work hours per week, the betterment of 
salaries, and the creation and recognition of factory committees (Ibid; Giannotti 2007, 250). 
With the adoption of Plano Cruzado in 1987, the CUT responded by organizing the most 
significant upheaval in Brasília and deemed the Plan “a betrayal for the working-class” 
(Giannotti 2007, 250). The regime brutally ended the mobilization, and when the Companhia 
																																																								
118 The MST official website: http://www.mst.org.br/nossa-historia/84-86 (accessed June 21 2018) 
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Siderúrgica Nacional’s (CSN) workers demanded the betterment of wages, the military 
occupied the factory (Ibid). On that same year, 11,772 families pursued 67 land occupations 
(Ondetti 2008); the landowners, in cooperation with the regime, responded by killing 
influential MST leaders (Giannotti 2007, 250). The repression intensified, but neither the 
working class nor the landless peasants gave up their struggles. In fact, in that same year, 800 
000 bank workers went on strike and called for the betterment of wages and demanded work 
stability (Ibid). The bank workers’ strike was followed by a popular upheaval in Rio de 
Janeiro when citizens there protested Sarney’s second plan, The Bresser Plan, and demanded 
the repeal of the 50% increase of bus fares. In that same year, the CUT declared a general 
strike to protest the Bresser Plan, which spread to Brazil’s impoverished northeast (Ibid, 254).   
In 1988, the year the constitution was drafted, the number of strikes slightly declined. 
As will be shown, workers mobilized to push for the adoption of constitutional amendments, 
but resistance to the Bresser Plan continued. The workers in the oil refineries, electricians, 
and workers in Embraer, the leading company producing civilian and military airplanes, 
protested the Bresser Plan and demanded the end of arbitrary dismissals. Their demands were 
met with military intervention. In the countryside, the landless peasants organized a more 
significant number of land occupations (88 occupations) involving 10,042 families (Ondetti 
2008), and landowners retaliated by assassinating the president of the Rural Workers’ Union, 
Chico Mendes, a leading socialist militant and advocate for the rights of the Native population 
(Giannotti 2007, 259).  
In 1989, the number of strikes reached astronomical levels (1962 in total; 1358 were 
demanding the betterment of work conditions, and 600 were defensive strikes). Despite 
military repression, the workers grew more confident and imposed heavy losses on the 
business community. The number of hours stopped increased from 29,948 in 1985 to 127,279 
in 1989, with 72,000 hours lost in the private sector alone. Furthermore, in the same year, 
landless peasants increased the number of land occupations (80) despite heavy-handed 
repression. The most important highlight for this year was the CUT’s call for the most 
successful general strike in Brazil’s history, when 15 million workers crossed their arms and 
protested Sarney’s Summer Economic Plan (Ibid). 
7.2.3 Social and Political Mobilization and The 1988 Constitution  
As the struggles led by the working class and the peasants continued to delegitimize 
military tutelage and impose losses on businesses, their mass mobilization in the process of 
constitution-making contributed to the adoption of the 1988 Constitution, which expanded the 
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parameters of social and economic rights and hence of democratic citizenship. However, as 
Kingston argued, the 1988 Constitution imposed roadblocks that impeded labor market 
deregulation and left businesses with the perception that the state was still “upholding the 
nationalization of key sectors of the economy, the distinction of foreign and local capital and 
multiple taxations on businesses” (Kingstone 1999, 56). By the end of Sarney’s term, the 
business community, which was neither homogenous nor unanimously committed to a 
neoliberal agenda, became convinced of the necessity to appropriate politics to remedy the 
fallout of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) and pursue structural reforms that would 
curb working-class militancy (Filho 2012, 127). This next section addresses these themes.  
 The 1987 constituent assembly paved the way for progressive voices to articulate their 
agendas by facilitating the broad-based support from popular sectors (Riethof 2018, 111). The 
adoption of proposals (popular initiatives) that guaranteed the protection of labor, 
environmental, and social rights was the culmination of the social movements' activism in this 
field mobilizing widely and gathering support for their proposed reforms (Ibid). In this 
respect, the process of constitution-making witnessed the rise of many civil-society groups, 
including workers, peasants, women, and environmentalists, who organized to shape the new 
document (Hochstetler 2000, 171). The mobilization was necessary given that representation 
within the constituent assembly was skewed in favor of the elites. As Sandoval explained, the 
“conservative and the moderate politicians mobilized strategies with the aid of the presidency 
to pre-empt the election to the constituent assembly of the progressive forces such as the 
social movements, the socialists and the social democrats” (Sandoval 1998, 189). Hence, the 
mass mobilization by unions and social movements allowed them to remedy this situation by 
gathering the required 30,000 signatures to submit a constitutional amendment (Hochstetler 
2000, 171). The most significant number of signatures was gathered by unionists (more than 6 
million signatures), followed by civil society groups (around 4 million), while the proponents 
of agrarian reforms solicited nearly 1,800,000 signatures to support land reforms (Ibid, 172).  
Moreover, the CUT used mass mobilization as a weapon to uncover the “assembly 
members who were not supportive of their agenda” (Riethoff 2019, 111) and at other times to 
resist the encroachment on labor rights. For example, the working class organized and 
solicited support from more than “22 million participants to rewrite the legislation through 
which the president sought to restrict the right to strike” (Arslanalp and Pearlman 2017, 320; 
Sandoval 1998). In sum, the protests, based on the accumulation of militancy and experience 
in organizing strikes and the Diretás Já campaign, honed the skills of the working class and 
social movements’ activists in mobilizing and in soliciting support for their democratic rights-
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based agenda by gathering the “mandate of the millions of mobilized voters” (Arslanalp and 
Pearlman 2017, 320). Moreover, as I discussed in Chapter 6, the mobilization that emerged 
under military rule was tied institutionally to alternative forms of organizations (parties, 
unions, and social movements) that imposed themselves on the business community as 
bargaining partners. These organizations played an instrumental role in the process of 
constitution-making, articulating proposals, representing the subordinate classes, and 
imposing the dispossessed and the excluded as bargaining partners.  
Three currents represented workers but did not all agree on a radical overhaul of 
corporatism. The CUT and the CGT were represented in the assembly and shared space with 
the corporatist past. A third sector was the National Trade Union Department for Political 
Affairs (DIAP), sponsored by the CUT and the CGT (Martinez-Lara 1996, 75). DIAP 
emerged in 1978 as a labor lobby out of the necessity to coordinate and oversee the "right to 
strike" (Ibid). In 1983, DIAP became formalized, with an office established in the capitol 
representing 350 unions (Payne 1991, 236). As the CUT and the CGT were not formally 
recognized, the DIAP became the main body responsible for drafting the most significant 
proposals concerning the “reduction of the workweek, the right to strike, improving work 
conditions and the work of women and minors” (Martínez-Lara 1996, 75; Payne 1991, 223).  
At the same time as the formal industrial working class was organizing in these ways, 
peasants also organized to push for land reforms. Their representation revolved around 
several types of organizations, including the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers 
(CONTAG), created in the last years of populist rule and revived by the military in the mid-
1970s. Besides this state-created structure, MST and the CPTs were also key players 
advocating for land reforms (Martínez-Lara 1996, 82).  
The strong peasant labor and civil society organizing had to face strong business 
lobbies. Corporatist structures, such as the Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo 
(Federation of Industries of The State of Sāo Paulo [FIESP] and the National Confederation 
of Industry (CNI), and non-corporatist organizations represented the businesses community 
and reflected their diversity (Martínez-Lara 1996, 78-80). In the industrial and commercial 
sectors, several non-corporatist organizations grew out of the frustrations of the corporatist 
organizing’s subservience to the state agenda. The National Thought of the Business Bases 
(PNBE) was one dissident voice that emerged from FIESP and remained as such until the 
1990s. PNBE was a representative of medium and small enterprises (Kingstone 1999, 52). 
The Union of Brazilian Businessmen (UBE) was another group that represented larger 
industrial groups, which along with the National Front for Free Enterprise (FNLI) also 
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included rural business elite. UBE and FNLI sponsored the creation of the Centrão that had 
lobbied against the labor reforms (Martínez-Lara 1996, 80). Landed capital was also 
represented in a variety of federations, such as the corporatist National Confederation of 
Agriculture (CNA) but also the “Rural Democratic Union (UDR) and, to a lesser degree, the 
Brazilian Rural Society (SRB), and the umbrella organization Frente Ampla da Agropecuaria, 
or Ample Front for Agriculture, created ad hoc as a lobby organization” (Ibid, 81). 
The 1988 Constitution stipulated that unions were free from state authorization and 
free from state meddling in union affairs (Cook 2007, 69). The constitution extended the right 
to strike and to organize for civil servants (Ibid). Breakthroughs concerning work conditions 
were also adopted: “reducing the work week from 48 to 44 hours, increasing overtime pay, 
decreasing the number of consecutive work hours from eight to six hours, creating profit-
sharing provisions, increasing maternity and paternity leaves, and instituting a minimum wage 
that covered the costs of basic and essential needs and entertainment” (Payne 1991, 224; 
Cook 2007, 69). Despite these progressive measures, the divisions between the CUT and the 
CGT impeded the full dismantling of corporatism. For example, the principles of union unity, 
the union tax, and the labor courts remained intact, leading some analysts to argue that the 
constitution relaxed the state’s grip over some aspects but maintained the controversial 
measures of the corporatist past (Cook 2007, 69-70). Other important provisions included the 
right to vote for the illiterate and the recognition of Natives' territories (Giannoti 2007, 257). 
Moreover, "education spending was increased constitutionally from 13 percent to 18 percent 
of total federal expenditure" (Martínez-Lara 1996, 78).  
However, the Constitution was a failure for peasants, despite the mass mobilization 
that accompanied the process of constitution-making (Ibid). The CPT, CONTAG, and the 
MST solicited more than 1.2 million signatures for their proposed land reforms (Ondetti 2008, 
105). However, the 1988 constitution stated that the “productive properties could not be 
expropriated […] To make matters worse, the document was silent on important issues. It 
failed to specify the criteria for determining whether a property would be considered large or 
unproductive and did not discuss the process by which ownership of expropriated land would 
pass to the federal government” (Ibid, 106). 
The passage of labor reforms triggered the anxiety of the elites, who were committed 
to submitting labor standards to the market and hence to making labor standards more flexible 
(Filho 2012). According to Brazil’s businessmen, the constitution was an anti-market 
constitution that gave too many concessions to the working class. Some studies estimated that 
“the immediate cost to business as a result of the constitution would be a 24.1 % increase in 
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the payroll. The medium effect would be an additional increase of 17.6 % in total labor costs” 
(Kingstone 1999, 54). It came as no surprise that businesses pushed in the direction of lifting 
the constitutional guarantees on the length of the workday, maternity and paternity leaves, and 
work shifts and advocated instead their transfer from the realm of constitutional rights to the 
legal sphere (Ibid). 
The most important provision for the business community was the one concerning 
“job stability provisions, which would prohibit the employer to fire employees without a just 
cause” (Payne 1991, 223-224). To abort these provisions, the Centrão, a business lobby 
consisting of right and center-right parties, organized in support of a clause that maintained 
the old practice, which inflicted a fine on employers who fired workers unjustly (Martínez-
Lara 1996, 115; Kingstone 1999, 54; Payne 1991, 224). However, the past practice suggested 
that the provision did not deter the business community from dismissing workers  (Ibid).  
Besides labor and social reforms, the elites were growing wary about attempts to 
nationalize the economy, as Kingstone (1999) noted. Three central issues shaped capital’s 
concerns during this phase. The first one concerned the constitutional nationalization 
provisions that distinguished between local and international capital. For example, the 
constitution awarded national businesses the right to preferential treatment in the sale of 
goods and services but “the business community was afraid that this would scare away the 
much needed foreign investments especially with a worsening economic situation” 
(Kingstone 1999, 55). For the local businesses seeking to expand their ventures with 
transnational capital, these measures undermined foreign investments in the country. The 
second issue was with how the constitution provided guarantees for the nationalization of key 
sectors of the economy, such as petroleum, mining, and telecommunications. For Brazil’s 
businessmen, the prohibitions placed on international investments in these fields promised to 
deepen state intervention in the economy and narrow the space for private capital to expand 
(Ibid). Finally, the constitution capped the annual interest rate at 12%, a provision viewed 
with skepticism by the business community as it limited consumer credit and private lending 
(Ibid). In short, the businesses maintained that the 1988 Constitution was anti-market, with 
the state upholding the “nationalization of the mining, the distinction between foreign and 
local capital as well as multiple taxations on businesses and personal incomes” (Ibid, 56).  
7.2.4 Disaggregating Capital and the Neoliberal Turn 
Besides losing constitutional battles, the business community was alarmed by several 
factors that prompted them to appropriate politics in order to expand the role of the market in 
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the economy and support a transition to a neoliberal accumulation regime (Galvão and 
Novelli 2001, 5-6). It is important to note that the business community is neither homogenous 
nor consistently ideologically committed to neoliberalism (Kingstone 1999, 51-52; Filho and 
Morais 2018, 127). It is therefore essential to disaggregate the bourgeoisie in Brazil.  
One can distinguish between the internal bourgeoisie and the internationalized 
bourgeoisie (Filho and Morais 2018, 127). The internationalized bourgeoisie is ideologically 
committed to neoliberal orthodoxy. In broad terms, the internationalized bourgeoisie is 
associated with “financial capital (the banks and the insurance companies) and with the 
transnational and internationally integrated manufacturing and the mainstream media” (Ibid). 
At the moment of constitution-making, the most avid supporter of the free-market economy 
was the Partido Frente Liberal (The Liberal Front Party (an offshoot of the PDS formerly the 
ARENA) [PFL]).119 The PFL did not enjoy the majority in the constituent assembly (Galvão 
and Novelli 2001, 7) and resolved the “necessity of introducing neoliberal ideology among 
the political elites, which was later on propagandized in the society” (Ibid). Other parties grew 
supportive of the neoliberal project. The PMDB, for instance, had always been a catchall 
elitist party. In post-Sarney Brazil, it experienced divisions with its ranks, leading to the 
founding of the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democratic Party 
[PSDB]) (Hunter 2009). Initially, the PSDB supported statist policies, but moved to support 
neoliberalism under Cardoso's mandate (1995-2002) (Ibid, 51).  
The internal bourgeoisie, the local industrialists in particular, had supported state 
interventionist measures (infrastructure, subsidies, a state providing directives in the 
economy) and the betterment of living conditions and wages under military rule. This capital 
fraction was tied to local demand and local markets (Filho and Morais 2018). In this respect, 
it was highly invested in socio-economic and political stability (Ibid). The Partido Liberal, a 
conservative party created in 1985 that later merged with another party to become the center-
right Partido Republicano Brasileiro (Brazilian Republic Party [PR]), was one of the 
representatives of the internal bourgeoisie who enjoyed strong ties with the Evangelical 
Church.   
 
The internal bourgeoisie during this period criticized what they perceived as the excessive 
state meddling in business affairs and, as Kingston argued, supported the free market reforms 
from “a tactical position in their conflict with the state” (Kingstone 1999, 52). For example, 
																																																								
119 [PFL]). Another division within the PDS also led to the rise of the Brazilian Progressive Party (PPB), one of the most conservative 
parties, led by the military's preferred presidential candidate, businessman Paulo Maluf.  
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the president of the largest capital group in Brazil, Votorantim Group, opened fire on the 
state’s role in the economy, saying,  
“We are a country that says it is based on free initiative. However, our governors insist 
on intervening in firms. They, who in their majority, never produced anything, never 
risked an investment, are generally accustomed to paying their payrolls with taxes 
levied on those who create wealth” (De Moras, President of Votorantim, quoted in 
Kingstone 1999, 58). 
 
Local businesses identified several problems with the previous economic policies. Firstly, 
they viewed the state’s regulation of prices as a politicized process privileging businesses that 
had only enjoyed good ties with the state (Kingstone 1999, 57). As Kingston noted, “as 
resources dried up, access to financing came to depend much more heavily on political 
connections than previously” (Kingston 1994, 35). Secondly, they grew wary about the 
inefficiency of the financial policies, the growing deficit, and its impact on businesses 
(Kingstone 1999, 52; Filho 2012). Thirdly, the interventionist and regulatory mechanisms 
introduced by the 1988 constitution antagonized businesses. The latter viewed these 
mechanisms as an encroachment on their capacity to expand their business ventures (Ibid).  
Equally importantly, the business community was aware of the growing power of the 
labor movement and the working class that had concretely translated its militancy into 
constitutional rights and guarantees. While the business community was committed to 
excluding the working class socially and economically, they had to rely less on repression and 
more on weakening labor organizing through market reforms, the restructuring of the 
workplace, and downsizing the labor force through dismissals and unemployment (Filho 
2012). Businesses and the elites who supported their agendas were also aware that the poor 
and the working class were no longer excluded politically, and, hence, their votes were 
needed to win elections.  
Brazil’s bourgeoisie thus took resolute steps to unify its position in the post-Sarney 
period in order to support the free market reforms and to pursue an attack on the 1988 
Constitution. This attack translated materially to the implementation of neoliberal reforms 
between 1990 and 2002 and symbolically to the post-Sarney presidents running on platforms 
that openly declared the necessity of “pursuing structural reforms and to reviewing the 1988 
Constitution that impeded them” (Giannotti 2007, 288). Cardoso also declared in 1995 the 
necessity of bringing an “end to the Vargas Era,” a slogan referring primarily to pursuing 
flexible labor standards  (Ibid).  
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In line with their anti-statist discourse, the business community grew wary of the military’s 
continued prerogatives, particularly the right to meddle in local affairs and derail the 
democratic process. As Hunter showed "whereas active-duty officers headed 6 ministries in 
1985, they controlled four throughout most of the 1990s and this number dropped to zero 
when in June 1999 President Fernando Henrique Cardoso implemented the decision to 
replace the three traditional services ministries and joint chief of staffs with a unified ministry 
of defense led by a civilian" (Hunter 2000, 106). As a result, the military's role was reduced to 
the protection of their affairs (salaries, budgets, promotions) and the reinforcement of their 
defense roles in post-Sarney Brazil (Ibid, 108).  
7.3	 Brazil’s	Neoliberal	Decade	(1990-2002)	
In this section, I argue that for over a decade, the neoliberal alliance defeated the PT at 
the ballot box and implemented market reforms. The neoliberals also neutralized the PT's 
opposition in Congress to neoliberal reforms. With the deepening of neoliberalism, the 
combative new unionists of the late 1970s and 1980s lost prominent members to economic 
restructuring that downsized the labor force and reduced the union density in their 
strongholds, including industry, banking, and the public sector. Declining wages and threats 
of dismissals placed the combative leadership and the working class on the defensive. The 
result was that the working class was unable to halt the deepening of the market reforms. This 
section illustrates the argument in two steps. First, I examine the neoliberal reforms between 
1990 and 2002 to assess the balance of class power under the neoliberals. This period 
signaled the political and economic ascension to power of proponents of trade liberalization, 
labor market deregulation, and privatization, all of which came at the expense of the working 
class. The second subsection examines the effects of neoliberal reforms on working-class 
organizing and mobilization.  
7.3.1 The Neoliberal Reforms (1990-2002)  
As soon as Collor, the first democratically-elected president, was sworn in in 1990, he 
provided a blueprint for the implementation of neoliberal policies by committing to 
downsizing the state and reducing expenditures and by opening an upfront attack on what 
remained of the welfare state, privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs), deregulating the 
economy and paving the way for foreign capital investments, attacking labor rights, and 
accelerating the process of deindustrialization (Giannotti 2007, 275-276; Galvão and Novelli 
2001, 4-5). Collor fulfilled his promises through the implementation of the Collor Plan, also 
known as the Plan New Brazil, even though his term was cut short by his impeachment in 
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1992 (Giannotti 2007, 276). Franco, his VP and heir, pursued the same policies; Franco was, 
in fact, an avid supporter of ISI. The man did not have an eye on political power and had 
decided to hand over the most critical issues of financial policymaking to his finance minister, 
Cardoso. Cardoso’s name was therefore associated with the implementation of Plano Real, 
which reduced inflation but deepened neoliberal reforms. Cardoso became the president of the 
republic between 1995 and 2002. Under his first mandate, Brazil witnessed the formalization 
and internationalization of market reforms through the signing of an IMF agreement in 1998. 
Cardoso oversaw labor-market deregulation, accompanied by an aggressive attack on the 
public sector that opened up strategic sectors for privatization. 
Neoliberalism in Brazil thus brought an end to ISI and the interventionist and 
redistributive state. Proponents of neoliberalism blamed Brazil's deteriorating economic 
conditions, astronomical levels of inflation, and a growing deficit on ISI policies (Mainwaring 
1997, 103-104; Filho 2012; Faucher 2018). The primary objective for presidents who oversaw 
the transition to neoliberalism was to deal with hyperinflation. Several attempts were pursued 
under Collor and Franco. Only Cardoso's Plano Real succeeded in ending inflation by 
introducing a new and overvalued currency, the Real. Cardoso maintained high foreign 
reserves, which also entailed giving free rein to the central bank in setting high interest 
rates,120 which appealed to financial capital (Baer 2014, 129; Chadarevian 2018; Breisser-
Perreira 2007). The primacy of maintaining an overvalued currency and reducing the deficit 
was wedded to the dismantling of the "inefficient" public sector (Mainwaring 1997, 103-104). 
A neoliberal agenda was put forth combining a reduction of state expenditures, the 
liberalization of the economy, privatization, and labor-market deregulation (Saad-Filho and 
Morais 2018, 71; Galvão and Novelli 2001, 5).  
Trade liberalization under Collor and Cardoso dismantled trade barriers, reduced 
tariffs (from 55% in 1987 to 10% in 1994) (Faucher 2018, 132), and removed the controls 
over companies' imports (Galvão and Norelli 2001, 8). In 1995, Brazil joined the Mercosur, a 
South American trade block, which initiated common external tariffs among participating 
countries (Baer 2014, 134). These policies not only increased trade's ratio to the GDP,121 but 
they also forced local businesses to lower their prices in order to avoid losing their markets to 
imports (Filho 2012, 129).   
The privatization of state-owned enterprises started in 1991 under the auspices of the 
National Destatization Program (Programa Nacional de Desestatização [PND]) (Filho 2012, 
																																																								
120 See the Real Interest Rate, WB data: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.RINR?locations=BR 
121 See the WB: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?locations=BR  
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129; Faucher 2018, 132). Under the Collor administration, privatization deals targeted the 
steel and the petroleum/chemicals industries (Annex). The more aggressive wave of 
privatization took place under Cardoso, whose term was synonymous with opening up all 
sectors of the economy to privatization, including the strategic oil sector, infrastructure, and 
public utilities through the passage of Law 8987 and a constitutional amendment (No.9) (Ibid; 
Faucher 2018). SOEs were sold at beneath their actual values (Interview with CUT1 and CUT 
2). For example, in 1997 the mining giant Vale do Rio Doce was sold at 3.4 billion dollars, 
while the actual value of its mineral reserves in Pará alone was estimated to be around 150 
billion dollars (Giannotti 2007, 293). Following the privatization of the Vale do Rio Doce, 48 
SOEs were privatized in the same manner (Ibid). According to Ricardo Antunes, the 
implications of the privatization process were such that “through the 1990s, about 25 percent 
of the gross domestic product moved from the state sector to that of international capital, 
reshaping and globalizing capitalism in Brazil even further” (Antunes 2013, 261). 
To open up Brazil for private investors, the state under neoliberalism played an 
essential role in deregulating the labor market. The rationale behind this deregulation, which 
drove working-class conditions in a race to the bottom, was that Brazil's main comparative 
advantage was its supply of cheap and unregulated labor power. However, the 1988 
Constitution imposed significant roadblocks that impeded labor-market deregulation. To 
overcome them, Cardoso mobilized the legislative powers conferred upon the president 
(provisional measures/decrees) to bypass congressional opposition (Cook 2007, 85). Under 
Article 62 of the 1988 Constitution, the president could “adopt provisional measures for 30 
days without congressional approval,” because the Constitution “awards the president decree 
powers in conditions of emergency” (Ibid, 84). Between 1990 and 1999, Brazil's presidents 
issued 857 provisional measures, bypassing congressional opposition on essential issues such 
as the Collor economic plan and Cardoso's Plano Real, both of which acted as blueprints for 
the implementation of neoliberalism (Mainwaring 1997, 62).  Equally importantly, wages 
came under attack with a 1995 provisional measure (MP 1053/95) that removed the wage 
indexation that had been implemented since military rule (Cook 2007, 85; Mayer 2016, 104). 
The policy resulted in one of the worst wage depreciations in Brazil’s history (Annex). 
Cardoso also pushed for labor-market deregulation by “introducing part-time jobs (MP 1709-
4/98), modifying contract durations (MP 1726/98), and creating measures to suspend or 
terminate work” (Mayer 2016, 105). The labor reforms targeted, in particular, the public 
sector employees opening the door for early retirement schemes (Law 9468/97) (Cook 2007, 
85). 
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To pursue the aggressive implementation of neoliberal reforms, the neoliberals and the 
political elites who supported them appropriated politics and defeated those who could 
oppose them, the Workers' Party, at the ballot box. Between 1990 and 2002, the presidents 
who made their way to power implemented neoliberal policies. Controlling the presidency has 
been key to shaping the policy arena in post-military Brazil. The Brazilian presidents 
controlled three key policy areas: public administration, taxation, and the budget (Limongi 
and Figueirdo 2000, 163-164; Mainwaring 1997, 57-62).  
However, the 1988 Constitution also increased congressional oversight on the 
presidential agenda. In Brazil, the presidents shared space with parties that were weakly 
disciplined but essential for ensuring governability (Mainwaring 1997, 57). It is worth noting 
that weak party discipline, except for the PT, and the absence of clearly defined ideological 
lines is a hallmark of Brazilian parties. Hence, the first challenge for Brazilian presidents was 
to overcome the dilemmas of a multi-party system with weakly-disciplined parties. 
Furthermore, the multi-party system inherited from the last days of military rule, and 
proportional representation in the chamber of deputies, prohibited a single party from 
dominating the Congress and the presidency (Mainwaring 1997, 68). 
The dilemmas of presidentialism under a multi-party system thus pushed Cardoso to 
pursue coalitional presidentialism. This informal institution guaranteed legislative support for 
the president “through the formation of large coalitions and permanent bargaining process 
with other political forces” (Gomez Brueira 2013, 94).  Brazilian presidents behaved "like 
European prime ministers, fashioning multiparty cabinets and voting blocs on the floor of the 
legislature" (Power 2010, 231). However,  
 
"Brazilian presidents also needed to engage in pork-barreling strategies among their 
allies in Congress. Because in Brazil the executive has discretionary authority to 
choose which individual amendments introduced by the legislators in the annual 
budget will eventually be executed and disbursed by the government, the release of the 
budget is used as political currency in exchange for votes. Both the distribution of jobs 
and the use of pork barreling are important elements of what Raile, Perreira, and 
Power (2010) define as the executive toolbox" (Gomez Bruera 2013,95). 
In the late 1980s and 1990s, the electoral process turned into a contest between an 
alliance of non-left parties that pushed for the adoption of market reforms and the Workers’ 
Party (PT) and its allies, which opposed the non-left alliance. The broad alliance that 
supported the neoliberal project included the PFL, the PMDB, and the Partido Democrático 
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Social (The Social Democratic Party [PDS]). The PFL supported the neoliberal reforms and 
drew its support from old-time notables, big landowners, and elites from the northeast, the 
south, and the southeast, as well as businessmen (Hunter 2009, 50). The center-right legal 
opposition under military rule, the PMDB, had always been an elitist party and incorporated 
among its ranks former ARENA members. As previously argued, the divisions within the 
PMDB led to the rise of the PSDB, which supported neoliberal reforms under Cardoso’s 
mandate and sought alliances with the non-left parties (Ibid, 51). The alliance of right and 
center-right parties controlled the presidency, vice-presidency, and government and secured 
an influential bloc of parties in Congress (Hunter 2009), assisting the presidents in the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms (Mainwaring 1997).  
Many factors played into the rise of the proponents of neoliberalism to presidential 
power. The 1989 presidential elections apparently pitted Collor against the worker-turned 
union and party leader, Lula. In terms of the electoral program, Lula did not refrain from 
attacking the banking sector, promising its nationalization and called for defaulting on debt, 
criticizing both privatization schemes and the international financial institutions’ policies in 
Brazil. He also promised to reinvigorate a redistributive state and to pursue land reforms 
(Hunter 2009, 110). Lula’s discourse contrasted with Collor’s open endorsement of the 
neoliberal project and his promise to get rid of the inefficient public sector. In this respect, 
Lula triggered the banking sector’s and the business’ anxieties. Such anxieties were translated 
into FIESP statements that announced “that 800 000 business people would leave the country 
if Lula was elected” (Ibid, 113). At the same time, Collor appeased and appealed to the 
business community, which also emerged as one of his chief supporters. Illicit campaign 
financing had played into Collor’s victory. In fact, as his brother would reveal in 1992, 
Collor’s campaign manager had used money-laundering schemes to finance the presidential 
campaign. These accusations were proven to be valid by the parliamentary committee in 
1992. To add to the issue of campaign financing, Collor’s ties to the conservative countryside 
allowed him to solicit the votes in these regions while Lula’s alliances with leftist parties 
enabled him to muster support from the urban centers (Ibid, 115). Collor and his VP, Franco, 
both of which hailed from a small but far-right party, the Partido da Reconstrução Nacional 
(The National Reconstruction Party [PRN]), narrowly defeated Lula, who gathered 47% of 
votes compared to Collor’s 53%.  
A similar scenario transpired in the 1994 and 1998 presidential elections when 
Cardoso from the PSDB ran with the PFL leader (representing the traditional Northern elite) 
and defeated the PT candidate, Lula. While the previous presidential elections were depicted 
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as a battle between labor represented by Lula and the bourgeoisie represented by Collor, the 
1994 elections were a bid between Lula representing the people and Cardoso representing the 
elites (Hunter 2009, 119). Hence, Lula’s discourse in the 1994 elections appealed more 
broadly to Brazilian citizens and emphasized his commitment to upholding citizenship rights, 
formalizing the labor market, improving salaries, pursuing land reforms, and eradicating 
hunger (Ibid, 118). However, as was the case in previous elections, Lula's leftist electoral 
alliance of urban-based middle-class parties did not give him a “ticket to penetrate Brazil's 
interior” (Ibid, 119). At the same time, the business community's unfavorable views of Lula 
were still predominant (Ibid). Consequently, Lula could not compete with the unwavering 
support that Cardoso enjoyed from the business community, or with his impressive campaign 
financing (Ibid). Moreover, Cardoso's successful control of inflation through the Plano Real 
was one of the critical factors that led to his victory (Ibid, 123).  
Teoria e Debate (Theory and Debate), the PT’s “main forum for intellectual 
exchange” criticized the  
"PT's insensitivity to the burden of inflation suffered by the informal sector poor (i.e., 
those without the benefit of indexed wages), they called for the party to be more in 
touch with and responsive to public opinion. The PT had not been very responsive to 
public opinion: Although surveys suggested that issues like price levels and 
employment far outweighed concerns like debt suspension and land reform, the party 
paid disproportionate attention to the latter " (Ibid, 124). 
Critics also attributed the failure to the rise in 1992/1993 of radical leftist voices within the 
PT bureaucracy (e.g. O Trabalho, Democracia Socialista, and Força Socialista) (Ibid, 120 
and 125). On this issue, the PT's moderate factions, associated with Lula and his closest allies, 
tried to convince the more radical factions within the PT of the necessity of appealing to the 
entirety of Brazilians in a system that promoted majoritarian races and where the population 
did not ascribe to the radical PT agenda (Ibid). However, the broadening of the PT’s electoral 
alliances and their appeal had to wait for the rise of the moderate factions within the PT to its 
top hierarchy, a phenomenon that only materialized in 2002 presidential elections.  
Even though the PT was defeated, it was the most vocal opposition against the 
neoliberal reforms and the party that held the civilian rulers in check, leading the first anti-
corruption investigation under Collor’s mandate. For example, as the attack on the public 
sector picked up the pace with privatization schemes, the PT created an anti-privatization 
coalition of leftist and centrist-leftist parties: Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Democratic 
Labour Party [PDT]), Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party [PSB]), and 
	 275	
Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil [PCdoB]). Together, they stirred the 
debate over the denationalization of the economy and the assault on competitive SOEs 
(Hunter 2009, 63).  Moreover, the PT proposed a series of measures that alleviated the burden 
of neoliberal reforms especially for the working class. This proposal included the betterment 
of wages, agrarian reforms, support for unemployment insurance, and price stabilization 
(Martuscelli 2010). 
In line with its commitment to politicizing everyday struggles and to encouraging 
participation by social actors, the PT adopted the Modo Petista de Governar (The PT Mode of 
Governing) (Bittar 1992), through which the party emphasized its fundamental principle: “the 
right to have rights” (Ibid; Arslanalp and Pearlman 2017, 320). The PT Mode of Governing 
emphasized the “popular participation, the inversion of priorities of investment towards the 
poor, and greater transparency in government” (Shum 2017, 58). It took various forms, such 
as encouraging and supporting the participation of civil society actors, the new unionists, and 
the MST in popular mobilization. The party played an instrumental role in the fight against 
corruption. When Collor’s brother accused him of involvement in “an influence-peddling 
scheme, run by his electoral campaign treasurer,” the PT was the only party to call for 
establishing a Parliamentary Commission Inquiry Committee and for the president’s 
impeachment (Martuscelli 2010). While the PT initiated the anti-corruption parliamentary 
front, the CUT, along with professional groups and university and high school students, 
initiated the Movement for Ethics in Politics (MEP). MEP organized mass mobilization in 
support of Collor’s impeachment, gathering 750,000122 protesters on September 1992 to 
demand the impeachment of the president; only a few days later, Congress voted in favor of 
his impeachment. 
The PT also introduced the Participatory Budget, which opened the policymaking 
realm at the local level to  
“Brazil’s poor majority, by focusing on policy issues that are of particular interest to 
them or by creating specific rules that provide a preferential bias in their favor. With a 
tangible incentive to participate, poor citizens can maintain pressure on governments 
to allocate resources to their communities. This approach of social redistribution via 
																																																								







accountability mechanisms differentiated the PT from the practices of patronage and 
clientelism that were common among other parties” (Shum 2017, 58-59). 
Despite these positive changes, introduced by the PT at the institutional level, that 
opened the space for the articulation and representation of the poor and the working class in 
politics after years of exclusion, Brazil under the neoliberals did not witness shifts in favor of 
the poor and the working class. In fact, by the end of Cardoso’s term, every indicator showed 
signs of a stalled economy. Even though neoliberalism controlled inflation, the neoliberal 
model neither produced desired levels of growth nor tied growth to a job-based economy 
(GDP % Annual Change). Unemployment had started to rise under Collor and Franco and 
reached its worst levels in Brazilian history under Cardoso, rising from 3.4% in 1989 to 
12.33% in 2003 (Unemployment Rate, Annex). Income inequality had slightly improved 
compared to the Sarney years, which is owed largely to the fact that Cardoso’s Plano Real had 
successfully lowered hyperinflation from 2490% in 1993 to nearly 9% in 2002 (Annex). As a 
result, "the Real Plan had abruptly increased the purchasing power of wages, enhancing the 
general welfare, and reducing poverty" (Ondetti 2008, 144).  However, it is important to note 
that income inequality remained relatively high, around 0.6 in the 1990s and 0.58 in 2002. 
Economic growth was not tied to job creation. In the 1990s, 11 million jobs were 
created, but more than half of them were informal and unwaged (Filho and Morais 2018, 76). 
The years that experienced some growth were preceded by the privatization of SOEs and an 
attack on the public sector (Proceeds of Privatization, Annex). In this respect, economic 
growth under neoliberalism was tied to attracting investments irrespective of whether they 
were productive and developmental or not.  Moreover, as will be discussed in the following 
section, the neoliberals would pursue an upfront attack on workers' organizational power, 
putting them on the defensive as neoliberalism deepened.    
7.3.2 The Working Class under Neoliberalism  
Even though the working class delegitimized the military regime, organized 
nationwide strikes, forced concessions from the elites, forced Collor out in the advent of the 
corruption scandals, and remained on the front lines resisting neoliberalism, it could not stop 
its implementation the way it had under the military. This section answers this puzzle by 
arguing that there were internal and external factors that shaped working-class militancy. On 
the one hand, the intensity of neoliberalism and structural transformations at the workplace 
pushed the working class away from combativeness and into defensiveness. On the other 
hand, the neoliberal decade witnessed the rise of a new form of coopted unionism, which 
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acted as the voice and the conduit for the neoliberal project. Força Sindical (Union Force 
[FS]) was the embodiment of this form of unionism. When CUT refused to bargain with the 
elites, FS disseminated a neoliberal ideology among the working class and sat at the 
bargaining table with the presidents and the business community. Finally, the rise of the 
moderates within the PT and CUT also contributed to transitioning unionism toward 
negotiation and bargaining rather than the previous confrontational and class-centered 
approach. Hence, while the first few years under Collor witnessed the persistence of 
combativeness, this combativeness started to decline as of the mid-1990s when neoliberal 
reforms deepened.  It was, therefore, the MST that emerged as of the mid-1990s at the 
forefront of combativeness and that inspired the most disadvantaged, namely the unemployed 
and the homeless, to politicize their struggles through the formation of the Movimento dos 
Trabalhadores Sem Teto (Homeless Workers’ Movement [MTST]).  The following section 
illustrates this argument by first examining the dilemmas of organizing under neoliberalism 
and will then move on to reflecting on the changing patterns of working-class mobilization 
between 1990 and 2002.  
 
7.3.2.1 Dilemmas of Organizing in the Neoliberal Age: The Rise of Neoliberal Unionism, and 
The Divisions within CUT 
New Pelegos in the Age of Neoliberalism: Força Sindical (FS) 
In post-Sarney Brazil, union centrals existed, but they were not yet officially 
recognized. The situation persisted as such in Brazil until 2008, when the Lula administration 
awarded them official recognition and formalized their work. Even though they were not 
officially recognized, these centrals, and the CUT in particular, enjoyed necessary legitimacy 
and support from their base and had throughout the years evolved into a critical player in 
Brazilian politics. Hence, when Collor was elected in 1989, he proposed a plan of 
Entendimento Nacional (National Agreement) through which he tried to coopt CUT and 
silence their opposition to his neoliberal reforms (Riethof 2018, 135). Collor’s move divided 
the CUT, which finally abstained from participating in the National Agreement, arguing that 
the objective of this move was to "isolate and weaken the CUT, and developing official new 
unionism in support of the government" (Riethof Ibid).  
Consequently, Collor played the most crucial role in the creation of FS, a move 
supported and blessed by the business community as represented by the FIESP. Amid 
heightened working-class mobilization initiated by CUT unions challenging the legitimacy of 
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the Collor administration and his neoliberal policies (see below), FS provided legitimacy and 
support for the president and his neoliberal project. On the one hand, FS sought to achieve 
this aim by condemning the general strikes organized by CUT and giving the impression that 
FS unions were supportive of Collor’s administration and his economic plans (Riethof 2018, 
135; Trópia and Cangussu de Souza 2018, 56). The role played by the FS leadership and 
especially the FS president, Luiz Antonio Medeiros, was crucial in this respect. Medeiros 
became the propaganda tool for Collor and his economic policies, and the FS organized one 
of the most massive demonstrations in São Paulo's financial district to showcase support for 
the president’s economic plan. Along with the rightwing media, the FS led a propaganda 
campaign to support Collor’s privatization scheme (Giannotti 2007, 278). In exchange for the 
vital role that Medeiros and FS played under Collor’s administration, Collor appointed 
Medeiros’ partner (the former CGT leader) Minister of Work, and Medeiros became the 
unofficial super-minister (Ibid).  
 On the other hand, FS played an instrumental role in promoting an alternative to 
CUT’s combative and classist unionism and pushed forward the concept of results-based 
unionism. CUT’s classist and confrontational approach, which rested on enforcing 
concessions through persistent working-class mobilization, proved to be particularly costly 
for businesses. In contrast to CUT’s combative and class-centered approach, FS’s results-
based unionism “was (and still is) organizationally top-down, ideologically pro-capitalist, and 
strategically committed to the peaceful pursuit of worker gains through labor-state dialogue” 
(Sluyter-Beltrão 2010, 43). The FS, therefore, moved away from the class-centered approach 
to emphasize a collaborative relationship between capital and labor and the attainment of 
working-class interests through negotiation rather than confrontation and mobilization 
(Riethof 2018, 139).  
FS continued to act as the conduit for the neoliberal project at the level of both 
discourse and actions under Cardoso (Antunes 2001; Trópia and Cangussu de Souza 2018). 
Its members did not refrain from praising Cardoso for achieving economic stability and 
controlling inflation (Interview with FS1 and FS2). FS also openly defended the market 
reforms, including labor market deregulation (Trópia and Cangussu de Souza 2018, 56). Its 
union leaders  
 
 “accepted many flexible provisions in its collective agreements. FS ’s more flexible 
contracts were seen as a forerunner of the broader kinds of changes the government 
and employers wanted to see implemented in labor reform. FS’s actions undermined 
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the CUT’s position and curried favor with the Cardoso administration” (Cook 2007, 
85)  
 
Moreover, the FS leadership supported the privatization in the abovementioned Usiminas and 
Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional – CSN (Steel Producer Companies) (Trópia and Cangussu 
de Souza 2018, 56).  
Ideological Divisions in the PT Make their Way to CUT  
Besides the competition from the FS, the CUT had to deal with its internal tensions, 
which became prominent under the neoliberals. Such divisions reflected the debate that was 
taking shape within the PT proper and that had started to become visible in the wake of Lula’s 
defeat in the 1989 presidential election. The PT is not a homogenous party. It encompasses at 
least ten tendencies, of which two major ones are examined here, as they shaped the debates 
within the party proper concerning the party's political participation, electoral alliances, and 
relationships with social movements and civil society actors. The first of these camps is 
known as Articulação, the moderates of the PT who are associated with Lula and his closest 
allies. Articulação remained the dominant tendency within the party since 1995 when José 
Direceu, a moderate, was elected to become the PT president. The other competing camp 
consists of tendencies that have described themselves as radical leftists, including, for 
example, Convergencîa Socialista (Socialist Convergence [CS]), O Trabalho, Causa 
Operária (CO), etc., and that have grown skeptical over the years of Articulação’s moderation 
and pragmatism (Hunter 2009).  
The differences between the moderates and the radicals within the PT manifested 
themselves in several instances, leading in the worst case to irreparable divisions within the 
PT ranks. This scenario unfolded when members of the radical left (CS and CO) were 
expelled from the party in 1992. The origins of the conflict between the two factions were that 
the radical left committed to raising the slogan Fora Collor (Collor Leave Now!) before the 
corruption allegations were raised. They immediately questioned Collors’ victory and deemed 
his government illegitimate given the biased media coverage and the exorbitant access to 
campaign financing. Hence, they launched their impeachment campaign “propelled by the CS 
through CUT posts within their reach and coordination” (Fernandes 2017, 127). At the time, 
the Articulação deemed this mobilization an institutional risk (Martuscelli 2010) and 
maintained that it was more strategic to accept Collor’s victory to pre-empt the likelihood of 
retaliation or a military coup against a PT-led government in the future (Ibid; Sluyter-Beltrão 
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2010, 296). As previously discussed, it was only when Collor’s brother unraveled the 
president’s involvement in corruption that the PT opened the anti-corruption investigation. 
The expelled members of the CS established in 1994 the Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores 
Unificado (Unified Workers' Socialist Party [PSTU]) a Trotskyist and Morenist party 
(influenced by Nahuel Moreno), and the CO created the Partido da Causa Operária (PCO) in 
1997.  
The divisions between the radical left and the Articulação were also prominent during 
the presidential elections. As some have noted, the Articulação maintained, for example, that 
“the construction of socialism should be based on democratic expansion and support for the 
improvement of representative institutions and that coalition building should be broad” (Shum 
2017, 61). The radical leftist factions advocated instead that “alliances should be pursued only 
with parties of the left and social movements and they made no commitment to preserving 
institutions of representative democracy” (Ibid). 
Even though the Articulação established by Lula in 1983 was the dominant tendency 
within the PT and has remained as such to today, the radical leftist tendency was both active 
and vocal and managed to control the party leadership in 1992/1993, when it won local 
elections in important cities (Hunter 2009, 120). Consequently, in 1993, "56% of the party 
delegates at the national party meeting came from left tendencies (moderates totaled only 
44%) allowing for the approval of a document that put forth a number of extremely radical 
these including an embrace of a revolutionary struggle and the call for PT to return to its 
social movements base" (Ibid). Following Lula's defeat in 1994, the two camps diverged over 
the causes of the defeat. The radical left blamed the media partisanship and campaign 
financing (Ibid, 123). The Articulação blamed the failure on the "rigidity of the party's 
alliance policy and the excessive influence that the PT's decision-making structure gave to 
radical voices in the party bureaucracy" (Ibid, 123). Hence, the aftermath of the 1994 
elections would invite changes to the party leadership toward more moderation with the 
election of Dirceu in 1995 as the PT president and the takeover of the National Executive 
Committee by the moderates (the moderates held 13 out of 21 posts) (Ibid, 127). However, it 
was not before the fourth round of elections, which brought Lula to power in 2002, that the 
PT pursued broader alliances.  
The ideological divisions within the PT made their way to the union level. Within the 
CUT proper, meaningful discussions started to take shape as of the second CUT congress, 
during which the CUT articulated clearly its adoption of socialism. Three tendencies became 
apparent in the wake of this congress: Articulação Sindical [AS], CUT pela base (CUT by the 
	 281	
Rank and File [CBRF]), and Convergencia Socialista (Giannotti 2007, 253). These tendencies 
disagreed over CUT's internal organization, its relationship with the state and the business 
community, and consequently, the strategies that it could pursue to defend workers' rights. 
The heated debates were concerning whether the CUT should accept participation in a social 
pact with the state or not; whether unionism should focus on negotiation with capital or 
pursue continuous mobilization and confrontation with capital; and, finally, whether the union 
structure should be horizontally-based or follow a clear hierarchy (Giannotti 2007, 256). 
The CS advocated continuous confrontation with capital and defended the classist 
CUT approach. In 1989 and 1990, the CS controlled important unions such as the bank 
workers in “Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre, and the metal workers of São José dos Campos 
and Minas Gerais” (Sluyter-Beltrão 2010, 370). However, the Articulação in alliance with the 
soft left (CBRF) defeated the CS, which ended up losing its commanding position among the 
bank workers of Rio (Ibid, 370). CS remained part of the CUT structure, although it was also 
associated with the party members who were expelled in 1992 and who established the PSTU. 
In fact, it was only under Lula's first mandate in 2003 that the CS left the CUT structure and 
created another union central, the CSP-Conlutas. The proponents of CBRF were strong 
among, for example, the São Paulo metalworkers’ opposition, and remained committed to 
“the principle of class harmony, a socialist ideology, and to the preservation of CUT’s 
internal democratic institutions in the face of bureaucratization” (Sluyter-Beltrão 2010, 372).  
Finally, the AS rose to prominence within the CUT ranks (Sluyter-Beltrão 2010) in 
the mid-1990s, which coincided with their ascension to power within the PT. AS is the 
hegemonic current within CUT and is associated with the Articulação that had controlled the 
PT since 1995 (Boito 2005, 6). It incorporates the “assembly-line workers, the workers in the 
petroleum industry and the banking sector workers” (Ibid). They favored a collaborative 
approach and negotiation instead of a confrontational, classist and a socialist agenda 
(Interview with DIEESE Sociologist, Galvão 2014, 185; Antunes 2013; Antunes and Santana 
2014; Sluyter-Beltrão 2010). AS moved the CUT toward "’citizen’ or ‘civic’ unionism—in 
practice, service-oriented unionism whereby unions offered their members services that 
hitherto had been provided by the state" to confront the disappearance of state services under 
neoliberalism (Galvão 2014, 185). The CS and CBRF criticized the concept and argued that 
civic unionism, with its focus on citizenship, stripped the class component from unions 
(Ostronoff 2015, 100). Along the same lines, they argued that “citizen unionism is an 
adaptation to the status quo rather than a revolutionary approach” that sidetracked the 
principles of confrontation with capital to put in place negotiation and bargaining (Ibid).  
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Several factors and experiences shaped the social democrats’ views under 
neoliberalism. Firstly, the transnational networks of cooperation with their European Social 
Democratic counterparts deepened their belief in the social democratic option rather than 
socialism per se, which was advocated by the radical and soft left (Anner 2011). Secondly, 
the institutional processes that the neoliberal elites put in place shaped the social democrats' 
view of the necessity of pursuing dialogue and participating in institutional mechanisms, 
rather than withdrawing completely and distancing themselves from the state. The neoliberal 
elites created consultative councils (“the compensation fund, the workers’ support fund, and 
the national development bank”), and CUT’s refusal to participate in them entailed that they 
left the space vacant for the FS, the union arm of the state, and the business community 
(Sluyter-Beltrão 2010, 285). For the AS, abstaining from participation in such councils was 
synonymous with silencing working-class representation. With time, CUT’s social democrats 
started to view these councils “as valuable sites of policy oversight constructive integration 
and political influence” (Ibid).  
 
7.3.2.2 Changing Patterns of Working-Class Mobilization under Neoliberalism (1990-2002) 
Workers’ Persistent Combativeness: 1990-1995 
DIEESE’s data on strikes indicates that in 1990 alone, workers organized 1773 strikes 
(1259 in the private sphere and 511 in the public, Annex) leading to 117,027 hours stopped, 
with the private sector alone losing 66,215 hours (Annex). The strikes were mostly 
demanding the amelioration of conditions at the workplace (Annex). In the following year, 
the number of strikes declined to 1041 (621 in the private sector and 414 in the public sector), 
but would remain combative as indicated by the hours lost (67,756 hours stopped) and the 
nature of demands (856 demanding a betterment of work conditions and 270 defensive 
strikes).   
Workers under Collor were not just demanding a betterment of wages. They were 
among the first to rise against the first democratically elected president to call for his 
departure, expressing dissatisfaction with Collor and his plans to implement neoliberalism. As 
soon as Collor was elected president, the CUT already took to the streets protesting his 
economic plan. The most significant strike was in the steel industry of Siderúgica Aliperti, led 
by the CUT in SP (Giannotti 2007, 277). Only two months after Collor was sworn in, the civil 
servants in Brasilía raised for the first time the slogan “Fora Collor,” (Collor Leave Now!), 
which reverberated in the CUT ranks (Ibid). As a response to Collor's privatization plan, the 
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Companhia Siderurgica Nacional (CSN), the second-largest steel company in Brazil, 
organized a strike that inspired a wave of militancy in the services and public utilities sectors 
(water, sewage, gas, and electricity) (Ibid, 277). Only six months into his term, Collor faced 
almost five thousand workers calling for his resignation. 
The landless peasants were also at the forefront of the struggles against Collor. They 
contested their dispossession when nearly 250,000 sugarcane cutters in Pernambuco went on 
strike, demanding 78% salary readjustments. Within a week of paralysis, they were granted a 
45% wage increase, but the land occupations and the demonstrations were never brought to a 
halt. In fact, from Alagoas to the Rio Grande do Sul, the landless peasants, sugar cane cutters, 
and the seasonal workers were rising in contention (Giannotti 2007).  
While the years 1992 and 1993 witnessed a drop in the number of strikes (556 in 1992 
and 664 in 1993), which is owed to the fact that the CUT channeled its energy into organizing 
political protests in support of Collor’s impeachment, the number of strikes rose again in 
between 1994 and 1996 (1035 and 1128 strikes respectively), suggesting that workers were 
still committed to resisting neoliberal reforms. Workers during this period were also 
committed to combativeness, as indicated in the number of strikes demanding the 
amelioration of work conditions versus defensive strikes (Annex).  
The Working-Class on the Defensive: 1996-2002  
Significant changes took shape as of 1996, when Cardoso’s neoliberal reforms 
deepened. In 1996, despite the high number of strikes (1228 in total), there was a considerable 
rise in the number of defensive strikes (802 defensive strikes), a trend that would continue 
until the end of Cardoso’s term (Annex). This increase suggests that workers were thrown on 
the defensive amid an aggressive policy of labor market deregulation and worsening work and 
living conditions under Cardoso. Another factor that indicates that workers were on the 
defensive is the diminishing number of hours stopped (58,792 hours in 1996 and 16,521 in 
2002, compared to 117,027 in 1990, Annex). In the private sector, the duration of strikes that 
played an instrumental role in imposing losses on capital was dramatically reduced (Annex). 
In short, between 1997 and 2002, the number of strikes started to decline to reach their lowest 
levels in 2002, which recorded only 248 strikes (Annex; Mayer 2016; Riethof 2018).  
Several factors explain the change. First of all, the transformations within the new 
unionism started to make their presence felt as of the mid-1990s. Another critical factor 
relates to the structural impediments to combativeness, namely the transformation of the 
geographies of production, the effects of privatization on CUT's combative base, the 
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structural unemployment, and Cardoso's commitment to using outright repression against 
workers and peasants whenever they challenged the implementation of neoliberal reforms.  
Neoliberalism transformed geographies of production (Antunes 2001) and dismantled 
combative unionism in large industrial areas. Industrialists weakened labor militancy by 
relocating or investing in new cities that had no previous experience in labor militancy. The 
neoliberal state supported the changes to the geographies of industrial production. For 
example, the state at the national and subnational level provided fiscal incentives, such as 
low-interest loans and investments in infrastructure, to entice investors to relocate their 
investments to the new industrial cities (Riethof 2018; Sandoval 2000, 180).  
Moreover, while industrialization under military Brazil was synonymous with 
Fordism, industrialization under the neoliberal phase introduced Toyotism, with dire 
implications for production structures and the management of workplace relations (Antunes 
2001; Sluyter-Beltrão 2010). Toyotism was synonymous with the introduction of new 
technologies at the workplace and consequently the reduction of labor costs (Antunes 2013). 
The metallurgic sector, the heart of Brazil's new unionism, was struck by such changes 
(Antunes 2001, 246; interview with CUT/Metallurgic Union Leader). Some scholars noted 
that, under Toyotism, managers introduced more democratic workplace relations, and hence 
gradually stripped workers of the necessity to pursue confrontation with management 
(Sluyter-Beltrao 2010). In addition to such transformations, the destabilization of work and 
the increase in temporary and contractual jobs dealt a blow to one of the most combative 
constituencies of new unionism: the industrial working class (Antunes 2001; Antunes 2013; 
interview with Intersindical 2). Reflecting on these transformations, one interviewee perfectly 
illustrated the dilemmas of organizing under the neoliberal age:  
“We do not have the Fordist model that marked the 1970s and 1980s when you could 
mobilize, and it was mostly due to the significant concentration of workers in large units 
which facilitated the confrontation with the capital” (Interview with Intersindical 2).   
Amid the deepening economic crisis and labor market deregulation, structural 
unemployment put workers on the defensive. The years between 1996 and 1998 witnessed 
one of the most aggressive waves of privatization, accompanied by the highest levels of 
unemployment (For example 10% in 1999, See Unemployment Rate in Annex). Furthermore, 
"unemployment in the six largest cities rose from 8.7% in 1989 to 18.3% in 1998" (Filho and 
Morais 2018, 75). Between 1991 and 2002, unemployment in Greater São Paulo rose from 
7.21% to 12.12 %. The implication of these structural transformations was that workers were 
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more concerned with defending existing rights and work stability than with conquering more 
rights at the workplace, as indicated in the number of defensive strikes (Annex). 
Finally, privatization dealt a blow to CUT's militant base in the industrial, banking, 
and public sectors. Between 1989 and 1994, fourteen steel industries were privatized, 
including giants such as Usiminas (See The Proceeds of Privatization, Annex). To contain 
labor opposition, the federal government devised a strategy of including the working class in 
the profit shares of the privatized industries (Riethof 2018, 152). For example, in Usiminas, 
10% of the shares were offered to employees (Ibid). A confrontation between the CUT and 
the workers in this steel giant ensued, with CUT opposing the privatization scheme (Sandoval 
2000, 192). However, workers supported the privatization and opted out of the CUT structure 
(Ibid). The banking sector employees did not view privatization favorably. However, the 
privatization schemes had hit 90% of national banks, leading to the reduction of the 
combative banking sector’s labor force by half (Ibid).  
Another factor that explains why the working-class was put on the defensive was 
Cardoso’s criminalization of unions and social movements (Interview with Intersindical). The 
most widely recognized cases were the strikes of the Petroleiros, the oil workers, resisting the 
privatization of Petrobras, which lasted for more than 25 days and garnered support from “the 
Federação Nacional dos Servidores das Universidades (National Federation of the 
Universities’ Civil Servants, [Fasbura]) which in turn ushered in solidarity across the country 
with people wearing t-shirts printed with the slogan “We are all the Oil Workers” ”(Giannotti 
2007, 289; See also Trópia and Cangussu de Souza 2018; Riethof 2018; Mayer 2016). The 
government responded by imposing hefty fines to break the Oil Workers Union’s back (RS 
2.1 million for each entity), inviting the army to occupy the paralyzed oil refineries (Ibid), and 
imposing punitive dismissals against militants who organized and participated in the strike 
(Ibid).  
Two other examples attest to the iron fist strategy mobilized under the Cardoso 
administration. The massacre in Corumbiara and the Eldorado de Carajás exemplified how 
the state was ready to mobilize outright repression and to cooperate with the large landowners 
to kill landless peasants who occupied lands and called for land reforms. The massacre in 
Corumbiara made news headlines when the police raided a camp for landless peasants, killed 
a child, and tortured and executed seven landless peasants (Ondetti 2008, 150).  In 1996, 
another massacre took place when the police opened the fire on 19 MST activists blocking a 
highway in southeastern Para´, leading to their deaths (Ibid, 151; Interview with Intersindical, 
Giannotti 2007, 292).  
	 286	
Despite the heavy-handed repression, the MST pursued combativeness. Hence, 
between the FS’ neoliberal rhetoric and the dilemmas that CUT faced under neoliberalism, the 
MST rose to the forefront of confrontation with the state and landed capital (Antunes 2001; 
2013; Riethof 2018). Following the two massacres, the number of occupations intensified 
with the “occupations in 1996 growing by 1726 percent and the number of occupying families 
by 107.0 percent” (Ondetti 2008, 157), and with nearly 40% of these occupations happening 
in the northeast (Ibid). In 1999, the landless peasants organized 586 land occupations, which 
is more than a 100% increase compared to 1990 (50 land occupations) (Ibid). Since then, the 
MST diversified its tactics to pursue continuous confrontation such as protesting and 
occupying the buildings of federal agencies. For example, "in one day in March 1998, the 
MST occupied the ministry's offices in ten state capitals. Another, smaller day of struggle, 
involving occupations of the Ministry of Finance and other federal office buildings, occurred 
in March 1999” (Ibid, 161). To draw attention to drought problems in the northeast, the MST 
in Pernambuco started to loot food trucks to raise awareness about the social problems there 
(Ibid). Scholars and activists argued that the MST became the beacon of combativeness after 
the transition to neoliberalism, filling a space previously held by new unionists (Interview 
with Intersindical 4; Antunes 2013; 2001; Riethof 2018). 
Moreover, the MST inspired the rise of other rural and urban movements that 
defended the rights of the most vulnerable. On the rural side, “these include the Workers’ 
Movement (MT), active in Pernambuco and Alagoas; the Struggle for Land Movement 
(MLT), in Bahia and Para´; the Brazilian Landless Movement (MBST), in Maranhão, Para´, 
and the Federal District; and the Movement for the Liberation of the Landless (MLST), in 
Maranhão, Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, and São Paulo” (Ondetti 2008, 
163). In 1997, the Movement of the Homeless (MTST) "emerged from the MST and the 
acknowledgment that urbanization was creating a need for urban reform" (Fernandes 2017, 
139). Starting in São Paulo, the movement spread out to nearly a dozen states (Ibid). The 
movement coordinated with popular and national housing movements, but it was not a 
national housing movement; instead, it saw itself as a defender of urban reforms and insisted 
on continuous confrontation with owners of capital, landowners, and bankers in particular 
(MTST 2019). The MTST focused on "political formation which is responsible for the 
formation of militants, the negotiation which coordinates the relationship with the state, 
organization that focuses on the collectivity, communication and symbolism which is 
responsible for the channels of dissemination of the MTST, and community work responsible 
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for the relationship with communities" (MTST 2019). 123  In this respect, it pursued 
combativeness, and as was the case for the MTST and the CUT before them it is at the 
frontline of a dignified and empowered citizenship.  
7.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I argued that the balance of class power between 1985 and 2002 had 
not shifted yet in favor of the poor and the working class. However, the working class played 
an instrumental role in defending the democratic process. Such a protagonist role was clear 
from the beginning, when workers expressed their dismay with the continuation of the 
military tutelage, and their commitment to using the strike weapon to delegitimize the Sarney 
administration and his economic policies. Their strategies to organize and mobilize inspired 
other subordinate groups and classes to pursue similar strategies, leading to a “contagion of 
combativeness” among the landless peasants and the homeless and the unemployed. In the 
mid 1980s, the MST emerged to play an instrumental role in organizing the most vulnerable. 
In turn, the MST inspired the struggles of the marginalized and dispossessed in the urban 
areas, the unemployed and the homeless who also pursue combative strategies in defense of 
urban reforms and their right to the city. Furthermore, the PT had used institutional and legal 
means to draw the post-1985 institutions closer to the citizens and to the poor and the working 
class in particular. Finally, the occurrence of mass mobilizations that built on working-class 
strikes also played an instrumental role in holding civilian leaders accountable to the rest of 
the population. Contesting economic policies, soliciting popular support for the democratic 
constitutional provisions, and holding corrupt leaders accountable to the rest of the population 
all attested to the fact that such mass mobilization was vital for defending the democratic 
process.  
I also argued in this chapter that the structural transformations under neoliberalism 
undermined working-class combativeness and organizing. However, while the working class 
came under attack and was unable to stop the neoliberal tide, the neoliberal alliance was 
finally defeated at the ballot box amid worsening social and economic conditions. For more 
than 13 years, the PT ruled Brazil and implemented a neo-developmental model, the effects of 
which on class power will be examined in the following chapter. 
  
																																																								
123 See the MTST website: https://mtst.org/quem-somos/a-organizacao-do-mtst/ (accessed June 21, 2019) 
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Chapter 8: Participation, Inclusion and Neo-Developmentalism: The Political Economy 
of the PT (2003-2016) 
8.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 7, I argued that a liberal democratic regime wedded to neoliberalism 
emerged under Cardoso. In this chapter, I argue that under the PT,the meaning of democracy 
deepens with the expansion of socio-economic rights and the political inclusion and 
participation of those who were marginalized from it but that the balance of class power does 
not tip in favor of the poor and the working-class. In Brazil, democracy deepened and was 
wedded to a neo-developmental model. Under the PT's democratic regime, civil and political 
rights were not only guaranteed by law, but the PT was also committed to refraining from 
criminalizing social actors and to expanding the parameters of social and economic rights. To 
ensure governability, Lula erected mechanisms that paved the way for solving social conflict 
through negotiation and bargaining with the state and with capital. The hope was that the 
political inclusion of unionists and social movement activists would circumvent the 
institutional roadblocks that undermined the capacity of the ruling party to secure a majority 
in Congress and pursue its preferred policies. At the symbolic level, this political inclusion 
would also change the face of the bureaucratic apparatus, which had remained controlled by 
the elites in pre-PT Brazil. This political inclusion was combined with a participatory 
architecture that emerged under Lula's mandate, aimed at involving civil society actors in 
policymaking and ensuring governability. As is the case for all governing parties, the PT 
could not tolerate constant social class mobilization, which would have undermined its 
legitimacy and capacity to govern (Gómez Bruera 2013). Hence, the PT sought through 
inclusionary and participatory mechanisms to solve social problems by encouraging 
negotiation, diverging the mobilization from constant combativeness (Gómez Burera 2013). 
That aspect of political inclusion and participation was sustained through "dialogue" with the 
president. Lula, unlike Dilma, drew from the labor movement, held important ties to social 
movements, and mastered negotiation and bargaining skills that simultaneously opened the 
Presidential palace for social movements and contributed to maintaining social conflict at the 
lowest level possible.  
However, as democracy deepened, the balance of class power did not shift in favor of 
the subordinate classes. The aforementioned democratic regime was wedded to a neo-
developmental economic model, which necessitated that the PT ally with the internal 
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bourgeoisie, whose investment in the economy was a key determining factor for the success 
of the economic model. Moreover, given that the economic model served capitalist interests, 
the PT's capacity to implement structural change was constrained by the elite hegemony over 
economic and political life. Consequently, the PT could not trigger elite anxiety, both because 
it did not enjoy a majority in the Congress to pass legislation and because it needed to ensure 
capital's compliance with the pursuit of governability under neo-developmentalism. A 
protracted cycle of growth under a neo-developmental model supported the PT's redistributive 
policies aimed at the lower-income classes and the banking sector, the latter being the largest 
creditor for the PT. However, economic growth depended on global demand for Brazilian 
primary goods and local demand for Brazilian commodities. As soon as the domestic market 
reached its limits, and global demand declined, the PT found itself in the middle of a paradox. 
Amid declining growth, the state had to attend to its redistributive functions aimed at the poor 
and the working class, and at the same time appease the financial sector, which benefited 
from the transfer of state revenues in the form of interest payments. As Rousseff, committed 
to diminishing the high interest rates, triggered the anxiety of the bankers, she was pushed in 
her second term to pursue neoliberal policies. This paradox, which resulted in contradictory 
policies, brought about her impeachment. As Rousseff was impeached, she was not supported 
by mass mobilization that defended her or the democratic process. The anti-impeachment 
mobilization was limited under her administration; in the first few months after her 
impeachment, the demonstrations demanding the removal of her successor, Michel Temer, 
and calling for direct elections were incomparable to the scale of the 1985 Diretas Já 
campaign or the 1992 anti-Collor demonstrations.  
This chapter explains this puzzle by investigating the role that the social and labor 
movements assumed under the PT. It sets out to argue that the majority of the labor centrals 
and significant social movements forfeited combativeness and joined the neo-developmental 
alliance, albeit to distinct degrees of moderation and involvement. This bargain reflects the 
transformative effects of state and society relations under Lula, but it also illustrates 
Valenzuela's argument (1989) that labor movements' voluntarily express restraint when 
democracy deepens. I argue that this moderation could have been pursued under Lula when 
capital was still tamed. As the political and economic elites pursued aggressive strategies 
against the democratic process under Rousseff, there was a need for labor and social 
movements to regain combativeness. That necessary shift did not take place under Rousseff, 
because the moderation option had had dire implications for the social and labor movements' 
capacity to mobilize their base. The largest labor centrals, including the CUT, moved in the 
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universe of policymakers and sat at the negotiation table with the business community. They 
achieved material gains for the working class, but they also spent less time mobilizing 
workers. Furthermore, the social movements were negotiating with the state to expand their 
resources and respond to the needs of their bases. This condition weakened the cross-
movement and inter-class alliance formation necessary to defend democracy.  
Moreover, as workers were organizing strikes to protest the deteriorating economic 
conditions under Rousseff, CUT's leadership was either organizing protests with the internal 
bourgeoisie or defending the PT, which was facing another corruption scandal. Hence, there 
was a noticeable disconnect between workplace strikes under Dilma and CUT's calls for 
mobilization. Furthermore, the fact that CUT under PT rule relinquished combativeness 
deepened the divisions that I describe in Chapter 7 within CUT proper. The radical left was 
alarmed by the PT's reconciliation with capital. There was no agreement among the new 
unionists, who had challenged the military and post-military regimes, on the necessity of 
defending the PT as the party pursued neoliberal policies, albeit briefly, under Rousseff. 
The empowerment of CUT's social democrats under Lula did not counterbalance the 
power of the FS. The FS, which was officially recognized and emerged as the second-largest 
union central, supported the impeachment process. The result was that such divisions and the 
weakness of alliance formation between workers, the peasants, and the residents of the urban 
peripheries and the social movements that represented them, impeded their capacity to pursue 
mass mobilization against the impeachment and hence to consolidate democracy the way they 
had in previous decades.  
The chapter illustrates these arguments by investigating the political economy of the 
PT rule. The first section assesses the neo-developmental model and the participatory and 
inclusionary mechanisms erected under Lula, particularly their effects on socio-economic and 
political equality as well as on the patterns of civic engagement. The section also examines 
state and labor relations under his administration, from the perspective of the labor centrals 
and the social movements, and the changing patterns of social class mobilization. The second 
section examines the political economy of Dilma Rousseff’s administration and examines 
union centrals' and social movements’ stances vis-à-vis the impeachment process. The final 
section is the conclusion.  
8.2 Neo-Developmentalism under a Participatory and Inclusive Regime (2003-2011) 
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 8.2.1 The Political Economy of Lula (2003-2011) 
The rise to power of Lula, the former unionist and the founder of both the CUT and 
the PT, was synonymous with the implementation of a neo-developmental model. Neo-
developmentalism is a hybrid model that borrows principles from neoliberalism and 
developmentalism about the role of the market and the state in the economy (Döring, Santos 
and Pocher 2017; Perreira 2007). As is the case for developmentalism, neo-developmentalism 
advocates for an interventionist and regulatory state that oversees and provides directives for 
private capital (Perreira 2007, 249-250; Chardovarian 2018). Unlike developmentalism, the 
neo-developmental model trusts the capacity of the market to “invest and to coordinate the 
economic system” (Perreira 2007, 250). In this respect, it allows a more significant expansion 
of the market, but the market ought to be regulated and overseen by a strong and 
interventionist state that provides assistance for market expansion and plays an essential role 
in income redistribution (Ibid, 251). Neo-developmentalism, therefore, departs from the 
neoliberal stream, which advocates for a minimal state. The state from a market 
fundamentalist view ought to provide guarantees for private property and the rule of law and 
to allow for a free-functioning market (Harvey 2005, 64). In other words, from the neoliberal 
viewpoint, the market could regulate its distortions while the state is the most significant 
impediment to development and growth (Pereira 2007, 251). This section assesses the balance 
of class power by investigating the implementation of neo-developmental policies under 
Lula’s administration and by reflecting on the material and symbolic gains for both labor and 
capital. 
When the polls showed that Lula could win the 2002 presidential elections, the 
anxiety of local and international financial capital was immediately triggered (Filho and 
Morais 2018; Power 2012; EIU Reports January 2003). However, Lula proved that the fears 
of instilling a radical socialist order were wrong. In his Carta ao Povo Brasileiro (The Letter 
to the Brazilian People), Lula addressed Brazilian citizens, promising to pursue the 
macroeconomic policies of his predecessor, which had successfully controlled inflation, and 
to end Brazil’s socio-economic problems (Filho and Morais 2018; Power 2012; Antunes 
2013). The Carta ao Povo Brasileiro laid the foundations for Lula’s conciliatory approach to 
capital (Antunes 2013; Interview with USP Sociologist, Conlutas, Intersindical 1,2,3,4, 
Interview with former PT member and former Metallurgic Leader). Lula maintained that his 
term would respect democratic rules and maintain business as usual “because there is little 
room for maneuver” outside of the neoliberal model (Dagnino and Chavez Teixeira 2014, 44).  
When he assumed political power, Lula maintained Cardoso's macroeconomic 
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policies. He kept inflation at a stable and low level by maintaining high interest rates (Annex, 
Interviews with Intersindical, Conlutas, CUT, Brigadas Populares, MST; Filho and Morais 
2018). 124  Targeting inflation was a necessary first step toward achieving greater 
macroeconomic goals, including providing an investor-friendly environment, promoting 
economic growth, and triggering economic redistribution that would, in turn, lead to 
economic development. As soon as Lula assumed power, international financial institutions 
were already warning of capital flight and declining foreign investment rates.125  To fulfill his 
commitments, Lula appointed Henrique Mirelles, a proponent of neoliberalism and a Bank of 
Boston executive, as the president of the Central Bank. Lula’s move appeased the important 
and influential banking sector, which would also become the largest creditor for Brazil under 
Lula (Gomez Brueira 2013).  
Brazil under Cardoso had submitted to international creditors; Lula, however, paid off 
the IMF loans and bought 10 billion dollars’ worth of debt.1 By ending Brazil’s dependency 
on the IMF, the Brazilian government reduced the share of debt as a percent of the GDP from 
78% in 2002 to a little bit more than 61% under the Lula administration (Annex). The Lula 
administration, therefore, turned to finance its neo-developmental model by borrowing from 
commercial banks (Baer 2014, 198). By 2009, the commercial banks were Brazil’s largest 
creditor (45.1% of the debt) (Ibid). The service of the public debt hovered between 7% and 
5% of the GDP. Critics argued that while Lula guaranteed the redistribution of income to the 
poor and working class, such redistribution was a small portion (0.5%) of the GDP compared 
to debt service (Baer 2014; Interview with MST; Interview with Intersindical 1; Interview 
with Conlutas, Brigadas Populares). The state had, therefore, to attend to its developmental 
goals and redistributive functions toward both developmental capital and the majority of the 
population and at the same time appease the financial sector, which benefited from high 
interest rates and the transfer of state revenues in the form of interest payments. 
 Moving on from the policies of financial stabilization, the neo-developmental model 
rested on the expansion of a select number of national industries based on export 
competitiveness (Döring, Santos and Pocher 2017, 4). The local industrialists who had 
previously sided with and supported Collor and Cardoso and had threatened to bring about 
capital flight in the advent of Lula’s victory in the 1989, 1994, and 1998 elections were now 
critical of neoliberal policies. The industrial entrepreneurs were skeptical of the trade 
liberalization that challenged local industries with high interest rates that diverted investments 
																																																								
124 For the Interest rate see the Central Bank of Brazil (Accessed April 30, 2018): https://www.bcb.gov.br/Pec/Copom/Ingl/taxaSelic-i.asp.  
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from the developmental sector and into financial speculation and economic stagnation. 
resulting in low levels of growth and high levels of unemployment under Cardoso (Boito, 
Galvão and Marcelino 2015). Lula’s administration supported this fraction of the internal 
bourgeoisie. In particular, the "Odebrecht (Construction), Inbev (Beverages), Gerdau (Steel), 
Itaù / Bradesco (Banking), Embraer (Aviation), Vale (Mining), JBS Friboi (Processed foods)" 
benefited from the neo-developmental model (Filho and Morais 2013, 96). These policies led 
to one of the highest trade balances in democratic Brazil for the period preceding the 2008 
financial crisis (Baer 2014). Trade surpluses maintained high levels of growth and triggered a 
diversification of trade (Baer 2014; Riethof 2018).  
The neo-developmental model aimed to overcome dependency on the influx of foreign 
capital and foreign investments by expanding demand from local and international markets. 
At the international level, the PT curbed Brazil's dependency on demand from industrialized 
western countries and deepened access to the Chinese market (Riethof 2018, 180). China, 
therefore, emerged as the leading trading partner for Brazil.126 However, the terms of trade 
with China expanded the export of primary goods. These terms were governed by global 
changes in the preceding three decades, during which China emerged as one of the most 
important exporters of cheap commodities (Hanieh 2018, 29). Concerning Brazilian-Chinese 
relations, the Chinese demand for iron ore, petroleum, and other exports triggered economic 
growth and maintained a strong and stable currency. In turn, a stable currency boosted 
investors' confidence in the economy and allowed capitalist investments.   
At the local level, the consumer durable and nondurable industries were tied to 
increased demand not only from the upper and middle classes but from the formal and 
informal working class. To increase demand for consumer durables and non-durables among 
the latter, the state pursued redistributive policies, improved salaries, and formalized the labor 
market. While, in the past, credit had been expanded to the middle and upper classes, Lula 
ordered issuing credit to those who had been previously excluded from it (Filho and Morais 
2018, 101; interview with CUT 1 and CUT2). In 2010, Lula provided incentives for banks to 
issue credit and promote the automotive industry, which sold 3.5 million units as a result 
(Baer 2014, 178). What is equally important is that this policy of revitalizing the local market 
overcame the historical and regional disparities that had favored economic development in the 
center and the south of Brazil (Azzoni and Haddad 2018; Döring, Santos and Pocher 2017) ; 
the north and northeast had historically been excluded from economic development (interview 
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with CUT 1). The increased demand from the working class and the lower-income wage 
earners for consumer durables and non-durables led to a constant cycle of growth (see 
Minimum Wage and Growth in Annex). For example, as the minimum wage nearly doubled 
between 2002 and 2010, the GDP annual percent change was maintained at a steady level, 
one of its highest since the transition from military rule. 
In order to serve the neo-developmental model, a new political pact between the 
formal working class, the lower-income middle class, and the informal working class as well 
the aforementioned local industrialists and local businesses sustained the regime. While the 
formal and informal working class and the lower-income middle class benefited from the 
formalization of the job market, the improvements in the minimum wage, and a wide range of 
social services, businesses benefited from the state’s policy of maintaining an overvalued 
currency and hence from a greater valorization of exports on the global market. They also 
benefited from state activism in promoting Brazilian commodities abroad as well as the 
guarantees for the rule of law, political stability and social cohesion, and the expansion of 
infrastructure and credit (Filho 2013). The class alliance thus incorporated these poles, all of 
which had vested interest in supporting a developmental, interventionist, and redistributive 
state. 
The class alliance that materialized on election day had been aided by the rise of the 
moderates to the party leadership, the Articulação, who advocated for a broad electoral 
alliance not restricted to leftist parties, as discussed in Chapter 7. In 2002, Lula was elected 
president based on a different alliance of parties from the left and the right of the political 
spectrum. The PT ran the elections with the “Partido Liberal (Liberal Party, Center-right, 
[PL]), the Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil, Left, [PCdoB]), Partido 
da Mobilização Nacional (National Mobilization Party, Center-left, [PMN]) and Partido 
Comunista Brasileiro (The Brazilian Communist Party, Left, [PCB])” (Dagnino and Chaves 
Teixeira 2014, 44). More broadly, these electoral alliances reflected the class reconciliation 
approach necessary for the implementation of neo-developmental policies. While the PT had 
previously chosen its running mates from center-left political parties, in 2002 Lula ran as the 
president and chose his VP from the PL (Power 2014). The PL was a conservative party, 
which would later merge with another party into the Partido Republicano Brasileiro (Brazilian 
Republican Party, Center-Right, [PR]). Both the PL and PR enjoyed strong ties with Brazil's 
industrialists and the evangelical church. José Alençar, the leading business tycoon in the 
textile industry and a PL member, became Lula's vice-president between 2002 and 2010 (Ibid, 
12). In practical terms, these strategies and the alliances that the PT pursued with the PL and 
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PR cemented the social and political pact and thereby the successful implementation of neo-
developmental policies.  
In line with the regime’s policies, former unionists made their way into Lula's cabinet, 
the Senate, and the Congress, and became managers of the most important pension funds 
(Galvão 2016, 273; Filho and Boito 2016, 215). In the cabinet, former unionists from the 
metalwork, oil, and banking sectors became the ministers of labor, social security, finance, 
and cities (Filho and Boito 2016, 215; Boito 2005, 6, Braga 2016, 63). These former unionists 
also chaired/administrated the pension funds of the largest and the most important SOEs in 
Brazil, including "Bank of Brazil (Previ), Petrobras (Petros) and Caixa Economica Federal 
(Funcef)" (Galvão 2016, 273; Filho and Boito 2016, 215; Braga 2016, 64). Some critics 
warned that this process transformed unionists and social movement activists into a “new 
class of high-powered investment managers” (Sluyter-Beltrão 2010, 22; Braga 2016, 64; 
interview with Sociologist, USP) who were then absorbed by the state apparatus with dire 
implications for their capacity to mobilize and organize workers (Braga 2016, 65; interview 
with Sociologist, USP); others argued that the rise of militants to the state bureaucracy 
diminished the gap between the subordinate classes and the state (Filho and Boito 2016, 215).  
In the latter view, the rise of union leaders to the higher levels of the state bureaucracy 
challenged historically elitist control over the bureaucratic apparatus (Filho and Boito 2016, 
215). 
Although these transformations changed the face of the state, the PT did not control 
the majority of seats in the Congress and continuously faced the dilemma of guaranteeing 
approval for its legislative agenda. Initially, Lula had not utilized the executive toolbox of 
“coalitional presidentialism” created under Cardoso; instead, he awarded 16 out of 29 cabinet 
positions to the PT by appointment instead of negotiating these positions with other party 
members (Gómez Bruera 2013, 95). The PT believed that alliances in Congress should be 
driven by a common agenda rather than by an exchange of favors (Ibid, 96). However, this 
policy line left the PT unable to secure Congressional support for its agenda (Ibid). The 
political fragmention therefore explains why the corruption scandal took place in 2005. The 
mensalão (big monthly payments) that were the object of the scandal were monthly salaries 
(30 000 R$ or 12 000 USD) paid by PT leaders, not Lula himself, from the pension funds of 
SOEs and public banks, to oppositional congress members; in this case, the members of the 
PMDB and PSDB were on the largest receiving end (Burera 2013, 95; Sluyter-Beltrão 2010, 
23). In post-2005, the PT became more convinced of the necessity of pursuing Cardoso’s 
strategy of coalitional presidentialism, which invited odd and broad alliances with big parties 
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in the Congress to secure support for the PT agenda (Burera 2013, 99). As part of this 
strategy, Lula allied with the PMDB, which filled up some cabinet posts.  
Unlike the minimal state of neoliberalism, the state in neo-developmentalism is 
interventionist and redistributive (Interview with CUT 1 and CUT 2) and arguably inclusive. 
While Lula did not reverse the privatization deals that had been made under his neoliberal 
predecessor, the state maintained control over strategic sectors such as oil, electricity, and 
banks, and stopped the privatization of public utilities (Ban 2013, 16). That the state still 
controlled significant assets is illustrated by the fact that “in 2011 up to 20 percent of Brazil's 
listed companies have the government among their top five shareholders, a trend that the 
economic crisis seems to have made even more pronounced” (Ibid, 17). The policy of state 
control over these strategic sectors challenged orthodox neoliberalism, which advocated the 
privatization of all sectors. Under the Lula mandate, the state continued to maintain its grip on 
the aforementioned strategic sectors to further its developmental goals.  
The state also played an essential role in directing investments, subsidizing the sectors 
that it sought to promote, resuming its role in infrastructure, and, in the wake of the 2008 
crisis, introducing counter-cyclical policies to revitalize the economy (Chadaverian 2018, 34). 
The BNDES, the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (National 
Economic and Social Development Bank), was a central actor assisting the state, under neo-
developmentalism, to provide incentives for capital ventures. The largest recipients of 
BNDES funds were the oil, mining, aviation, and construction giants.127 The BNDES “offered 
financial backing for internationalization projects but also loans to prop up domestic 
operations and developments for important SOEs such as Vale and Petrobras” (Döring, 
Santos and Pocher 2017, 343). BNDES also played an instrumental role in funding industrial 
projects in the previously disadvantaged north and northeast, overcoming unbalanced 
economic development and regional disparities (DIEESE 2013; Ibid). The Programa de 
Aceleracão do Crescimento (The Growth Acceleration Program [PAC]) overcame the policy 
of state retreat pursued under Cardoso and expanded state investment in infrastructure to 
incentivize private investments in areas such as construction, transport, sanitation, and 
																																																								













8.2.2 Democracy under Lula: Participation; Socio-economic and Political inclusion  
Along with this neo-developmental model, Lula paved the way for the representation 
of the labor and social movements in the bureaucratic apparatus. Lula also moved toward 
deepening participatory mechanisms, both of which had an impact on the betterment of the 
social and economic conditions of the poor, the working class, peasants, women, the LGBTT 
community, and the Afro-Brazilian community. I agree with Gómez Bruera (2013) and 
Dagnino and Teixeira (2014) that the dynamics of inclusion and participation are best 
understood through the lens of ensuring governability in the fragmented political context of 
Brazil. In this understanding, the dynamics of inclusion and participation would create social 
and popular compliance to the PT agenda. However, the argument presented here does not see 
these mechanisms of representation and participation as part of a regime strategy to control 
civil society. I argue instead in this section and the following that a large and representative 
sector of social movements and labor centrals voluntarily took part in Lula's administration. 
This participation, however, was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it drew the 
bureaucratic apparatus closer to the citizenry at large, involved them in policy deliberation, 
and led to the implementation of policies that expanded socio-economic, racial, gender, and 
sexual rights. On the other hand, the acceptance of taking part in these participatory 
mechanisms over the years diminished their radical rhetoric such that they emerged less vocal 
about their criticism of the Lula administration whenever it did not meet their agenda.  
The formal inclusion of labor and social movement activists in the bureaucratic 
apparatus and the expansion of social and political rights was mediated by Lula's capacity to 
create room for dialogue. Several interviewees in the labor, housing, and landless peasants' 
movements confirmed that Lula had put in place space for dialogue. Social and labor 
movement activitists interviewed in this research also highlighted the differences between 
Lula's and Cardoso's strategies toward social and labor movements (Interview with CUT 1 
and 2; Intersindical 1, 3 and 4). While the latter resorted to outright repression in order to 
tame anti-government disruptive action, Lula mobilized his inter-personal linkages with the 
social movements as a way to appease them whenever they disagreed with his policies. For 
example, the presidential palace under Lula opened its doors to activists, and Lula used his 
masterful negotiation skills to draw them closer to the presidency (Hochstetler 2010, 43). 
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Hence, dialogue, along with the political and economic inclusion and participation of social 
movements, led to the social pacification needed to ensure governability under Lula.  
8.2.2.1 Political and Bureaucratic Inclusion of the Social Movements  
Under Lula, the face of the bureaucracy was transformed and was drawn more closely 
to the social movements and the labor movements. The president mobilized his presidential 
power, which awarded him the capacity to recruit 47,000 bureaucrats (Gómez Bruera 2013, 
143). Under Lula's mandate, 46% of all higher-level bureaucratic posts were handed to 
members of labor and social movements, and 45% of bureaucrats were unionized (Gómez 
Bruera 2013, 143; D'Arujo 2009a; Dagnino and Teixeira 2014, 53). In addition to handling 
important bureaucratic positions, the CUT controlled 12 cabinet positions under Lula's first 
mandate and was in charge of the Ministry of Labor between 2003 and 2007. FNRU activists 
filled up positions in the Ministry of Cities under Lula’s first administration (Ibid, 144; 
Dagnino and Teixeira 2014, 56). CONTAG occupied important positions in the Ministry of 
Rural Development (Gómez Bruera 2013, 144) and although the MST denied its involvement 
in the bureaucratic apparatus, the director of the Programa Nacional de Educação na Reforma 
Agrária (National Program for Education in Agrarian reform [PRONERA]), the most 
important educational program targeting illiterate peasants, was a member of the PT and the 
MST (Ibid).  
Hence, the inclusion of social movements (SM) in the state bureaucracy broke with 
the tradition of an arena that had been treated as the exclusive domain controlled by the elites, 
and opened avenues for enlarging the policy domain to make it open for those who had been 
struggling for years under military and post-military regimes against the public policies that 
dispossessed and marginalized them or treated their demands as non-issues. This PT approach 
also challenged gender and racial inequalities in Brazil. Lula's first and second administration 
would, for example, implement the 2002 gender and racial affirmative actions, which boosted 
the number of women and Afro-Brazilians visible in public positions to one of its highest 
levels since 1985 (D'Arajuo 2009 b).  
Moreover, as the face of the bureaucratic apparatus changed under Lula, these social 
movements would implement policies that reflected the struggles for which they had been 
mobilizing for more than three decades (Gómez Bruera 2013, 145). The creation of the 
Ministry of Cities is largely viewed by some urban activists as the fruit of the activism 
pursued by the urban reform movement. The peasants represented by CONTAG and the MST 
along with the Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens (Movement of People Affected by 
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Dams [MAB]), expanded state resources to improve production, access to markets and 
technical assistance, and peasant education (Boito et al 2014; Carter 2015, 419). Between 
2001 and 2008, Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar (The National 
Program for the Strengthening of Family Agriculture [PRONAF])’s budget expanded from 
R$2.4 billion to R$ 13 billion (Gómez Bruera 2013, 146). The formal recognition of the labor 
centrals, the improvements to the national minimum wage, and the number of collective 
agreements reached above inflation, were also the fruit of working-class struggles (Ibid, 145).  
The culmination of the Afro-Brazilian community's activism was the "creation of the 
Secretaria Especial de Promoção de Políticas da Igualdade Racial (Special Secretariat for the 
Promotion of Racial Equality Policies, SEPPIR), a cabinet-level federal secretariat" (Caldwell 
2017, 72-73). With the creation of SEPPIR, Brazil became "the first country in the world to 
have a cabinet-level government unit that focused on achieving racial equality" (Ibid, 74). 
SEPPIR defined a list of priorities including supporting the Afro-Brazilian community and 
other ethnic and racial minorities and implementing affirmative action (Ibid). SEPPIR 
oversaw the adoption of the University Program for All (Programa Universidade para Todos 
[PROUNI]). The program targeted people of African descent, mixed-race, and indigenous 
peoples, granting both full and partial scholarships to those who came from low-income 
families. By the end of 2011, PROUNI served 780,000 students (Júnior, Daflon, and Campos 
2011). SEPIRR had also contributed to the recognition that access to the Sistema Único de 
Saúde (Unified Health System [SUS]) is racialized, and pushed for the inclusion of the Afro-
Brazilian communities' health concerns, which had been hitherto ignored (Caldwell 2017, 81). 
Women's rights activists would also benefit from the creation of the Secretariat of 
Women's Rights in 2003, a high-level entity with a Ministerial status charged with 
coordinating policies that dealt directly with women's rights at the federal level. Their agenda 
included improving women's participation in decision-making positions; promoting inclusive 
education irrespective of race, class, or gender; addressing issues of women's sexual health 
rights; and implementing a law to defend women from domestic violence. As a result of the 
women's rights activists' continuous lobbying and Lula's commitment to pursuing affirmative 
action (Interview with CUT 1; Caulfield and Schettini 2017), women’s participation in 
decision-making increased during his term. However, despite this considerable increase, 
Brazil still lags behind other countries in Lain America on this matter (Jalalzai and dos Santos 
2015). As for the substantive changes, women and especially poor women benefited from 
Lula's social programs, discussed more thoroughly below, such as the Bolsa Família (Family 
Allowance [BF]). The pressure from women's rights organizations also led to the adoption of 
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Law Maria da Penha, which increased the penalty for perpetrators of domestic violence 
(Dagnino and Teixeira 2014, 51). The LGBT community, which had benefited from national 
conferences addressing their issues, had also pressured the government to eliminate 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and lobbied for civil unions. Consequently, the 
Supreme Court ordered the state to recognize same-sex unions in 2011, a move that would 
pave the way for the legalization of same-sex marriage two years later (Caulfield and 
Schettini 2017). 
 
8.2.2.2 Participatory Councils  
The origins of the participatory councils are rooted in the struggles of the social 
movements that called for their adoption in the 1988 constitution. They also drew inspiration 
from the PT's Participatory Budgeting (PB) and the legacy of participatory councils that 
preceded the transition to democracy (Pogrebinschi and Samuels 2014). Lula's administration 
was synonymous with an "architecture of participation," which rested on an impressive 
quantitative and qualitative increase in participatory councils and national conferences. Lula 
oversaw the creation of 25 national councils on racial, gender, and sexual minorities, and on 
socio-economic development (Dagnino and Teixeira 2014, 46-47). Under Lula's mandate, 74 
national conferences mobilizing “5 million people and approving more than 15,000 proposals 
and 2,000 motions” (Ibid) were held. These conferences covered a wide range of issues from 
the environment to women’s right, education, rights of the elderly, and rights of the LGBT 
community (Ibid). 
The scholarly community has been divided over the efficiency of these participatory 
mechanisms. Some have argued that such participation led to the betterment of social and 
economic conditions (Krein and Dias 2018, 204; Dagnino and Teixeira 2014, 54). Others 
have argued that, however participatory and relevant these mechanisms were, some of the 
councils charged with labor, tax, and pension reforms suffered from a serious 
overrepresentation of the business community and an underrepresentation of unions and the 
working class (Riethof 2018, 187; Hochstetler 2008). In the Conselho de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social (Council for Economic and Social Development [CDES]), charged with 
drafting proposals for the aforementioned reforms, the business community monopolized 50% 
of the votes, compared to only 16% for unions (Galvão 2016, 273; Doctor 2007). Lula had 
tolerated the move because he "believed that the overrepresentation of business was crucial 
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for the improvement of economic and investment conditions and the generation of support for 
public policy decisions" (Doctor 2007, 139).  
I argue that the imperative of ensuring governability shaped the contours of civil 
society’s participation in policymaking. I argue that in the policy realm where the interests of 
capital were at stake, the participatory mechanisms were futile in the sense that the 
deliberation as a result of these participatory councils was shelved and vetoed by Congress or 
was encumbered by the absence of a political will, especially concerning the land reforms, to 
confront capital. In relation to the issue of policy implementation, the picture was rendered 
even more complex. On the policy issues that were deemed a critical PT policy, the PT would 
favor that the state ensured the delivery of such services. The centrality of these policies to the 
PT agenda and the imperative of reaching out to voters by programmatic efforts that make a 
direct impact on their lives sometimes eclipsed civil society participation. In other policy 
areas, that are less relevant for present purposes, the PT expended large amounts of their 
financial resources on civil society organizations to involve them in the delivery of services 
that would shape their local communities. While involving the civil society sector in service 
delivery had a direct and positive impact on local communities, it also had dire implications 
for the capacity of these organizations to draw their autonomy from the state, criticize state 
policies when needed, and pursue alliances with their fellows from other social movements.  
Several examples illustrate the arguments above. Environmentalists successfully 
lobbied for the passage of an anti-GMO bill, which was adopted by the Ministry of 
Environment. The bill was later on turned on its head by the agribusiness lobby in Congress. 
The latter pushed legislation that legalized GMOs and enforced its will through the Ministry 
of Agriculture, which it also controlled (Hochestetler 2008, 45-46).  
A similar case transpired around the construction of a hydroelectric dam in Belo 
Monte when  
"not only did the government not reconsider its decision to allow the projects to go 
ahead, but the government-agreed standards set to minimize the impacts of the 
ventures have largely been ignored. Work on the Belo Monte hydroelectric plant was 
stopped several times by the courts for not offering the conditions of adjustment for 
affected indigenous and local populations previously agreed to, such as housing, 
healthcare, schools, among others" (Dagnino and Teixeira 2014, 55-56). 
 
The housing program, Minha Casa Minha Vida Vida (My House My Life [MCMV]), 
also illustrates the limits of participation, as it colluded with the imperative of delivering 
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social services to the PT’s social base of support. A few years after its creation, the Ministry 
of Cities, initially led by a PT member, the first mayor who oversaw the implementation of 
the first PB in Porto Alegre, was finally managed by a conservative minister. The latter 
marginalized civil society actors from the ministry and oversaw the implementation of the 
MCMV (Dagnino and Teixeira 2014, 57). The program financed the construction of 2 million 
homes worth more than R$ 50 billion, to be inhabited by low-income earners (Boito and 
Berringer 2014, 101). Activists from the Frente de Luta por Moradia (The Front for the 
Housing Struggles [FLM]) argued that, despite the importance of the MCMV, it also 
benefited the construction and real estate sectors (Interview with FLM; Dagnino and Teixeira 
2014, 56). For critics, "the program reproduced the spatial segregation between the rich and 
the poor […] The construction sector chose to build in isolated regions that have no access to 
urban services in order to maximize profitability" (Braga 2016, 83). In fact, the MCMV was 
put in place as one of the countercyclical policies that Lula pursued in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis. It aimed to deliver housing for lower-income earners and at the same time 
benefit the construction and financial sectors through the expansion of credit to the purchasers 
of these houses (Interview with FLM; Brigadas Populares).  
The Bolsa Família (Family Allowance [BF]) is another example, which also illustrates 
how the imperative of ensuring governability and delivering services took precedence over 
civil society's participation in policy implementation. The BF is a conditional cash transfer of 
about 104$ per month aimed at the “extremely poor” and “poor” households, those who earn 
a monthly income of 73$ and 36$ respectively (Seidman 2010, 96). While the recipient 
communities and civil society were involved in the program that inspired the BF, the Fome 
Zero (Zero Hunger), the BF did not pave the way for such participation (Gómez Bruera 2015, 
13). Here again, the PT administration was concerned with overcoming the inefficiency and 
delays that can result from the participation of citizens and civil society actors, in order to 
implement a program deemed crucial for the PT.  
While the first three examples illustrate the limits of participation on the question of 
policy formulation and monitoring, this last example opens the discussion concerning the 
involvement of civil society groups in implementing social policies and delivering social 
services. While the state made sure to step in to deliver these services, this pattern was not 
generalized across all policies. Under Lula, both social movements and civil society 
organizations were involved in delivering services to their local communities, which mirrors 
the public-private partnerships visible across the globe under neoliberalism. The civil society 
sector is said to be more efficient at service delivery due to its proximity to the local 
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communities, its innovation in overcoming bureaucratic hurdles, and its capacity to involve 
citizens in running their affairs.  
In Brazil, some have estimated that the state under Lula devolved 1.3 R$ billion in 
2003 alone to civil society organizations (Gómez Bruera 2013, 146), with a large number of 
state financing channeled from state-owned enterprises to the civil society sector (Ibid). It is 
worth noting that data for more recent years does not exist, but between 2003 and 2009, the 
"government provided 152 R$ million to 42 (rural) coops" (Ibid). The rural coops were 
charged with providing technical assistance and training to the landless peasants, and at the 
same time, they expanded significant funding to the MST and CONTAG. As the resources 
devoted to the PRONAF expanded under Lula, funding to the MST also increased. As Bruera 
noted, “although the resources of PRONAF were directly channeled to its beneficiaries; the 
MST charged (3-5%) of the credit they receive from the government” (Ibid). 
Service delivery also shaped patterns of democratic civic engagement, and prospects 
for cross-movement alliance building. Firstly, in a trend that reflects the dilemmas of civil-
society participation in service delivery across the globe, funding shaped their discourse, their 
relationships with other civil society actors, and the state. A plethora of research is focused on 
how encouraging civil society's involvement in service delivery has contributed to the 
moderation of the civil society's discourse and goals. In Lula's Brazil, and given that the 
president expanded resources for the civil society sector, the latter became more dependent on 
state funding than during the years of his predecessors, and hence less prone to voicing their 
criticisms of the PT administration (Gómez Bruera 2013, 148).  
Social movements were also drawn closer to the state, and prospects for building 
alliances among them were narrower. In fact, social movements' engagement shifted toward 
allying with the state (Maier 2008) to obtain more resources and satisfy immediate needs 
(Gómez Burera 2013, 148). For example, the CONTAG continued to organize its famous 
marches, but their protests were turned into means to negotiate with the Lula administration 
for increased funding (Ibid, 147). In addition to spending more time on their relationship with 
the state, these social movements spent less time organizing and mobilizing at the grassroots 
level (Ibid). Not only were social movements gravitating more to the realm of the state, but 
civil society organizations, especially those operating in similar fields, were competing for 
resources. The combination of these factors weakened prospects for cooperation among the 
civil society sector, with necessary implications for interest politics (Interview with USP 
sociologist).  
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8.2.2.3 Socio-economic Inclusion  
The combination of participation and inclusion, along with Lula's commitment to 
tying economic growth to a redistributive state that provided welfare not only for the formal 
working class but also for Brazil's poor and marginalized sectors, had important implications 
for addressing Brazil's socio-economic inequalities and revitalizing the domestic market 
(Filho and Morais 2018). The following section complements the discussion above to reflect 
on the material benefits of the expansion of social and economic rights under Lula.  
The most important social programs introduced under Lula were the BF, the MCMV, 
and Luz Para Todos (Light for All [LPT]). As the number of households benefiting from BF 
increased from 8 million in 2003 to 14 million in 2011, the equivalent of 30% of the Brazilian 
population (Annex), the percentage of poor families dropped from 28.2% in 2003 to 14.08% 
in 2011 (Annex, The Percentage of Poor and Extremely Poor Families) and the number of 
impoverished households dropped from 11.27% in 2003 to 5.26% in 2011 (Ibid). In sum, the 
number of people living below the poverty line dropped from 15.18% in 2003 to 6.31% in 
2011 (Annex, People below Poverty Line). A substantial improvement on the GINI 
coefficient was recorded for the same period (Annex, GINI Coefficient). Lula's administration 
also introduced the LPT a program, which brought light to areas that had been deprived of 
electric power before Lula's victory (Interview with MST). The program emerged under the 
first Lula administration when Rousseff was the Minister of Energy, and, by 2018, the 
program had already reached close to 3,400,000 families and 16.2 million residents.129 In 
addition to the BF and the LPT, Lula ordered the creation of the aforementioned subsidized 
housing program, the MCMV, aimed at low-income families.  
Finally, the valorization of the minimum wage was a vital strategy to incentivize 
consumption among lower-income families. Between 2003 and 2011, the minimum monthly 
wage rose from 533 R$ to 834 R$ (Annex), multiplying in value by 1.5. The benefits of this 
strategy were not only felt by the formal working class but also by the precarious casual 
workers whose incomes are calculated in terms of multiples of the minimum wage (Seidman 
2010, 98). Furthermore, the "minimum wage is often seen as the ceiling, rather than the floor, 
of wages in poor rural areas, and the increase in the official level has almost certainly helped 
reduce poverty by raising prevalent wages in the last decade" (Ibid). The rise in the minimum 
wage had its profound impact on the elderly. By 2010, Brazil was one of the countries with 
the highest pension coverage in the world, with 90% of Brazil's senior citizens receiving 
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government pensions, which were also calculated based on the minimum wage (Ibid, 99). 
Lula had also implemented a program to punish the slavery practices that were still 
predominant in the countryside. He introduced penalties for employers caught recruiting 
unpaid workers. These penalties involved paying their "former workers all back wages and 
taxes and threatening to cut off offending employers from any future government loans, 
subsidies or tax benefits" (Ibid, 100). Since 2003, the PT government has freed between 4 and 
6 thousand workers who endured slavery practices (Ibid).  
Moreover, growth was tied to a job-based economy. Under Lula's mandate, almost 21 
"million jobs were created compared to 11 million in the 1990s" (Filho and Morais 2018, 99). 
The services sector absorbed more than 90% of these newly-created jobs (Souza et al. 2016, 
1041; Braga 2016). The increase was not only in the number of people who were employed 
but, equally importantly, in the number of "people working under the terms and conditions 
that are under Brazil's labor law and covered by the social security system" (Melleiro and J. 
Steinhilber 2016, 214). The increase from 45% to 56% of those employed by the formal 
sector between 2003 and 2012 (Ibid) has been the consequence of the formalization of the job 
market.  
As has been previously shown, the PT policies departed from the populist welfare that 
targeted the male members of the industrial working class. PT policies were inclusive of 
women and Afro-Brazilians as well as of members of the LGBT community. Women, who 
inhabit the more precarious and informal sector, have benefited from the aforementioned cash 
transfer programs. For example, the GINI coefficient by gender recorded an improvement for 
women, with the GINI coefficient for women dropping from 0.525 in 2004 to 0.484 in 2011 
(Annex, GINI by Gender). Improvements to the minimum wage and the formalization of the 
job market not only lifted people from extreme poverty; they led to upward social class 
mobility and challenged racial inequality (Interview with CUT 2; MST leader). A 2012 study 
published by the Strategic Affairs Secretariat (SAC) reported that more than 35 million 
Brazilians stepped into the middle-class category between 2002 and 2012. In 2012, those who 
belonged to the middle class constituted 53% of the population (SAC 2012, 13). These 
transformations also challenged Brazil's racial questions, as the majority of the poor were 
drawn from the Black community. The combination of  social programs, the valorization of 
the minimum wage, and affirmative action led to a situation wherein "80% of the increase of 
the middle-class refers to the black population" (SAC 2012).  
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8.2.3 The Neo-Developmental Alliance, Unionism, and Workers under Lula (2003-2011) 
So far, the discussion has focused on the PT strategies for deepening democracy and 
implementing a neo-developmental model. This following section focuses on the views of the 
labor and social movements vis-à-vis the PT administration and the reforms that directly 
affected the formal working class, the peasants, and the forms of labor and peasant 
mobilization under Lula. Firstly, I argue with Boito et al. (2014) that the neo-developmental 
alliance incorporated not only the formal working class but also peasants; the more vulnerable 
population of the temporary, unemployed, and underemployed; and the homeless population. 
However, the degree of approval of the labor, peasants', and urban reform movements of 
Lula's economic policies was not uniform. To give a few examples, the MST supported 
Lula’s re-election but criticized his economic policies. Within the labor movement, two small 
leftist union centrals emerged from CUT's ranks in the wake of the 2003 pension reforms. 
Albeit small, at the symbolic level, these centrals challenged the focus on 
mediation/negotiation, maintained combativeness as an option to promote working-class 
interests, and defended the principles of shop-floor level unionism. As will be shown, the 
nature of Lula’s reforms (pension, land reforms, recognition of union centrals, tax reforms) 
shaped the relationship between the formal and informal working class on the one hand and 
Lula's administration on the other. Secondly, I show that the large labor centrals led by the 
CUT and the landless peasants either consciously pursued moderate strategies of mass 
mobilization or were forced to do so as their bases moderated their views; the result was that 
in general terms the mass mobilization shifted increasingly toward less disruptive forms of 
collective action. 
It is worth noting that, as discussed above, the inter-class and cross-movement 
alliances remained weak. The absence of alliance formation is owed to the patterns of civic 
engagement that emerged under Lula’s administration and encouraged cooperation with the 
state rather than between civil society actors. Another factor that impeded alliance formation 
was that these social and labor movements did not hold the same degree of approval of the 
Lula administration. Arguably most, though not all, of the labor centrals and the social 
movements would have agreed that Lula promoted democratic practices. However, they 
disagreed on the question of supporting his economic agenda. This disagreement would also 
affect patterns of alliance formation. Forms of alliance formation would take place 
occasionally, in the wake of the 2005 scandal for example, when the CUT, the MST, and 
other civil society actors together pursued mass mobilization to defend the democratic process 
(Hochstetler	 2008). Alliances were absent when individual strikes or land occupations took 
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place, which is in line with the decision by both labor and social movements to avoid 
disruptive collective action. 
8.2.3.1 Workers, Peasants, the Homeless and the Unemployed: Labor Centrals and Social 
Movements of the Neo-developmental Alliance and its Critics 
I have thus far discussed the mechanisms of participation and socio-econoic and 
political inclusion under Lula. The following section sheds light on the class composition of 
those subordinate classes that had taken part in the neo-developmental alliance, the labor 
centrals and the social movements that represented them, and the dissenting oppositional 
voices from within these movements. The first social class that took part in the neo-
developmental alliance was the formal urban working class. The latter would benefit from the 
PT policies of the valorization of the minimum wage, the formalization of the job market, and 
the recognition of the labor centrals discussed below (Boito et al 2014).  
The neo-developmental alliance between the working class, the state, and the internal 
bourgeoisie involved the majority of union centrals, including both some centrals that openly 
supported the former military regime or the post-military neoliberal policies and the new 
unionists who emerged from the anti-military struggles. This ideologically diverse alliance of 
union centrals agreed to support the neo-developmental model, confer legitimacy on and 
support the president’s agenda, and maintain mobilization at a manageable level (Gómez 
Bruera 2013, 136).  
CUT led the neo-developmental alliance of union centrals. It was the largest union 
central, representing the largest number of unionized workers (30.4% in 2016, Annex) and the 
largest number of unions (21.22% of unions in 2016, Annex). As I discussed in the previous 
chapter, the rise of Articulação Sindical (Union Articulation [AS]), which was also tied to the 
PT’s Articulação, prompted CUT to moderation under Lula. When Lula was elected 
president, the schoolteachers’ union leader, who was associated with public-sector employees, 
headed CUT. Neither the PT nor proponents of the AS viewed his re-election favorably, and 
both feared that his union base would oppose Lula’s pension reforms (Gómez Bruera 2013, 
142). As a result, the CUT opted to elect one of Lula’s favorite union leaders, Luiz Marinho. 
Under Marinho’s mandate, CUT held favorable views of the state. CUT members depicted 
the state as more open to working-class representation and participation in policy-making than 
the state under Cardoso for example (Interview with CUT 1). Hence, CUT’s former position 
of hostility and distancing from the state gave way to collaboration and participation under 
the PT administration. Consequently, CUT sought to reconcile with the internal bourgeoisie, a 
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leading ally for the working class under neo-developmentalism. Neo-developmentalism was 
credited for positive gains for both capital and labor (Interview with CUT 2). Permanent mass 
mobilization and general strikes were no longer viewed favorably. According to CUT, the 
mass mobilization that had delegitimized the previous regimes could pave the way for a 
potential anti-Lula coup launched by his opponents (Krein and Dias 2018). CUT’s fears were 
not unfounded; the Mensalão scandal would confirm them.  
Some leftist centrals joined the CUT and supported the neo-developmental alliance. 
The first one was the Central Geral dos Trabalhadores do Brasil (General Workers' Central of 
Brazil [CGTB]), which controlled close to 2% of union representation until 2016 (Annex). A 
division rocked CUT in 2007, leading to the rise of the Central dos Trabalhadores e 
Trabalhadoras do Brasil (The Central of Brazilian Workers [CTB]). CTB and CGTB views 
are not reflected here because I could not schedule interviews with their representatives. The 
CTB was associated with the Corrente Sindical Classista (Trade union classist current [CSC]) 
that had joined CUT in 1988 after separating from the Central Geral dos Trabalhadores 
(CGT) (Galvão et al. 2015, 27). One of the main issues of debate between CUT and the CTB 
was that CUT advocated for union pluralism, while the CTB argued, “it could weaken the 
union movement dividing workers in a single work category into different unions” (Ibid). 
Until 2016, the CTB represented 6.81% of unions and 10.08% of unionized workers. The 
largest numbers of unions affiliated with the CTB were the urban workers’ unions (42.3% of 
CTB unions), and the civil servants’ unions (32.8% of CTB unions) (Galvão et al. 2015, 35). 
Despite the divisions, the CTB held favorable views of Lula, was in agreement with PT 
policies, and participated in the neo-developmental union central alliance (Ibid; Interview 
with DIEESE sociologist). 
  In addition to CUT, the CGTB, and the CTB, the coalition also included union 
centrals that represented former pelegos as well as union centrals that supported the neoliberal 
policies of Collor and Cardoso. The FS, the second largest central and CUT’s traditional rival, 
turned ally under Lula, also participated in the coalition. In 2016, the FS controlled 14.78% of 
unions and represented 10.08% of unionized workers (Annex). FS held positive views of Lula 
and praised his minimum wage policies and the recognition of union centrals (Interview with 
FS1 and FS2). They actively took part in the councils erected under Lula, among others the 
Fórum Nacional do Trabalho (National Labor Forum [FNT]), and the Conselho de 
Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (Council for Economic and Social Development 
[CDES]), and cooperated with CUT on the labor reform agenda, as will be discussed in 
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greater detail below. In 2007, the FS president was appointed the Secretary of Labor 
Relations in the Ministry of Labor (Trópia and Cangussu de Souza 2018, 58).  
 The União Geral dos Trabalhadores (General Workers Union [UGT]) also joined the 
coalition. In 2016, the UGT represented 11.69% of unions and 11.29% of the unionized 
working class (Annex). It “combined three former trade union groupings (as well as 
dissidents from FS)” (Melleiro and J. Steinhilber 2016, 219). UGT, like the FS, cooperated 
with CUT on its labor reform agenda. It was a union central of different political tendencies 
(Interview with UGT1, DIEESE sociologist). While some of its representatives praised the 
Lula administration and his redistributive policies (Interview with UGT1), others criticized 
the PT, accusing them of corruption and transforming the poor into clients for their social 
programs (Interview with UGT 2 and MTST activist). Finally, the Nova Central Sindical de 
Trabalhadores (New Workers' Central [NCST]) emerged in 2005; in 2016 it represented 
10.4% of unions, and 7.45% of unionized workers (Annex). NCST is considered one of the 
representatives of the old unionists/pelegos, who were opposed to transforming corporatism 
(Melleiro and J. Steinhilber 2016, 219).  
In the wake of the 2003 pension reforms, dissident voices emerged from within CUT 
proper criticizing CUT's relationship with the state, particularly the way in which CUT had 
compromised its autonomy in favor of the Lula administration and acted as the PT’s “union 
arm” (Interview with Conlutas, Intersindical 1, and 2). Two small centrals, CSP Conlutas – 
Central Sindical e Popular (Popular and Union Central) – and Intersindical – Central da 
Classe Trabalhadora (The Central of the Working Class), emerged. Although they represented 
a small number of unions, they played an important role at the symbolic level in their 
commitment to pursuing combativeness with both capital and the state. 
 CSP-Conlutas’ majority of delegates (more than 70%) were affiliated with the Partido 
Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unidos (Unified Workers’ Party [PSTU]) (See Chapter 7). 
Conlutas controlled 2.25% of unionized workers and a small number of union affiliates 
(0.96%) (Annex). It mostly represented civil servants, primarily in the educational and 
cultural sectors (55.6% of Conlutas unions), as well as the workers in the urban private sector 
(the services sector and the industrial sectors, 33.2% of Conlutas) (Galvão et al. 2015, 35). 
Conlutas had emerged from various leftist currents,130 and presented itself as an alternative to 
CUT. It proposed a combative strategy rooted in the persistence of shop-floor unionism rather 
																																																								
130 The currents include the Movimento por Uma Tendencia Socialista (The Movement for a Socialist Tendency [MTS]), which is now 
linked to the PSTU; the Movimento de Esquerda Socialists (The Movement of the Socialist Left [MES]), associated with the PSOL; as well 
as the Movimento Avançado Sindical (Advanced Trade Union Movement [MAS]) and the Movimento Terra Trabalho e Liberdade (The 
Land and Work Movement [MTL]) (Galvão et al 2015 26; Sluyter-Beltrão 2010; Fernandes 2017) 
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than negotiation and conciliation (Interview with Conlutas).  Its founders criticized CUT’s 
conciliatory approach toward capital and the state and Lula’s pursuit of the implementation of 
Cardoso’s macroeconomic policies (Ibid). The central also criticized how Lula compromised 
CUT’s autonomy (Interview with Conlutas). Furthermore, they opposed CUT’s participation 
in the CDES and CUT’s willingness to sit at the bargaining table with capital (Galvão et al. 
2015, 26-27). On several occasions, Conlutas accused CUT of acting as the union arm of the 
PT (Interview with Conlutas; Antunes 2013, 272; Galvão 2016). The most widely cited 
evidentiary examples for these accusations were the 2004 banking sectors’ strike and the 2003 
pension reforms (Interview with Conlutas), both of which will be discussed in the following 
section. However, Conlutas’ criticism of the government’s neoliberal policy did not receive 
much support from its base, given the positive gains that the working class achieved under 
Lula (Galvã 2014, 194). 
Intersindical was the other main central that emerged from CUT in the wake of the 
2003 pension reforms (see below). Intersindical was also predominantly present among civil 
servants (57.9% of unions affiliated with Intersindical) (Galvão et al. 2015, 35). The majority 
of its delegates were affiliated with the Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (Socialism and 
Liberty Party [PSOL]), a party that emerged in the wake of the 2003 pension reforms when 
four PT politicians were expelled from the party for their opposition to the reforms.  The 
central was also critical of Conlutas. The two centrals maintained a good relationship until 
Conlutas tried to bring Intersindical under its umbrella in 2010, leading to further divisions 
within left unionism (Interview with Intersindical 1, 2, 4). According to one of my 
interviewees, this condition reflects the broader dilemmas of left politics in Brazil with "too 
many leaders (capos), leading a small number of people" (Interview with Sociologist, USP). 
 Intersindical also presents itself as a central, preserving the first and fundamental 
principle of CUT: shop-floor unionism. It initially proposed organizing the unions at the base 
level regardless of whether there was a union central or not (Galvão et al. 2015, 27). However 
critical of PT policies and the CUT under the PT, Intersindical acknowledged CUT’s 
historical legacy and its struggles under the military regime (Interview with Intersindical 1, 2, 
3, 4). Its members identified themselves as CUT’s left base, who had been antagonized by 
Lula’s accommodation of capital’s interests and CUT’s subservience to the PT (Ibid). 
Intersindical leaders labelled their union central “one of the left that would never relinquish 
struggles against exploitive capitalism” (Interview with Intersindical 1). Intersindical also did 
not compromise on the question of union autonomy with either the state or capital (Ibid). 
They argued that CUT acted in harmony with the PT agenda, but a distinction between CUT 
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and the FS needed to be made (Interview with Intersindical 1,2,3,4). The FS is the 
embodiment of unionism created by the state, with some of its members drawing from the 
ranks of the pelegos who cooperated with military rule, while the CUT was born from 
working-class militancy under military rule and played an instrumental role in the 
democratization process (Interview with Intersindical 1). Intersindical also criticized Lula's 
policies, but maintained the line that unlike with FHC, who criminalized workers and social 
movements, their disagreements with Lula were political (Interview with Intersindical 4).  
Intersindical opposed the Lula administration and held that the PT was responsible for the 
financialization of the economy (Interview with Intersindical 1, 2, 3, 4). They also maintained 
that despite the improvements in consumption patterns under the PT, it was not a 
consolidation of universal and constitutional rights. For Intersindical, the cash transfer and 
social housing programs remained party programs, aimed at a targeted group, that could 
disappear or make its way depending on the government in place (Ibid).  
Peasants would benefit from Lula’s openness and recognition of their struggles, which 
was a considerable change compared to the Cardoso era (Interview with MST). Those who 
benefited the most were peasants who received state financing for agriculture and who were 
involved in selling their products to the government (Boito and Berringer 2014, 100. Those 
who were more disadvantaged were the vulnerable landless peasants who counted on land 
expropriation and aggressive land reforms, which did not materialize given the strength of 
agribusiness (Ibid). Peasants were represented by the MST, the Movimento dos Atingidos por 
Barragens (Movement of People Affected by Dams [MAB]), and CONTAG (Ibid). 
Unfortunately, I was not able to schedule interviews with CONTAG and MAB, and their 
views are therefore not reflected in this dissertation.  
 As for the MST, it supported Lula's first and second electoral campaigns but insisted 
that it was a politically autonomous movement that continued to support agrarian reforms 
under the PT administration (Interview with MST). The MST assumed a more critical stance 
on the Lula administration compared to the hegemonic neo-developmental union centrals, but 
it was also more moderate compared to the leftist union centrals. On the one hand, it was 
aware that despite the fact that Lula promised but did not implement land reforms, he was still 
the most popular president among landless peasants; his policies led to the decriminalization 
of the movement, an expansion of funds for their activities, and an expansion of social 
benefits that lifted peasants from extreme poverty and eradicated peasant illiteracy (Interview 
with MST; Gilbert 2015; Carter 2015; Brandford 2015). On the other hand, the MST moved 
toward more critical stances when the land reforms were not adopted under Lula's first 
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administration, and the number of settled families started to decline under his second term. 
While Lula's first mandate witnessed the settlement of 300,000 families, the numbers declined 
to a little bit more than one third of that number during his second term.131 However critical 
of Lula’s economic policies, the MST was keen to direct its criticism toward Lula’s economic 
policies rather than Lula himself. MST argued that PT policies lifted landless peasants from 
hunger, but the structural change did not take place (Interview with MST). The MST deemed 
the structural transformations necessary for tipping the balance of power in favor of the 
peasants and the working class.132 The MST was also more pragmatic than the urban Left. 
According to one of its leaders,  
"We do not know where he (Lula) is, but we know that if the poor do not get 
organized, he will go in the direction of the rich. However, we do not think Lula's 
government is lost; we think it is still in dispute. Lula still has the smell of the people 
from which he came. We do not agree with the ‘radicaloids’ of the urban Left who do 
not believe in the government anymore. They do not think Lula can be redeemed. We 
disagree. We think he can be redeemed." (Ondetti 2008, 203)  
As for the more precarious unemployed and underemployed, mostly residing in the 
urban peripheries, they were more on the “fringe of the neo-developmental alliance” 
compared to the formal working class and peasants (Boito and Berringer 2014, 100).   They 
found their representation among a plethora of social movements pushing for the right to 
housing and urban reforms but also among other social movements focusing on the struggles 
of the unemployed and the homeless. I have previously discussed the incorporation of the 
urban reform movement in Lula’s government, which was also responsible for the creation of 
the Ministry of Cities. The FLM, one of those housing movements, held favorable views of 
the Lula administration, praising his efforts to create the Ministry of Cities, and argued that 
the PT administration represented the interests of the homeless and the unemployed 
(Interview with FLM). The Brigadas Populares (BP) and the MTST held more critical views 
of the PT administration. For example, the MTST criticized the “PT administration […] and 
promoted the politicization of its base from a radical left point of view (from anti-capitalist to 
socialist depending on the context)” (Fernandes 2017, 142). The Brigadas Populares (BP), 
which emerged in September 2011, presented itself as a national anti-capitalist and anti-
imperialist political organization that proposed a revolutionary alternative to the socio-
																																																								
131  For the settled families between 1994 and 2014 see: http://www.incra.gov.br/sites/default/files/uploads/reforma-agraria/questao-
agraria/reforma-agraria/familias_assentadas_serie_historica_incra_mar_2014.pdf  
132 See the interview with João Pedro Stedile, MST Leader: https://www.globalresearch.ca/brazil-2012-interview-with-mst-leader-joao-
pedro-stedile-on-dilma-governments-agrarian-reform-program/5525699 
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political order and was committed to organizing and mobilizing those who “have nothing to 
loose,” i.e. the residents of the urban peripheries, by “advocating the right to housing, which 
is embedded in the right to the city, the right to work, and resistance to deindustrialization” 
(Ibid). BP, like the MTST, was critical of the PT’s economic policies and of the concessions 
that it gave to capital, and financial capital in particular (Ibid).  
Aside from the unemployed and the homeless, there were others who benefited 
significantly from the PT’s social redistributive mechanisms, such as the BF recipients, but 
who have been deemed by many scholars and activists to be the passive recipients of such 
policies, in the sense that the PT did not put in practice any mechanisms to organize them 
(Boito and Berringer 2014, 100; Filho and Morais 2018). The CUT members acknowledged 
this shortcoming, while arguing that 
“We did not explain to workers that all of this happened in their lives because of a 
government project and the party project. We did not do it. We ended up being caught 
in this fight against corruption and all the excuses that paralyzed Brazil” (Interview 
with CUT 1).  
 
8.2.3.2 Land and Labor Reforms under Lula  
 As discussed above, the councils were charged with presenting policy proposals. The 
tax, pension, union, labor reforms were devolved to the CDES and the FNT. On average, the 
most positive reform was the recognition of the union centrals that finally formalized their 
work. While greater political participation and economic redistribution benefited the poor and 
the working class under Lula, the outcomes of the pension and agrarian reforms attest to the 
limits of the structural change necessary to tip the balance of class power in favor of the poor 
and the working class (Interview with Intersindical 1, 3; Interview with MST). In the case of 
pension reforms, the PT could not pursue a radical pension reform, as it faced a strong 
military-judicial lobby that resisted stripping the military and the judiciary of their privileges 
and their high salaries. In the case of agrarian reforms, the PT feared triggering the anxiety of 
large landowners whose economic participation was necessary for the generation of foreign 
currency under neo-developmentalism. 
The first reform discussed here is the 2003 pension reform. In 2003, Lula charged the 
CDES to present a pension reform for public sector employees. This reform aimed to reduce 
payments to “2.3 million civil servants who in 2002 accounted for about four-fifths of the 
deficit in the pension system” (Melleiro and J. Steinhilber 2016, 217). Those who were 
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responsible for the large deficit were high-ranking public sector employees, including judges 
and the senior military officers who had negotiated to increase their benefits with the pre-PT 
governments (Ibid).  
To everyone's surprise, the reform package was not different from the one proposed 
by Cardoso in 1998, which had at that time been formally opposed by both the PT and CUT 
(Hunter 2009, 150). The alliance of neo-developmental Centrals supported the reform, which 
was also approved by the Senate and the Congress. The CUT did not oppose it, despite 
public-sector unions affiliated with CUT insisting that the bill should be withdrawn and 
calling for a general strike, an issue discussed at length in the following section (Gómez 
Bruera 2013, 143). The PT ended up expelling three federal deputies and a senator because 
they opposed the reforms (Hunter 2009, 151). Together, the expelled former PT politicians 
formed a new socialist party, the PSOL (Party of Socialism and Liberty) (Ibid). CUT 
members who were affiliated with the PSTU left and joined the PSOL to establish the CSP-
Conlutas and Intersindical, which would together constitute the pole of union opposition to 
CUT and the PT. 
 
The 2003 reforms  
“increased the minimum retirement age of all civil servants (to 55 for women instead 
of 48, and 60 for men instead of 53), required retired civil servants to contribute to 
social security if their income exceeded the 1440 R$ per month (less than 2.5 times 
the minimum wage at the time), limited the amount of pension paid to widows and 
orphans of civil servants and placed a cap on civil servants' wages” (Baer 2014, 160).  
At the same time, the arrangements that served the interests of high-ranking bureaucrats 
remained intact.133 Under the pressure of the military and the judges, Lula was forced to make 
concessions to the latter. In the initial proposal, “the military would have to leave the special 
regime that it enjoyed and would receive retirement according to the same rules that regulated 
access for other civil servants. Under the pressure of the deputies who defended the category 
(including the current president Jair Bolsonaro), the PT government excluded representatives 
of the Armed Forces from the package.”134 The judiciary represented by the Association of 
Federal Judges of Brazil also lobbied to maintain its privileges, leading the critics of the 2003 
pension reform to argue that  “78% of judges have salaries above 140,000$ (260 times the 
																																																								
133  See Simon Romero, "Brazil Where a Judge made 365 000 $ a month", NY times: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/world/americas/brazil-seethes-over-public-officials-super-salaries.html.   
134 See the following: https://economia.ig.com.br/previdencia/reforma-urgente/2019-05-29/problema-antigo-previdencia-ja-foi-alterada-por-
fhc-lula-e-dilma.html  
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minimum wage). They earn salaries higher than the president of the Republic, while the 
constitution established that no one could earn more than R$ 37,200, the salary of the 
president of the republic” (Interview with Intersindical 1). 
Another major reform was the recognition of the large centrals in 2008, which could 
up to then “informally organize and mobilize their affiliates but could not intervene directly in 
the negotiation processes or claim a share of the union tax” (Mayer 2016, 112). The 2008 law 
guaranteed access to the union tax, proportional to the representative capacity of the centrals.  
The centrals did not agree over whether to maintain or get rid of the union tax. CUT leaders 
argued that the system was left intact because other union centrals opposed removing the 
union tax (Interview with CUT 2). FS did not even mention union tax reforms as necessary. 
Both Conlutas and Intersindical remained highly critical of its persistence, and both argued 
that the union tax should be abolished as it risked compromising union autonomy (Interview 
with Conlutas), paving the way for the bureaucratization of the union leadership (Interview 
with Intersindical 1 and 3). In line with this argument, some have pointed out that the union 
tax was maintained because under the PT mandate it continued to generate revenue for the 
centrals (Riethof 2018; Krein 2016). Between 2008 and 2014, the union tax revenues 
increased from 65.7 million R$ to 180 million R$ (Krein 2016). It was finally abolished under 
the mandate of Michel Temer’s, President Rousseff’s vice-president who was appointed 
president in the wake of her impeachement.  
Furthermore, the law was restrictive for small union centrals. To be officially 
recognized, the centrals had to demonstrate activity in at least three regions of the country and 
represent activity in 5 economic sectors while representing 7% of workers in each sector 
(Antunes and Santana 2014; Antunes 2013). This condition proved untenable for the union 
opposition under Lula, both for Conlutas and Intersindical, who each represented a small 
number of unions and competed for the representation of overlapping work categories.  
Aside from the aforementioned reforms, it is worth noting that tax reforms never saw 
the light (Brookings Institute 2010). As a result, the tax system continued to hurt low and 
middle-income wage earners. According to my interviewees, "those who earn up to $ 5000 
they have to pay the highest tax rate, which is 27.5% for a physical person. However, a 
banker who already paid for his income tax is exempted from paying taxes on dividends. 
Seventy-three thousand in Brazil have equity of 300 million, and they are all tax exempt" 
(interview with Intersindical 1).  
The land reforms also did not come to pass under Lula (Interview with MST, 
Brandford 2015). In 2003, Lula charged the Minister of Agrarian Development, Miguel 
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Rossetto, to come up with a land reform plan. The latter in turn charged a former PT member 
and expert on agrarian reforms, Plínio de Arruda Sampaio, to coordinate with intellectuals 
and social movements (the MST, the CONTAG and the Movements of Small Farmers) on this 
matter. The result was Sampaio’s reform plan, which suggested the settlement of 1 million 
families between 2003 and 2007 (Brandford 2015, 342). In order to "enable the government 
to obtain this land at a reasonable cost, it recommended first that the government should take 
over all terra grilada (land usurped illegally by large landowners) and second it should 
change the criteria by which a latifúndio is deemed unproductive and thus available for 
forcible purchase. At the moment, the criteria are set at such a low level that much of the land 
being used is well below its full potential and is therefore deemed productive" (Ibid). 
However, the government did not endorse Sampaio's proposal, fearing strong opposition from 
landowners (Ibid). These fears were confirmed as landowners evicted nearly 35,000 families 
during the same period in which the plan was drafted (Ibid, 342).  Lula then modified the plan 
by proposing to settle "400 thousand families and to expand rural credit to 130 thousand 
families" (Ibid, 344). As Rossetto has explained, Sampaio's "plan had to be changed because 
it was not realistic given the correlation of social, economic, and political forces" (Ibid, 343). 
As previously argued, the agrarian lobby was predominant in Congress, and the agrarian 
sector remains one of the largest sectors in Brazil today, where it is responsible for the 
generation of foreign revenues and currency, which is necessary to ensure financial stability 
and hence incentivize capitalist investments under a neo-developmental model.    
8.2.3.3 Peasants’ and Workers’ Mobilization under Lula 
In this section, I argue that the mass mobilization under Lula shifted toward less 
disruptive forms of action that were in line with the labor and social movements' commitment 
to moderating their approaches and to ensuring governability. It was also a consequence of 
the processes of inclusion, participation, and dialogue pursued under Lula, which appeased 
potential sources of opposition. As will be shown, the patterns of mobilization pursued by the 
neo-developmental alliance supported rather than challenged the PT agenda. Increasingly, the 
fact that CUT unfolded into the PT's union arm, a pattern that had started in the mid-1990s, 
became clearer under Lula's administration. The neo-developmental alliance and CUT in 
particular would demand the betterment of wages and achieve significant advancements, 
recorded by the number of collective agreements reached under Lula. However, they would 
avoid pursuing aggressive forms of mobilization whenever their demands collided with 
capital's interests or the PT agenda. As for the MST, they would not relinquish 
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combativeness. In fact, in the first year of Lula's administration, they would pursue mass 
mobilization to apply pressure from below on Lula and to enforce the adoption of the land 
reforms. Over the years, however, their combativeness would subside, likely because, as 
previously argued, both the MST and its base benefited from the expansion of resources under 
Lula. 
The neo-developmental alliance of union centrals called for mobilization around its 
labor agenda, but it was not a disruptive form of mobilization. Instead, it aimed at negotiating 
with the state and capital a labor agenda spearheaded by CUT in 2005 and adopted in 2009. 
The agenda revolved around "ending arbitrary dismissals, the ratification of the ILO 
Convention 158, the reduction of the workweek from 44 to 40 hours without reducing 
salaries, increasing resources for education, health, and public services, and increasing 
unemployment insurance" (Galvão 2016, 273; Krein 2016). The neo-developmental alliance 
of union centrals would mobilize during six national working-class marches to make these 
demands but they would avoid pursuing more aggressive mass mobilization to enforce, for 
example, the reduction of the workweek and the ratification of ILO Convention 158 against 
unplanned dismissals, both of which were vetoed by capital as they continued to challenge 
their interests.135 
The neo-developmental alliance of union centrals also abstained from supporting labor 
mobilization that challenged the PT administration or its pact with capital. First of all, the 
pension reforms triggered intense resistance from CUT's public-sector unions (Melleiro and J. 
Steinhilber 2016, 217). When the civil servants' unions within CUT resisted the reform and 
organized several strikes, including the largest one in Brasilia, which gathered 50,000 civil 
servants, the AS within CUT opposed the mobilization, supported the pension reforms, and 
called for negotiation with the government (Galvão 2009, 182; Riethof 2018, 189; Gómez 
Bruera 2013, 143). The mobilization around the 2003 reforms thus attests to the fact that CUT 
allied with the government and was unwilling to take any action that challenged the PT 
administration. A similar scenario transpired during the 2004 banking sector strike. Bank 
workers declared a 30-day strike that spread geographically across different regions of Brazil 
(Interview with Conlutas; Riethof 2018, 192). In light of the strike, "CUT-affiliated National 
Bank Workers' Confederation (Confederação Nacional dos Bancários, CNB) negotiated a 
national wage agreement" (Ibid). However, the "grassroots union meetings ended up rejecting 
																																																								
135  See the Trade Union Movement Back to the Political Scene: 
http://www.ipea.gov.br/desafios/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2803:catid=28&Itemid=23 
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the agreement, accusing the CNB of betraying them and pandering to the government's 
macroeconomic goals while neutralizing union militancy" (Ibid).  
Beyond the mass mobilization, workplace strikes also recorded significant changes 
under Lula. One can observe that the number of workplace strikes diminished compared to 
the immediately post-military decade (1985-1995), but the numbers were also higher and 
more demanding of the betterment of work conditions compared to the strikes under Cardoso 
(1995-2002), when workers had been thrown on the defensive (Boito and Marcelino 2013, 
65). For example, the number of strikes seeking the betterment of work conditions ranged 
between 65% and 69% of the total number of strikes between 2003 and 2009 (Annex). The 
shift is indicative of the fact that both living and work conditions improved under Lula (Boito, 
Galvão, and Marcelino 2015). The increase in the number of strikes under Lula is owed 
primarily to Lula's tolerance and openness to the working class and social movements 
(Interview with Intersindical 1 and CUT1). In terms of numbers, the Lula administration 
recorded slightly more than 300 strikes yearly between 2003 and 2007 (Annex); the numbers 
started to increase between 2008 and 2010 again (Annex). Despite the increase in strike 
activity under Lula, it is worth noting that the number of strikes never reached the levels of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, which also reflects the moderating effects of the neo-
developmental model on the base, with the latter reaping the benefits of redistributive 
mechanisms. As a result of working-class mobilization, the percentage of collective 
agreements above inflation reached 87% (in 2007 and 2010) under Lula's mandate, compared 
to 46.5%, the highest percentage under Cardoso (Linhares 2015, 10). 
There were also qualitative changes about working-class mobilization under Lula. 
First of all, while the trend in the previous decades was such that the private sector was the 
one leading the strikes, Lula's administration witnessed the rise of the public sector, with civil 
servants at the forefront of organizing strikes in the public sector between 2003 and 2007 
(Annex). As the civil servants rose in militancy, they were also responsible for the most 
significant number of hours stopped (Annex). Several factors explain this change. First of all, 
the aforementioned 2003 pension reforms antagonized this sector against Lula and translated 
to the rise of two radical leftist centrals who were represented within this sector and played an 
essential role in maintaining combativeness among public sector employees. As Boito, 
Galvão, and Marcelino (2015) observed, the large centrals initiated very few strikes. The 
other factor that explains the change is the rising participation and organization among civil 
servants (Boito and Marcelino 2013, 69-70). Within the private sector, the workers in the 
automotive industry as well as workers in the construction and services sectors workers were 
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the protagonists of working-class mobilization (Boito and Marcelino 2013, 69; Nowak 2019). 
At times, the grassroots unionists and non-unionized workers went against their leadership 
and called for strikes whenever their demands were not met (Riethof 2018, 204). With the 
expansion of the construction sector under the PT, the construction workers raised demands 
about the "quality of food, adverse housing and transportation conditions, low wages, lack of 
medical assistance, and a low frequency of holiday leave" (Nowak 2019, 213). 
The landless peasants' mobilization would pass through two different phases of 
activism under Lula. Initially, a more friendly and enabling political context led to an upsurge 
in peasant mobilization, especially under his first mandate. The MST tried to apply pressure 
from below to push for the 2003 land reforms. It was met, however, by the landowners' 
violence, as previously discussed. Under Lula's first mandate, the most significant increases in 
land occupation were in the South and the Northeast (Ondetti 2008, 209-211). Besides the 
occupations, the movement organized a large number of protests, more than 200 yearly, 
between 2003 and 2005 (Ibid). As aware that the alternatives to Lula would be far worse for 
the MST, the MST leadership made sure that the protests were not aimed at Lula but at his 
economic policies (Ibid, 213). As of 2008, the MST entered a period of retrenchment 
"characterized by the diminished capacity to influence state policies through public activism" 
(Carter 2015, 421). The number of land occupations was therefore halved, and the number of 
occupying families decreased by 65% (Ibid). As was the case for the working class, the 
effects of Lula's social policies – namely the BF, LPT, and minimum wage policies – were 
deeply felt by poor peasants, which in turn "diminished the pool of recruits available for the 
MST" (Carter 2015, 421). However, it is worth noting that between 2008 and 2012, the MST 
remained responsible for "2,712 protest actions across Brazil, 56% of all such events. During 
this time, it mobilized three-fourths of all the people involved in land occupations throughout 
Brazil, that is, close to 100,000 families" (Ibid, 422).  
 
8.3 The Limits of Neo-Developmentalism and the End of PT Rule: Dilma Rousseff 
(2011-2016) 
In this section, I argue that though 50 years apart, the crisis that faced Dilma Rousseff 
is a reminder of the crisis that faced Goulart in 1964. Rousseff, like Goulart, was viewed with 
skepticism by the neoliberal elites. She was not only the first woman president who broke the 
tradition of a male-dominated arena, but she was also a former radical Marxist guerilla fighter 
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who was imprisoned and tortured by the military regime. Like Goulart, she was in danger of 
being deemed too much of a leftist by her neoliberal counterparts when she pursued policies 
under her first mandate that challenged the interest of the powerful financial sector. 
 
8.3.1 The Political Economy of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016)  
Rousseff’s term followed the economic boom experienced under Lula. In 2010 alone, 
the economy grew by 7.5% (Annex). Rousseff also inherited a domestic and international 
context that made it harder to sustain the high levels of growth that were necessary to 
maintain the PT’s redistributive policies. At the domestic level, she had to deal with the 
implications of the Mensalão scandal and growing debt. Even though she kept Lula’s core 
team, some ministers who were involved in the scandal were forced to resign.  
Following the 2008 financial crisis, Rousseff was aware of the necessity of 
diversifying the economy, curbing Brazil’s dependence on external markets, and revitalizing 
local markets (Filho and Morais 2018). In line with this objective, Rousseff was hoping to 
contain financial capital and shift investments away from financial speculation to the 
productive and developmental sectors, hence her bold move to confront the banking sector 
(Singer 2015, 43). During her first term, this policy translated to replacing the neoliberal 
Central Bank president with a new president who, along with the Minister of Finance, 
initiated a policy to lower the interest rate from 12.5% in 2011 to 7.25% in 2013 and to 
devaluate the currency. 136  “The monetary policy shift aimed to reduce the inflow of 
speculative foreign capital, devaluate the currency and lower the cost of credit, in order to 
promote private investment and consumption instead of rewarding speculation” (Filho and 
Morais 2018, 108). 
These macroeconomic shifts were accompanied by policies that expanded credit to 
local investors and expanded the state’s involvement in mega-projects to facilitate capital 
investments. To stimulate local investments, she launched the “Brazil Maior” (Greater Brazil) 
program, which reduced the IPI (Imposto Sobre Produtos, Tax on Industrialized Products) on 
capital goods (Singer 2015, 48). It also extended 600 billion R$ to the industrial sector in 
2015 through the BNDES. The increase is considerable compared to the second Lula 
administration, where subsidized credit did not exceed 100 billion R$ (Ibid). The president 
also oversaw the implementation of mega-projects that antagonized her leftist critics due to 
their environmental and social impacts. The largest project in Belo Monte involved the 
																																																								
136 See the SELIC rate on the Central Bank of Brazil: https://www.bcb.gov.br/Pec/Copom/Ingl/taxaSelic-i.asp 
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construction of a hydroelectric dam, the world’s third-largest dam, with 22.5 R$ billion 
financing from the BNDES. The project transferred 80% of the river’s flow, devastating the 
rainforest and displacing 40,000 indigenous people.  
The president who was elected by Lula’s social base (i.e., the poor with the support of 
large capital) “had always been a technocrat who had never been elected to political office 
based on her political base” (Filho 2013, 663). Consequently, she did not enjoy the same 
popularity or possess the same political skills as Lula had, which had made governance 
possible. While running on a slate with a member of the PMDB as her VP, she showed no 
openness to her party members or her political allies (Pinto et al. 2015).  For example, amid 
worsening economic conditions, Rousseff projected herself as the “autonomous” bureaucrat 
capable of managing state affairs independent of class interests. Pertaining specifically to the 
neo-developmental centrals, she maintained a distant relationship with the union movement. 
As a result, the 
“close crossover between the political leadership and the unions and the countless—
often informal—contacts during Lula’s period in office have since been replaced by 
what the government side would like to see as “businesslike” handling of the unions. 
Since the election of Rousseff, there have been fewer direct ties with government 
offices. The unions have also been confronted with a government that gives 
preferential treatment to dialogue with the employers and a number of their 
demands—such as lower non-wage labor costs and tax breaks” (Melleiro and J. 
Steinhilber 2016, 222). 
Rousseff’s attack on the banking sector and her unwillingness to dialogue, combined 
with declining demands on Brazilian exports, growing debt, and capital’s passivity toward 
invest in the economy, exacerbated the economic situation. While she inherited from Lula a 
GDP annual growth of 7%, theis percentage would decline to 1.9% in 2012, and 3% in 2013 
(Annex). Moreover, the percentage of debt from GDP jumped from 61.24% in 2011 to 
73.71% in 2015. Inflation started to rise slowly after being successfully controlled for over 
two decades (Annex), and economic deceleration lowered the value of foreign investments to 
54,744 million USD in 2013 after reaching a high of 85,090 million USD in 2011.137  
The president pursued policies to revitalize the local market, and to boost local 
demand. She lowered the electricity tariff by 20%, which triggered anxiety among capital that 
she was veering to the left (Filho and Morais 2018, 111). While lowering interest rates and 
																																																								
137 See CEPAL: http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/Perfil_Nacional_Economico.html?pais=BRA&idioma=english (Accessed April 2018) 
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hence the margin of profit for financial capital, Rousseff maintained social spending on the 
Bolsa Familía;formalized and regulated the wage increase by adopting a minimum wage law 
(Law 12.382/2011), which gave her the capacity to determine the national minimum wage 
between 2012 and 2015; and oversaw the passage of PEC 72 2013/15. PEC 72, which 
awarded one of Brazil's largest and most vulnerable groups, women working as domestic 
workers, their fundamental right to a minimum wage and decent work conditions. It also 
imposed fines on their employers   if they did not abide by the law (Careira 2016). 
Besides antagonizing the bourgeoisie, her policies squeezed the middle class and 
improved conditions for the informal sector. PEC 72 antagonized vast sectors of Brazil’s 
middle class who hired domestic workers but were committed to cutting costs and continued 
slavery practices at home (Ibid; Interview with Intersindical 4). PEC 72 stepped into this 
previously unregulated sphere and deprived the middle class of its capacity to pursue such 
practices.   
Moreover, Brazil’s middle class was provoked by its declining capacity to consume, and its 
growing proximity to the working class. As Filho and Morais have explained, the middle 
class was   
“squeezed by the exhaustion of ISI and the subsequent economic slowdown, the 
retreat of traditional occupations with the neoliberal transition, the low-wage intensity 
of the recovery in the mid-2000s, and the downturn since 2011. So-called ‘good jobs' 
in the private and public sectors have become scarce, higher education no longer 
guarantees sufficient income or status, and the young find it hard to do better 
economically than their parents. For example, 4.3 million jobs paying more than five 
times the minimum wage were lost in the 2000s, in contrast with the net creation of 
950,000 such jobs in the 1990s” (Filho and Morais 2018, 134) 
 As the middle class experienced this slashing of its consumption patterns, it also witnessed 
the upward social mobility of the working class under PT rule that I have previously 
discussed. As a consequence of the PT's redistributive policies, and the valorization of the 
minimum wage, the formal working class shared spaces that were previously considered 
"exclusive domains" of the middle class, such as shopping malls and airports (Interview with 
CUT 1).   
As a result, toward the end of Dilma’s first term, protests rocked Brazil’s streets. 
Initially, it was a divided radical left, which organized to lower the transportation tariffs under 
the Movimento Passe Livre (Free Pass Movement [MPL]) in June 2013. The MPL was “an 
autonomist non-party organization founded in the early 2000s that led a demonstration […] 
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demanding the reversal of a recent increase from R$3 to R$3.20 in public transport fares in 
the city of São Paulo” (Filho 2013, 658). As the movement coincided with the 2014 World 
Cup preparations, it started to grow, mobilizing citizens’ discontent initially against 
“government spending on the World Cup, while simultaneously decrying stadium 
construction working conditions” (Riethof 2018, 200). Later, as the protests widened, they 
started to gather a very diverse set of demands and soon morphed into an anti-PT movement, 
with slogans calling for the impeachment of Rousseff and decrying corruption. Amid rising 
police repression, the protests captured media attention (Filho 2013, 659). The media seized 
the opportunity to fuel public discontent and to thereby encourage more people to participate 
in the anti-PT demonstrations. As the protests grew, they “tended to be disproportionately 
white and middle-class in composition” (Ibid) and focused solely on anti-PT slogans. Hence, 
in the vacuum of strong left organizing, the right-wing discourse and agenda settled and 
seized the opportunity to delegitimize the PT. The aforementioned protests soon died out, 
largely because they remained leaderless, suffered from the absence of a sustained form of 
organization, and were limited in their geographical reach, taking place mostly in São Paulo 
(Filho 2013, 664). 
The working-class mobilization that preceded the aforementioned middle-class 
mobilization increased astronomically in the years between 2011 and 2013. In 2013 alone, 
there were 2,050 strikes compared to 877 in 2012 (Annex). It is worth noting that the neo-
developmental alliance of unionists was not responsible for the organization of this strike 
action; rather, what happened was a profusion of workplace strikes as a response to the 
deceleration of the economy and rising unemployment. CUT and FS initially organized 
collective action with the FIESP to support an agenda that encouraged the protection of 
industries, the revitalization of the productive sectors, lowering financial speculation, and 
protesting the high interest rates that were undermining productive investments (Boito, 
Galvao and Marcelino 2015). As the centrals were antagonized by the president’s failure to 
dialogue with the unions, they called for mobilization in 2013 to enforce the implementation 
of their Labor Agenda. However, their demands were shelved with the advent of the 2014 
presidential election, amid a growing political and economic crisis (Melleiro and J. 
Steinhilber 2016, 222).  
 During the economic recession, the centrals could no longer contain workplace 
mobilization. Workplace strikes “were triggered by rank and file and were accompanied by 
large scale rioting and destruction” (Nowak 2019, 193; See also Riethof 2018, 205). The most 
important form of working-class mobilization took shape among construction workers in the 
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North and the Northeast and was aimed at the PAC sites and the World Cup stadium 
constructions (Ibid). In 2011 and 2012, 310,000 construction workers went on strike in 
Fortaleza, protesting working conditions (Riethof 2018, 205). Aside from these strikes in the 
construction sector, the overall decline in investments exacerbated conditions for workers and 
unemployment was again on the rise, reaching 8% in 2013. These conditions pushed workers 
to the defensive once again (Annex). The list of their demands revolved around salary 
readjustments (730 strikes, 35.96%), food indemnities (553 strikes, 26.9%), and the 
betterment of work conditions (431 strikes, 20.9%) (Annex).  
It is against this background that Rousseff ran for her second term. Rousseff ran on a 
platform of redistributive policies for the working class, but as soon as she assumed power, 
she turned to the right. Neoliberalism under a leftist government entered with vigor. On the 
one hand, she backed away from her confrontational approach and instead appealed to the 
financial sector. In line with this new policy, she chose her Minister of Finance from among 
the biggest proponents of neoliberalism. The minister, Joaquim Levy, was the CEO of 
Bradesco, Brazil’s largest financial institution (Singer 2015; Filho and Morais 2018, 155). He 
promised to raise interest rates, and revitalized the discourse on the expensive and inefficient 
public sector to justify austerity measures that would reduce public spending on health, 
education, and housing, followed by pension cuts and unemployment benefits cuts, as well 
opening up SOEs for privatization (Filho and Morais 2018, 155). Rousseff also appointed 
Katia Abreu138 as the Minister of Agriculture (interview with MST). Abreu’s appointment 
was controversial to many, but especially to the MST, as she openly advocated for a series of 
controversial policies including “congressional control over the demarcation of indigenous 
reserves, ‘efficient monocultures,’ and the approval of genetically modified seeds” (Watts 
2014; interview with MST). During this time, the neoliberal elites who had long waited to 
overcome the “rigid” labor standards in Brazil supported the passage of PEC 4330/04, which 
set the stage for outsourcing in its open forms and in all productive sectors (De Souza et al 
2016, 1041). 
What is more, Dilma’s second term witnessed the adoption of a controversial anti-
terror law to comply with the recommendations of the Financial Task Force (FATF) and the 
UN Security Council for countries to enforce mechanisms that curb the financing of terrorist 
organizations. Some have argued that the law was futile because Brazil is a signatory to the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which was 
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incorporated by Decree no. 5640/2005. Critics have not only leveled their criticism at the 
vagueness embedded in this law,139 they have also interpreted the law as a tool aimed at 
demobilizing public dissent in the wake of the 2013 FPM and the anti-World Cup protests 
(Interview with Intersindical 4; Interview with Conlutas). In this view, as neoliberalism 
deepened under Dilma's second term, more people were drawn into mobilization, and policing 
neoliberalism became a priority in order to contain the anger from the streets and maintain 
social and political stability (Ibid). In fact, within a day following the adoption of the law, 
four MST activists were arrested. 
However, despite adopting policies to the “right,” Rousseff, despite taking up 
economic policies in her second term contradictory to those in her first, failed to win back 
capital’s confidence. Amid this loss of confidence and another corruption scandal (The Lava 
Jato)140 involving Brazil’s oil giant Petrobras, the Brazilian economy suffered a severe 
setback. In 2015 and 2016, negative growth rates were recorded (-3.8 and -3.5 respectively). 
The unemployment rate reached highs of 9% and 12% in 2015 and 2016 respectively, one of 
its highest records. The right-wing media stepped in to selectively focus on PT corruption, 
even though most parties have been involved in the scandal. Consequently, the media created 
an enabling environment for Rousseff’s impeachment. As Rousseff lost popular support when 
people took to the streets, once again raising anti-PT slogans and demanding her 
impeachment, she faced an orchestrated parliamentary, media and judiciary campaign aimed 
at removing her from office. Rousseff’s “crime” was that she committed “pedalo fiscal” 
(fiscal peddling):  borrowing money from state-owned banks, without congressional approval, 
to continue financing the social programs (BF and MCMV) that benefited the PT’s base of 
support.  
8.3.2 Mass Mobilization and the Impeachment Process 
In this section, I argue that a number of factors led to a situation wherein the anti-
impeachment working class mobilization remained weak and fragemented and hence could 
not mount a challenge to the elitist attack on the democratic process. First, I argue that the 
rising number of strikes along with deteriorating economic conditions as the austerity 
measures entered into effect necessitated mass strikes that the CUT could not pursue, as they 
would have risked delegitimizing the PT government. Second, the neo-developmental 
strategy of negotiation and conciliation, and hence moderation, had run its course as austerity 
																																																								
139  See Human Rights Watch Response: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/news_attachments/hrw_letter_to_president_dilma.pdf 
(Accessed April 18, 2018).  
140 « The scandal was one that enmeshed together with the construction companies with the oil giant. The former bribed Petrobras executive 
to secure a monopoly of oil-related contracts" (See Filho and Morais 2018, 152). 
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measures entered into effect. Third, the pact of large centrals disintegrated under Rousseff, 
which led to the withdrawal of support from the large centrals for Rousseff’s government. 
Finally, I argue that the divisions within left unionism played an important role in dividing the 
left union centrals' position over the issue of defending the democratic process and impeding 
impeachment.  
To start with, CUT, the principal actor that had played an instrumental role in 
Brazilian struggles for democracy, faced a severe crisis under Rousseff. The marriage 
between the CUT and the PT did not shield CUT from severe scrutiny by those who opposed 
PT policies. Even though CUT did not order its unions to participate officially in the FPM, 
fearing that such protests could delegitimize PT rule (Fernandes 2017), some CUT militants 
who took part in the FPM protests were aggressed by FPM protestors.141 Furthermore, as I 
have argued, the working class mobilized against Rousseff’s economic policies but was met 
with CUT’s passivity with respect to calling for a national strike against austerity measures, 
the way they had done in military and post-military Brazil. In fact, as workers were thrown on 
the defensive beginning in 2013, CUT was organizing demonstrations to support Petrobras in 
the wake of the Lava Jato scandal (Riethof 2018, 203). This CUT move came under scrutiny 
from the Corrente Sindical Classista within CUT, which urged CUT to resist austerity through 
mass mobilization, arguing that such policies cannot be reversed through negotiation and 
mediation, an option that the CUT had pursued so long under the PT (Ibid).  
Amid the worsening economic condition, it was much more difficult for CUT to 
convince the formal working class to link their workplace struggles to anti-impeachment 
mobilization. As some of my interviewees explained,  
“Under the economic recession, you (Rousseff) had to cut social spending to keep 
debt interest payment. There has also been a distancing between the government and 
its social base with the worsening economic conditions. So the government did not 
solve the problems of the poor, and the poor did not defend the government” 
(Interview with Intersindical 3).  
According to such voices, Rousseff had also committed a mistake by alienating the working 
class when “she reduced security at the workplace and launched the tercerization talk in a 
desperate move to win back capital’s confidence” (Ibid).  
The distancing between CUT and the working class described above had their 
																																																								





profound effects on the anti-impeachment mobilization. CUT opposed the impeachment and 
had taken part in the Brazilian Popular Front, a coalition of more than 60 organizations 
including social movements and union centrals, that set for themselves the task of defending 
the democratic process,142 and People Without Fear, another coalition of social movements, 
leftist parties, and union centrals that also gathered strength to protest the impeachment 
process (Krein and Dias 2016, 13). 143 The largest demonstration took place in São Paulo in 
August 2016, gathering more than a hundred thousand protesters. Soon after the protests, 
which managed to bring together diverse union centrals and social movements, including the 
Intersindical, MST, MTST, and CUT, the movement started to die out slowly. The protests 
calling on Michel Temer, Rousseff’s VP and successor, to leave and demanding direct 
elections, did not paralyze the country, the way they had three decades earlier. When Temer 
opened fire on the labor law, committing to labor market flexibilization and freezing public 
spending on education and health, the protests that emerged mirrored the divisions within 
unionism at large. They gathered a small number of people, and took place on one day and 
ended on the next. This mobilization contrasts to the military and post-military working-class 
mobilization, wherein economic issues were politicized, which inspired the rise of the 
democratic movement by demanding direct elections or the enforcement of democratic rights 
in post-military Brazil. 
The Intersindical, the MST, and the MTST, despite their opposition to the PT, viewed 
the impeachment as a severe setback for democracy. Both the MST and Intersindical have 
agreed that the impeachment is a regression (Interview with Intersindical 3 and MST). They 
argued that those who have the most to gain from this coup are the "conservative sectors" 
(Interview with Intersindical 4). Intersindical also argued that the impeachment paved the way 
for an attack on the 1988 constitution, which guaranteed a protection of rights and 
undermined the capacity of neoliberal capitalism to implement their agenda of "a new pension 
reform, a flexibilization of labor standards and maintaining the same economic policies while 
selling parts of the public equity such as oil" (Interview with Intersindical 1). During this 
moment of crisis, Intersindical union leaders and the MST called for unity of action with 
those who expressed a commitment to standing against this attack on labor rights and Temer’s 
proposed constitutional amendments, which froze all social spending. They argued that 
"despite all the differences that we have, we have to be united" (Interview with Intersindical 
1). 
																																																								
142 For a list of participating organizations in the Brazilian Popular Front see: http://frentebrasilpopular.org.br/conteudo/compromissos-da-
militancia/ 
143 For a list on People without Fear: https://pt.org.br/tag/frente-povo-sem-medo/ 
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While the impeachment brought a rapprochement between CUT, Intersindical, the 
MTST, and the MST, the neo-developmental alliance that had supported Lula and Dilma’s 
first mandate disintegrated. Consequently, the two largest union centrals after CUT, the FS 
and the UGT, played a divisive role in the impeachment process. UGT did not take any clear 
stance, with the reasoning that it was a plural union central home to diverse ideological views 
with some supporting and others opposing the impeachment. Despite the suggestion that 
members of the UGT might support the anti-impeachment protests, this support was not 
forthcoming. For instance, the UGT was absent when CUT, the MST, and the MTST called 
for mobilization against the Temer government in August 2016. 
 Furthermore, while furing the 2010 elections all significant centrals supported Dilma's 
candidacy, the FS withdrew its support in the 2014 elections. The FS supported the PT until 
2013 when the FS president, Paulinho, created a new party, "Solidarity." Solidarity supported 
the neoliberal PSDB candidate in the 2014 elections and had also supported the impeachment 
process (Galvão 2016, interview with DIEESE Sociologist). FS had an eye on filling up the 
space that was occupied by CUT unionists under the PT (interview with DIEESE sociologist). 
They justified their support for Rousseff’s impeachment, reiterating that "she could not 
govern, closed the doors for dialogue and did not hold a majority in the legislature" (interview 
with FS1). FS also accused the PT of corruption, but absolved Temer, who had been equally 
involved in the corruption scandals, and they went as far as to praise Temer for “his capacity 
to govern” (Ibid). 
 Finally, the divisions that had made their way into left unionism under Lula became 
more pronounced under Dilma. There was no unanimity among the leftist union centrals to 
defend the democratic process. The Conlutas in particular did not see any advantage in 
preempting the impeachment, because the PT openly bargained with financiers and neoliberal 
capitalism (Interview with Conlutas) and had passed the anti-terrorism law used against social 
movements’ activists under Rousseff (Ibid). In fact, CSP-Conlutas was active in mobilizing 
for both the anti-World Cup protests and the FPM. They had also been antagonized by CUT’s 
ordering its base not to join the 2013 FPM protests (Fernandez 2017). Conlutas, therefore, 
refused to come together with CUT, Intersindical, the MST, and the MTST on an agreed-upon 
day of mobilization calling on Temer to leave (Interview with Intersindical 1). While aware of 
their controversial stance, Conlutas blamed the divisions between them and the other centrals 
on FS, who refused to unify the ranks of the union centrals. One of my interviewees from 
Intersindical recalls, "we agreed on a day of action on November 11, 2016, which could 
consolidate and strengthen the labor movement. However, Conlutas and FS opted to mobilize 
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on November 25 and divided the movement" (Interview with Intersindical 1).  
8.4 Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that the rise of the PT to power was synonymous with 
deepening democratic practices on various levels. Firstly, the PT, especially under Lula, 
refrained from criminalizing social and labor movements, a move that had long been resisted 
by the political and economic elites. Secondly, the PT expanded the parameters of political 
inclusion and appointed labor and social movement activists to the bureaucratic apparatus, a 
strategy that drew the state apparatus closer to the average citizen, and that allowed the PT to 
govern in the fragmented context of Brazil. Thirdly, the PT deepened the meaning of 
democracy by expanding the parameters of political participation and opening the higher level 
of the state apparatus to negotiation and dialogue with civil society. Fourthly, as a result of 
the abovementioned factors, the PT had implemented social policies that expanded welfare 
beyond the formal working class to target also the informal sector, women, Afro-Brazilians, 
and the LGBT community.  
I have also argued that participatory mechanisms and socio-economic and political 
inclusion were maintained for as long as the class reconciliation approach underlying neo-
developmentalism maintained social and political stability. This class reconciliation was 
achieved under extraordinary domestic and international conditions. Once these conditions 
changed, Brazil faced a backlash against the democratic process and was set off on a 
neoliberal track. 
At the domestic level, political stability relied on factors tied to the domestic market 
and informal institutions. Even though Lula pursued income redistribution and incentivized 
domestic consumption, this economic model reached its limits under Rousseff. As some of 
my interviewees argued, you “can produce commodities, then there is a limit on how many 
cars and fridges and stoves you can buy for your home” (Interview with Brigadas Populares; 
CUT/Former Metallurgic Unionist; USP Sociologist). As a result, the class-reconciliation 
approach maintained stability only through a commodity boom that guaranteed growth and 
economic redistribution. When domestic demand for consumer durables declined, the 
economic model reached its limits. Another important domestic factor that helped maintain 
political stability in Lula’s Brazil was Lula’s capacity to dialogue and his commitment to 
purusing participatory mechanisms to involve social actors in policymaking. Lula’s 
personality appeased the majority of Brazilians as well as the elites. Interviewees agreed that 
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Lula listened to and negotiated with both unions and capital. This image is contrasted with 
that of Rousseff, who projected herself as an autonomous bureaucrat independent of class 
interests and closed the doors to dialogue. Moreover, Rousseff did not share Lula’s approach 
and long experience with the PT, which had focused on participatory mechanisms to deepen 
democracy. Rousseff also antagonized civil society actors when she pursued the 
implementation of anti-terror law, which was seen by the social movement activists as an 
attempt to criminalize social protests. Consequently, Rousseff lost credibility with both her 
allies and capital.  
On a symbolic level, Lula challenged the white, privileged control of the state 
apparatus. The unionist hailing from Brazil’s most impoverished region who became Brazil’s 
most popular man triggered elite anxieties. These anxieties were confirmed in the lead-up to 
the 2018 presidential elections and have invited the fabrication of accusations against Lula, 
giving him a lengthy prison sentence and barring him from running for office. Moreover, Lula 
had managed to keep the neoliberal elites in check and allied with the domestic bourgeoisie 
who had been equally marginalized under Cardoso’s model (Filho and Boito 2016).  
At the international level, the model replaced Brazil’s dependency on the industrial 
west with a dependency on the Chinese market, but the terms of trade privileged the exporting 
sector, a condition governed by the structural transformations in the global economy. The 
valorization of Brazilian exports and increased Chinese demand determined the high levels of 
growth. While the model overcame the dependency on western countries, it did not shield 
Brazil from exogenous shocks.  
As these conditions changed, the social pact disintegrated, leading the elites to 
monopolize political power. Under the PT, socio-economic and political inclusion produced 
immediate gains for the poor and working class, but the imperative of neo-developmentalism 
maintained the privileges of Brazil’s capital. Under a neo-developmental model, the PT 
depended on capital’s investements and financing and could not trigger their anxiety. As they 
allied with capital and because they did not control the majority in Congress, the PT could not 
address important structural reforms such as the land, tax, and political reforms that promised 
to tip the balance of class power in favor of the subordinate classes (Interview with 
Intersindical 1,2,3,4; CUT1).  
At the same time, when the domestic and international conditions changed, elite 
interests collided with the PT’s participatory and inclusionary policies aimed at the social 
classes and groups that are deemed by neoliberals as the most serious impediment to 
deepening neoliberalism. Although the neoliberal elites would benefit from high interest rates 
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and the absence of structural reforms under the PT, they could not pursue their preferred 
agenda as long as the state remained open to the subordinate classes. The elites were alarmed 
by the fact that despite the economic recession under Rousseff, the minimum wage continued 
to increase. A continued valorization of the minimum is indeed a historical precedent for 
Brazil: the poor have had to bear the brunt of the economic recession. Hence, the neoliberal 
elites’resolute steps to appropriate politics while excluding the PT’s social base and those 
who benefited from the PT’s policies in order to attack the progressive 1988 constitution and 
to pursue aggressive labor market deregulation, privatization of strategic sectors, and the 
criminalization of the social and labor movements  (Interview with Intersindical 1 and 2; 
Filho and Morais 2018). 
For the poor and the working class, the “PT governments were governments with 
social consciousness” (Interview with Intersindical 2). Social and economic redistribution 
mechanisms and the impressive upward class mobility along with the rise of the PT to power 
“changed the face of the state” (Filho and Boito 2016, 245). However, the 2015/2016 crisis 
showed that on the one hand the elite could still solicit the support of the media, the judiciary, 
and the Congress to tip the balance of class power in their favor (Interview with Former 
Scania Militant), and on the other that the classes that benefited from the PT’s participatory 
and inclusionary policies could not rise to defend the party against the coup (Interview with 
Intersindical 1). 
The argument presented here embeds this puzzle in the changing roles that social and 
labor movements assumed under the PT rule. I have argued that the large labor centrals and 
significant social movements voluntarily relinquished combativeness and pursued negotiation 
with the state and capital. This strategy was the outcome of both the effects of the 
inclusionary and participatory mechanisms erected under Lula and the voluntary decision by 
these movements to avoid disruptive action in order to shield the PT from a coup. At the 
grassroots level, peasants and workers had also moderated their stances as they reaped the 
benefits of socio-economic redistribution under Lula’s administration. However, this 
moderation option ran its course under Rousseff for two main reasons. Firstly, amid the 
economic recession, workers regained combativeness but were met with continued insistence 
by the large centrals of the necessity to pursue negotiation instead. Secondly, as the political 
and economic elites aggressively attacked the democratic process, there was a need for the 
labor and social movements to relinquish moderation in favor of combativeness.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
9.1 Research Focus and Main Findings  
This research determined the social classes that played a democratizing role in Brazil 
and Egypt, the reasons why these social classes contested authoritarianism, and the forms of 
inter-class alliances needed to dismantle it. In the final stage of this research, the dissertation 
explored whether the balance of class power shifted in favor of the poor and the working class 
in post-Mubarak Egypt (2011-2016) and post-military Brazil (1985-2016). The research 
proceeded in three consecutive steps. The first step delved into the political economy of 
populist and post-populist Brazil (1930-1985) and Egypt (1952-2011) to trace its structural 
effects on capital and labor, the second step examined the way class struggles delegitimized 
authoritarianism under military Brazil (1964-1985) and Mubarak's Egypt (1981-2011), and 
the last phase attended to the roles that the dispossessed social classes played in post-Mubarak 
Egypt (2011-2016) and post-military Brazil (1985-2016). 
The main findings of this research are as follows. Firstly, the poor and the working 
class are the leading protagonists of social and political change. Their struggles mount a 
challenge to authoritarian capitalism. Secondly, the two cases inform us that as neoliberalism 
is deepening globally, there is a need for redefining who constitutes the dispossessed and the 
disenfranchised classes. There is also a need for the working class to broaden its alliances to 
include all of those social classes that bare the brunt of neoliberal reforms, including the 
urban poor, the peasants, and a downwardly mobile middle class. Although Brazil under 
military rule did not prescribe to a neoliberal accumulation regime, the broad inter-class 
alliance led by the working class in Brazil is what is needed today to counter neoliberal 
authoritarianism. Thirdly, the ability of the poor and the working class to politicize their 
demands in alternative parties, unions, and social movements and to sustain struggles for the 
expansion of democratic citizenship is context-dependent. What played to the advantage of 
the Brazilian working class was the fact that the pact between the military and the business 
community disintegrated in the favor of the working class and that the military in Brazil 
intended to leave power leaving time and space for workers to hone their political skills. 
Another enabling factor for the success of inter-class alliances was the catalyst role pursued 
by some fractions of the church influenced by liberation theology. In contrast, in Egypt, the 
transition was rushed and neither Mubarak nor the Egyptian military were committed to 
pursuing a transition to civilian rule. Fourthly, in Egypt, the creation of the anti-corporatist 
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federation happened quickly, which was not reflective of the militancy at the shop-floor level. 
The weakness of the anti-corporatist federation and the divisions among its leadership paved 
the way for the military to coopt its leadership, which in turn undermined the capacity of the 
post-Mubarak labor movement to insert workers as bargaining partners in post-Mubarak 
Egypt. In contrast, the Brazilian anti-corporatist federation was representative of the new 
unions and the militancy at the shop-floor level. These unions were tied to their base, they 
were shielded from elite cooptation and the anti-corporatist federation remained 
representative of the broad sectors of the economy. Finally, this research drew lessons from 
the two cases on prospects for shifting the balance of class power in favor of the poor and the 
working-class in post-Mubarak and post-military Brazil. The research showed that in Egypt, 
neoliberalism was maintained and deepened, but this time under a much more brutal and more 
repressive military regime compared to Mubarak’s police state. The military’s counter-
revolution supported by Gulf capital and international actors, became a necessary prerequisite 
to end the mass mobilization in post-Mubarak Egypt that impeded the deepening of neoliberal 
reforms.  The picture in post-military Brazil is more complicated. The period (1985-2002) is 
marked by the expansion of civil and political rights, but neoliberalism enters into effect since 
the early 1990s. In this regard, it is a period marked by shifting the balance of class power in 
favor of the neoliberal elites. The PT mandate (2003-2016) is marked by income 
redistribution, which lifts millions out of poverty and an expansion of the political arena, 
drawing it closer to workers, peasants, urban reform activists, women, Afro-Brazilians, and 
the LGBT community. However, the deepening of democracy did not shift the balance of 
class power in favor of the poor and the working class. The PT had inherited structural factors 
from the previous phase that constrained its ability to move beyond an economy that attended 
to the needs of local capital and the neoliberal financial capital, combined with a fragmented 
party system that imposed challenges for the PT to pursue radical reforms. Shifting the 
balance of class power is, therefore, one of the hardest tasks to achieve and it invites much 
more than social and economic redistribution and expanded political inclusion and 
participation. It also necessitates implementing alternative economic models that were 
impossible to achieve in Brazil, given the political and economic strength of its bourgeoisie. 
In the Introduction and Chapter One of this dissertation, I have drawn attention to the 
fact that cross-regional approaches allow us to reflect on how the scholarship on Latin 
America helps explain the phenomenon emerging in the Arab world, which has experienced a 
challenge to decades of authoritarianism since December 2010. The reverse is also true as the 
two countries are converging towards a far-right new populist regime under the auspices of 
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men drawing from the ranks of the military and pursuing aggressive neoliberal reforms. 
Bunce's (2003) proposition, which stipulated that pursuing a cross-regional analysis would 
help us reflect on new factors and new issues that single cases or research focused on does not 
help us uncover inspired this research.  The following discussion invokes the main findings of 
this research and highlights the main themes to address how the two cases inform each other 
and the theoretical framework adopted in this dissertation.  
9.2 The Political Economy of Populist and Post-Populist Brazil (1930-1985) and Egypt 
(1952-2011)  
9.2.1 Capitalist Development and its Structural Effects  
 The theoretical perspectives on the transition from an agro-export economy to ISI and 
the limits of ISI (O’Donnell 1978; 1979; Wallerstein 1980) in Brazil shined light in particular 
on how late capitalism shapes regime types, the pacts of domination that underlie these 
regimes and the state functions that are needed to appease the social classes included in these 
pacts. Applied to the two cases, the populist regime in Egypt under Nasser (1952-1970) like 
the populist regime under Vargas and his successors (1930-1964) served to weaken large 
landowners by expanding local industries and incentivizing local production. The difference 
between Egypt and Brazil under ISI was that the pact that sustained Nasser’s populism 
excluded large landowners and the local bourgeoisie and was biased towards the working 
class and the peasants. Whereas populism in Brazil (1930-1964) was sustained by a pact that 
brought together the industrial working class and local capital both of which benefited from 
industrialization under the auspices of a populist regime. That Nasser antagonized capital and 
pursued anti-imperial policies, made it much harder for Egypt to deepen industrialization. 
What the Egyptian case adds to the reading of late capitalist development is that the transition 
to ISI did not only serve purely economic ends. In Egypt, it was tied to Nasser's anti-imperial 
discourse and pan-Arabism that sought to curb the influence of large landowners and imperial 
powers. Hence a transition away from ISI or the limits of ISI as described in the literature 
from Latin America, cannot be isolated from imperialism in the case of the Arab world 
(Hanieh 2013).  
As the early stage of ISI ran its course in Egypt, there was an expansion of the 
industrial working-class and an expansion of a middle-class absorbed by a large bureaucratic 
apparatus that had stepped in to oversee the transition to ISI amid capital’s retreat. In Brazil, 
the two social classes expanded although the state did not step in the same way the Egyptian 
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state did to pursue industrialization but rather to facilitate its implementation initially in 
alliance with local capital and later on with foreign capital. The implications of these 
transformations in Egypt were such that the public sector would come under attack by local 
actors and the international financial institutions all under the banner of dealing with state 
inefficiency and letting the market rule.  
Hence, and when ISI reached its limits, the two countries embarked on different 
economic models with dire implications on structural arrangements. In the post-populist 
phase, Brazil’s industrialization deepened under the auspices of a BA military regime, closing 
the channels for political representation for “private interests” and wedding it to a security 
state disciplining and taming the working class through coercive means. The military between 
1964 and 1985 played the most critical role in political and economic life. However, the 
Brazilian military was less expansive than its Egyptian counterpart. It pursued local austerity 
measures that laid the burden of stabilization policies on the working class in order to attract 
foreign capital and foreign investors. The deepening of industrialization therefore invited the 
internationalization and the financialization of the economy. Under military Brazil, the 
workers were excluded from social and political life, and the pact erected was one that 
brought the military bureaucracy, and the civilian technocrats, with international capital to 
oversee the deepening of industrialization. At the same time, local capital was, a junior 
partner, and the relationship between the military and local capital remained tense, a theme 
discussed in greater details in the following section. 
The structural effects of the military's developmental model laid the burden on the 
poor and the working class. Wages depreciated as inflation reached astronomical levels, and 
as the country experienced its worst debt crisis, the living conditions for the majority of 
Brazilians deteriorated. Under military Brazil, the expansion of the car industry especially in 
Greater São Paulo with a large concentration of exploited and repressed working class soon 
became aware of the military regime’s manipulation of inflation indices to keep their wages 
low, became the hotbed of militancy. In Brazil, the contradictions of capitalist development 
and in particular the contradictions of accumulation in the production process expounded by 
the traditional left including RSS (1992) were clearly present. However, as the economic 
conditions deteriorate, the circle of contention to the military regime widened. Landless 
peasants rose against the large concentration of land, the urban subalterns against state neglect 
and their inability to reproduce themselves under a deep economic crisis and a downwardly 
middle class had bore the brunt of wage depreciation. Under this severe economic crisis, the 
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working-class led the struggles and drew to its circle the social classes affected by the military 
policies.  
In Egypt, the move away from industrialization was much more aggressive. I had 
shown that in Egypt, there was no consensus around the necessity of maintaining state-led 
industrialization, which was also the flipside of Nasser’s anti-imperial policies. 
Neoliberalism, accompanied by foreign policy realignment with the USA, entered into effect 
in 1991. Egypt liberalized its trade, and under Mubarak, it embarked on policies of aggressive 
privatization, opening up essential sectors to private ventures. At the same time, it pursued 
policies of changing the geographies of production, labor market deregulation, introducing 
temporary and contractual work, and pursuing massive layoffs. The policies of de-
industrialization had left many unemployed. As the state acted was the principal employer, it 
started to close the doors for fresh university graduates while slashing the salaries for civil 
servants. In Egypt, in 2007, the number of unemployed youth was 24.8%, and the numbers 
continued to grow, reaching 31.5% in 2015.144 By the 2017 estimates, and in a continuation of 
a trend that was growing under Mubarak, the percentage of those who held university degrees 
or graduate education (Master’s and PhDs) and were unemployed constituted 31.4% of the 
total number of the unemployed in Egypt, compared to 43.98% of the unemployed who had 
reached intermediate or technical education (CAPMAS 2019). While the unemployed youth 
and the unemployed workers shared their dispossession from the right to work under 
neoliberalism, they were not technically drawn from the same social class, which also 
necessitated forging much stronger ties between the downwardly mobile middle class and the 
formal working class.  
Hence, in Egypt and Brazil the contradictions of capitalism under authoritarianism 
were present but were quiet different. In Brazil, the acute economic crisis accompanied with 
high levels of debt and astronomical levels of inflation in the last years of the military regime 
accompanied by the exploitation of the labor power would precipitate the deligitimization of 
military rule. The contradictions of a debt driven capitalist development, would unite social 
classes that would have not been otherwise united and bring them closer to the demands and 
the struggles raised by the industrial working-class. In Egypt, and by the end of Mubarak’s 
rule, the country was not facing the same economic crisis the way Brazil did. What happened 
in Egypt was that the neoliberal economy had created dispossessions over time slowly driving 
the conditions of the poor, the working class and a state-dependent middle class in a race to 
																																																								
144 See for example the Index Mundi estimates on Youth Unemployment: https://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=eg&v=2229 (Accessed 
August 15, 2019)  
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the bottom gradualy to shield Mubarak from mass mobilization. It is throughout time, that 
Egyptians become aware that Mubarak has been using his position in power for self-
enrichement and to appease a state-dependent business community while depriving the 
majority of Egyptians from their capacity to reproduce themselves. In Egypt, the struggles 
over wages were important but they were embedded with depriving the average citizens from 
adequate healthcare, education, pension and the right to work while Mubarak, his family and 
the closely linked business tycoons enjoyed luxurious styles of living and accumulated wealth 
through an assault on public property and corrupt deals that sold public assets and ressources 
at far beneath their actual values. 
9.2.2 State Autonomy and the Limits of the Authoritarian Pacts  
While agreeing with O’Donnell’s general propositions that capitalism shapes regime 
types (O’Donnell 1978; 1979), this research also borrowed from Migdal the necessity to 
disaggregate the state. The purpose was to attend to the state fractions that served capital’s 
interests and whether the state developed interests of its own. What this disaggregation tells 
us in the case of Brazil is that the emergence of the security apparatus tied to the survival of 
the military regime was a case in which the BA regime served not only the interests of capital 
per se but also the ideological and material interests of the security apparatus. In the case of 
Egypt, the disaggregation of the state paved the way for distinguishing between Mubarak's 
support for a neoliberal state-dependent business community, and the military, which 
expanded its capitalist economic ventures but whose business interests were not always in line 
with Mubarak’s protégés. In Egypt, the state bourgeoisie became a dominant class in itself 
and exploited its position in power to accumulate capital and deprive the population of the 
nation's wealth or control over the means of production (Waterbury 1983).  
A better understanding of the role of the state and the interests that state managers 
developed under authoritarian rule, allowed for an assessment of how the pact maintaining the 
authoritarian regime disintegrates. The two cases confirm that the most critical divisions 
within an authoritarian pact are the ones between the business community and the military. 
The reading of the two cases leads to the conclusion that such divisions can pave the way for 
subordinate classes to insert themselves as bargaining partners and to democratize 
authoritarianism when both the military and the business community have vested interests in a 
transition to civilian rule. A reading of the two cases combined also leads to the conclusion 
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that the longevity of the transition, shapes prospects for those struggling under authoritarian 
capitalism to organize alternatively and hence for democratizing authoritarianism. 
In 1985, Brazil was a case of a business community that had withdrawn support from 
the same military regime that it had initially supported, namely because it did not reap the 
benefits of the financialization and the internationalization of the economy under military 
rule. As the local businesses withdrew their support from the military-technocratic coalition 
that governed military Brazil, they narrowed the military regime’s base of support. As for the 
military itself, which had held political power for nearly two decades, it became much more 
intrusive in political life, controlling the political realm, repressing against all forms of 
dissent, and leading debt-driven industrialization. The Brazilian military remained smaller 
than its Egyptian counterpart and less involved in the Brazilian economy in the sense that it 
did not own the means of production the way the Egyptian military did.  The Brazilian 
military also did not permeate every aspect of the bureaucratic apparatus and the SOEs, the 
way the Egyptian military did. Furthermore, as the military assumed political power, the 
military's share of the GDP declined dramatically. Consequently and by the end of military 
rule, the military, as an institution, did not have any stake in preserving military rule. Instead, 
they had a higher stake in ensuring that military personnel, especially the security apparatus, 
could be shielded from calls for public retribution for the crimes that they had committed over 
the two decades. Furthermore, as the military had been in power and was therefore held 
responsible for one of the worst economic crises to ever hit Brazil, it lost legitimacy and 
support amid heightened repression. Faced with an economic crisis as well as a crisis of 
legitimacy, and combined with the military's aforementioned institutional interests, it sought 
to step outside of political power.  
Egypt is a case of a state-dependent business community and an autonomous and 
powerful military, a combination that had not been conducive to democratization. Businesses 
benefited from Mubarak’s neoliberal policies. The neoliberal reforms ceded public assets and 
public land to the politically-connected businesses and supplied them with cheap and 
unregulated labor power along with free access to natural resources and energy subsidies 
(Mitchell 2002; Adly 2009; Abdelrahman 2015, 11). This state-dependent business 
community had higher stakes in entrenching authoritarian rule and in appropriating politics to 
deepen its control over the economy. Moreover, the Egyptian military had cultivated a vested 
interest in a regime that protected its autonomous interests. The discussion in Egypt showed 
that the military benefited from Mubarak's rule, but it also remained autonomous from 
Mubarak with a defined institutional, foreign policy, and economic agenda. With an eye on 
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expanding its economic ventures in post-Mubarak Egypt and in ensuring a constant flow of 
American aid assistance, the military rushed the transition to civilian rule and divided the 
revolutionary forces, fearing that a more radicalized street would threaten its expansive 
economic empire. Furthermore, at the moment when the popular sectors delegitimized 
Mubarak's rule, the military still received widespread support. In Egypt, the military, unlike 
the internal security apparatus, was not profoundly imbricated in repression. It was also not 
responsible for economic policymaking under Mubarak, and its economic activities, as well 
as its transformation from a military supporting the lower-income under Nasser to a military 
geared to respond to the consumerist needs of the upper classes, was wholly walled off from 
the average citizen. The combination of these factors gave the generals the upper hand in 
negotiating a transition that would guarantee their privileged position in post-Mubarak Egypt. 
Hence and given that the military in Brazil lost legitimacy and support, it engineered a 
slow and secure transition which started with political liberalization, and which extended over 
nearly a decade (1974-1985), before the rise of the first civilian but military-approved civilian 
president. While overseeing the long transition from military to civilian rule, the military gave 
the time and the space for the opposition and chief among them the workers to politicize their 
struggles, hone their political skills and form the PT which later on would act as the most 
crucial party in opposition (1985-2002) before its rise to power. On the other hand, in Egypt, 
Mubarak, was not ready to leave power; instead, he prepared for the succession of his son. He 
was only forced out by the struggles that emerged in the last decade of his rule and during the 
18-day revolution. Furthermore and as it had been argued in the previous section, the military 
in Egypt had no stakes in enabling a transition to civilian rule, one that risks challenging its 
monopolies over critical sectors of the economy and its foreign policy alignments with the 
USA. As a result, the transition from Mubarak’s rule to SCAF and later on to the MB rule 
was rushed, and the political space for the politicization of the struggles of the dispossessed 
and the disenfranchised was restricted in the case of Egypt.  
9.2.3 Challenges to State Corporatism 
In this dissertation, I have examined how the authoritarian regimes engineer state and 
society relations and in particular, the labor relations to tame labor militancy. The focus was 
on the strategies adopted vis-à-vis union representation, cooptation of union leadership, and 
the control over strikes, collective bargaining, and funding. Such an approach allowed an 
understanding of how corporatism under authoritarian capitalism becomes vulnerable when 
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workers break free from the corporatist structure. In the two cases, the corporatist structure 
was weakened as it lost membership to arbitrary dismissals, unemployment, etc. The 
weakening of the corporatist structure was even more acute in the case of Egypt, given that 
the country had embarked officially on neoliberal restructuring with workers losing their jobs 
for unemployment and early retirement schemes.  The two cases tell us that the most 
significant challenge for the independent/militant unionists is to break from state strategies of 
exerting control over union membership. The case of Egypt showed that Egyptian workers 
were not less militant than their Brazilian counterparts; their main challenge was to redeem 
the corporatist structure from Mubarak. In the case of Egypt, they had to navigate a context 
whereby all forms of identity that were not directly affiliated with the ruling party, were 
immediately criminalized or excluded from the union hierarchy. In this regard, the militant 
workers operated outside of the formal structure created factory committees and independent 
unions to represent them. In Brazil, albeit the military ruled with an iron fist and pursued 
strategies to repress the traditional left and populists from within the union hierarchy there 
was room for union activists who refused to be co-opted by the military regime to create a 
new identity, the authenticos. The authenticos conquered the union structure from below, as 
the military did not exercise tight control. Furthermore, in Brazil, the union representation 
was not tied to the ruling party, which allowed the union activists to reclaim their space from 
within and to establish an anti-corporatist structure.  
The two cases teach us that working from within the union structure to redeem it and 
to transform it, as is the case for Brazil, was more successful than working outside the formal 
structure. The anti-corporatist unionists in Brazil had access to organizational resources, they 
could redeem the union structure from the military, and they could solicit more support from 
the base. In Egypt, the workers had no option but to operate outside the state-controlled 
structure, but this also meant they had less access to resources and more significant challenges 
in transcending the parochial interests of the factory/workplace levels. Theoretically, the 
research contributes to the literature on corporatism by showing that the biggest challenge for 
workers is to overturn the regime monopoly over representation and membership and to 
create an alternative identity that could appeal to broader sectors of the working-class amid 
increased fragmentation under neoliberalism.  
9.3 Delegitimizing Authoritarianism and the Pressure for Democracy: Class 
Mobilization, Class Organization and Inter-class Alliances in Brazil (1964-1985) and 
Egypt (1981-2011) 
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The comparative historical approach expounded by the RSS approach places emphasis 
on the contradictions of capitalism and developmental capitalism in particular in the 
production process. The RSS (1992) approach is inspired by the Marxist tradition, as argued 
in the Theoretical chapter, which emphasizes the domination and exploitation of labor power 
leading to emancipatory class struggles primarily by the industrial working-class. This 
dissertation did not displace this contradiction in the production process; it sought to embed 
this contradiction in the contradictions of accumulation by dispossession under neoliberalism 
(Harvey 2007; 2003). Such an approach, which combines the two dialectically intertwined 
processes of accumulation in the production process and accumulation by dispossession, 
allows for a better understanding of the emancipatory class struggles under neoliberalism. The 
dissertation, therefore, contributes to the RSS (1992) approach by viewing the struggles that 
take place at the workplace and the struggles that take place within the community, as Karl 
Polanyi argued, as intertwined. The struggles for the betterment of the minimum wage, job 
stability and workplace conditions are linked to the struggles for a dignified living including 
the right to housing, education, healthcare, etc. 
 
9.3.1 Class Mobilization and Class Alliances De-legitimizing Authoritarianism 
In the two cases, I have examined the struggles under the long authoritarian rule in 
Egypt (1981-2011) and Brazil (1964-1985). The two cases illustrated that workers were 
among the main actors who contested authoritarianism. Their struggles over the betterement 
of the minimum wage placed them in direct confrontation with the security apparatus that 
sought to maintain the authoritarian structure to serve capital accumulation. As the workers 
were striking, they were breaking the fear barriers under authoritarianism and exposing the 
authoritarian regime’s pact with the business community. In Brazil, the strikes of the 
industrial working-class in the late 1970s, learnt and built upon the experiences of working-
class struggles of the late 1960s, of the 1970s’ guerillas, and of mobilization of the urban 
peripheries and the countryside mediated by the Church-based organizations. The late 1970s 
industrial working-class strikes did not exist in a vacuum. Furthermore, in the case of Brazil, 
workers exposed the manipulation of inflation indices, which kept their wages low but had 
also dire consequences for the consumption capacity of other social classes. In Egypt, the 
formal working-class was the one to organize and contest authoritarianism from the very early 
years of Mubarak’s term. With time, they grew more defiant to the Mubarak regime and they 
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started upgrading their strategies and demands from pleading with the state to challenging the 
state and Mubarak’s pact with the businessmen. As they bare the brunt of privatization deals 
and industrial closures, they expose these corrupt deals that transcended the walls of the 
industry to also incorporate for example public lands and public assets.  
In the two cases, workers’ strikes also delegitimized authoritarianism by inspiring 
other social classes to take action. In Brazil, workers’ struggles followed the rise of the urban 
subalterns who raised the banner of the costs of living, and challenged state neglect in the 
urban peripheries at the same time the industrial working-class inspired the landless peasants 
to confront the large landowners. Workers also inspired the civil servants and the middle class 
with the latter witnessing to the depreciation of their salaries amid deteriorating economic 
conditions.  In Egypt, the peasants and the urban subalterns would also rise against their 
dispossessions and the state neglect under Mubarak’s rule. As for the civil servants in Egypt, 
they were inspired by the strikes of the industrial working class but they were also the ones to 
establish the first independent unions. In the two cases the breadth of this cross-class 
mobilization signaled the narrowing of the base of support to the regime in power which also 
became more evident when this mobilization inspired the rise of the Diretas Já Campaign 
(Direct Elections now) in Brazil and the 18 days revolt in 2011 Egypt culminating with the 
removal of Mubarak.  
 A reading of the class struggles in the two cases leads to important implications for 
the practical and theoretical levels. For the RSS (1992) approach, the discussion of how 
workers could challenge the authoritarian structure had mainly focused on industrial strikes 
and the way workers coalesce into alternative union and party organizing. The research in the 
two cases suggests that it is actually the horizontal spread of class struggles from the 
industry/workplace to other sectors of the economy and to geographical regions that 
deligitimize the regime. A reading of the two cases combined also suggests that although this 
horizontal spread was taking place in the two cases at the societal level, in Brazil the working 
class was aware of the necessity to strategize and a leadership that emerged from these 
struggles would impose itself as a key bargaining partner to the political and economic elites. 
In Egypt, the workers remained leaderless and less strategic compared to their Brazilian 
counterparts. The reasons behind this outcome in Egypt are owed to the nature of the 
transition as it had been discussed, and the fact that the transition away from Mubarak’s 
regime was rushed which gave no time for workers to internalize the fact that they were 
political actors. 
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9.3.2 Alternative Forms of Organizing  
Based on the above discussion, the major problem in Egypt was that these horizontal 
struggles were not met with the levels of organization that matched the militancy at the 
workplace or in the streets.  Independent unions in Egypt were not representative of the 
working class as a whole. The independent federation was also not representative of the 
militancy at the workplace or of the different work categories of the Egyptian economy. In 
Egypt, as is the case for Brazil, the factory committtees or the shopfloor unionism were the 
most representative forms of organizing of the working class militancy and their demands.  
The point of strength in Brazil was that the new unions embraced the militancy at the 
shop-floor level as a critical principle to challenge the dominant classes. Furthermore, the 
practice of direct democracy at the shop-floor level was generalized to a plethora of 
organizations such as neighborhood committees and peasants' organizations, which in turn 
politicized the struggles of the urban peripheries and the peasants. What played to the 
advantage of the subordinate classes in military Brazil was the catalyst role played by the 
organized religious groups in supporting the struggles of the landless peasants and the urban 
peripheries. Under a strong military regime, the Church-based organizations acted as spaces 
of shared activism for the working class, the peasants and the urban peripheries and facilitated 
the ways in which these social classes could view their struggles as politically, historically, 
and economically connected, a key prerequisite to successful counter-hegemonic organizing. 
While in Egypt the MB refrained from politicizing the struggles of the poor and the working 
class along class lines. The MB accommodated neoliberalism and adopted a reformist stance 
towards the authoritarian structure and it inhibited rather than facilited the creation of shared 
spaces of activism under Mubarak or even in post-Mubarak Egypt. 
While the horizontal spread of class struggles in Egypt delegitimized Mubarak’s 
regime and the military regime in Brazil, the lessons from Brazil were such that this 
horizontal spread needs to be wedded to active and popular organizing that reflects the 
concerns of the social classes dispossessed and repressed by authoritarian capitalism. In 
Brazil, the mass mobilization was met with the creation of such organizing that provided 
alternatives to the social classes struggling under military rule and politicized their demands. 
The agenda promoted by the CUT, the PT and the MST included a long list of labor, land, 
urban and political reforms as well as an alternative economic model. Furthermore, such 
alternatives and a strong alternative organizing assisted the working class, the peasants, and 
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the urban poor in negotiating the post-military phase and held the post-military elites who 
ruled Brazil prior to the rise of the PT accountable at all times.  
9.4 The Roles of the Subordinate Classes in Negotiating the Transition and Deepening 
Democracy in Brazil (1985-2016) and Egypt (2011-2016) 
Based on the discussion in the previous step, the two cases differ in the role that the 
formal working class, assumed in the post-authoritarian phase. I argued that in Egypt, the 
transition took place under the auspices of a military orchestrating the transition from 
Mubarak, manipulating the rules of the game, maintaining neoliberal policies, and 
undermining prospects for moving away from this model. I argued that the analysis of post-
Mubarak Egypt had to take into consideration the strategies that the military pursued to that 
end, and in particular the way it had created divisions between the contending social forces of 
the 2011 revolution. 
Consequently, workers had to operate in a constrained context. The shop-floor 
militancy and the working-class mobilization that challenged the remnants of the regime were 
not matched with the support of other social classes. In post-Mubarak Egypt, the middle class 
was swift to reiterate the military's discourse that striking workers ought to forfeit their strike 
weapon, and held them responsible for the deceleration of the economy. Aside from the 
middle class, the urban subalterns and the informal sector were not organized to mount a 
challenge to neoliberalism. The informal sector, in particular and very early on, continued to 
bear the brunt of heavy-handed military repression against its economic activities, with street 
vendors, for example, being forced to military courts. That fragmentation and the absence of 
inter-class alliances played against the capacity of the struggling social classes to insert 
themselves as bargaining partners in post-Mubarak Egypt. 
Furthermore, the anti-corporatist federation was not representative of significant work 
categories or the militancy at the shop floor level. The EITUF overrepresented white-collar 
employees, and the divisions among its leadership weakened the federation and facilitated its 
cooptation by the military. At the same time, the leaders of the EITUF and the EDLC were 
entangled in the struggles pitting Nasserites, leftists, and seculars against the MB. As they 
became embedded in these struggles, this leadership shelved the working-class struggles 
against the policies that had dispossessed and marginalized them for decades. Furthermore, 
the independent federations played no role in negotiating state and labor relations under 
Mursi, and they deliberately impeded prospects for the democratization of state and labor 
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relations in post-Mursi Egypt when the security apparatus infiltrated their organization and 
the military successfully co-opted them. At the moment of the 2012 constitution-making, the 
MB had monopolized working-class representation to suffocate a pro-labor agenda. In 2014, 
under El Sisi's military rule, the independent unionists who had started the struggle for the 
recognition of anti-corporatist unions were absorbed by El Sisi's military regime and would 
contribute to the passage of the 2014 constitution, which derailed their two most important 
weapons: the rights to organize and mobilize. At the same time, this coopted leadership 
fought with and silenced the more militant unionists, who were still willing to pursue a 
combative approach in the pursuit of greater democratization of state and labor relations in 
post-Mubarak Egypt. 
In Brazil, I argued that the divisions between the reformists and the combative 
leadership were also present in Brazil. In Brazil, unlike in Egypt, these divisions were not 
inhibiting for the labor movement, which was still able to pursue the defense of labor and 
democratic rights. CUT, for the first two decades following the transition from military rule, 
would, therefore, play a significant role in articulating an alternative agenda to that of a 
coopted union leadership who embraced the idea of reforming rather than transforming 
corporatism. 
In Brazil, the political and economic elites were still committed to implementing an 
agenda that marginalized the poor and the working class. The elites expanded civil and 
political rights, but at the same time, they had put in place a neoliberal economic model that 
ended up benefiting the elites and weakening the capacity of the workers to organize and 
mobilize. The neoliberal track proposed that the implementation of neoliberal reforms could 
only provide the solution to the vicious circle of debt and inflation. It laid the burden of the 
public deficit on the lower classes. Furthermore, the post-military political and economic 
elites hoped that the working class' capacity to pursue permanent combativeness would be 
contained through labor market deregulation, forced unemployment, and the privatization of 
the sectors in which the combative leadership had emerged. However, the elites had only 
come to this realization when they were faced with the working class’ and the peasants' 
continued combativeness in the first five years of post-military Brazil. I argued that a constant 
confrontation between the workers and the peasants,  showed to the rest of the population that 
the military was not constrained in its capacity to exert power and to shape the socio-political 
agenda, and, at the same time, the occurrence of workers' and peasants' confrontations with 
the repressive apparatus had incurred losses for capital, losses that the business community 
could no longer afford.   
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Equally important was that the working class, the peasants, and civil society actors 
had not ceased to push for a democratic agenda from below. Here, the alternative forms of 
organizing that emerged under the last years of military rule played an instrumental role in 
inserting the dispossessed and marginalized classes as key bargaining actors, along with the 
elites, in the process of constitution-making. Workers, peasants, women's rights activists, and 
environmentalists had solicited popular support on the streets to push further the expansion of 
democratic citizenship. It was an unprecedented practice of democratic participation, rooted 
in the principles of grassroots activism, and popular participation in defense of democratic 
rights through bargaining and negotiation, while continuously holding the ruling elites 
accountable. I provided several examples to support this argument, such as the role played by 
the new unionists in objecting to the economic policies in post-military Brazil that continued 
to burden the poor and the working class. The old motto of the socialization of the costs of an 
economic crisis was shattered by impressive workplace strikes but also the occurrence of 
general strikes, the longest and the largest in Brazilian history.  
As the grassroots mobilization in the streets expanded the parameters of democratic 
citizenship and forced the post-military elites to revisit their strategies vis-à-vis the poor and 
the working class, the PT played the electoral game, ran for elections, and emerged as the 
most significant opposition between 1985 and 2002. The PT would deepen the meaning of 
democracy by holding civilian leaders accountable and putting in place the PT mode of 
governing. This mode rested on promoting citizens’ participation and on an inversion of 
priorities, favoring now the poor and the working class. The PT initiated participatory 
budgeting (PB), which guaranteed governability by circumventing the roadblocks of the 
representative institutions without undermining them (Gómez Bruera 2015, 5). Hence, the PT 
built on previous experiences of soliciting mass support for its agenda. This time, however, 
the PT shifted its strategy toward promoting deliberation rather than combativeness, in order 
to stamp the budget at the local level with citizens' approval (Ibid). The strategy made it 
possible for the PT to pursue its socioeconomic agenda, and, at the same time, it made it hard 
for those who opposed the agenda to block it, as these budgets were "already legitimated by 
sizeable citizen participation" (Ibid). Overtly blocking them or standing against their 
implementation carried the political risk of losing electoral support.  
It was when the PT rose to political power in 2003 that the meaning of democracy 
deepened, becoming more in line with the definition of democracy used in this dissertation. 
The PT extended the meaning of democracy beyond its representative form to incorporate 
participatory mechanisms as a central innovation of the Lula administration. Furthermore, the 
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expansion of the structure of participation was aimed at promoting inclusionary mechanisms 
both at the symbolic and practical levels. Ordinary citizens and those who were marginalized 
by the elites made their ways to decision-making circles and shaped the content of policies 
geared toward more significant socioeconomic redistribution and representation of the formal 
working class, Afro-Brazilians, women, the LGBT community, the peasants, and the residents 
of the urban peripheries. Naturally, like all parties in power, the PT had to ensure 
governability. Through its social redistributive and participatory mechanisms, it sought to 
shift problem-solving strategies from persistent combativeness, which had marked military 
and post-military Brazil, toward negotiation and dialogue. As a result, there was an apparent 
decline in social mobilization until the last two years preceding Dilma Rousseff's 
impeachment. 
I have argued that even as the PT deepened democracy and expanded the parameters 
of inclusive and participatory practices, it could nevertheless not tip the balance of class 
power in favor of the poor and the working class. The PT was constrained in the range of 
economic policies that it could adopt, and the neoliberal elites made it almost impossible for 
PT presidents to take Brazil outside the influence of the banking sector, Brazil's largest 
creditors. Hence, Lula pursued a form of neo-developmentalism that would maintain the 
significant macroeconomic policies of his neoliberal predecessor to control inflation, but at 
the same time would promote the most critical redistributive social programs that ranged from 
cash transfers to the valorization of the minimum wage to the housing programs, free access 
to health and education, etc.  In Brazil, this critical social and economic redistribution was not 
matched by structural transformations, namely land reforms, tax reforms, and political 
reforms, that could have assisted the subordinate classes in the process of tipping the balance 
of class power in their favor. The neo-developmental model, which necessitated an alliance 
with capital, had set the limits for such structural transformations to take place. 
Furthermore, although Lula tried to appease capital for an extended period, capital 
continued to be tamed under exceptional domestic and foreign policy conditions. This 
condition of a "tamed capitalist class," in particular the neoliberal capitalist class (represented 
by the banks, the insurance companies, the agro-exporting sector, the elite-controlled media), 
did not moderate their stances. The "red lines" that ought not to be crossed or bypassed were 
unchangeable for the neoliberal community, including keeping a high-interest rate, labor 
market deregulation, and the privatization of critical sectors of the economy. They were also 
disturbed with workers and social movements' activists making their way to political power in 
Brazil, which challenged the historical elite dominance over the political realm. 
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When Rousseff tried to lower the interest rate, the country experienced a political 
crisis that would bring about democratic reversals and an attack on the gains achieved under 
13 years of PT rule. The elites would appropriate politics once again to implement their 
preferred economic model and to marginalize and exclude the poor and the working-class 
from decision-making circles. Throughout this turmoil, I have shown that the militant labor 
and social movements did not successfully mobilize against the impeachment process. Hence, 
while they played a significant role in bringing about the democratization of authoritarian 
rule, negotiating democratic citizenship, and deepening the meaning of democracy, they were 
unable to preempt the assault on the democratic process. This condition is owed to several 
factors discussed in this dissertation.  I argued that as the labor and social movements joined 
the neo-developmental alliance, they achieved immediate gains, but they spent less time 
mobilizing their constituencies.  Furthermore, the rise of coup supporters from within the 
ranks of the social and labor movements impeded prospects for mass mobilization in defense 
of democracy. 
 
9.5 Broader Implications and Future Research  
From a theoretical perspective, this research contributed to the comparative 
democratization literature in three ways. Firstly, the RSS (1992) approach adopted in this 
dissertation does not address the contradictions of neoliberal capitalism, and how 
neoliberalism could shape the struggles of the dispossessed and disenfranchised social 
classes. This dissertation furthered the arguments made by RSS (1992) by examining social 
class mobilization under a neoliberal accumulation regime and the implications that this 
mobilization has for democratizing authoritarianism and tipping the balance of class power in 
favor of the lower classes. It suggested that in contemporary societies struggling under 
neoliberalism, the labor movement has to build a broad alliance with the dispossessed and 
disenfranchised classes. Secondly, and while my research has focused on the formal working 
class, I have acknowledged that there is evidence that suggests that the informal working class 
was also an important actor. Given the limitations of researching this sector for my 
dissertation, I could not draw formal conclusions on the roles of the informal sector, which 
remains an important topic for further research. For example in the context where the 
industrial working class does not exist, there is a evidence that suggests that the residents of 
the urban and rural peripheries have been at the frontline of the renewed wave of mass 
mobilization since 2019. Thirdly, while RSS (1992) assessed the success or failure of 
democracy based on the “balance of class power,” which is measured in their account by the 
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capacity of workers to organize in alternative parties and unions, this dissertation proposed 
several correctives. The dissertation suggested that the RSS (1992) approach does not 
emphasize the critical role that the length of the transition plays in democratization processes. 
It also suggested assessing the balance of class power by looking at the post-authoritarian 
political economy.  
On the practical level, the dissertation opens avenues for extending the research to the 
cases that had experienced renewed mass mobilization and calls for regime change. It also 
questions the role that the formal and informal working-class played in these protests and the 
breadth of alliance needed to bring about the desired social, economic and political change. In 
2019, countries across the Globe have witnessed an unprecedented wave of mass 
mobilization. Citizens of Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Ecuador, Chile, and Hong Kong 
have all taken to the streets to restore human dignity and demand regime change. In Lebanon, 
Chile, and Sudan, there is evidence to suggest that the mobilization was born from the 
contradictions of neoliberal dispossessions and failed economic policies.  It is interesting to 
see in these cases whether labor played a significant role if not only in initiating the mass 
mobilization but in sustaining protests, forcing concessions from the political and economic 
elites, spreading mass mobilization across different regions and promoting an alternative 
discourse one that mounts a serious challenge to neoliberal authoritarianism. In Sudan, it was 
the Sudanese Professional Association that had played a role in spreading the mass protests 
and delegitimizing authoritarian rule. In Algeria and in Lebanon, the protesters have shielded 
themselves from being labeled with a specific form of organizing or leadership, which is 
owed to the history of these two countries whereby the practice of politics was held captive of 
a corrupt political leadership that had often used the realm of politics to keep citizens divided 
along confessional or tribal lines. In Lebanon, however, there is a nascent independent current 
of unionists that broke free from a federation controlled by Lebanon’s sectarian parties. The 
Independent Union Current of Lebanon though not responsible for the protests has proposed 
an agenda that challenges the neoliberal dispossessions including wage depreciation of public 
sector employees, improving the quality of the health sector and public education, ending 
privatization, ending contractual work, as well as Lebanon’s subservience to the international 
financial institutions. The movement is still nascent and only time can tell whether this 
movement would expand beyond its base to incorporate the struggles of Lebanon’s urban 
poor, the peasants, the unemployed and the migrant workers who make up a large labor force 
and inhabit the most precarious jobs of the economy from garbage collection to domestic 
work to construction work.  
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There is also evidence that suggests that the current wave of mass mobilization have 
been engaging in political learning, a theme that inspires this dissertation. For example, 
similar slogans have reverbated in different contexts showing an increased insistence from the 
protesters that the political and the economic are necessarily intertwined. In the streets, the 
calls for bread, freedom and social justice were immediately raised as were the calls for 
dignified living, the right to employement, adequate services, etc and an end to corrupt non-
democratic rule. In other words, the renewed protests confirmed what this research has 
proposed that the struggles are not simply generated from struggles under authoritarian and 
corrupt non-democratic rule; they are essentially born from the contradictions of neoliberal 
capitalism sustained by non democratic regimes. The renewed protests also confirmed another 
finding in this research, which suggested that lengthy periods of transitions are necessary to 
lead to real change as they give time and space for protesters to build on the militancy and 
activism in the streets, imagine new ways of doing politics and creating the alternative forms 
of organizing to this end. The longevity of the mass strikes is one striking difference 
compared to the Arab spring. To give an example, in Sudan, the opposition had insisted that 
elections would be held in three years time so to avoid the same mistakes of the Egyptian 
revolution that ended up with rushing the elections giving no time for the social forces that 
contributed to the revolution to organize efficiently, win elections and preempt the 
militarization of politics.   
Finally, it is essential to extend the analysis to contemporary Egypt and Brazil under 
the rightist turn. Between 2016 and 2018, Brazil underwent a radical shift in governance. 
After more than a decade of social democratic Workers’ Party (PT) governments successfully 
advancing the socioeconomic conditions as well as civil and political rights of the formal and 
informal working-class, Afro-Brazilians, women, and sexual minorities, the coalition 
supporting the PT disintegrated. Voters who had benefitted from the PT’s progressive policies 
abandoned their support to the left and elected instead, Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right candidate 
with a regressive agenda (Hunter and Power 2019). Future research on Brazil can indeed 
attend to this puzzle, namely the rise of the right-wing new populist regimes and reflect on the 
factors that led the PT’s social base to support the turn to the right, and the failure of the labor 
and social movements to overcome their fragmentation, to bring about an alternative agenda 
to the new far-right authoritarian regime.  
In Egypt, El-Sisi’s military rule faced challenges with a business community, at least 
some of El-Sisi’s former allies, withdrawing support from the regime and leveling criticism 
against the military corruption. Such accusations weighed heavily on Egyptians who have not 
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only been under siege since the rise of El-Sisi but who also experienced the worsening of 
economic conditions as the general and his close circles reaped the benefits of military 
neoliberalism. In late September 2019, Egypt witnessed an upsurge of mass mobilization 
demanding El Sisi’s departure, and the poor and the working-class neighborhoods, rather than 
Cairo, were at the frontline of such mobilization. The military immediately repressed the mass 
mobilization, but it signaled that the regime is far from being able to achieve poltical stability 
even if it could solicit international, and regional support and mobilize its repressive 
apparatus, which had expanded and deepened under El Sisi with Egypt ranking as the largest 
importer of weapons. Finally, since this dissertation focused mainly on the local determinants 
of democratization and regime change, it would be interesting for future research to examine 
how regional powers affected social classes and their capacity to organize and mobilize. This 
topic is an important one, especially in the Arab World and the Middle East, where regional 







Abdalla, Nadine. 2016. “The Labor Movement in the Face of Transition.” In Egypt’s 
Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements, edited by Bernard Rougier 
and Stéphane Lacroix, 197–211. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York 
City : Palgrave Macmillan  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-56322-4_11. 
 
Abdelhamid, Doha, and Laila El Baradei. 2010. “Reforming the Pay System for Government 
Employees in Egypt.” International Public Management Review 11 (3): 59–87. 
 
Abdel-Malek, Anouar. 1964. “Nasserism and Socialism.” Socialist Register. 
 
———. 1967. “The Crisis in Nasser’s Egypt. New Left Review” 45 (1).  
 
———. 1968. Egypt: Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under 
Nasser. New York: Random House. 
 
Abdelrahman, Maha. 2012. “A Hierarchy of Struggles? The ‘Economic’ and the ‘Political’ in 
Egypt’s Revolution.” Review of African Political Economy 39 (134): 614–28.  
 
———. 2013. “Ordering the Disorderly? Street Vendors and the Developmentalist State.” 
Jadaliyya, January 14 2013. https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/27807. 
 
———. 2004. Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt. London ; New York : 
Tauris Academic 
 
———. 2015. Egypt’s Long Revolution : Protest Movements and Uprisings. Milton Park, 
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group 
 
 
Abelvik-Lawson, Helle. 2014. “Sustainable Development for Whose Benefit? Brazil’s 
	 353	
Economic Power and Human Rights Violations in the Amazon and Mozambique.” 
The International Journal of Human Rights 18 (7–8): 795–821. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2014.946800. 
 
Abers, Rebecca, Lizandra Serafim, and Luciana Tatagiba. 2014. “Changing Repertoires of 
State-Society Interaction under Lula.” In Brazil Under the Workers’ Party: Continuity 
and Change from Lula to Dilma, edited by Fábio de Castro, Kees Koonings, and 
Marianne Wiesebron, 36–61. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY : 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
 
Abreu, Marcelo P. de, Afonso S. Bevilaqua, and Demosthenes M. Pinho. 2000. “Import 
Substitution and Growth in Brazil, 1890s–1970s.” In An Economic History of 
Twentieth-Century Latin America: Volume 3: Industrialization and the State in Latin 
America: The Postwar Years, edited by Enrique Cárdenas, José Antonio Ocampo, and 
Rosemary Thorp, 154–75. Houdsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York : 
Palgrave ; Oxford : in association with St. Antony's College. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Adly, Amr. 2009. “Politically-Embedded Cronyism: The Case of Post-Liberalization Egypt.” 
Business and Politics 11 (4): 1–26. 
 
———. 2012. State Reform and Development in the Middle East: Turkey and Egypt in the 
Post-Liberalization Era. Kindle Edition. London: Routledge Studies in Middle 
Eastern Economies.  
 




———. 2014 b. “The Sisi Government’s Attempts to Win Over Egypt’s Civil Servants.” 




———. 2015. “Triumph of the Bureaucracy: A Decade of Aborted Social and Political 
Change in Egypt.” Carnegie Middle East Center. http://carnegie-
mec.org/2015/01/31/triumph-of-bureaucracy-decade-of-aborted-social-and-
political-change-in-egypt-pub-58924. 
———. 2016 a. “Rescuing the Sinking Ship.” Carnegie Middle East Center. 
http://carnegie-mec.org/2016/08/22/rescuing-sinking-ship-pub-64396. 
———. 2017. “Too Big to Fail: Egypt’s Large Enterprises After the 2011 Uprising.” 
Carnegie Middle East Center. http://carnegie-mec.org/2017/03/02/too-big-to-
fail-egypt-s-large-enterprises-after-2011-uprising-pub-68154 
———. 2017 a. “Sisi and the Businessmen.” Carnegie Middle East Center. Accessed 
December 19, 2017c. http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/68398. 
 
Afonso, José Roberto, Eliane Cristina Araújo, and Bernardo Guelber Fajardo. 2016. “The 
Role of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in the Brazilian Economy: Understanding 
Recent Institutional Reforms and Economic Changes.” The Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance, Special Issue: 41–55. 
 
Ahram Online. 2019. “32.5 Percent of Egyptians Live below Poverty Line: CAPMAS - 




Ajami, Fouad. 2012. “The Arab Spring at One.” Foreign Affairs, March 1, 2012. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2012-01-24/arab-spring-one. 
 
Al Arabiya. 2012. “The Revolutionary Youth in Egypt Dissolve Themselves.” Al Arabiya, 
July 07, 2012. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/07/07/225057.html. 
 
Al Jazeera Arabic .2009. The Muslim Brotherhood 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nhs3R7amMZM. 
 





Al Masry al Youm. 2011. “Al Maghrabi Denies Playing a Role in the Allocation of 112 
Feddan for His Company and a Decision to Send Him to Prison , Chocks and Angers 
Him.” Al Masry Al Youm, February 19, 2011. 
http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=288356. 
 
Al Masry Al Youm. 2012.   “Independent Unions Against the Brotherhoodization of Unions 
and Calling for the Dismissal of Al Azhary.” Al Masry Al Youm, August 31, 2012. 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/160563. 
———. 2013. “Al Giza Court Orders a 37 years prison sentence for Ahmed Ezz.”  Al Masry 
al Youm, March 06, 2013. 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/293058. 
 
. ———. 2017. “ CTUWS Demands from Sisi to Abstain from Signing the New Trade Union 




Al Tawy, Aya. 2017. “80,500 Feddans of Egyptian Farmland Have Seen Violations over Past 




Al-Ali, Zaid. 2016. “Egypt’s Third Constitution in Three Years: A Critical Analysis.” In 
Egypt’s Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements, edited by Bernard 
Rougier and Stéphane Lacroix, 123–37. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New 
York City : Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
 
Albrecht, Holger. 2015. “Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political–Military Relations in 




Albrecht, Holger, and Oliver Schlumberger. 2004. “‘Waiting for Godot’: Regime Change 
without Democratization in the Middle East.” International Political Science Review / 
Revue Internationale de Science Politique 25 (4): 371–92. 
 
Alencar, Douglas Alcantara, and Eduardo Strachman. 2014. “Balance-of-Payments-
Constrained Growth in Brazil: 1951-2008.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 36 
(4): 673–98.  
 
Alexander, Anne, and Mostafa Bassiouny. 2014. Bread, Freedom, Social Justice: Workers 
and the Egyptian Revolution. London: Zed Books.  
 
Alexander, Anne, and Sameh Naguib. 2017. “Behind Every Caesar a New One? Reflections 
on Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt in Response to Gramsci on Tahrir.” 
Review of African Political Economy 0 (0): 1–13.  
 
Alexander, Robert J., and Eldon M Parker. 2003. A History of Organized Labor in Brazil. 
Westport, Conn: Praeger 
 
Allinson, Jamie. 2015. “Class Forces, Transition and the Arab Uprisings: A Comparison of 
Tunisia, Egypt and Syria.” Democratization 22 (2): 294–314. 
  
Almeida, Paulo Roberto de. 2009. “Lula’s Foreign Policy: Regional and Global Strategies.” 
In Brazil under Lula: Economy, Politics, and Society under the Worker-President, 
edited by Joseph L. Love and Werner Baer, 167–83. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
US. 
 
Al Qudus Al Arabi. 2017. “The Increase in labor protests in Egypt demanding better wages 
and working conditions,” July 28, 2017. http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=761828. 
 
Al-Rasheed, Madawi. 2011. “Sectarianism as Counter-Revolution: Saudi Responses to the 
Arab Spring.” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11 (3): 513–26.  
 
	 357	
Alvarez, Sonia E. 1990. “Women’s Participation in the Brazilian ‘People’s Church’: A 
Critical Appraisal.” Feminist Studies 16 (2): 381–408. 
  
Alves, Giovanni. 2000. “From the ‘New Syndicalism’ to ‘Social Agrument’: Rise (and Fall) 
of Syndicalism in Brazil (1978-1998).” Revista de Sociologia e Política, no. 15 
(November): 111–24.  
 
Alves, Maria Helena Moreira. 1985. State and Opposition in Military Brazil. Kindle Edition. 
Austin: University of Texas Press. 
 
———. 1989. “Interclass Alliances in the Opposition to the Military in Brazil Consequences 
for the Transition Period.” In Power and Popular Protest, edited by Susan Eckstein, 
279–98. Berkeley Los Angeles London: University of California Press 
 
Amadeo, Edward J., and José Márcio Camargo. 1993. “Labour Legislation and Institutional 
Aspects of the Brazilian Labour Market.” Labour 7(1): 157–80.  
 
Amado, Adriana Moreira, and Maria de Lourdes Rollemberg Mollo. 2015. “The 
‘Developmentalism’ Debate in Brazil: Some Economic and Political Issues.” Review 
of Keynesian Economics 3 (1): 77–89.  
 
Amar, Paul, and Vijay Prashad. 2013. Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the 
New Middle East. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
 
Ambrosio, Thomas. 2014. “Democratic States and Authoritarian Firewalls: America as a 
Black Knight in the Uprising in Bahrain.” Contemporary Politics 20 (3): 331–46.  
 
Anani, Khalil al-. 2015. “Upended Path: The Rise and Fall of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.” 
The Middle East Journal 69 (4): 527–43. 
 
Anderson, Lisa. 1987. “The State in the Middle East and North Africa.” Comparative Politics 
20 (1): 1–18. 
———. 1999. “Politics in the Middle East: Opportunities and Limits in the Quest for 
Theory.” Area Studies and Social Science: Strategies for Understanding Middle East 
	 358	
Politics, 1–10. 
———. 2011. “Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Libya.” Foreign Affairs, 2–7. 
 
Andrews, George Reid. 1995. “Black Political Mobilization in Brazil, 1975–1990.” In The 
Social Construction of Democracy, 1870–1990, edited by George Reid Andrews and 
Herrick Chapman, 218–40. New York: New York University Press. 
 
Anglade, Christian. 1985. “The State and Capital Accumulation in Contemporary Brazil.” In 
The State and Capital Accumulation in Latin America: Volume 1: Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, edited by Christian Anglade and Carlos Fortin, 52–138. Latin American 
Studies Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-
349-06552-3_2. 
 
Angrist, Michele Penner. 2013. “Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in 
Tunisia.” The Middle East Journal 67 (4): 547–64. 
 
Antunes, Ricardo. 2001. “Global Economic Restructuring and the World of Labor in Brazil: 
The Challenges to Trade Unions and Social Movements.” Geoforum, Urban Brazil, 32 
(4): 449–58. 
 
———. 2011. “A engenharia da cooptação e os sindicatos.” Pegada - A Revista da Geografia 
do Trabalho 12 (1).  
 
———. 2012. “Trade Unions, Social Conflict and the Political Left in Present-Day Brazil 
between Breach and Compromise.” In The New Latin American Left: Cracks in the 




———. 2016. “The New Morphology of Labour and Its Main Trends: Informalisation, 
Precarisation, (Im)Materiality and Value.” Critique 44 (1–2): 13–30.  
 
Antunes, Ricardo, and Ruy Braga. 2014. “Os Dias Que Abalaram o Brasil: as rebeliões de 
	 359	
junho, julho de 2013.” Revista de Políticas Públicas 18 (0): 41–47. 
 
Antunes, Ricardo, and Laurence Hallewell. 2000. “The World of Work, the Restructuring of 
Production, and Challenges to Trade Unionism and Social Struggles in Brazil.” Latin 
American Perspectives 27 (6): 9–26.  
 
Antunes, Ricardo, Marco Aurélio Santana, and Luis Alberto Hernández. 2014. “The 
Dilemmas of the New Unionism in Brazil: Breaks and Continuities.” Latin American 
Perspectives 41 (5): 10–21. 
 
Antunes, Ricardo, and Amy Shimshon-Santo. 1998. “Socialism and the Latin American 
Labor Movement: Points for Discussion.” Latin American Perspectives 25 (6): 26–27. 
 
Antunes, Ricardo, and Sabrina E. Wilson. 1994. “Recent Strikes in Brazil: The Main 
Tendencies of the Strike Movement of the 1980s.” Latin American Perspectives 21 
(1): 24–37.  
 
Aoudé, Ibrahim. 1994. “From National Bourgeois Development To ‘Infitah’: Egypt1952-
1992.” Arab Studies Quarterly 16(1), Winter 1994. 
 
Araujo, Aloisio, and Bruno Funchal. 2009. “The New Brazilian Bankruptcy Law.” Brazilian 
Journal of Political Economy, 29 (3): 191–212.  
 
Arends-Kuenning, Mary. 2009. “A Report Card for Lula: Progress in Education.” In Brazil 
under Lula: Economy, Politics, and Society under the Worker-President, edited by 
Joseph L. Love and Werner Baer, 205–20. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.  
Arestis, P., and Alfredo Saad-Filho. 2007. Political Economy of Brazil: Recent Economic 
Performance. Basingstoke [England] ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan 
 Arestis, Philip, Julimar da Silva Bichara, André Moreira Cunha, and Fernando Ferrari Filho. 
2016. “Brazil after the Great Recession: Searching for a Coherent Development 
Strategy.” In The Brazilian Economy Today, edited by Anthony W. Pereira and Lauro 
Mattei, 88–120. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY : Palgrave 
Macmillan 
Arjomand, Saïd Amir. 2013. “The Islam and Democracy Debate after 2011.” Constellations 
	 360	
20 (2): 297–311.  
Arslanalp, Mert, and Wendy R. Pearlman. 2017. “Mobilization in Military-Controlled 
Transitions: Lessons from Turkey, Brazil, and Egypt.” Comparative Sociology 16 (3): 
311–39.  
Aspden, Rachel. 2016. “Generation Revolution: How Egypt’s Military State Betrayed Its 
Youth.” The Guardian, June 2, 2016. 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/jun/02/generation-revolution-egypt-military-
state-youth. 
Assaad, Ragui, Caroline Krafft, John Roemer, and Djavad Salehi-Isfahani. 2017. “Inequality 
of Opportunity in Wages and Consumption in Egypt.” Review of Income and Wealth, 
March, n/a-n/a. https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12289. 
Auf, Yussef. n.d. “A Legal Analysis of Egypt’s Military Judiciary.” Atlantic Council. 
Accessed December 14, 2017. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/a-
legal-analysis-of-egypt-s-military-judiciary. 
Avritzer, Leonardo. 2010. “Living under a Democracy: Participation and Its Impact on the 
Living Conditions of the Poor.” Latin American Research Review 45: 166–85. 
Ayeb, Habib, and Ray Bush. 2014. “Small Farmer Uprisings and Rural Neglect in Egypt and 
Tunisia.” MERIP Middle East Report 44: 9. 
Ayubi, Nazih N. 1991. The State and Public Policies in Egypt since Sadat. Ithaca Press. 
———. 1995. Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East. IB 
Tauris. 
 
Azzoni, Carlos R., and Eduardo A. Haddad. 2018. “Regional Disparities.” In The Oxford 
Handbook of the Brazilian Economy edited by Edmund Amann, Carlos R. Azzoni, 
and Werner Baer. New York, NY : Oxford University Press. 
 
Baer, Werner. 2014. The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development. Seventh edition. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
 
———. 2018. “Brazil’s Import-Substitution Industrialization.” In The Oxford Handbook of 
the Brazilian Economy edited by Edmund Amann, Carlos R. Azzoni, and Werner 
Baer. New York, NY : Oxford University Press. 
 
	 361	
Baer, Werner, and Issac Kerstenetzky. 1964. “Import Substitution and Industrialization in 
Brazil.” The American Economic Review 54 (3): 411–25. 
 
Baer, Werner, and Joseph L. Love. 2009. “Introduction.” In Brazil under Lula: Economy, 
Politics, and Society under the Worker-President, edited by Joseph L. Love and 
Werner Baer, 1–5. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.  
Baer, Werner, and Annibal V. Villela. 1973. “Industrial Growth and Industrialization: 
Revisions in the Stages of Brazil’s Economic Development.” The Journal of 
Developing Areas 7 (2): 217–34. 
 
Baiocchi, Gianpaolo, Einar Braathen, and Ana Claudia Teixeira. 2013. “Transformation 
Institutionalized? Making Sense of Participatory Democracy in the Lula Era.” In 
Democratization in the Global South: The Importance of Transformative Politics, 
edited by Kristian Stokke and Olle Törnquist, 217–39. London: Palgrave Macmillan 
UK.  
Bak, Joan L. 1983. “Cartels, Cooperatives, and Corporatism: Getulio Vargas in Rio Grande 
Do Sul on the Eve of Brazil’s 1930 Revolution.” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review 63 (2): 255–75.  
Ban, Cornel. 2013. “Brazil’s Liberal Neo-Developmentalism: New Paradigm or Edited 
Orthodoxy?” Review of International Political Economy 20 (2): 298–331. 
Barakat, Saber, and Khaled Ali. 2003. “Unions without Workers and Workers without 
Unions: A report on the 2001/2006 Union Elections in Egypt” Cairo: Hisham 
Mubarak Foundation.  
Barros, Alexandre Rands, and André Matos Magalhães. 2009. “Northeast Brazil under the 
Lula Government.” In Brazil under Lula: Economy, Politics, and Society under the 
Worker-President, edited by Joseph L. Love and Werner Baer, 283–301. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan US. 
Barros, Mauricio Rands. 1999. Labour Relations and the New Unionism in Contemporary 
Brazil. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Bassyouni, Mustafa. 2015. “Egypt’s Trade Unions Take on the Regime.” Alaraby, 2015. 
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/a258925f-3527-47b6-afbb-0dbdc51e6a5a. 
Bayat, Asef. 1998. “Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: 
Comparing Islamic Activism in Iran and Egypt.” Comparative Studies in Society and 
	 362	
History 40 (1): 136–69. 
———. 2013a. Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, Second 
Edition. Stanford University Press. 
———. 2013b. (eds) Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam. Oxford ; New 
York : Oxford University Press. 
———. 2017a. Revolution without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring. 
Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press. 
———. 2017b. “Critical Voices in Critical Times: Revolution without Revolutionaries, an 




Beinin, Joel. 1981. “Formation of the Egyptian Working Class.” MERIP Reports, No. 94, 
February 1981. 
———. 1989. “Labor, Capital, and the State in Nasserist Egypt, 1952–1961.” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies. 
———. 2009 a. “Workers’ Struggles under ‘socialism’ and ‘Neoliberalism.’” In Egypt the 
Moment of Change, 68–86. 
———. 2009 b. “Workers’ Protest in Egypt: Neo-Liberalism and Class Struggle in 21st 
Century: Social Movement Studies: Vol 8, No 4” 8 (4): 449–54.  
———.  2011. “Workers and Egypt’s January 25 Revolution | International Labor and 
Working-Class History”. 
———. 2012. “The Rise of Egypt’s Workers.” Carnegie Middle East. https://carnegie-
mec.org/2012/06/28/rise-of-egypt-s-workers-pub-48689. 
———. 2013. “All Unionized and Nowhere to Go.” Carnegie Endowment. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/50540. 
———. 2016. Workers and Thieves: Labor Movements and Popular Uprisings in Tunisia 
and Egypt. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, Kindle Edition. 




 Bellin, Eva. 2004. “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism 
	 363	
in Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Politics 36 (2): 139–57.  
Bellos, Alex. 2003. “Leftwing Lula Earns Credit as His First 100 Days Revive Economy.” 
The Guardian, April 11, 2003, sec. World news. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/11/brazil.politics. 
Bianchi, Alvaro, and Ruy Braga. 2005. “Brazil: The Lula Government and Financial 
Globalization.” Social Forces 83 (4): 1745–62. 
Bianchi, Robert. 1986. “The Corporatization of the Egyptian Labor Movement.” Middle East 
Journal 40 (3): 429–44. 
———. 1989. Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt. Oxford 
University Press.  
Bittar, Jorge, and Antonio Lassance. 1992. O Modo Petista de Governar. EDITORA 
FUNDAÇÃO PERSEU ABRAMO. 
Bloomberg. 2016. “IMF Steps Deeper Into Middle East Cauldron With Loan to Egypt,” 
August 14, 2016. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-14/imf-steps-
deeper-into-middle-east-cauldron-with-loan-to-egypt. 
———. 2017. “Egypt Plans to Extend $2 Billion Financing Deal for a Year,” October 14, 
2017. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-14/egypt-plans-to-extend-2-
billion-financing-deal-for-a-year. 
Bochsler, Daniel, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2013. “Varieties of Democracy.” In Democracy in 
the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, edited by Hanspeter Kriesi, Sandra 
Lavenex, Frank Esser, Jörg Matthes, Marc Bühlmann, and Daniel Bochsler, 69–102. 
Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan 
UK.  
Bohn, Simone R. 2011. “Social Policy and Vote in Brazil: Bolsa Família and the Shifts in 
Lula’s Electoral Base.” Latin American Research Review 46 (1): 54–79.  
Boito, Armando. 2007. “Class Relations in Brazil’s New Neoliberal Phase.” Latin American 
Perspectives 34 (5): 115–31. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X07306304. 
Boito, Armando, Tatiana Berringer, and Gregory Duff Morton. 2014. “Social Classes, 
Neodevelopmentalism, and Brazilian Foreign Policy under Presidents Lula and 
Dilma.” Latin American Perspectives 41 (5): 94–109. 
Boito, Armando, Andréia Galvão, and Paula Marcelino. 2015. “La nouvelle phase du 
syndicalisme brésilien (2003-2013).” Cahiers des Amériques latines, no. 80 
(December): 145–64. https://doi.org/10.4000/cal.4184. 
Boito, Armando, and Paula Marcelino. 2011. “Decline in Unionism?: An Analysis of the New 
	 364	
Wave of Strikes in Brazil.” Latin American Perspectives 38 (5): 62–73.  
Boito, Armando, and Laura Randall. 1998. “Neoliberal Hegemony and Unionism in Brazil.” 
Latin American Perspectives 25 (1): 71–93. 
Boito, Armando, and Alfredo Saad-Filho. 2016. “State, State Institutions, and Political Power 
in Brazil.” Latin American Perspectives 43 (2): 190–206.  
Boito, Armando. 2003. “A Hegemonia Neoliberal No Governo Lula.” Crítica Marxista, 2003. 
Boito, Armando, and Andréia Galvão, eds. 2012. Política e classes sociais no Brasil dos anos 
2000. São Paulo, SP: Alameda. 
Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge Studies in Comparative 
Politics. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Boukhari, Jamal. 2017. “Egypt’s Conscripts Serving the Army’s Economic Empire.” Alaraby. 
September 5, 2017. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/9/5/egypts-
conscripts-serving-the-armys-economic-empire. 
 
Braga, Ruy. 2015. A Política Do Precariado: Do Populismo à Hegemonia Lulista. Boitempo 
Editorial. 
———. 2016. “Terra em Transe o Fim do lulismo e o retorno da luta de classes.” In As 
contradições do lulismo: A que ponto chegamos?, edited by André Singer and Isabel 
Loureiro, Boitempo Editorial. Boitempo Editorial. 
 
Brandford, Sue. 2015. “Working with Governments : The MST’s Experience with the 
Cardoso and Lula Administration.” In Challenging Social Inequality: The Landless 
Rural Worker’s Movement and Agrarian Reform in Brazil, edited by Miguel Carter, 
Duke University Press, 331–50. Durham, United States. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/mcgill/detail.action?docID=2009763. 
Bresser-Pereira, Luiz Carlos. 2009. “Os Dois Métodos e o Núcleo  Duro Da Teoria 
Econômica.” Revista de Economia Política 29(2), 2009. 
Bresser-Pereira, Luiz Carlos. 2016. “The Macroeconomic Tripod and the Workers’ Party 
Administration.” In The Brazilian Economy Today, edited by Anthony W. Pereira and 
Lauro Mattei, 121–34. Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137549815_6. 
Brown, Nathan, Yasser El-Shimy, Nathan Brown, and Yasser El-Shimy. 2016. “Did Sisi Save 
Egypt?” Foreign Affairs, January 25, 2016. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2016-01-25/did-sisi-save-egypt. 
	 365	
Brown, Nathan J. 2016. “Egypt’s Judiciary in a Postrevolutionary Era.” In Egypt’s 
Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements, edited by Bernard Rougier and 
Stéphane Lacroix, 101–21. The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and 
Political Economy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.  
Brownlee, Jason. 2002. “Democratization in the Arab World? The Decline of Pluralism in 
Mubarak’s Egypt.” Journal of Democracy 13 (4): 6–14. 
———. 2010. “The Muslim Brothers: Egypt’s Most Influential Pressure Group.” History 
Compass 8 (5): 419–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2010.00685.x. 
Bruera, Hernán F. Gómez. 2013. Lula, the Workers’ Party and the Governability Dilemma in 
Brazil. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203493984. 
Brun, Élodie. 2016. “Brazil’s Relations with Middle Eastern Countries: A Diplomacy in 
Search for Constancy (2003–2014).” In Latin American Foreign Policies towards the 
Middle East, edited by Marta Tawil Kuri, 37–57. Middle East Today. Palgrave 
Macmillan US.  
Bruneau, Thomas C., and W. E. Hewitt. 1989. “Patterns of Church Influence in Brazil’s 
Political Transition.” Comparative Politics 22 (1): 39–61. 
Brynen, Rex, Pete W. Moore, Bassel F. Salloukh, and Marie-Joelle Zahar. 2012. Beyond the 
Arab Spring: Authoritarianism & Democratization in the Arab World. Boulder, Colo.: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Bühlmann, Marc, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2013. “Models for Democracy.” In Democracy in the 
Age of Globalization and Mediatization, edited by Hanspeter Kriesi, Sandra Lavenex, 
Frank Esser, Jörg Matthes, Marc Bühlmann, and Daniel Bochsler, 44–68. Challenges 
to Democracy in the 21st Century Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.  
Bunce, Valerie. 2003. “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist 
Experience” World Politics 55 (2): 167–92. 
Bush, Ray, ed. 2002. Counter-Revolution In Egypt’s Countryside: Land and Farmers in the 
Era of Economic Reform. London ; New York: Zed Books. 
———. 2004. “Poverty and Neo-Liberal Bias in the Middle East and North Africa.” 
Development and Change 35 (4): 673–95. 
———. 2007a. “Mubarak’s Legacy for Egypt’s Rural Poor: Returning Land to the 
Landlords.” Land, Poverty and Livelihoods in an Era of Globalization. January 24, 
2007. 
———. 2007b. “Politics, Power and Poverty: Twenty Years of Agricultural Reform and 
Market Liberalisation in Egypt.” Third World Quarterly 28 (8): 1599–1615. 
	 366	
———. 2010. “Food Riots: Poverty, Power and Protest.” Journal of Agrarian Change 10 (1): 
119–29. 
———. 2011. “Coalitions for Dispossession and Networks of Resistance? Land, Politics and 
Agrarian Reform in Egypt.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38 (3): 391–
405.  
Caldwell, Kia. 2007. Negras in Brazil: Re-Envisioning Black Women, Citizenship, and the 
Politics of Identity. Rutgers University Press. 
———. 2017. Health Equity in Brazil: Intersections of Gender, Race, and Policy. University 
of Illinois Press.  
Calhoun-Brown, Allison. 2000. “Upon This Rock: The Black Church, Nonviolence, and the 
Civil Rights Movement.” PS: Political Science & Politics 33 (2): 169–74.  
Callinicos, Alex. 2016. “Neoliberalism, Austerity, and Crisis.” In The Brazilian Economy 
Today, edited by Anthony W. Pereira and Lauro Mattei, 29–42. Palgrave Macmillan 
UK. 
Cammett, Melani, and Ishac Diwan. 2016. “The Roll-Back of the State and the Rise of Crony 
Capitalism.” In The Middle East Economies in Times of Transition, edited by Ishac 
Diwan and Ahmed Galal, 63–98. International Economic Association Series. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan UK.  
Cammett, Melani, Ishac Diwan, Alan Richards, and John Waterbury. 2015. A Political 
Economy of the Middle East. 4th edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Cardenas, E., J. Ocampo, and R. Thorp. 2016. An Economic History of Twentieth-Century 
Latin America: Volume 3: Industrialization and the State in Latin America: The 
Postwar Years. Springer. 
Cardoso, Adalberto Moreira. 2002. “Neoliberalism, Unions, and Socio-Economic Insecurity 
in Brazil.” Labour, Capital and Society / Travail, Capital et Société 35 (2): 282–316. 
Carlstrom, Gregg. 2013. “Egypt Passes Law Restricting Public Protests.” November 25, 2013. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/egypt-passes-law-restricting-
public-protests-2013112413847867334.html. 
———. 2012. “Political Clash over Egypt’s Constitution.” October 20, 2012. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/10/20121019620186523.html. 
Carothers, Thomas. 2002. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy 13 
(1): 5–21. 
Carrara, Sergio. 2012. “Discrimination, Policies, and Sexual Rights in Brazil.” Cadernos de 
Saúde Pública 28 (January): 184–89.  
	 367	
Carter, Miguel. 2010. “The Landless Rural Workers Movement and Democracy in Brazil.” 
Latin American Research Review 45: 186–217. 
———, ed. 2015. Challenging Social Inequality: The Landless Rural Worker’s Movement 
and Agrarian Reform in Brazil. Durham, UNITED STATES: Duke University Press. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/mcgill/detail.action?docID=2009763. 
Caulfield, Sueann, and Cristiana Schettini. 2017. “Gender and Sexuality in Brazil since 
Independence.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History, October. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.013.296. 
Cavalcante, Luiz Ricardo, and Simone Uderman. 2009. “Regional Development Policies, 
2003–2006.” In Brazil under Lula: Economy, Politics, and Society under the Worker-
President, edited by Joseph L. Love and Werner Baer, 263–81. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230618374_15. 
Cavatorta, Francesco. 2015. “Post-Islamism, Ideological Evolution and ‘La Tunisianité’ of 
the Tunisian Islamist Party al-Nahda.” Journal of Political Ideologies 20 (1): 27–42. 
Cavatorta, Francesco, and Fabio Merone. 2017. Salafism after the Arab Awakening : 
Contending with People’s Power. 
Cavendish, James C. 1994. “Christian Base Communities and the Building of Democracy: 
Brazil and Chile.” Sociology of Religion 55 (2): 179–95.  
Chafi, Omar. 2011. “A Respone to the Call for Ending Strikes” Revolutionary Socialists 
(blog). February 2011. https://revsoc.me/workers-farmers/rd-l-dw-wqf-ldrbt/. 
Chagas-Bastos, Fabrício H. 2019. “Political Realignment in Brazil: Jair Bolsonaro and the 
Right Turn.” Revista de Estudios Sociales, no. 69 (July): 92–100.  
Charbel, Jano. 2012. “Egypt’s Constitution Seen to Curtail Labor Rights and Workers 
Freedoms.” Egypt Independent. January 21, 2013. 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/egypt-s-constitution-seen-curtail-labor-rights-and-
workers-freedoms/. 
———. 2013. “Labor Activist Wades into the Deep State.” Mada Masr, September 30, 2013. 
https://madamasr.com/en/2013/09/30/feature/politics/labor-activist-wades-into-the-
deep-state/. 
———. 2015a. “What Sisi Didn’t Say about Labor Conditions in Constructing the New Suez 
Canal.” Mada Masr, August 7, 2015. 
https://madamasr.com/en/2015/08/07/feature/economy/what-sisi-didnt-say-about-
labor-conditions-in-constructing-the-new-suez-canal/. 
———. 2015b. “Workers Protest Civil Service Law in One of Biggest Street Actions since 
	 368	
2013.” Mada Masr, August 10, 2015. 
https://madamasr.com/en/2015/08/10/feature/politics/workers-protest-civil-service-
law-in-one-of-biggest-street-actions-since-2013/. 
———. 2015c. “Labor Unrest from North to South.” Mada Masr, December 19, 2015. 
https://madamasr.com/en/2015/12/19/feature/economy/labor-unrest-from-north-to-
south/. 
———. 2015d. “Spate of Industrial Action Continues to Gather Steam.” Mada Masr, 
December 29, 2015. https://madamasr.com/en/2015/12/29/feature/economy/spate-of-
industrial-action-continues-to-gather-steam/. 
———. 2016a. “Strikes and Labor Protests Hit State-Owned Companies.” Mada Masr, 
January 5, 2016. https://madamasr.com/en/2016/01/05/feature/economy/strikes-and-
labor-protests-hit-state-owned-companies/. 
———. 2016b. “Why Are Egypt’s Independent Trade Unions on Trial?” Mada Masr, 
February 8, 2016. https://madamasr.com/en/2016/02/08/feature/politics/why-are-
egypts-independent-trade-unions-on-trial/. 
Cheibub, José Antonio. 2009. “Political Reform in Brazil: Recent Proposals, Diagnosis, and a 
Suggestion.” In Brazil under Lula: Economy, Politics, and Society under the Worker-
President, edited by Joseph L. Love and Werner Baer, 9–25. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230618374_2. 
Chomiak, Laryssa. 2011. “The Making of a Revolution in Tunisia.” Middle East Law and 
Governance 3: 68–83. 
CIA. 1984. “Interagency Intelligence Assessment: Developments in the Egyptian Armed 
Forces.” https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP87T00413R000100090002-9.pdf. 
———. 1985. “Egyptian Arms Industry.” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP06T00412R000504730001-
1.pdf. 
———. 1987. “The Egyptian Military Its Role and Missions Under Mubarak.” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88T00096R000700820001-
5.pdf. 
———. 1988. “Growing Military Influence.” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP04T00990R000100630001-
1.pdf. 
Clark, Janine A. 2011. “Social Movement Theory, Selective Incentives, and Benefits.” In 
	 369	
Political Islam A Critical Reader, Routledge. USA and Canada: Frédéric Volpi. 
———. 2012. “Islamist Movements and Democratic Politics.” In Beyond the Arab Spring : 
Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Arab World, Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
London. 
Close, David. 2009. Latin American Politics : An Introduction. Toronto : University of 
Toronto Press 
Coes, Donald V. 1995. Macroeconomic Crises, Policies, and Growth in Brazil, 1964-90. 
World Bank Publications. 
———. 2009a. “Exchange Rate Policy, Perceptions of Risk, and External Constraints under 
Lula.” In Brazil under Lula: Economy, Politics, and Society under the Worker-
President, edited by Joseph L. Love and Werner Baer, 115–33. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230618374_7. 
Cohen, Youssef. 1987. “Democracy from Above: The Political Origins of Military 
Dictatorship in Brazil.” World Politics 40 (1): 30–54.  
Collier, Ruth B, and James Mahoney. 1995. “Labor and Democratization: Comparing the 
First and Third Waves in Europe and Latin America,” Institute for Research on Labor and 
Employment.  
Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1979. “Inducements versus Constraints: 
Disaggregating ‘Corporatism.’” American Political Science Review 73 (04): 967–86. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1953982. 
———. 2002. “Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and 
Regime Dynamics in Latin America.” SSRN Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2769109. 
Conclat. 1981. “RESOLUÇÕES DA CONFERÊNCIA NACIONAL DA CLASSE 
TRABALHADORA - Resolutions of the First National Conference for the Working 
Class.” 
Conclat. 1983. “RESOLUÇÕES DO 1o CONGRESSO NACIONAL DA CLASSE 
TRABALHADORA - Resolutions of the First National Congress of the Working 
Class.” 
Cook, Maria Lorena. 2007. The Politics of Labor Reform in Latin America: Between 
Flexibility and Rights. Pennsylvania State University Press. 
http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=4e6cfd0c9fd709d9e4010ed13796fe27. 
Cook, Steven A. 2007. Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in 
Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
	 370	
http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=3318410. 
———. 2016. “Where the Turkish Military Fails, Egypt’s Succeeds.” Foreign Affairs, July 
19, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2016-07-19/where-turkish-
military-fails-egypts-succeeds. 
Cottenet-Djoufelkit, Hélène. 2001. “L’industrialisation de l’Égypte Au Xxe Siècle.” 
Égypte/Monde Arabe, Deuxième Série. 
Crowell, Jamison Curtis. 2013. “Understanding State-Labor Relations in Morsi’s Egypt: 
Moving beyond Islamic Narratives.” M.A., United States/California: University of 
California, Santa Barbara. https://0-search-proquest-
com.mercury.concordia.ca/pqdtglobal/docview/1468682704/abstract/47849CA290404
B2EPQ/1. 
CTUWS. 2015. “2014 Assassination of Union Freedom | Center for Trade Union & Workers 
Services.” http://www.ctuws.com/en/content/2014%C2%A0assassination-union-
freedom. 
———. 2016. “Returning to Point Zero. Report about Violations for Union Freedoms 
1/1/2016 – 1/6/2016 | Center for Trade Union & Workers Services.” 
http://www.ctuws.com/en/content/returning-point-zero-report-about-
violations-union-freedoms-112016-%E2%80%93-162016. 
Cutright, Phillips. 1963. “National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis.” 
American Sociological Review 28 (2): 253–64. 
Cutright, Phillips, and James A. Wiley. 1969. “Modernization and Political Representation: 
1927–1966.” Studies in Comparative International Development 5 (2): 23–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02800607. 
Dadush, Uri, and Michele Dunne. 2011. “American and European Responses to the Arab 
Spring: What’s the Big Idea?” The Washington Quarterly 34 (4): 131–45.  
Dagnino, Evelina, and Ana Claudia Chaves Teixeira. 2014. “The Participation of Civil 
Society in Lula’s Government.” Journal of Politics in Latin America 6 (3): 39–66. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy; Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Dalacoura, Katerina. 2016. “Islamism and Neoliberalism in the Aftermath of the 2011 Arab 
Uprisings: The Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt and Nahda in Tunisia.” In 
Neoliberal Governmentality and the Future of the State in the Middle East and North 
Africa, edited by Emel Akçali, 61–83. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.  
Daniel, James M. 1946. “The Brazilian Revolution of 1930, Causes and Aftermath.” The 
	 371	
Historian 9 (1): 37–42. 
D’Araujo, Maria Celina. 2009. “Os Ministros Da Nova República Notas Para Entender a 
Democratização Do Poder Execu Tivo.” 60. 
https://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/handle/10438/6745 
Davis, Diane E. 1999. “The Power of Distance: Re-Theorizing Social Movements in Latin 
America.” Theory and Society 28 (4): 585–638. 
De Smet, Brecht. 2013. “Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt.” Science & Society 78 
(1): 11–40. 
———. 2015. A Dialectical Pedagogy of Revolt: Gramsci, Vygotsky, and the Egyptian 
Revolution. Brill. 
———. n.d. “From Nasser to the 25 January Revolution Contradictions of Accumulation and 
Development in Egypt Draft.” 
https://www.academia.edu/4410703/From_Nasser_to_the_25_January_Revoluti
on_Contradictions_of_Accumulation_and_Development_in_Egypt_Draft. (Accessed 
September 14, 2017) 
Della Cava, Ralph. 1989. “The ‘People’s Church,’ the Vatican, and Abertura.” In 
Democratizin Brazil : Problems of Transition and Consolidation edited by Alfred 
Stepan, 143–67. New York: Oxford University Press  
De Oliveira, Rodrigues Carlindo, Eduardo G.Noronha, Vera Gebrim, and Victor Gnecco 
Pagani . 2016. Greves no Brasil de 1968 aos Dias Atuais (Livro 1). Sao Paulo: Cortez 
Editora. 
———. Greves no Brasil de 1968 aos Dias Atuais (Livro 2). São Paulo: Cortez Editora. 
Diamond, Sara, and Christian Poirier. 2010. “Brazil’s Native Peoples and the Belo Monte 
Dam: A Case Study.” NACLA Report on the Americas 43 (5): 25–29.  
Dieter, Weiss, and Wurzel Ulrich. 1998. Development Centre Studies The Economics and 
Politics of Transition to an Open Market Economy Egypt: Egypt. OECD Publishing. 
Diniz, Eli. 1989. “The Post-1930 Industrial Elite.” In Modern Brazil Elites and Masses in 
Historical Perspectives, University of Nebraska Press, 103–23. Michael L Conniff and 
Frank D McCann. 
———. 2011. “Democracy, State, and Industry: Continuity and Change between the Cardoso 
and Lula Administrations.” Latin American Perspectives 38 (3): 59–77. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X10391065. 
Diwan, Ishac. 2012. “Understanding the revolution in the Middle East : the Central role of the 




Dixon, Marion. 2014. “The Land Grab, Finance Capital, and Food Regime Restructuring: The 
Case of Egypt.” Review of African Political Economy 41 (140): 232–48. 
 Doctor, Mahrukh. 2007. “Lula’s Development Council: Neo-Corporatism and Policy Reform 
in Brazil.” Latin American Perspectives 34 (6): 131–48.  
Döring, Heike, Rodrigo Salles Pereira dos Santos, and Eva Pocher. 2017. “New 
Developmentalism in Brazil? The Need for Sectoral Analysis.” Review of 
International Political Economy 0 (0): 1–31.  
Dorsey, James. 2016. “Under Pressure, Egyptian President Promises Change.” Huffington 
Post (blog). October 30, 2016. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-dorsey/under-
pressure-egyptian-p_b_12709666.html. 
Dossie Super interessante. 2016. “21 Mitos Sobre a Ditadura Militar : As Verdades e Mentiras 
Sobre o Período Mais Obscuro Da História Do Brasil.” 
https://super.abril.com.br/especiais/21-mitos-sobre-a-ditadura-militar/. 
Droz-Vincent, Philippe. 2010. “From Political to Economic Actors: The Changing Role  of 
Middle Eastern Armies.” In Debating Arab Authoritarianism : Dynamics and 
Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes edited by Oliver Schlumberger, 177–95. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Dulles, John W. F. 2012. Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises 1955-1964. University of 
Texas Press. 
Dunne, Michele, Joel Beinin, Kamal Abbas, and Sarah Whitson. 2010. “Labor Protest Politics 
and Worker Rights in Egypt.” February 17, 2010. 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/2010/02/17/labor-protest-politics-and-worker-rights-in-egypt-
event-2816. 
Dunne, Michele. 2017. “Egypt: Human Rights, Seven Years After the Revolution.” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. December 06, 2017. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/12/06/egypt-human-rights-seven-years-after-
revolution-pub-74923. 
ECES. 2016. “Egypt’s Economic Profile 2016.” The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies. 
February 2016. http://www.eces.org.eg/Publication.aspx?Id=605&Type=7. 
Egypt Independent. 2016. “Egypt Becomes World’s Fourth-Biggest Weapons Importer: 




Egypt Independent. 2011. “Police and Street Vendors Clash in Ramses Square.” Egypt 
Independent. August 23, 2011. https://www.egyptindependent.com/police-and-street-
vendors-clash-ramses-square/ 
El-Rifae. 2014. “Egypt’s Informal Economy.” Middle East Institute January 6, 2014. 
https://www.mei.edu/content/egypt%E2%80%99s-informal-economy. 
El Gundy, Zeinab. 2012. “UPDATED: Revolution Youth Coalition Disband with End of 
Egypt’s ‘transitional Phase’ - Politics - Egypt - Ahram Online.” Ahramonline, July 7, 
2012. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/46988/Egypt/Politics-
/UPDATED-Revolution-Youth-Coalition-disband-with-en.aspx. 
El Tarouty, Safinaz. 2015. Businessmen, Clientelism, and Authoritarianism in Egypt. 
Palgrave Macmillan US. 
El Waten News. 2017. “The Independent Unions Call upon the President Sisi for Rescue.” El 
Waten News, November 14, 2017. 
https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/2707515. 
El-Ghobashy, Mona. 2005. “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers.” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 37 (3): 373–95. 
El-Hamalawy, Hossam. 2011. “The Workers, Middle Class, Military Junta, and the 
Permanent Revolution.” Jadaliyya, February 12, 2011. 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/23689. 
El-Mahdi, Rabab. 2011. “Labour Protests in Egypt: Causes and Meanings.” Review of African 
Political Economy 38 (129): 387–402.  
El-Mahdi, Rabab., and Philip Marfleet. 2009. Egypt: The Moment of Change. London: Zed 
Bookd.  
Encarnación, Omar G. 2003. “Political Institutions and Democratization in Brazil.” In The 
Myth of Civil Society, edited by Omar G. Encarnación, 133–60. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan US.  
Ennaji, Moha. 2016. “About North African Women’s Rights After the Arab Spring.” In 
Women’s Movements in Post-“Arab Spring” North Africa, edited by Fatima Sadiqi, 
97–107. Comparative Feminist Studies. Palgrave Macmillan US.  
Erickson, Kenneth Paul. 1977. The Brazilian Corporative State and Working-Class Politics. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Escobar, Arturo, and Sonia E. Alvarez. 1992. The Making of Social Movements in Latin 
America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy. Westview Press.  
	 374	
Evans, Peter. 1977. “Multinationals, State-Owned Corporations, and the Transformation of 
Imperialism: A Brazilian Case Study.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 
26 (1): 43–64. https://doi.org/10.1086/450994. 
Evans, Peter B. 1979. Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and 
Local Capital in Brazil. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
———. 2001. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. 1 online resource 
(344 pages) vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=574432. 
Evans, Peter B., Dietrich. Rueschemeyer, and Theda. Skocpol. 1985. Bringing the State Back 
In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam034/85004703.html. 
Farah, Nadia Ramsis. 2009. Egypt’s Political Economy: Power Relations in Development. 
The American University in Cairo Press. 
Farid, Doaa. 2016. “70 Million Reliant on Food Subsidies in Peril amid Government 
Austerity and Mismanagement - Daily News Egypt.” Daily News Egypt, March 2, 
2016. https://dailynewsegypt.com/2016/03/02/70-million-reliant-on-food-subsidies-in-
peril-amid-government-austerity-and-mismanagement/. 
Faucher, Philippe. 2018. “Leviathan Captured Neoliberalism as Solution and Problem in 
Brazil.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Brazilian Economy edited by Edmund 
Amann, Carlos R. Azzoni, and Werner Baer. Oxford University Press.  
Fausto, Boris. 2014a. “The Military Government and the Transition to Democracy (1964–
1984).” A Concise History of Brazil. August 2014. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139567060.007. 
Fearnside, Phillip M. 2006. “Dams in the Amazon: Belo Monte and Brazil’s Hydroelectric 
Development of the Xingu River Basin.” Environmental Management 38 (1): 16.  
Fernandes, Sabrina. 2017. “Crisis of Praxis: Depoliticization and Leftist Fragmentation in 
Brazil.” Ph.D Dissertation, Carleton University.  
Figueiredo, Ademir, and Clemente Ganz Lúcio. 2015. “O DIEESE no século XXI.” Revista 
Ciências do Trabalho 0 (5): 55-90–90. 
Figueiredo, Argelina Cheibub. 2010. “The Collor Impeachment and Presidential Government 
in Brazil.” In Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America: Causes and Outcomes of 
Executive Instability in Developing Democracies, edited by Mariana Llanos and Leiv 
Marsteintredet, 111–27. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.  
Figueiredo, Argelina Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. “Presidential Power, Legislative 
	 375	
Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil.” Comparative Politics 32 (2): 151–70. 
Filho, Fernando Ferrari. 2016. “The Economic Policies and Performance of Brazil’s Leftist 
Government: A Critical Analysis.” In The Brazilian Economy Today, edited by 
Anthony W. Pereira and Lauro Mattei, 77–87. Palgrave Macmillan UK.  
Fishlow, Albert. 1972. “Brazilian Size Distribution of Income.” The American Economic 
Review 62 (1/2): 391–402. 
Flores, David. 2011. “Social Movement Unionism and Neoliberalism in São Paulo, Brazil: 
Shifting Logics of Collective Action in Telemarketing Labor Unions.” Societies 
Without Borders 6: 30. 
Fontes, Paulo, and Larissa R. Corrêa. 2018. “Labor and Dictatorship in Brazil: A 
Historiographical Review.” International Labor and Working-Class History 93: 27–
51.  
Fox, Jonathan. 2013. An Introduction to Religion and Politics: Theory and Practice. 
Routledge. 
French, Jan Hoffman. 2007. “A Tale of Two Priests and Two Struggles: Liberation Theology 
from Dictatorship to Democracy in the Brazilian Northeast.” The Americas 63 (3): 
409–43. 
French, John D. 1989. “Industrial Workers and the Birth of the Populist Republic in Brazil, 
1945-1946.” Latin American Perspectives 16 (4): 5–27. 
French, John, and Alexandre Fortes. 2012. “Nurturing Hope, Deepening Democracy, and 
Combating Inequalities in Brazil: Lula, the Workers’ Party, and Dilma Rousseff’s 
2010 Election as President.” Labor 9 (1): 7–28.  
Gause. Gregory. 2011. “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring.” Foreign Affairs, 
July 1, 2011. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2011-07-01/why-
middle-east-studies-missed-arab-spring. 
Galvão, Andréia. 2003. “Neoliberalismo e reforma trabalhista no Brasil.” 
http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/280199. 
———. 2014. “The Brazilian Labor Movement under PT Governments.” Latin American 
Perspectives 41.5, 2014. 
———. 2014. “Les mouvements sociaux dans le Brésil de Lula et Dilma.” Savoir/Agir n° 27 
(1): 31–38. 
———. 2016. “Political Action and the Brazilian Labor Movement: Issues and 
Contradictions Facing PT Governments.” Studies in Political Economy 97 (3): 270–
84.  
	 376	
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences. BCSIA Studies in International Security. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press.  
Giannotti, Vito. 2007. Historía das lutas dos trabalhadores no Brasil. Mauad Editora Ltda. 
Gonzalez, Elizabeth, and Luisa Leme. 2019. “Tracking the First 100 Days of Brazilian 
President Jair Bolsonaro.” AS/COA. April 2019. https://www.as-
coa.org/articles/tracking-first-100-days-brazilian-president-jair-bolsonaro. 
Graham, Lawrence, and Robert H. Wilson. 2012. The Political Economy of Brazil: Public 
Policies in an Era of Transition. University of Texas Press. 
Guidry, John A. 2003. “Not Just Another Labor Party: The Workers’ Party and Democracy in 
Brazil.” Labor Studies Journal 28 (1): 83–108.  
Gumuscu, Sebnem. 2010. “Class, Status, and Party: The Changing Face of Political Islam in 
Turkey and Egypt.” Comparative Political Studies 43 (7): 835–61. 
Haddad, Mônica A. 2009 . “A Spatial Analysis of Bolsa Família: Is Allocation Targeting the 
Needy?” In Brazil under Lula: Economy, Politics, and Society under the Worker-
President, edited by Joseph L. Love and Werner Baer, 187–203. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan US.  
Haddon, Hazel. 2013. “Is the Mubarak Regime Making a Comeback?” August 30, 2013. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/20138291358285746.html. 
Hadiz, Vedi R., and Khoo Boo Teik. 2011a. “Approaching Islam and Politics from Political 
Economy: A Comparative Study of Indonesia and Malaysia.” The Pacific Review 24 
(4): 463–85. 
Hafez, Sherine. 2014. “The Revolution Shall Not Pass through Women’s Bodies: Egypt, 
Uprising and Gender Politics.” The Journal of North African Studies 19 (2): 172–85. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2013.879710. 
Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 1997. “The Political Economy of Democratic 
Transitions.” Comparative Politics 29 (3): 263–83. https://doi.org/10.2307/422121. 
Hagopian, Frances. 1990. “‘Democracy by Undemocratic Means’?: Elites, Political Pacts, and 
Regime Transition in Brazil.” Comparative Political Studies 23 (2): 147–70.  
Hall, Anthony. 2008. “Brazil’s Bolsa Família: A Double-Edged Sword?” Development and 
Change 39 (5): 799–822.  
Hall, Michael M. 2009. “The Labor Policies of the Lula Government.” In Brazil under Lula: 
Economy, Politics, and Society under the Worker-President, edited by Joseph L. Love 
and Werner Baer, 151–65. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. 
	 377	
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230618374_9. 
Hammer, Joshua. 2017. “Egypt: The New Dictatorship.” The New York Review of Books. 
June 8, 2017. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/06/08/egypt-the-new-
dictatorship/. 
Hammond, John L. 2009. “Land Occupations, Violence, and the Politics of Agrarian Reform 
in Brazil.” Latin American Perspectives 36 (4): 156–77. 
Handoussa, Heba and Nivine El Oraby. 2004. “Civil Service Wages and Reform: The Case of 
Egypt.” The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies. May 2004. 
http://eces.org.eg/Publication.aspx?Id=89&Type=10. 
Hanieh, Adam. 2011a. Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States. 1st ed. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
———. 2011b. “Beyond Mubarak: Reframing The ‘Politics’ and ‘Economics’ of Egypt’s 
Uprising.” Studies in Political Economy 87 (1): 7–27.  
———. 2011c. “Egypt’s ‘Orderly Transition’? International Aid and the Rush to Structural 
Adjustment.” Jadaliyya - Ezine, May. 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1711/egypt%E2%80%99s-
%E2%80%98orderly-transition%E2%80%99-international-aid-and. 
———. 2013. Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East. 
Haymarket Books. 
———. 2015. “Shifting Priorities or Business as Usual? Continuity and Change in the Post-
2011 IMF and World Bank Engagement with Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt.” British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42 (1): 119–34. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2015.973199. 
Harb, Imad. 2003. “The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?” 
Middle East Journal 57 (2): 269–90. 
Harding, Luke. 2011. “WikiLeaks Cables Show Close US Relationship with Egyptian 
President.” The Guardian, January 28, 2011, sec. US news. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/28/wikileaks-cairo-cables-egypt-
president. 
Hartshorn, Ian M. 2015. “Corporatism, Labor Mobilization, and the Seeds of Revolution in 
Egypt and Tunisia.” Ph.D., Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania.  
Harvey, David. 1990. The Condition of Postmodernity : An Enquiry into the Origins of 
Cultural Change. Oxford: Blackwell. 
———. 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Incorporated. 
	 378	
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/mcgill/detail.action?docID=886664. 
———. 2006. Spaces of Global Capitalism. Verso. 
———. 2007. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford ; Oxford University Press,. 
———. 2010a. A Companion to Marx’s Capital. London: Verso. 
———. 2013. Jadaliyya - On Why Struggles over Urban Space Matter: An Interview with 
David HarveyJadaliyya. https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/29822/On-Why-
Struggles-over-Urban-Space-Matter-An-Interview-with-David-Harvey. 
———. 2014. Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism. Oxford University Press. 
Hauslohner, Abigail. 2014. “Egypt’s ‘Military Inc’ Expands Its Control of the Economy.” The 
Guardian, March 18, 2014, sec. World news. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/egypt-military-economy-power-
elections. 
Hearst, David. 2013. “Why Saudi Arabia Is Taking a Risk by Backing the Egyptian Coup.” 
The Guardian, August 20, 2013. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/20/saudi-arabia-coup-egypt. 
Heydemann, Steven. 2004. Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of 
Economic Reform Revisited. Springer. 
———. 2007. “Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World.” The Saban Center The 
Brookings Institution. 
Hilgers, Tina. 2012. Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics. Palgrave MacMillian. 
Hilton, Stanley E. 1975. “Vargas and Brazilian Economic Development, 1930-1945: A 
Reappraisal of His Attitude Toward Industrialization and Planning.” The Journal of 
Economic History 35 (4): 754–78. 
———. 1981. “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960: End of the Special 
Relationship.” The Journal of American History 68 (3): 599–624. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1901941. 
Hinnebusch, Raymond A. 1981a. “Egypt Under Sadat: Elites, Power Structure, and Political 
Change in a Post-Populist State.” Social Problems 28 (4): 442–64.  
———.1985. Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an 
Authoritarian-Modernizing State. New York: Lynne Rienner. 
Hirschman, Albert O. 1987. “The Political Economy of Latin American Development: Seven 
Exercises in Retrospection.” Latin American Research Review 22 (3): 7–36. 
Hirst, Monica. 2005. The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations. 
Routledge. 
	 379	
Hochstetler, Kathryn. 2008. “Organized Civil Society.” In Democratic Brazil Revisited edited 
by Peter Kingstone and Timothy J Power , 33–53. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press. 
———. 2000. “Democratizing Pressures From Below? Social Movements In New Brazilian 
Democracy,” In Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions, and Processes edited by Peter 
R. Kingstone, and Timothy Power, 167-185. Pittsburgh : University of Pittsburgh 
Press.  
Hofman, André A. 2000. The Economic Development of Latin America in the Twentieth 
Century. Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 
Hollis, Rosemary. 2012. “No Friend of Democratization: Europe’s Role in the Genesis of the 
‘Arab Spring.’” International Affairs 88 (1): 81–94.  
Holston, James. 2008. Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in 
Brazil. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Hopewell, Kristen. 2016a. “The Accidental Agro-Power: Constructing Comparative 
Advantage in Brazil.” New Political Economy 21 (6): 536–54.  
Houtzager, Peter P. 1998. “State and Unions in the Transformation of the Brazilian 
Countryside, 1964- 1979.” Latin American Research Review 33 (2): 103–42. 
———. 2001. “Collective Action and Political Authority: Rural Workers, Church, and State 
in Brazil.” Theory and Society 30 (1): 1–45.  
 
Hroub, Khaled, ed. 2011. Political Islam: Context Versus Ideology. London: Saqi Books. 
Htun, Mala. 2004. “From ‘Racial Democracy’ to Affirmative Action: Changing State Policy 
on Race in Brazil.” Latin American Research Review 39 (1): 60–89. 
Huber, Daniela. 2015. “A Pragmatic Actor — The US Response to the Arab Uprisings.” 
Journal of European Integration 37 (1): 57–75.  
Huber, Evelyne, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens. 1993. “The Impact of 
Economic Development on Democracy.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (3): 71–
86.  
 
Huggins, Martha Knisely, and Marie-Louise Glebbeek. 2009. Women Fielding Danger: 
Negotiating Ethnographic Identities in Field Research. Rowman & Littlefield.  
Humphrey, John. 2017. Capitalist Control and Workers’ Struggle in the Brazilian Auto 
Industry. Princeton University Press. 
Hunter, Wendy. 1995. “Politicians against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Post-
	 380	
authorization Brazil on JSTOR.” Comparative Politics, 1995. 
———. 2000. “Assessing Civil-Military Relations in Post-authoritarian Brazil” In  
Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions, and Processes edited by Peter R. Kingstone, and 
Timothy Power. Pittsburgh : University of Pittsburgh Press.  
———. 2009. The Transformation of the Workers’ Party in Brazil, 1989–2009. Kindle 
Edition. Cambridge University Press. 
Hunter, Wendy, and Timothy J. Power. 2005. “Lula’s Brazil at Midterm.” Journal of 
Democracy 16 (3): 127–39. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2005.0046. 
———. 2007. “Rewarding Lula: Executive Power, Social Policy, and the Brazilian Elections 
of 2006.” Latin American Politics and Society 49 (1): 1–30. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2007.tb00372.x. 
Hunter, Wendy, and Natasha Borges Sugiyama. 2009. “Democracy and Social Policy in 
Brazil: Advancing Basic Needs, Preserving Privileged Interests.” Latin American 
Politics and Society; Coral Gables 51 (2): 29–IV.  
Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (3): 22–49. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/20045621. 
———. 2006. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, Conn. ; Yale University 
Press. 
Ikram, Khaled. 2005. The Egyptian Economy, 1952-2000: Performance Policies and Issues. 
Kindle Edition. Routledge. 
IMF. 2018. “Egypt: The Economy Is Gathering Strength.” IMF. Accessed January 24, 2018. 
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/09/25/na092617-egypt-the-
economy-is-gathering-strength 
IMF. 2019. “Arab Republic of Egypt : Fourth Review Under the Extended Arrangement 
Under the Extended Fund Facility-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the 




Inman, Phillip. 2011. “Mubarak Family Fortune Could Reach $70bn, Says Expert.” The 
Guardian, February 4, 2011, sec. World news. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/04/hosni-mubarak-family-fortune. 
International Crisis Group (ICG). 2012. “Lost in Transition: The World According to Egypt’s 
SCAF” International Crisis Group.” 121. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-
	 381	
north-africa/north-africa/egypt/lost-transition-world-according-egypt-s-scaf. 
Ismail, Salwa. 2006. Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters. Kindle Edition. University of 
Minnesota Press. https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/political-life-in-
cairoas-new-quarters. 
———. 2007. “Islamism, Re-Islamization and the Fashioning of Muslim Selves: Refiguring 
the Public Sphere.” Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 4 (1). 
https://doi.org/10.2202/1554-4419.1116. 
———. 2011a. “Authoritarian Government, Neo-Liberalism and Everyday Civilities in 
Egypt.” Third World Quarterly 32 (June): 845–62. 
———. 2011b. “Civilities, Subjectivities and Collective Action: Preliminary Reflections in 
Light of the Egyptian Revolution.” Third World Quarterly 32 (5): 989–95.  
———. 2011c. “The Syrian Uprising: Imagining and Performing the Nation.” Studies in 
Ethnicity and Nationalism 11 (3): 538–49.  
———. 2013a. “Urban Subalterns in the Arab Revolutions: Cairo and Damascus in 
Comparative Perspective | Comparative Studies in Society and History | Cambridge 
Core” 55 (4): 865–94. 
———. 2013b. “Piety, Profit and the Market in Cairo: A Political Economy of Islamisation.” 
Contemporary Islam 7 (1): 107–28.  
Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1994. “Studying Substantive Democracy.” PS: 
Political Science and Politics 27 (1): 9–17.  
Jaichand, Vinodh, and Alexandre Andrade Sampaio. 2013. “Dam and Be Damned: The 
Adverse Impacts of Belo Monte on Indigenous Peoples in Brazil.” Human Rights 
Quarterly 35: 408. 
Jalalzai, Farida, and Pedro G. dos Santos. 2015. “The Dilma Effect? Women’s Representation 
under Dilma Rousseff’s Presidency.” Politics & Gender 11 (1): 117–45.  
Jamal, Amaney A. 2007. Barriers to Democracy: The Other Side of Social Capital in 
Palestine and the Arab World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/mcgill/detail.action?docID=617652. 
Johnston, Hank, and Jozef Figa. 1988. “The Church and Political Opposition: Comparative 
Perspectives on Mobilization against Authoritarian Regimes.” Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion 27 (1): 32–47.  
Joya , Angela. 2011. “The Egyptian Revolution: Crisis of Neoliberalism and the Potential for 
Democratic Politics.” Review of African Political Economy 38 (129): 367–86. 
———. 2013. “Accumulation by Dispossession and the Transformation of Property Relations 
	 382	
in Egypt: Hou_sing Policy under Neoliberalism.” Ph.D. Dissertation, York University 
(Canada). 
———. 2017. “Neoliberalism, the State and Economic Policy Outcomes in the Post-Arab 
Uprisings: The Case of Egypt.” Mediterranean Politics 22 (3): 339–61. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2016.1219182. 
———. 2018 a. “Is Islamism Accommodating Neo-Liberalism? The Case of Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood.” In Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings: Governance, 






———.2018 b. “The Military and the State in Egypt: Class Formation in the Post-Arab 
Uprisings.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, October, 1–21.  
Júnior, João Feres, Verônica Toste Daflon, and Luiz Augusto Campos. 2011a. “Lula’s 
Approach to Affirmative Action and Race.” NACLA Report on the Americas 44 (2): 
34–37.  
Kamrava, Mehran. 2000. “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the 
Middle East.” Political Science Quarterly 115 (1): 67–92.  
Kandil, Hazem. 2012. Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt’s Road to Revolt. Verso Books. 
———. 2016. “Sisi’s Egypt.” New Left Review, II, no. 102: 5–40. 
Karl, Terry Lynn. 2000. “Economic Inequality and Democratic Instability.” Journal of 
Democracy 11 (1): 149–56.  
———. “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America.” Comparative Politics 23(1): 1-21.  
——— and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1991. “What Democracy is and Is not?” Journal of 
Democracy, 2(3), 75-88.  
Keck, Margaret E. 1989. “The New Unionism in the Brazilian Transition.” In Democratizing 
Brazil : Problems of Transition and Consolidation edited by Alfred Stepan,  252–96. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 1992. The Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. http://www.gbv.de/dms/bowker/toc/9780300050745.pdf. 
Kingsley, Patrick. 2013. “Egypt’s Interim President Adly Mansour Signs ‘Anti-Protest Law.’” 




———. 2015. “How Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s First Elected President, Ended up on Death 
Row.” The Guardian, June 1, 2015. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/01/mohamed-morsi-execution-
death-sentence-egypt. 
Kingstone, Peter R. 1994. “Shaping Business Interests: The Politics of Neo-Liberalism in 
Brazil, 1985-1992.” Ph.D. Dissertation, California: University of California, Berkeley.  
———. 1999. Crafting Coalitions for Reform: Business Preferences, Political Institutions, 
and Neoliberal Reform in Brazil. Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Kingstone, Peter R., and Timothy J. Power. 2017. Democratic Brazil Divided. University of 
Pittsburgh Press. http://muse.jhu.edu/book/56735. 
 
Krein, José Dari. 2008. “Neoliberalismo e Reforma Trabalhista.” Revista de Sociologia e 
Política 16 (30): 319–22.  
———. 2016. “O Movimento Sindical No Século XXII.” Presentation at the Conference on 
Work and Unionism, DIEESE School of Work, São Paulo. 
———. 2018. “The CUT’s Experience during the Workers’ Party Governments in Brazil 
(2003-2016).” Global Labour Journal 9 (2): 199–214. 
Lacroix, Stéphane. 2001. “Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism.” 
Brookings (blog). November 30, 2001. https://www.brookings.edu/research/sheikhs-
and-politicians-inside-the-new-egyptian-salafism/. 
———. 2016. “Egypt’s Pragmatic Salafis: The Politics of Hizb al-Nour.” Carnegie 
endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/11/01/egypt-
s-pragmatic-salafis-politics-of-hizb-al-nour-pub-64902. 
Land Center for Human Rights (LCHR). 1998a. “Land Disputes in Egypt’s Countryside.” 
Land Center for Human Rights (LCHR). http://www.lchr-eg.org/archive/66/66-2.htm. 
———. 1998b. Conditions of Workes in 1998 ... A Year of Strikes.” Land Center for Human 
Rights (LCHR). http://www.lchr-eg.org/archive/77/77-17.htm. 
———. 2004. “The conditions for Workers in Egypt in 2003.” 31. http://www.lchr-
eg.org/archive/77/77-31.htm. 
———. 2004b. “Labor Protests : Between State Neglect and the Reformist Discourse.” 34. 
http://www.lchr-eg.org/archive/77/77-34.htm. 
———. 2005. “Labor Protest in the Battle for Change in the First Half of 2005.” 39. 
	 384	
http://www.lchr-eg.org/archive/77/77-39.htm. 
———. 2006. “What Did the Workers Reap from the Privatization in 2005? Labor Protests in 
Egypt between the Government, the Businessmen and the GEFTU (40 Protests, 22 
Strikes and 20 Sit-Ins and 11 Demonstrations).” 42. http://www.lchr-
eg.org/archive/77/77-42.htm. 
Langohr, Vickie. 2015. “Women’s Rights Movements during Political Transitions: Activism 
against Public Sexual Violence in Egypt.” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 47 (1): 131–35. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743814001482. 
Lavinas, Lena. 2017. “Connections Between the Social Protection System, Taxation, and 
Financialization.” In The Takeover of Social Policy by Financialization, 109–70. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lee-Treweek, Geraldine, and Stephanie Linkogle. 2000. Danger in the Field: Risk and Ethics 
in Social Research. London ; Routledge.  
Legislation Portal Brazil. n.d. 1937 to 1946 - Decrees-Laws - Legislation Portal. Accessed 
March 29, 2018. http://www4.planalto.gov.br/legislacao/portal-legis/legislacao-
1/decretos-leis/1937-a-1946-decretos-leis-1. 
Leopoldi, Maria Antonieta P. 2009a. “Reforming Social Security under Lula: Continuities 
with Cardoso’s Policies.” In Brazil under Lula: Economy, Politics, and Society under 
the Worker-President, edited by Joseph L. Love and Werner Baer, 221–39. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan US.  
Levine, Daniel, Scott Mainwaring, and Susan (editor) Eckstein. 2001. “Religion and Popular 
Protest in Latin America : Contrasting Experiences.” In Power and Popular Protest: 
Latin American Social Movements, Updated and Expanded Edition. Berkeley  Los  
Angelos London: University of California Press. 
Lewis, Bernard. 1990. “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” The Atlantic 266 (3). 
Lima, Valesca. 2015. “The Context of Participation: Challenges and Opportunities for Civil 
Society in Participatory Institutions in Brazil.” SSRN Electronic Journal. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2725200. 
———. 2019. “Analysis | Brazil’s New Leaders Are Challenging the Tradition of 
Participatory Democracy. Here’s Why.” Washington Post, June 7, 2019, sec. Monkey 
Cage  Analysis     Analysis Interpretation of the news based on evidence, including 




Linhares, Rodrigo. 2015. “As greves de 2011 a 2013.” Revista Ciências do Trabalho 0 (5): 
97–112. 
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. JHU 
Press. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy.” The American Political Science Review 53 
(1): 69–105. 
Lopes, Marina. 2018. “An Old CIA Memo Provides Rare Proof of Abuses by Brazil’s 
Dictatorship.” Washington Post, May 21, 2018, sec. WorldViews. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/05/21/an-old-cia-memo-
provides-rare-proof-of-abuses-by-brazils-dictatorship/. 
Lust, Ellen. 2011. “Why Now? Micro Transitions and the Arab Uprisings.” The American 
Prospect, October 24, 2011. https://prospect.org/article/why-now-micro-transitions-
and-arab-uprisings. 
Lutterbeck, Derek. 2013. “Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil–Military Relations.” 
Armed Forces & Society 39 (1): 28–52.  
Mada Masr. 2016a. “1,117 Labor Protests across Egypt in 2015: Democracy Meter Report.” 
Mada Masr, January 11, 2016. 
https://www.madamasr.com/en/2016/01/11/news/economy/1117-labor-protests-
across-egypt-in-2015-democracy-meter-report/. 
———. 2016b. “5 Jailed Alexandria Shipyard Workers Released on Bail, as Trial Adjourned 
to November 15.” Mada Masr, October 18, 2016. 
https://www.madamasr.com/en/2016/10/18/news/u/military-court-releases-5-jailed-
alexandria-shipyard-workers-on-bail-adjourns-trial-to-november-15/. 
Magdy, Muhammed. 2017. “New Trade Union Law Undermines Freedom of Association in 
Egypt.” Al-Monitor. December 14, 2017. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/12/egypt-law-trade-unions-independent-
government-control.html. 
Mahoney, James, and Dietrich. Rueschemeyer. 2003. Comparative Historical Analysis in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge, U.K. ; 
Cambridge University Press.  
Mahoney, James, and Celso M. Villegas. 2009. “Historical Enquiry and Comparative 




Mainwaring, Scott. 1986. “The Transition to Democracy in Brazil.” Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs 28 (1): 149–79. https://doi.org/10.2307/165739. 
———. 1988. “Political Parties and Democratization in Brazil and the Southern Cone.” 
Comparative Politics 21 (1): 91–120. https://doi.org/10.2307/422073. 
———. 1997. “Multipartism Robust Federalism and Presidentialism.” In Presidentialism and 
Democracy in Latin America edited by Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart., 
University of California.  
Mamdani, Mahmood. 2004. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the 
Roots of Terror. 1st ed. New York: Pantheon Books.  
Mandour, Maged. 2017. “Egypt: An Obsession with the State.” 2017. OpenDemocracy. 
August 4, 2017. https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/maged-
mandour/egypt-opposition-social-class-sisi-revolution-military. 
Mani, Kristina. 2011. “Military Entrepreneurs: Patterns in Latin America.” Latin American 
Politics and Society 53 (3): 25–55. 
Mann, Michael. 1984. “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and 
Results.” European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie 25 
(2): 185–213. 
Marcelino, Paula. 2017. “Sindicalismo e neodesenvolvimentismo: analisando as greves entre 
2003 e 2013 no Brasil.” Tempo Social 29 (3): 201–27. 
Marfleet, Philip. 2009. “State and Society.” In Egypt the Moment of Change edited by Rabab 
el Mahdi and Philip Marfleet, 14-33. Zedbooks. 
Marshall, Shana. 2015. “Egyptian_armed_forces and Remaking of Economic Empire .Pdf.” 
Carnegie Endowment. April 2015. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/egyptian_armed_forces.pdf. 
Marshall, Shana, and Joshua. Stacher. 2012. “Egypt’s Generals and Transnational Capital.” 
Middle East Report 42 (262): 12–19. 
Martínez-Lara, Javier. 2016. Building Democracy in Brazil: The Politics of Constitutional 
Change, 1985-95. Springer. 
Martone, Celso L. 1987. “Macroeconomic Policies, Debt Accumulation, and Adjustment in 




Martuscelli, Danilo Enrico. 2010. “O PT e o impeachment de Collor.” Opinião Pública 16 
(2): 542–68. https://doi.org/10.1590/S0104-62762010000200010. 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1969. Manifesto of the Communist Party. Moscow: 
Progress Publisher. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf. 
Masoud, Tarek. 2013. “The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.” In The Oxford Handbook of 
Islam and Politics edited by John L Espisoto and Emad Eldin Shahin. Oxford 
University Press. 
Mayer, Jean-François. 2016. “The Limits of Labor Legislation Reforms: Rigidity, Growth, 
and Employment in Brazil (1995–2010) - Jean François Mayer, 2016.” Journal of 
Politics in Latin America 8 (1): 95–127. 
Migdal, Joel Samuel. 1988. Strong Societies and Weak States. 
 
Migdal, Joel Samuel, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue. 1994. State Power and Social Forces: 
Domination and Transformation in the Third World. Cambridge University Press. 
Miguel, Luis F. 2008. “Political Representation and Gender in Brazil: Quotas for Women and 
Their Impact.” Bulletin of Latin American Research 27 (2): 197–214. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1470-9856.2008.00263.x. 
Mitchell, Timothy. 1991. “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their 
Critics.” The American Political Science Review 85 (1): 77–96. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1962879. 
———. 2002. Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity.. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.  
———. 2013. Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil. London: Verso. 
Monteiro, Thiago William Nunes Gusmão. 2015. “Como pode um povo vivo viver nesta 
carestia: o movimento do custo de vida em São Paulo (1973-1982).” Masters Thesis, 
Universidade de São Paulo.  
Moore, Barrington. 1973. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant 
in the Making of the Modern World. Penguin Books.  
Morais, Lecio, and Alfredo Saad-Filho. 2005. “Lula and the Continuity of Neoliberalism in 
Brazil: Strategic Choice, Economic Imperative or Political Schizophrenia?” Historical 
Materialism 13 (1): 3–32. https://doi.org/10.1163/1569206053620924. 
———. 2011. “Brazil beyond Lula: Forging Ahead or Pausing for Breath?” Latin American 
Perspectives 38 (2): 31–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X10395890. 
	 388	
———. 2012. “Neo-Developmentalism and the Challenges of Economic Policy-Making 
under Dilma Rousseff.” Critical Sociology 38 (6): 789–98. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920512441635. 
Morceiro, Paulo César. 2018. “Evolution and Sectoral Competitiveness of the Brazilian 
Manufacturing Industry.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Brazilian Economy edited 
by Edmund Amann, Carlos R. Azzoni, and Werner Baer.  
Moustafa, Tamir. 2007. The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic 
Development in Egypt. Cambridge University Press. 
Naguib, Sameh. 2011. “Egypt’s Unfinished Revolution | International Socialist Review.” 
International Socialist Review 79 (September). /issue/79/egypts-unfinished-revolution. 
Najjar, Farah. 2017. “Why Is Egypt’s New NGO Law Controversial?” Accessed December 
14, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/egypt-ngo-law-
controversial-170530142008179.html. 
Napolitano, Marcos. 2018. “The Brazilian Military Regime, 1964–1985.” In Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of Latin American History, Oxford University Press. 
http://oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-
9780199366439-e-413. 
Nassif, Hicham Bou. 2013. “Wedded to Mubarak: The Second Careers and Financial 
Rewards of Egypt’s Military Elite, 1981–2011.” The Middle East Journal 67 (4): 509–
30.  
Noll, Jessica. 2017. Egypt’s Armed Forces Cement Economic Power: Military Business 
Expansion Impedes Structural Reforms. SWP Comments, 5/2017. Berlin. http://nbn-
resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-51006-5. 
Noronha, Eduardo G. 2009. “Ciclo de greves, transição política e estabilização: Brasil, 1978-
2007.” Lua Nova: Revista de Cultura e Política, no. 76: 119–68. 
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-64452009000100005. 
Novelli, José Marcos N., Andréia Galvão, Norman Myers, and Michele Myers. 2001. “The 
Political Economy of Neoliberalism in Brazil in the 1990s.” International Journal of 
Political Economy 31 (4): 3–52. 
Nowak, Jörg. 2019. “An Ascending Wave: Mass Strikes in the Brazilian Construction 
Sector.” In Mass Strikes and Social Movements in Brazil and India: Popular 
Mobilisation in the Long Depression, edited by Jörg Nowak, 193–288. Springer 
International Publishing.  
Nylen, William R. 2003. “Elitist Democracy, Civic Disengagement, and Citizen Politics in 
	 389	
Brazil.” In Participatory Democracy versus Elitist Democracy: Lessons from Brazil, 
edited by William R. Nylen, 13–26. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.  
Obeid, Dina Makram. 2012. “Manufacturing Stability: Everyday Politics of Work in an 
Industrial Steel Town in Helwan, Egypt.” P.h.D dissertation, The London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1978. “Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-
Authoritarian State.” Latin American Research Review 13 (1): 3–38. 
———. 1979. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American 
Politics. Text ed. Politics of Modernization Series ; No. 9. Berkeley: Institute of 
International Studies, University of California. 
O’Donnell, Guillermo A., and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Oliveira, Francisco de. 2006. “Lula in the Labyrinth.” New Left Review, II, , no. 42: 5–22. 
Ondetti, Gabriel A. 2008. Land, Protest, and Politics : The Landless Movement and the 
Struggle for Agrarian Reform in Brazil. University Park, Pa. : Pennsylvania State 
University Press. 
Oszlak, Oscar. 1981. “The Historical Formation of the State in Latin America: Some 
Theoretical and Methodological Guidelines for Its Study.” Latin American Research 
Review 16 (2): 3–32. 
Ottaway, Marina, and Marina Ottaway. 2014. “Democracy by Necessity.” Foreign Affairs, 
December 23, 2014. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/tunisia/2014-12-
23/democracy-necessity. 
Owen, Roger. 2012. The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life. London: Harvard 
University Press. 
Payne, Leigh A. 1991. “Working Class Strategies in the Transition to Democracy in Brazil.” 
Comparative Politics 23 (2): 221–38. https://doi.org/10.2307/422362. 
Payne, Leigh A. 1992. “Brazilian Business and the Democratic Transition : New Attitudes 
and Influence.” 179. 
Pereira, Anthony. “Brazil’s Agrarian Reform: Democratic Innovation or Oligarchic Exclusion 
Redux?” Latin American Politics and Society 45 (2): 41–65. 
Pereira, Luiz Carlos Bresser. 1984. Development and Crisis in Brazil, 1930-1983. Westview 
Press. 
———. 2016. The Political Construction of Brazil : Society, Economy, and State Since 
	 390	
Independence. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
https://proxy.library.mcgill.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct
=true&db=nlebk&AN=1464815&scope=site. 
Pogrebinschi, Thamy, and David Samuels. 2014. “The Impact of Participatory Democracy: 
Evidence from Brazil’s National Public Policy Conferences.” Comparative Politics 46 
(3). https://doi.org/info:doi/10.5129/001041514810943045. 
Polanyi, Karl. 2001. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time. Beacon Press. 
Posner, Paul W., Viviana Patroni, and Jean François Mayer. 2018. Labor Politics in Latin 
America: Democracy and Worker Organization in the Neoliberal Era. University 
Press of Florida. http://muse.jhu.edu/book/60411/. 
Posusney, Marsha Pripstein. 1997. Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and 
Economic Restructuring. Columbia University Press. 
Poulantzas, Nicos. 2000. State, Power, Socialism. Verso Books. 
Power, Timothy J., and Mahrukh Doctor. 2004. “Another Century of Corporatism ? 
Continuity and Change in Brazil’s Corporatist Structures.” In Authoritarianism and 
Corporatism Revisited, University Press of Florida, 218–41. Howard J Wiarda. 
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America. Studies in Rationality and Social Change. 
Cambridge ; Cambridge University Press. 
http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam025/91007524.html. 
Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1997. “Modernization: Theories and Facts.” 
World Politics 49 (2): 155–83. 
Reichmann, Rebecca L. 2010. Race in Contemporary Brazil: From Indifference to Inequality. 
Penn State Press. 
Richards, Alan, John Waterbury, Melani Cammett, and Ishac Diwan. 2013. A Political 
Economy of the Middle East. Westview Press. 
Riethof, Marieke. 2018. Labour Mobilization, Politics and Globalization in Brazil: Between 
Militancy and Moderation. Springer International Publishing. 
Roccu, Roberto . 2013 a. The Political Economy of the Egyptian Revolution: Mubarak, 
Economic Reforms and Failed Hegemony. Basingstoke: Palgrave Pivot.  
———. 2013 b. “David Harvey in Tahrir Square: The Dispossessed, the Discontented and the 
Egyptian Revolution: Third World Quarterly: Vol 34, No 3.” Third World Quarterly 
34 (3): 423–40. 
	 391	
———. 2012. “Gramsci in Cairo: Neoliberal Authoritarianism, Passive Revolution and 
Failed Hegemony in Egypt under Mubarak, 1991-2010.” P.h.D Dissertation, London 
School of Economics. 
Rocha, Geisa Maria. 1989. “Brazil’s Dilemma: Dependency, Debt, and Democracy. (Volumes 
I and II).” Ph.D. Dissertation, New York: City University of New York.  
———. 1994. “Redefining the Role of the Bourgeoisie in Dependent Capitalist Development: 
Privatization and Liberalization in Brazil.” Latin American Perspectives 21 (1): 72–
98. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X9402100106. 
Rochon, Thomas R., and Michael J. Mitchell. 1989. “Social Bases of the Transition to 
Democracy in Brazil.” Comparative Politics 21 (3): 307–22. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/422295. 
Roll, Stephan. 2010. “‘Finance Matters!’ The Influence of Financial Sector Reforms on the 
Development of the Entrepreneurial Elite in Egypt.” Mediterranean Politics 15 (3): 
349–70.  
———. 2013. “Egypt’s Business Elite after Mubarak.” 8. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs. 
———. 2016. “Managing Change: How Egypt’s Military Leadership Shaped the 
Transformation.” Mediterranean Politics 21 (1): 23–43.  
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich. 2004. “Addressing Inequality.” Journal of Democracy 15 (4): 76–
90. 
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens. 1992. Capitalist 
Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/uchi051/91029464.html. 
Rustow, Dankwart A. 1970. “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” 
Comparative Politics 2 (3): 337–63. 
Saad-Filho, Alfredo. 2003. “False Dawn or New Start : The Political Economy of Lula’s 
Election.” Historical Materialism, 2003. 
———. 2007a. “Neoliberalism, Democracy and Economic Policy in Brazil.” In Political 
Economy of Brazil: Recent Economic Performance, edited by Philip Arestis and 
Alfredo Saad-Filho, 7–23. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.  
———. 2007b. “Neoliberalism, Democracy and Economic Policy in Brazil.” In Political 
Economy of Brazil, edited by Philip Arestis and Alfredo Saad-Filho, 7–23. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
———. 2012. “Neoliberalism, Democracy and Development Policy in Brazil.” In 
	 392	
Developmental Politics in Transition: The Neoliberal Era and Beyond, edited by 
Chang Kyung-Sup, Ben Fine, and Linda Weiss, 117–39. London: Palgrave Macmillan 
UK.  
———. 2013. “Mass Protests under ‘Left Neoliberalism’: Brazil, June-July 2013.” Critical 
Sociology 39 (5): 657–69.  
Saad-Filho, Alfredo, and Lecio Morais. 2018. Brazil: Neoliberalism versus Democracy. Pluto 
Press. 
Sabry, Sarah. 2008. “Lost in the Slums.” Al-Ahram Weekly, April. 
https://www.academia.edu/5797794/Lost_in_the_Slums. 
———. 2010. “Could Urban Poverty in Egypt Be Grossly Underestimated?” SOAS - 
Development Viewpoint, May. 
https://www.academia.edu/15383151/Could_Urban_Poverty_in_Egypt_Be_Grossly_
Underestimated. 
———. 2014. “Pause for a Second and Visualize This – Poverty in Egypt.” Mada Masr, 
January 20, 2014. 
https://www.academia.edu/5797762/Pause_for_a_second_and_visualize_this_poverty
_in_Egypt. 
Said, Edward W. 1978. Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Salloukh, Bassel F. 2006. “The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: 
Elections in Postwar Lebanon on JSTOR,” 2006. 
Samuels, David. 2004. “From Socialism to Social Democracy: Party Organization and the 
Transformation of the Workers’ Party in Brazil.” Comparative Political Studies 37 
(9): 999–1024.  
Sandoval, Salvador A. M. 1993. Social Change and Labor Unrest in Brazil since 1945. 
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. 
Sandoval, Salvador A M. 2000. “The Crisis of the Brazilian Labor Movement and the 
Emergence of Alternative Forms of Working-Class Contention in the 1990s.” 
REVISTA  PSICOLOGIA  POLÍTICA, 23. 
Sayigh, Yezid. 2012. “Above the State: The Officers’ Republic in Egypt.” https://carnegie-
mec.org/2012/08/01/above-state-officers-republic-in-egypt-pub-48972. 
Schlumberger, Oliver. 2007. Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in 
Nondemocratic Regimes. Stanford University Press. 
Schmitter, Philippe C. 1974. “Still the Century of Corporatism?” The Review of Politics 36 
(1): 85–131. 
	 393	
Seidman, Gay W. 1994. Manufacturing Militance: Workers’ Movements in Brazil and South 
Africa, 1970-1985. University of California Press. 
———. 2010. “Brazil’s ‘pro-Poor’ Strategies: What South Africa Could Learn.” 
Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, no. 72–73: 86–103. 
Shum, Maggie. 2017. “The Politics of Policy Diffusion: Party Organization Versus Individual 
Motivations in the Diffusion of Participatory Budgeting in Brazil.” Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Notre Dame.  
Sikkink, Kathryn Angel. 1988. “Developmentalism and Democracy: Ideas, Institutions, and 
Economic Policy-Making in Brazil and Argentina (1954-1962).” Ph.D. Dissertation, 
New York: Columbia University.  
Singer, Andre. 2009. “RAÍZES SOCIAIS E IDEOLÓGICAS DO LULISMO,” CEBRAP , 
85(November 2009). 
Singer, Singer, and Isabel Loureiro (eds). 2016. As Contradicoes Do Lulismo. : A Que Ponto 
Chegamos. 
Skidmore, Thomas E. 1983. “Race and Class in Brazil: Historical Perspectives.” Luso-
Brazilian Review 20 (1): 104–18. 
———. 1988. The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85. New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
———. 1999. Brazil: Five Centuries of Change. Cary, UNITED KINGDOM: Oxford 
University Press, Incorporated.  
———. 2004. “Brazil’s Persistent Income Inequality: Lessons from History.” Latin American 
Politics and Society 46 (2): 133–50. 
———. 2007. Politics in Brazil, 1930 - 1964: An Experiment in Democracy - 40th 
Anniversary Edition. Oxford University Press.  
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis Of France, 
Russia, and China. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Slater, Dan. 2009. “Revolutions, Crackdowns, and Quiescence: Communal Elites and 
Democratic Mobilization in Southeast Asia.” American Journal of Sociology 115 (1): 
203–54.  
Sluyter-Beltrão, Jeffrey. 2010. Rise and Decline of Brazil’s New Unionism: The Politics of 
the Central Única Dos Trabalhadores. Peter Lang. 
Springborg, Robert. 1987. “The President and the Field Marshal: Civil-Military Relations in 
Egypt Today.” MERIP Middle East Report, no. 147: 5–42.  
———. 2018. Egypt (Hot Spots in Global Politics) - Kindle Edition by Robert Springborg. 
	 394	
Politics & Social Sciences Kindle EBooks @ Amazon.Com. Polity Press. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. https://www.amazon.com/Egypt-Hot-Spots-Global-Politics-
ebook/dp/B075Z4G6Q6. 
Sriram, Chandra Lekha. 2009. Surviving Field Research: Working in Violent and Difficult 
Situations. London ; Routledge.  
Stacher, Joshua. 2012a. Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria. Stanford 
Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures. Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press. 
———. 2012b. “Five Notes on Egypt’s Crisis.” MERIP, b 2012. 
https://merip.org/2012/12/five-notes-on-egypts-crisis/. 
Steinhilber, Jochen, and Waldeli Melleiro. 2016. “Brothers in Arms? Trade Union Politics 
Under the Workers Party Governments.” In The Political System of Brazil, edited by 
Dana De la Fontaine and Thomas Stehnken. Online Access with Purchase: Springer. 
Berlin: Springer. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/ebooks/ebc/9783642400230. 
Stepan, Alfred C. 1973. Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
———. 1988. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press.  
———, ed. 1989. Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2000. “Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations” Journal of Democracy 11 
(4): 37–57.  
Sulaymān, Samīr, and Peter Daniel. 2011. The Autumn of Dictatorship: Fiscal Crisis and 
Political Change in Egypt under Mubarak. Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and 
Islamic Societies and Cultures. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
Tawfeek, Farah. 2017. “10 Richest Arabs of 2017: Forbes.” Egypt Independent, December 
11, 2017. http://www.egyptindependent.com/10-richest-arabs-of-2017-forbes/. 
Trebat, Thomas J. 1983. Brazil’s State-Owned Enterprises: A Case Study of the State as 
Entrepreneur. Cambridge University Press. 
Trópia, Patricia Vieira, and Davisson C. Cangussu de Souza. 2018. “Brazilian Trade 
Unionism Faces Neoliberal Capitalism - Alliances and Disputes between CUT and 
Força Sindical, 1990-2015.” Workers of the World, Vol. 1 / No. 9 / May 2018 1. 
https://doi.org/10.17185/duepublico/46308. 
Trópia, Patrícia Vieira, Andréia Galvão, and Paula Marcelino. 2015. “A reconfiguração do 
	 395	
sindicalismo brasileiro nos anos 2000: as bases sociais e o perfil político-ideológico da 
Conlutas.” Opinião Pública 19 (1): 81–117. 
Tucker, Robert C., Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels, eds. 1978. The Marx-Engels Reader. 2d 
ed. New York: Norton. 
Tuğal, Cihan. 2012. “Fight or Acquiesce? Religion and Political Process in Turkey’s and 
Egypt’s Neoliberalizations.” Development and Change 43 (1): 23–51.  
Valenzuela, J. Samuel. 1989. “Labor Movements in Transitions to Democracy: A Framework 
for Analysis.” Comparative Politics 21 (4): 445–72. https://doi.org/10.2307/422007. 
Volpi, Frédéric. 2011. Political Islam : A Critical Reader. London ; Routledge,. 
Wallerstein, Michael. 1980. “The Collapse of Democracy in Brazil: Its Economic 
Determinants.” Latin American Research Review 15 (3): 3–40. 
Waterbury, John. 1983. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two 
Regimes. Princeton University Press. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
———. 1991. “Twilight of the State Bourgeoisie?” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 23 (1): 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800034528. 
Weinstein, Barbara. 1995. “Industrialists, the State, and the Limits of Democratization in 
Brazil, 1930–1964.” In The Social Construction of Democracy, 1870–1990, edited by 
George Reid Andrews and Herrick Chapman, 315–39. London: Palgrave Macmillan 
UK.  
Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood : Evolution of an Islamist 
Movement. Princeton: Princeton University. 
Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2000. “Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan.” 
Comparative Politics 33 (1): 43–61. https://doi.org/10.2307/422423. 
———. 2004. Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Indiana University 
Press. http://muse.jhu.edu/book/3920. 
Wolford, Wendy. 2003. “Producing Community: The MST and Land Reform Settlements in 
Brazil.” Journal of Agrarian Change 3 (4): 500–520. https://doi.org/10.1111/1471-
0366.00064. 
———. 2004. “This Land Is Ours Now: Spatial Imaginaries and the Struggle for Land in 
Brazil.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 94 (2): 409–24. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8306.2004.09402015.x. 
Woltering, Robbert. 2013. “Unusual Suspects: ‘Ultras’ as Political Actors in the Egyptian 
Revolution.” Arab Studies Quarterly 35 (3): 290–304. 
https://doi.org/10.13169/arabstudquar.35.3.0290. 
	 396	
Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2009. “Field Research.” The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Politics 
Wright, Erik Olin. 2009. “Understanding Class: Towards an Integrated Analytical Approach.” 
New Left Review, no. 60: 101–16. 
Yom, Sean L., and F. Gregory Gause Iii. 2012. “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies 
Hang On.” Journal of Democracy 23 (4): 74–88. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2012.0062. 
Zaytsev, Dmitry. 2017. “Brazilian Protests: Actors and Demands for Political Changes.” In 
Non-Western Social Movements and Participatory Democracy, edited by Ekim 
Arbatli and Dina Rosenberg, 43–64. Societies and Political Orders in Transition. 
Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51454-3_4. 
 
Websites  
858 (Archive of Resistance): https://858.ma/ 
Amnesty International : https://www.amnesty.org/en/ 
Brigadas Populares : https://brigadaspopulares.org.br/ 
 
CAPMAS : https://www.capmas.gov.eg/ 





CUT : https://www.cut.org.br/ 
 
DIEESE : https://www.dieese.org.br/ 
ECES: http://www.eces.org.eg/ 
ECESR : https://ecesr.org/en/ 
Forca Sindical : http://www.fsindical.org.br/ 
 
Historical Atlas of Brazil : https://atlas.fgv.br/capitulos/ditadura-militar-1964-1985  
Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/ 
 






Index Mundi : https://www.indexmundi.com/ 
Intersindical: https://www.intersindicalcentral.com.br/ 
 
LCHR : http://www.lchr-eg.org/en/ 
 
MST : http://www.mst.org.br/ 
MTST : https://mtst.org/quem-somos/ 
Planalto (Portal of Brazil’s Legislation): http://www4.planalto.gov.br/legislacao/ 
 
Revolutionary Socialists: https://revsoc.me/ 




1. Interview with Metalurgics Former Union Leader 1 (SCANIA), 1 November 2016, 
ABC, São Paulo. 
2. Interview with Metalurgics Former Union Leader 2 (Mercedes), 13 December 2016, 
ABC, São Paulo 
3. Interview with Metalurgics Former Union Leader 3 (Mercedes), 17 November 2016, 
ABC, São Paulo  
4. Interview with Metalurgics Former Union Leader 4 (Ford), 18 November 2016, ABC, 
São Paulo. 
5. Interview with Metalurgics Former Union Leader 5 (Ford), 20 November 2016, ABC, 
São Paulo. 
6. Interview with Metalurgics Former Union Leader Affiliated with the Communist 
Party, 22 November 2016, ABC, São Paulo.. 
7. Interview with Former CUT leader and PT depute, 18 November 2016, 27 November 
2016, ABC, São Paulo.  
8. Interview with Current CUT leader (CUT1), 22 November 2016, São Paulo 
9. Interview with Current CUT leader (CUT 2), 22 November 2016, São Paulo 
	 398	
10. Interview with Current CUT unionist (CUT 3), 11 November 2016, São Paulo 
Interview with Current CUT unionist (CUT 4), 3 November 2016, São Paulo 
11. Interview with Conlutas Union leader, 3 November 2016, São Paulo. 
12. Interview with Forca Sindical Union leaders 1 (FS1), 3 November 2016, São Paulo. 
13. Interview with Forca Sindical Union leader 2 (FS 2), 15 November 2016, São Paulo. 
14. Interview with UGT Union leader 1 (UGT1), 18 October 2016, São Paulo. 
15. Interview with UGT Unionist (UGT 2), 6 November 2016, São Paulo.  
16. Interview with FLM, 16 November 2016, São Paulo. 
17. Interview with MNM, 6 November 2016, São Paulo. 
18. Interview with Intersindical Leader (Intersindical 1), 12 December 2016, São Paulo.  
19. Interview with Intersindical Leader (Intersindical 2), 9 December 2016, São Paulo. 
20. Interview with Intersindical Leader (Intersindical 3), 20 December 2016, São Paulo.  
21. Interview with Intersindical Leader (Intersindical 4), 5 December 2016, São Paulo.  
22. Interview with Brigadas Populares, 9 December 2016, São Paulo.  
23. Interview with USP Sociologist, 15 November, São Paulo. 
24. Interview with Sociologist and DIEESE Lecturer, 3 November, São Paulo. 
25. Interview with MST Coordinator, 1 December 2016, São Paulo 
Egypt  
26. Interview with Textile Unionist 1, Alexandria, 13 January 2016. 
27. Interview with Dismissed Textile Unionist, Alexandria, 13 January 2016. 
28.  Interview with Founder of  the Alexandria Permanent Council, 12 January 2016 
29. Group interview with Dismissed Cement Industry Workers, Alexandria, 12 January 
2016. 
30. Interview with Political Economist 1, 17 December 2015, Cairo. 
31. Interview with Political Economist 2, 22 December 2015, Cairo.   
32. Interview with Giza Unionist and EITUF Leader, 5 January 2016, Cairo. 
33. Interview with Independent Teacher’s Unionist, 10 January 2016, Alexandria.  
34. Interview with Tanta Flax Unionist, 20 December 2015, Cairo.  
35. Interview with Cairo Unionist, 20 December 2015 and 5 January 2016, Cairo.  
36. Interview with Suez unionist, 10 January 2016, Cairo.  
37. Interview with billing company workers, 05 January 2016, Cairo. 
38. Interview with ECESR researcher 1, 05 January 2016, Cairo.  
39. Interview with ECESR researcher 2, 20 December 2015, Cairo. 
40. Interview with Labor lawyer, 16 December 201, Cairo.   
	 399	
41. Interview with Labor journalist 1, 20 December 2015, Cairo. 
42. Interview with Labor Journalist 3, 25 December 2015, Cairo. 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2003/2004	 2004/2005	 2005/2006	 2006/2007	 2007/2008	 2008/2009	 2009/2010	 2010/2011	 2011/2012	
Bread	Subsidies		 	Fuel	Subsidies		
	 405	














1997/1998	 1998/1999	 1999/2000	 2000/2001	 2001/2002	 2002/2003	 2003/2004	
Education	 Health	
	 406	








































Chart 9: Unemployment Rate in Egypt (1970-2016)  
 
 
Table 2: Poverty Indicators in Egypt (1990-2015)153 
 Percentage of People Living 
below the poverty Line (National) 
Percentage of People living below 
one dollar a day 
Percentage of people living below 
2 $ a day  
1990/1991 24.3% 8.2% 39.5% 
1999/2000 16.7% 0.7% 24.8% 
2004/2005 19.6% 3.4% 42.8% 
2008/2009 21.6% 3.2% 42% 
2010/2011 25.2% NA NA 
2012 26.3% NA NA 












































































































































































































Table 3 : Informality (1995-2003)155  
 
  2003 2002 1995 
  Informal% Formal% Informal% Formal% Informal% Formal% 
Urban/ male 21.5 78.5 22.3 77.7 22.6 77.4 
Urban/female 7.5 92.5 6.1 93.9 6.9 93.1 
Urban/total 18.8 81.2 18.9 81.1 80.2   
Rural/male 57.9 42.1 58.0 42 62.3 37.7 
Rural/female 67.9 32.1 54.3 45.7 75.4 24.6 
Rural/total 59.8 40.2 57.4 42.6 65 35 
Total/male 42.6 57.4 43 57 44.6 55.4 
Total female 42.1 57.9 31 69 47.8 52.2 











156	Various Sources  Interviews, Beinin and Duboc 2014, ECESR Reports, Democracy barometer 








1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 2002	 2003	 2004	 2005	 2006	 2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	 2016	
Strikes		
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Table 4: Number of employees in the automobile industry158  
Year  Number of people 
employed in the 
automobile industry 
Number of cars produced 
per year  
1965 49 000 185 000 
1967 46 000 225 000  
1970 66 000 416 000 
1972 80 000 609 000  
1975 105 000 930 000  
 
																																																								
158	Adapted from The Historical Atlas of Brazil https://atlas.fgv.br/capitulos/ditadura-militar-1964-1985 (Accessed February 19 2019)	
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Chart 15: GDP % Change in Brazil (1950-2017)161 
  
																																																								









Chart 16: Gross Debt in US$ Million in Brazil162 
 
																																																								








































































































































































































































































































165 Data compiled From The Brazilian Historical Atlas (FGV) for strikes between 1958 and 196 : https://atlas.fgv.br/marcos/governo-joao-goulart-1961-1964/mapas/numero-de-greves-ano-ano (Accessed February 
2019).  
For data on strikes between 1965 and 1971 data was compiled from  Vito Giannoti Historia das Lutas dos Trabalhadores No Brasil. For Data between 1971 and 1975 see (Alexandre 2003, 152); Data on strikes 1975-


























































































































































































166 Personal Compilation from SAG- DIEESE (1983-2013). DIEESE identifies different types of strikes and defines them as such:  1) Advancing Conditions at Work- This incorporates strikes calling for new 
achievements or advancing/ameliorating the working conditions; 
- Maintenance of existing conditions - the maintenance of already established working conditions and / or in defense of minimum conditions of work, health and safety at work  
- Non-compliance with law - against acts or intentions of employers that violate labor standards established in labor legislation; 
- Breach of agreement - against acts or intentions by employers that violate labor standards established in agreement; 
- Failure to comply with a judicial decision - against acts or intentions by employers that fail to comply with judicial orders; 
- Protest - for reasons that go beyond the scope of labor relations. Protests are usually linked to the political issue or the strikes thus declared by the command; 
- Solidarity - in support of movements of workers from other categories, companies or sectors. By leading mobilizations of this nature, strikers may not have immediate interest in the agenda items defended by the 
























































































Chart 24 : Number of People Benefiting from Bolsa Familia. 170 
  
																																																								











2004	 2005	 2006	 2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	 2016	
Number	of	People	BenePiting	from	Bolsa	Familia		
	 426	





















172  The GINI data according to Skidmore (2004) starts in the 1960s when the first census was conducted. For Data on the 1960s and 1970s decades (See IBGE 2006) : 
https://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/livros/liv37312.pdf 
For the 1960s Data, IBGE notes a discrepancy between the resources see : https://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/biblioteca-catalogo.html?id=284590&view=detalhes 
For Data between 1976 and 2014 see Ipea :  http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/Default.aspx 

































































































































































































175 Adapted from Krein (2016). 
Central Unions Number of Affiliated Workers  
Central No % No % 
CUT- Central única dos Trabalhadores (Unified Workers’ Central) 2 319 21,22 3 878 261  30.4 
UGT- União Geral Dos Trabalhadores (The General Union of 
Workers) 
1 277  11,69 1440 121 11,29 
CTB- Central dos Trabalhdadores e Trabalhadoras do Brasil  744 6,81 1286 313 10,08 
FS- Força Sindical  (Union Force) 1615 14,78 1285 348 10,08 
CSB – Central dos Sindicatos Brasileiros (The Central of 
Brazil’s Unions) 
597 5,46 1039 902  8,15 
NCST- Nova Central Sindical dos Trabalhadores  (The New 
Union Central of The Workers) 
1 136  10,4 950 240  7,45 
CSP-Conlutas 105   0.96  286 732  2,25 
CGTB- Central Geral dos Trabalhadores do Brasil 217 1,99 239 844  1,88 
CBDT - Central Brasileia Democrática dos Trabalhadores  94 0.86  85 299  0,67 
PUBLICA 21 0,19 16 580  0,13 
Intersindical  1 0,01 1 739  0,01 
Central Unificada dos Profissionais Servidores Públicos do 
Brasil  
3 0,03 875 0,01 
UST- União Sindical dos Trabalhadores  6  0,05  791 0,01 
Without declaration  or affiliation  2791 25,54  2 245 076  17,6 
Total  10 296  100  12 757 121  100 
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Chart 30:Arms Exports Brazil in USD Millions of Dollars (1960-2016)177  
 
																																																								
177 Adapted from Index Mundi : : https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/brazil/military-expenditure#MS.MIL.XPND.ZS 
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